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
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THE 'EUMENIDES'

OF

AESCHYLUS



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ΑΙΣΧΥΛΟΥ ΕΥΜΕΝΙΔΕΣ

THE 'EUMENIDES'

OF

AESCHYLUS

WITH AN

INTRODUCTION, COMMENTARY, AND
TRANSLATION

BY

A. W. VERRALL, LITT.D.,
FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

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F.

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PREFACE.

THE composition of this book has been extended, by interruptions arising from my health or other causes, over some fifteen years. More than once it has been brought near to completion. I hope and believe that it has gained in maturity; but it may retain some traces of discontinuity, which, if found, the facts will explain.

The books which I have most used are the editions of the play by Paley, by Mr A. Sidgwick, and by Prof. N. Wecklein, both his critical edition and that with explanatory notes.

Much is due to periodical publications, especially to papers by Dr W. Headlam. Obligations, so far as I am aware of them, are acknowledged in their place; but I am conscious of debts not traceable.

Many of my own scattered publications I have adapted or modified without notice. In particular, I have not remarked on the frequent disagreement between this book and the 'acting edition' of the play, which I made when it was performed at Cambridge in 1885. The requirements of that occasion will account for any divergence.

More perhaps than to any book, or as much, I am indebted to conversations, especially with colleagues in Trinity College or in Cambridge. I am certain, for instance, that to the late Mr R. A. Neil of Pembroke College I owe many hints and corrections, though not one can I definitely refer to him. Sir Richard Jebb also must have left traces of this kind upon my work, and others, both lost and living, whom I cannot distinguish.

One such case, however, I am bound to specify. With Miss J. E. Harrison, during the composition of her *Prolegomena to Greek Mythology* and at other times, I have so constantly discussed both her work and my own, that to disentangle her contributions, where my subject overlaps, is altogether impossible.

The commentary on the *Eumenides* by the late Prof. Blass did not become accessible till most of this book was in print. In these circumstances, proper estimation and incorporation being impossible, I have not consulted his book, but shall of course consult it carefully, if I should have an opportunity of revision. This, though unfortunate for me, is of the less importance, inasmuch as my work would in no case pretend to finality. A final 'Aeschylus' is perhaps hardly to be desired. We are at all events far from it at present. Everything in this book, especially what may be new, is propounded simply as matter for consideration.

To the scholarship and experience of Mr M. A. Bayfield, who has helped me in the reading of proofs, I owe many valuable suggestions. And once more I must repeat my acknowledgments to the staff of the University Press.

A. W. V.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
January, 1908.

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INTRODUCTION.

IN turning from the *Agamemnon* and the *Choephoroi* to the third play of the Orestean trilogy, the *Eumenides*, exposition enters upon easier ground. Whatever be the cause and true explanation, the first two plays now present, in the story and structure, difficulties which cannot be ignored. In story and structure the third is comparatively and even positively clear. On the other hand, while the facts and conceptions actually here presented by the dramatist offer happily little occasion or room for dispute, the history of those conceptions, the enquiry into the sources of the drama, presents questions not merely difficult but, upon the existing evidence, insoluble. This enquiry therefore, which, however interesting and important in itself, is, for the reader of Aeschylus, secondary and not essential, we will sharply separate and postpone, taking first the story of Aeschylus, and adding afterwards what is necessary to be said respecting its origin or origins.

Such a separation is perhaps specially desirable in the present state of research, when, in the legitimate and successful pursuit of enquiries into the dark places of prehistoric times, we may easily forget that literary documents, which happen to serve this purpose, are not to be construed as if this had been the design of their authors. If the book of *Genesis* had disappeared after the seventeenth century, information about the story of the Fall, of great importance to scientific history, might probably have been obtained, by careful application of the comparative method, from *Paradise Lost*. But what should we make of *Paradise Lost*, if we were to assume that Milton understood his original as it is now interpreted by science, and that everything, of which traces may be found in the poem, was present to the mind of the poet? Very similar is the relation of Aeschylus to the extremely ancient story, which, in the *Eumenides*, he has used for the exposition of thoughts not ancient, but new, original, and his own. In his work, as in Milton's, science may find

traces of much which, in all probability, he did not even perceive, and in which, if he did perceive it, he certainly took no interest. All such elements we, as readers of Aeschylus, must, in the first instance, resolutely eliminate and ignore. We are to look steadily for the thought of the poet, and to interpret his play, so far as possible, solely by itself.

The Story of Aeschylus.

The *Choephoroi* closes in a sort of moral bankruptcy. The house of Atreus has presented in successive generations a series of terrible deeds, each provoking the next,—Atreus and Thyestes, Agamemnon, Aegisthus and Clytaemnestra, Aegisthus, Clytaemnestra and Orestes. The last of these, the vengeance taken by Orestes upon the murderers of his father, has been accomplished not merely with the sanction, but upon the command, and even under the threats, of the Delphian Apollo. Here therefore, it might be hoped, is something final, something absolute, purely and divinely just. Yet it is not so. Though the deed of Orestes, as presented by Aeschylus, has every excuse which the poet could devise,—the mother being not only an adulteress, a traitor, and a murderess, but also, a stain scarcely less black to Greek eyes, a ‘tyrant’, the usurper of a throne and destroyer of a free government, and Orestes himself being the lawful and only possible deliverer of his country,—yet for all this the matricide finds it almost impossible to overcome his contrary instinct. No sooner is the thing done than his doubts return with such force as to dethrone his reason. And what is more than all, if the excuses have a superhuman sanction in the command of Delphi, so are the doubts divinely enforced by the Erinyes, the pursuers, seen (in the *Choephoroi*) by his eye alone, who chase him finally from the scene. ‘What then’, it is sadly asked, ‘what after all is Orestes? Is he bringer of deliverance, or of death? And where, oh where, shall a peaceful close be found?’

The *Choephoroi* thus revives and emphasizes the painful question, ‘the burden of the mind’, propounded in the opening of the *Agamemnon*¹ and familiar to earnest and resolute thinkers in all ages. Confronted constantly with cases of conduct, upon which we can give no sentence with absolute satisfaction, upon what can we repose, or how do we know that there is any right at all? ‘Zeus’, it is there answered, is the only means by which the burden can be put off: that is to say, in later but

¹ *vv.* 170 foll.

not essentially different phrase, it must be by an act of faith in God. In the same spirit, but more joyously and triumphantly, the present drama solves the case of Orestes, or, to speak more properly, declares it to be solved in the sight of Eternal Justice, by conducting us to a final scene of reconciliation, in which, under the sanction of Zeus, all the parties to the divine dispute, the pursuing no less than the protecting deities, are shown to be absolutely content.

But the manner in which this conclusion is reached brings into view a new subject not less interesting to the audience, and perhaps to the dramatist, than the religious solution of the trilogy. Orestes, by direction of Apollo, repairs to Athens, and puts himself in the hands of the patron-goddess Athena. She invents for this occasion a new institution, the civic court of justice, and the method of trial by jury, the conventional basis of civic liberty and order. Upon this basis she founds the court of Areopagus, the most venerable of Athenian institutions. By a trial, conducted in Athenian form, with Athena as president and Apollo as counsel for the defence, it is decided that the defendant shall be set at liberty. The Erinyes, who are compelled to be prosecutors, reject this solution (with much reason) as arbitrary and anarchic. In their view, from an absolute point of view, it is no justice at all. But they are persuaded by Athena not only to acquiesce in the verdict, but also to accept a home in the city and the guardianship of the new institution. Thus the peace in Heaven is accompanied by a peace upon earth, and with the claims of the poet's mystical religion are satisfied also those of Athenian patriotism.

These purposes (let us at once observe) are combined, but are not confused. Aeschylus was not so shallow in thought and feeling as to offer, by way of key to the enigma of moral responsibility, or even as an absolute decision of right in the special case, the opinion of a jury. The jury of his play, being equally divided, gives on the merits no decision at all; and the practical result, the discharge of Orestes, is allowed to appear as what in such a case it must be, a mere accident of place, form, and circumstance. What is important, and solely important, from a religious and speculative point of view, is the final acquiescence of the opposing gods, the conversion of the Erinyes; and if the reason of the solution is to be found anywhere, it must be sought in the grounds of this conversion,—a point which we will consider in its place. But, whether grounded or not grounded upon reason, the impressive and affecting harmonies of the final scene declare that a solution exists, and that, after the long agitations of the story, we may depart in peace.

The play is divided into three parts, acts, or scenes.

I. (*vv.* 1—234). Orestes, pursued by the Erinyes to Delphi, has received from Apollo, while the pursuers sleep, the rite of ceremonial purgation. He is dismissed by the god to accomplish a long course of persecution and wandering, which is to end in a trial at Athens. The Erinyes are roused by the ghost of Clytaemnestra, and after a furious altercation with Apollo, follow in pursuit.

II. (*vv.* 235—568). Orestes, after great sufferings, has arrived at Athens, where the Erinyes also immediately appear. Orestes invokes the protection of Athena, who presently arrives, and decides to remit the case to a new, but permanent, tribunal which she will establish, a jury-court of Athenian citizens. The Erinyes, over-awed, consent to be prosecutors; but when the goddess has departed to make the necessary arrangements, they vent their real feelings in a withering denunciation of the new justice and its proposed organ.

III. (*vv.* 569—the end). The trial (to *v.* 780), and the conversion of the Erinyes. The court being met under the presidency of Athena, Apollo suddenly appears as advocate and witness. The case is argued, and the jury being equally divided, the defendant (in accordance with the previous declaration of Athena in view of that possible case) is discharged. Apollo disappears, and Orestes departs for Argos. The Erinyes for some time rage implacably, but presently, being convinced by the goddess, accept the offer of an abode in Athens, which is indicated to be a certain cave-sanctuary, appropriated by tradition to deities called the *Semnai Theai*. After solemnly blessing the city in a series of hymns, they are conducted to the sanctuary by the goddess and the assembled citizens.

It is not necessary, even for a modern reader, that these scenes should be introduced by any prefatory exposition in detail. With such interpretation as can conveniently be given in notes, they explain themselves, and for the most part with singular clearness. Here we shall call attention only to a few particular points.

The first scene opens with a prayer for blessing by the Pythian prophetess, who is about to enter the Delphian temple for the purpose of receiving consultants. This prayer is one of the most remarkable documents concerning the history of Greek religion, which have come down to us, and strikingly illuminates the relation of Aeschylus to the popular beliefs of his time. It is severely formal, and insists chiefly on a distinction, alleged to be founded upon the history of the oracle, between possessors of the place, past or present, who receive 'petitions' (*εὐχαί*), and other divinities connected with the place, who demand

rather 'mention' (λόγος). The apparently needless emphasis of this distinction is suspicious, the more so as on certain points the statement is expressly polemical and contradictory to some assumed opponent. The truth is that the whole is fictitious, inconsistent with the cult, the practices, and the genuine legends of Delphi. These, as ill-suited to the religious conceptions of Aeschylus, and especially to the kind of religion preached in the *Eumenides*, he excludes by a composition of his own, being, like his contemporary Pindar, still sufficiently interested in legends to desire their improvement. The tendency of Aeschylus was to evolve from the chaotic pantheon a virtual monotheism by the subordination of all and everything to 'Zeus', whose name is his nearest expression for what is now meant by 'God'. In the *Eumenides* the whole religious system, the attitude of Apollo and Athena, and above all the great peace, 'the alliance of Zeus and Fate', to which as by a climax the whole ascends, depend upon this conception and presuppose it. Manifestly it is a conception which does not favour, and never would have created, such an institution as a local oracle, nor can even be reconciled with it, except upon the condition that the wisdom there delivered shall not belong essentially to the place of consultation, but shall proceed, immediately or by a deputy, from the only source of wisdom, the supreme ruler of the world. Accordingly Aeschylus, being compelled, by prescription of legend, to find for Delphi a prominent place in his story, is above all things careful to assure us that Delphi is an oracle of this kind: it is merely a place where, by accident rather than choice, and certainly not from necessity, Apollo, through the mouth of the prophetess, 'speaks for' his father Zeus. This conception of the oracle was not novel, but it was modern; and Aeschylus evidently doubted whether it was, for his purpose, sufficiently accepted and established. And no wonder; for in fact and in history Delphi was nothing of the sort. The oracle was really based upon theories of divinity and of inspiration far more primitive and pagan than those of the poet; and its practices were not really explicable except upon those theories which he rejected. The source of inspiration was not Zeus, but a certain hole or depression in the earth; the instrument was not Apollo, but a woman, who sat in this place and thereby received became possessed by its supposed influences. As to any deeper explanation, the Delphian legends recognised in the dim past, and less with general truth, the succession or conflict of several deities, various, but none of them acceptable to Aeschylus. At one place itself was the oracular deity, at another the Water under the

earth, personified by the name of Poseidon,—whose former occupation of the oracle was commemorated by an altar in the sanctuary and said to have been terminated by arrangement, Poseidon having been bought out by the grant of the island of Calauria. Some early and heretical spiritualist seems even to have advocated the claims of the abstraction 'Themis' or 'Right'. But far more important than these, and more deeply impressed upon the cult, were the ideas connected with the name of 'Bromios' or Bacchus, an occupant never evicted, not even by Apollo himself. He shared the temple, of which one pediment presented Apollo and the other Bacchus; he shared the sacred calendar. The 'possessed' woman, whose mediation was the most remarkable feature of the oracular function, is a characteristic, generally speaking, not of Apolline religion but of Bacchic, and was probably derived from it. At Delphi, as elsewhere, the worship of Bacchus, which in its pure form was inconsistent with Greek paganism and rebellious against it, was believed, and probably with truth, to have been introduced by invasion, an invasion of spiritual rather than temporal arms, which triumphed through the conversion of the women. Between the spiritual doctrines of the Bacchant and that simple notion which placed deity in the earth, an accommodation was found by the supposition that Bacchus possessed and filled with inspiration the sacred place and mountain itself. As for Apollo, the legends, with perfect candour, gave him for what he probably was, a conquerer from the north, a martial deity, who by the might of his bow acquired the sanctuary as he acquired the country, who 'slew the snake which guarded Earth's oracle', and thenceforward, though not without some violence and bargaining, relegated Earth and all other claimants to exclusion or a subordinate place². Nor does he seem to have done this, according to the original conception, in the interest or even under the sanction of Zeus. At least, if that was so, it is hard to understand why the cult of Zeus, even when, by the efforts of Aeschylus, his predecessors, and his successors, it had become the very key-stone of the Greek pantheon, had still in the actual practices of Delphi so little prominence³. The fact seems rather to be that Apollo, when he

¹ Eur. *Iph. T.* 1243.

² Eur. *l.c.*

³ The object with which the name of Zeus was connected, when a place for it became necessary, seems to have been the *omphalos* or Holy Stone, with its mysterious eagles, which in the fifth century (if we may so far trust Aeschylus)

stood in the temple, apparently in the *pronaos*. This connexion accounts for the prominence given to the *omphalos* our poet, from whose account it may be supposed that this was the important feature of the place also in Pindar (*Pyth.* 4. 3) who attempt so to treat the *omph*

captured the oracle, was, for the warriors who installed him there, an independent deity, whose affiliation to Zeus, if recognised at all, was not yet of any importance.

Such was the promising material with which, at the principal sanctuary of Greek religion, harmonizers like Aeschylus had to deal. His method is bold, magnificent, and simple. Apollo, subject to Zeus, is the sole oracular deity and sole possessor; everyone else, without the least regard to fact or tradition, is ignored or thrust out. For obvious reasons he is especially anxious to eliminate Poseidon and Bacchus, and the purpose of the formal division between possessors and non-possessors of the sanctuary is simply to assert that these two were not what in fact they notoriously were. It is not surprising to see that the poet himself had some doubt as to the acceptance which he should find with the pious. As for Earth and her family, since these were deities older than Zeus, it was not impossible to give them a place, as predecessors of Apollo, provided that there was no conflict, either between themselves or with their successor, and provided also (this is the essential matter) that the soil which they convey to him shall not be represented as the source and necessary condition of the oracular function. The practice and belief of Delphi proclaimed that it was such a condition, and are on no other hypothesis intelligible. The prophetess of Aeschylus nevertheless declares the contrary, and leaves us to account as we can for the existence of herself and her seat.

Profane history, if it conflicts with the intended harmony, fares no better than sacred. The possession of the oracle had been the subject of conflicts which were by no means legendary, which, when Aeschylus was young, were within the memory of living men. It is by no accident that the ancient names of Pytho and Crisa find no place in this modern-antique picture. We see that this is no accident, when we observe the way in which the poet suggests, without asserting, that the place to which Apollo came was called *Delphi*; "and he was received with much honour by the people, and by *Delphos*, the king and governor of the land". The people who possessed and managed the sanctuary of *Pytho* (not *Delphi*) were, as Aeschylus and everyone

make Apollo secondary: there the prophetess is 'she who sits by the golden eagles of Zeus', and Apollo, when she prophesies, is said merely 'not to be absent'. How little these notions were supported by the real and permanent instincts of Delphi appears when we find that in the time of Pausanias (2nd century

A.D.) the *omphalos* is a mere curiosity, and apparently is not even within the building. The 'tripod' of the prophetess is never named by Aeschylus, not even in the prologue to the *Eumenides*, where it is not easily veiled; see *v.* 29. The existence of it would alone refute his representation of the oracle and its theory.

knew, *Crisaeans* (not Delphians), until, in the sixth century B.C., a confederacy, of which Athens was a member, for certain pious reasons, among which the desire to imitate and rival Olympia seems to have been the most conspicuous, dispossessed the Crisaeans and destroyed their city, handing over the oracle to new managers, who, among other things, 'restored', remodelled, and practically founded the Pythian Games. Of the town and name of Delphi all that can be said with certainty is that it was not primitive; it seems to have first risen into prominence after and in connexion with this very revolution. But Aeschylus will recognise no revolutions, and carries back the Delphian name by implication to the earliest times. The place itself, though mentioned repeatedly both in this play and in the *Choephoroi*, he contrives never to name at all; and the name of Crisa also is avoided in the *Choephoroi*, not without some difficulty and consequent obscurity¹, as it is here. Delos on the other hand, the religious centre in some sense of the Athenian empire, and Athens itself, assume in the primaeval antiquities of the realm of 'Delphos' an importance which appears to be wholly fictitious and partly invented by the poet himself.

These observations however in no way diminish, but rather increase, the admiration due to this prayer as a composition. Aeschylus himself is perhaps nowhere more stately, religious, and impressive.

The second speech of the prophetess, when she has entered and reissued from the temple (*vv.* 34—63), is designed partly to make a link with the close of the *Choephoroi*, by showing that Orestes has received² from Apollo the ceremonial purgation which was promised³. As to the scope of this rite the *Eumenides* is clear; it is necessary to make the homicide a safe associate for other men, and specially to admit him to contact with persons and things religious; but it effects no more, and even this effect must be proved, it would seem, if not completed, by long and expiatory wandering⁴. The Erinyes take no other notice of it than to taunt Apollo with the pollution which he and his house have contracted; and neither by Apollo, by Athena, nor by Orestes himself is it treated as terminating or diminishing his moral responsibility. Doubtless if we could trace back the history of the rite, we should arrive at a time when it was far more important, and the homicide, who had poisoned to himself the soil of his home with 'kindred blood', obtained all that he needed or could obtain, if he

¹ See *Cho.* 670 foll. and notes there.

² See on *vv.* 40 foll.

³ *Cho.* 1036, where ἐφέστιον and τραπέσθαι point to the conditions and

technical name (προστροπή) of the rite. See on *Eum.* 205 etc.

⁴ See especially *vv.* 284, 285.

found elsewhere a householder to re-admit him to human society. But such a view would cut away the ground from the story of Aeschylus, in which the 'purgation' is a survival and has little reality, though he seems to intimate nevertheless that it was, or ought to be, demanded as a preliminary to trial before the court of Areopagus¹.

Finally the prophetess describes, in order to stimulate the curiosity of the audience, the strange and enigmatical figures of the Erinyes, whom she has seen sleeping in the temple. For these an outward habit and artistic type seems to have been now first invented or fixed by the dramatist himself.

In the dismissal of Orestes by Apollo (*vv.* 64—93), the chief point is the indication that the wanderings and sufferings of the pursued, before he reaches Athens, are to be long and severe². Why this is to be is never explained, and perhaps might have been difficult to explain; but the fact is important to the colour of the drama, even more so than is commonly recognised. Aeschylus, it is plain, was not without apprehension that in his day the acquittal of a matricide by a criminal court, however warranted by tradition, might not, in the light of the theatre, prove a subject sympathetic to the audience. He shared in fact, though with a difference, the feelings which shape the *Electra* and *Orestes* of Euripides³. He is therefore anxious that his Orestes, though finally released, shall undergo everything that is consistent with this conclusion, and in fact seems to indicate that the fugitive, when the course is at last over, reaches Athens barely alive. This however depends partly upon the interpretation and supposed action of the scene in which he arrives, and is discussed in the notes there⁴. On the other hand, it is remarkable that, in the trial, the fact that the accused, whatever he has done, has horribly suffered, is never noticed at all. Logic demands this, for the issue is, as we shall see, whether the crime of Orestes is *under any circumstances and upon any considerations* remissible, the Erinyes contending that it is not. But we may doubt whether in practice even the Areopagus could or would have maintained the abstract severity of reason with which Aeschylus characteristically invests it.

The awakening of the Erinyes by the ghost of Clytaemnestra and their entrance upon the scene⁵, though admirable in expression and

¹ *vv.* 441—456.

² *vv.* 75—78.

³ Sophocles in his *Electra* defies and extrudes the difficulty, but in a manner not open to Aeschylus. He has no Areopagus to deal with, and can assume a purely ideal state of society and feeling

in which Orestes is something different from an ordinary human being.

⁴ See especially *vv.* 245 foll.

⁵ The stage-arrangements are discussed below in a separate section on the scenery.

imaginative power, do not affect the general issue and may here be passed over. The invective of Apollo against the Erinyes (*vv.* 179—197) directs our attention to the antipathy between the Olympians, who are supposed to have recently acceded to power, and the older gods; an antipathy which appears also, though tempered by more self-control and (we can use no other expression) by better manners, in the first interview between the Erinyes and Athena¹, and prepares us by contrast for the harmonies of the final reconciliation. It is by no means the purpose of the play to present even Athena, much less Apollo, as perfect. They are but representatives, and imperfect, of the absent and unseen Father; and if they are not precisely human, neither are they, in the sense which the word now carries, divine. We want, and Aeschylus wanted, some distinction here, with which the later pagan daemonology, and the mediaeval, would have supplied him. But if incomplete in terms, he makes himself, by dramatic symbols, sufficiently and indeed vividly comprehensible.

The Act concludes with an altercation between Apollo and the Erinyes, which deserves particular attention as first propounding the issue between these future adversaries in the cause, a point upon which the play as a whole is clear and consistent. The opposition, as we should now describe it, is between a 'legal' and an 'equitable' view,—using these words of course in a popular not a technical sense. The Erinyes are the implacable executors of a narrow but absolute rule. They punish 'homicides'²; but homicide has for them peculiar limitations. The persons in whom they are principally interested are first parents (*τοκέες*), and secondly *ξένοι*, *hospites*, those who stand to one another in the relation of hospitality as guest and host³. These persons must be absolutely respected; impiety against these is inevitably punished both in this world and the next. It is evident that these requirements do in fact represent the minimum of personal protection with which a human society could exist, not a civic society, a city, but a rudimentary society of independent households. With the sanctity of the parent (but nothing less) household-government is possible; with that of the *xenos* (but nothing less) intercourse between households is

¹ *vv.* 409 foll.

² *βροτοκτονούντας*, *v.* 424.

³ *vv.* 270, 271 ἢ ξένον...ἢ τοκήας φίλους, *vv.* 552 foll. *τοκέων σέβας...καὶ ξενότιμους δωμάτων ἐπιστροφάς*. (The first passage, as commonly interpreted, would add to these the general punishment of offences against 'a god'. This

however introduces an idea so foreign to the rest of the play that we can hardly believe it correct. See note there.) In *vv.* 356 foll. they use language which might include all members of a family, and in *vv.* 335 foll. terms at least as large as the *βροτοκτονούντας* of *v.* 424. See hereafter.

possible. There is a certain severity and simplicity in the idea, which appeals to the imagination, and justifies it for a poetical and dramatic purpose, whether it answers or not to any historical reality,—respecting which, as matter of fact, Aeschylus, who totally transfigures and misrepresents such history as was actually within his reach, cannot have been curious to enquire: history is, for him, a mere symbol of his own thoughts, a fact which we must clearly realise and steadily bear in mind. But however limited, the justice of the Erinyes is absolute, certain, and implacable: *Κύριον μένει τέλος*, the end is absolutely sure¹. To illustrate this point particularly is needless, as everything said and done by the Chorus, up to the moment of their conversion, is designed to enforce it. He that becomes liable to the vengeance of the Erinyes can *never* know any peace. Chased by their terrors from every human abode, he must wander and pine, till he yields to the fiends the last drop of his life-blood and is haled to fresh torments below².

Now it is upon this question, whether 'Justice' is or is not absolute and inexorable, that the Erinyes, if we look to the scope of the whole play, are seen to be at issue (always until their conversion) with the new kind of justice, the kind adapted and necessary for a civic community, which is instituted by Athena with the complicity and foreknowledge³ of Apollo. Aeschylus, who has an extraordinary power of striking down to the roots of things, has so dealt with his material as to expose a fundamental problem of life, one of those profound and insoluble difficulties which are the very basis of tragic thought and tragic emotion. What *is* the justice of a tribunal? The Erinyes object to the very notion of a tribunal, as applied to an offence within their purview. 'The thing is impossible'⁴. A trial implies the possibility of pardon; and the admission to trial of a matricide, who is *ipso facto* unpardonable, is in itself an outrage. It brings 'the House of Justice' to the ground⁵. It is to say that there are no principles at all, that 'remedy is uncertain'⁶, mere matter of fluctuating opinion. The nature of an Athenian court, with a jury, generally a very large jury, not guided by expert direction, was specially exposed to this objection; but it can be brought to bear, by choosing suitable circumstances, against any tribunal howsoever constituted. Yet the position of the Erinyes, that some acts are absolutely unpardonable, so that no consideration of circumstances is admissible, is equally insecure; and the case of Orestes

¹ v. 546. See also vv. 384 foll., and the Erinyes *passim*.

² See especially vv. 258—271.

³ vv. 81, 224.

⁴ v. 261, the whole ode vv. 493 foll., and *passim*.

⁵ v. 519.

⁶ *ἄκεα οὐ βέβαια*, v. 509.

aptly brings out the weakness of it. Instinct revolts against the doctrine that such a case, with all its qualifications, is determined, as the Erinyes contend, by the mere statement that the man took the life of his mother¹.

This antithesis of principles, which is as disquieting and perplexing now as it was in the fifth century B.C., though we should doubtless choose a different set of facts for the illustration of it,—this, and not any mere conflict of laws, is the subject of the *Eumenides*. Whatever may have been the origin of the legend, we do not find in this play the precise reflexion of any temporary or historical dispute, any particular contest of positive codes. The contending powers have a strong dose of humanity, and, like other disputants, they say some things; for the purpose of the moment, to which they do not consistently adhere. Apollo, for example, when pressed and embarrassed by the shrewd fencing of his adversaries, suddenly propounds, with the audacity of an advocate, a theory of parentage and of filial obligation² which, if true, would make every part of the *Orestea* incomprehensible, not excepting the conduct of Apollo himself. And similarly the Erinyes choose to assume upon occasion, that homicide is criminal only as between kindred³, although such a theory would annihilate their solemn and repeated declarations that a *xenos*, a guest or host, is sacred and inviolable as such. But these incidents affect the main issue not at all. To this it matters not how the Erinyes define crime or define homicide; nor does it appear that Aeschylus was at the pains to provide them with a definition. The essence of their case is this: the act of Orestes, being, upon their view and upon all views, a crime, is therefore, in their view, *unpardonable*. Right, they maintain, must be absolute and cannot bear exceptions. Of perfect right and eternal justice this, it would seem, should be true. And yet, if we build upon this basis, any scheme of law, any whatever, that can be shaped in human thought and stated in human words, may, by the suitable choice of a hard case, be proved liable to the reproach of Apollo, that it is not impartial but 'here exceeding scrupulous and there more indulgent in demand'⁴.

But yet again, if all is a question of circumstances, votes, and opinions, if any and every act is pardonable upon considerations which cannot be defined, then surely, as the Erinyes say, 'Right is a building which falls'. This, and no shallower dispute, is the issue raised by the play as a whole, and supposed to be in some way determined, for the quieting of anxious minds, when the Erinyes make peace with Athena and become patrons of the Areopagus.

¹ *vv.* 425—430.

² *vv.* 661 foll.

³ *vv.* 212, 608.

⁴ *vv.* 222, 223.

More especially perhaps, for reasons which will appear when we come to investigate the antecedents of the story, must we guard against supposing that, for Aeschylus, the issue is between theories of kinship, or between the claims of father and mother. The legend may have once had such a colour; but if this be so, and if (which does not appear) Aeschylus was aware of it, he has deliberately changed the colour and the significance. Whatever his Erinyes may be, they are not the advocates of the mother as against the father. In the plainest words, again and again, they tell us that both the parents, both father and mother¹, are under their protection. Of the mother they speak more often, because it is a matricide whom they now pursue; but nowhere is there on their part a hint of any difference between the parental claims. Indeed, as Aeschylus represents the matter, the converse case, a mother avenged by her son upon a wicked father, would have raised the same issue and might have led to the same result. The attitude of Delphi, of the Erinyes, of the jury, might have been just what it is in the case of Orestes. Apollo, under duress, might then have pretended to prove that the father is no parent, and might use for this purpose the very same fallacious analogy which he actually directs against the mother². Only the president of the court must happen to be some one (let us say Hera, instead of Athena) with a personal prejudice *caeteris paribus* in favour of mothers³. Change only this accident, by placing the trial (let us say) at Argos instead of at Athens, and the patricide might be discharged, upon an equal division of the jury, as the matricide now is, and to the equal indignation of the prosecutors; while the appeasement and conversion of these prosecutors, the crown of the *Eumenides* as it actually stands, might be transferred to the play so altered without the alteration of a word. So different is the problem, as viewed by Aeschylus, from a dispute about the notion of kinship and the constitution of the family. What vestiges of such a conception may remain in his treatment will come to be considered hereafter.

In the opening of the Second Act and the arrival at Athens (*vv.* 235 foll.), we should notice the stress which is laid upon the long agony which Orestes has suffered in the interval, and its terrible effect. Naturally this would be expressed chiefly by the action, but it is written also in the words. His pollution, he says pathetically, is 'fresh no more, but dull, ay worn withal'⁴. The pursuers seem

¹ See especially *vv.* 516 foll.

² *vv.* 661 foll.

³ See *vv.* 739—741.

⁴ *v.* 238.

instantly to expect the last horrible close, when they will drain his life-blood; and they add, with fierce mockery, that exhausted as he already is, he will scarce supply the draught¹. Bleeding also he is, and for this reason comparable to a wounded fawn², a figure which would not be justified by the supposition (were we at liberty to make it) that, either literally, or mystically and to the apprehension of the pursuers, he still drips with the blood of his murdered mother. And indeed this conception, though familiar by frequent repetition in commentary, and perhaps, to a modern judgment, poetical, seems little suited to the sober imagination of Attica. It is at all events not countenanced by Aeschylus, and may be exchanged without loss for the additional touch, given by a simpler interpretation, to the picture of the agonizing fugitive. That picture, we may well suppose, is not altogether imaginary. In the conditions of the ancient world, even in the fifth century, the physical sufferings of those exiled, like Orestes, 'for cause of blood', must sometimes have been dreadful beyond thought, both in the continuance and in the end; and it is likely that Aeschylus had seen wanderers dying and dead, who offered models only too apt for the atrocities of the *Choephoroi*³ and the *Eumenides*. The state of Orestes, as shown in this scene, should not be forgotten in connexion with the question (discussed hereafter under the head of the scenery and stage-arrangements, and in the note at v. 568) what interval is to be supposed between the Second Act and the Third (the trial), how that interval is indicated, and what is supposed to happen.

The invocation of Athena by Orestes (*vv.* 276 foll.) first brings into view the connexion of the play with the foreign relations of Athens, then (458 B.C.) at the height of her imperial strength and expectations. In the concatenation and system of this novel power, by which autonomy, as was hoped, was to be reconciled with subordination, the poet seems to have perceived a certain analogy to that harmony of opposite principles by which he himself would resolve the eternal and celestial problem of justice. This thought emerges clearly in the ode which follows (*v.* 363), the 'binding spell', chanted by the Chorus over their expected victim, while the goddess is flying home from the Troad. Here Aeschylus has put forth all his strength, and the drama ascends to its full height. The theme is the absolute and unchallengeable rights of the Erinyes within their sphere, and the certainty of their execution. What is their sphere, remains, as before, not clear; but

¹ *vv.* 264 foll., 299 foll.

² *v.* 248. As to *v.* 230, see note there.

³ See especially *Cho.* 268—295.

(doubtless with a view to the play's conclusion) their scope is expanded so as to cover at least all bloodshed, and even all wilful wrong-doing¹. The dramatic effects of rhythm, especially in the *ep'hymnia* or 'burdens', surpass perhaps even those of the *Parodos*, and are the acme of art in this kind².

Athena, having arrived, proceeds to an enquiry, and in fact, from this point to the end of the trial, acts as an Athenian magistrate (in the Areopagus, the Archon Basileus), ascertaining the existence and nature of the cause, assembling the court, and presiding there. Reasons are given elsewhere³ for thinking that, in the case of the Areopagus, the Archon, like Athena, selected the persons, of course Areopagites, who for the occasion should be jurors. With a view to the sequel, it should be noted that the reference to a jury, and indeed all the proceedings, take place without any real consent on the part of the pursuers, who at the first opportunity express their opinion of them, with plainness and energy.

An important passage is that (*vv.* 473—492) in which Athena announces her intention to found the new tribunal. She here solemnly repudiates, as unfit for her nature, the function of judge in such a question. This view, which Aeschylus propounds not in obedience but in contradiction to the famous and respected religious legends of Athens, must have been consistent, in his opinion, with the part in the trial which is assigned to the goddess by himself. This has often been pointed out, but even now the force and weight of the proposition are perhaps not always sufficiently appreciated. We shall return to the subject in the proper place⁴. The latter part of the passage (*vv.* 485 foll.) has been obscured, as I think, by mistakes as to the nature of the 'oaths' there mentioned, and to the assumption that we are here concerned with the oath to be taken by the jurors. Of this oath the play naturally says little, since, though a proper part of the jury-system, it has no direct bearing on the issue propounded by the poet. Sworn or unsworn, a jury is no possible instrument for the ascertainment of ultimate and eternal justice; and if, as the Athenians not unreasonably held, it is the best political instrument which man possesses, so much the more confounding is the problem which it leaves untouched. Here however all the references are to the oaths, not of the jury, but of the parties or of their prospective witnesses.

The choric ode which follows (*vv.* 493 foll.), though less tremendous than the 'binding chant', is most vigorous and interesting, and rises at

¹ *vv.* 313 foll., 337 foll.

² See Appendix II.

³ See on *vv.* 490 foll., with Appendix I.

⁴ See below on Athena's vote.

the close to a thrilling sublimity. It is a fierce denunciation of the new law and the proposed institution, which (it is alleged) will be at once anarchic and tyrannical. The Erinyes would have found exceptions to any tribunal; but their actual criticisms are calculated for the Areopagus and its history, especially its recent history. In its limited function as a court of murder, the proper end (according to Aeschylus) of its institution, the Areopagus was popular, or at all events highly respected. But this limitation had been effected very recently, and not without violence, by a democratic revolution. Before that, the Council had claimed and exercised a general and censorial jurisdiction, which, though probably legitimate in origin, had become extremely unpopular and anachronous, and was abolished as a usurpation. The pacification and amendment¹, with which the play concludes, typify, among other things, this present reform, which of course like all reforms was to be the last; and the abuses of the Court must not be forgotten in considering the invective of the Erinyes. We can thus understand some connexions of thought which would otherwise seem abrupt and obscure²; and we should probably see yet more points of allusion, if, instead of a bare and broken outline, we possessed a complete picture of the times.

The character and outward expression of the break between this Act and the next will be further discussed in connexion with the stage-arrangements. The Third Act, comprising the trial and pacification, continues without any break in the action from here to the end, and covers half the play. In the opening, a noticeable point is the entrance of Apollo, a delicate moment in the frame of the story, managed with excellent simplicity and power³. To enhance the effect of his unexpected appearance, it is permitted to divert the course of proceeding and to precipitate the hearing of the cause (*vv.* 585—683), which actually precedes the inauguration of the Court (*vv.* 684—713). This formal irregularity, judicious and necessary, does not justify suspicion either of the scene as we have it, or of the inaugurating speech, which indeed (though some have been bold enough to impeach it) may be thought by its majesty to vindicate itself.

The argument of the cause, though it does not perfectly overcome the difficulty of presenting satisfactorily such a process between such persons, is both lively and dignified, and has some striking turns, especially the latter part, where the prosecutors encounter the roving eloquence of the defendant-deity with a shrewdness by which he is

¹ *v.* 1001.

² See especially *vv.* 520 foll.

³ *v.* 576.

both exasperated and misled¹. The most essential portion is that (vv. 617—642) in which Apollo (when Orestes, attempting a sort of technical defence, has inevitably failed) exposes what may be called the extenuating circumstances. The real and only question, material to the issue of the play, is whether in such a case these are admissible, and, if so, what is their weight. An English reader will observe that the procedure, in accordance with Athenian principles and feelings but in radical distinction from ours, sets no limit to the competence of a court or of a jury, which, for the nonce, has a deputed sovereignty. The issue is neither of fact nor of law, for the facts are admitted and no law is applicable. It is a question in one aspect political or diplomatic, like a case of extradition, in another purely ethical. Of course this is partly due to the abnormal and superhuman circumstances; but it is natural and normal nevertheless, from the Athenian point of view, as it would not be if transferred to our own state. No English court could be even imagined as receiving such a cause, but it would have been entertainable at Athens.

It would be interesting to know, but Aeschylus is naturally careful not to hint, by what expedient, among the many devised by Greek piety, he would have reconciled Apollo's declaration, confirmed by something like an oath, that every word of his Oracle proceeds from Zeus², with that strictly limited estimation of a Delphic command, which is implied by the fact that the obedient servant of the Oracle obtains but a bare half of the votes. That the utterances of the Pythian prophetess were always in some way justifiable, Aeschylus seems really to have believed or tried to believe. That they might always be safely or properly acted upon by those who received them, perhaps no one believed, and certainly few or none at Athens in the fifth century. There were various and obvious ways by which a resolute spirit might escape from the dilemma, and the poet wisely leaves us to our choice.

When Apollo, at the end of his arguments, is beginning to try the effect of his influence³, Athena closes the debate, and, after a solemn exhortation, directs the jury to give their votes, which is done by ballot secretly. She then, before the count, gives notice (the word is future, *προσθήσομαι*) that she will reckon an additional vote for herself in

¹ vv. 643 foll.—The least satisfactory episode is the altercation (vv. 590 foll.) in which Orestes endeavours, without success, to give a technical form to his moral and equitable defence. Here however the dramatist, if we avail our-

selves of a tradition preserved by the *scholia*, is seen to have strengthened the scenic effect by an impressive and pathetic interlude. See note on v. 601.

² vv. 617 foll.

³ vv. 660—676.

favour of Orestes, and lays down that an equal division of votes will count in his favour. Her act and reasons make one of the most subtle points in the play, and are the subject of persistent dispute. A positive opinion we nevertheless must form, for nothing can be more vital to the purport and effect of the poet's work. "Here" she says—

Here is a task for me, to give discriminating sentence last. And this vote I for my part shall reckon to Orestes. For mother is there none who bore me, but the masculine, in all ways save for wedlock, I extol with all my heart, and verily am of the father. Therefore the death of a woman, who slew her husband when he came to make visitation upon his house, I will not prefer in value (to his), and Orestes wins even with equal votes¹.

What is the relation of this final statement to the vote and reasons? The two views, of which both still have defenders, are

(1) that the statement gives the effect of the vote and reasons: if the jury should prove to be equally divided, then, by the vote and for the reasons, Athena makes or will make a decision in Orestes' favour;

(2) that the vote and reasons are given by Athena as a member of the jury; if *with this vote* there shall be equality, then she rules, also and separately, that this equality shall count for the defendant.

My opinion in favour of the first view, now prevalent, is indicated by the punctuation of the sentence; and, to speak candidly, I do not think the point really open to doubt. The other view has no substantial evidence, contradicts an express statement of Aeschylus, and above all, would be in moral effect disastrous to his conception.

The number of jurors (proper) exhibited on the stage, even or uneven, will of course, if ascertained, be decisive. I think there are ten, or some multiple of ten²; but this is questionable and must not be pressed.

The arguments commonly alleged on this side are: (1) that the rule in case of equality, if given without reasons, has a bald and awkward effect, while there is no ground for counting the reasons twice; (2) that to place the human jurors and the goddess in opposition, they pronouncing by a majority one way (since the count shows equality) and she the other, would be disagreeable, and not suggestive of confidence in the Court, when it should not have a goddess to control it; (3) that Athena disclaims, as unfit and impossible for her, the function of a judge in the matter (*v.* 474), a disclaimer without meaning, if in fact she votes, like any member of the jury, upon the merits of the case. These arguments, especially the last, are

¹ *vv.* 737—744.

² See on *vv.* 686, 714 foll.

strong. But more significant, and surely decisive, is *the quality of the reasons which Aeschylus assigns to the goddess as sufficient for her purpose*. These reasons he must himself have thought adequate; if not, he would have provided others. Even if there existed a legendary version of the trial (which, as we shall see, is doubtful) so complete as to equip Athena with reasons for a vote, Aeschylus, to judge by the freedom with which he treats legends in general, both Athenian and others, in this play, would not have adopted those reasons unless he had approved. Are we then to understand that Athena, voting as judge upon the merits of a particular cause, is determined by a general prejudice or preference, purely personal to herself and arising out of her personal history? That in her opinion, and that of Aeschylus, any one of the Areopagites might properly have condemned or acquitted Orestes according as the accidents of his own birth, childhood, or family circumstances inclined him to father or to mother? And that a judicial sentence is matter for likes and dislikes, a choice purely arbitrary? Such, if Athena's vote is part of the judgment, would seem to be the inevitable inference. But in fact, after her disclaimer, we are entitled and bound to assume that she will not play the part of a judge. Nor does she here. The point which she rules, as conceived by Aeschylus, is (in our language) 'not judicial',—a distinction fully appreciated by Aeschylus and noted by Athena herself in the play¹; and it is so far from requiring sound reasons, that pure chance, if there be such a thing, would be the most appropriate arbiter.

Judgment by division of a jury, the Athenian palladium, has the defect that it may fail by equality of votes. This defect is inherent in the principle, an appeal to the balance of opinion, and is only disguised or shuffled away, not really removed, by fixing an uneven number of jurors, and thus making an equal balance impossible. There is no reason for making impossible in fact a case obviously possible in principle and theory. What is to be done upon an equal division, is a purely practical question, to which the Athenians, eminently clear and logical in their ways of thinking, were content to give a conventional answer. In that case, all defendants were discharged, in honour of the patron-goddess, whose favourable vote in one such case had discharged a particular defendant, Orestes². This explanation assumes no reason and pretends no principle. It accounts for the practice merely as a fact, making it a matter of

¹ See ψήφον δικάσαν in *v.* 677, and contrast ἐκδικον as used in *v.* 492.

² Eur. *Iph. T.* 965, 1469.

precedent and local tradition, an accident of Athenian history. The treatment of Aeschylus, whether devised by himself or inherited from predecessors, is consistent with this view and not less logical. Presenting the very cause which furnished the traditional example, he cannot indeed make the rule in case of equality a matter of precedent; but neither does he make it a matter of principle. In his exposition, it still appears as something extraneous to the judgment, an arbitrary decision and essentially accidental, based on motives proper neither to the cause nor even to the ruling, but to the person of the ruling authority. Athena, who has repudiated the office of judge in a blood-cause as too 'passionate' for her mind¹, claims *this* on the contrary, and with evident reference to her previous disclaimer, as 'an office for me',—*ἐμὸν τὸδ' ἔργον*. Why? Precisely because, being arbitrary, it involves no such agitation as her nature, she has told us, rejects. If the judicial votes should be equal, then the method, which she has instituted as the best available, will have failed, as it must conceivably fail, to give a result. The disposal of Orestes must then rest practically with herself and depend upon her free choice; and if it comes to that, if *judgment* is equivocal and *preference* must weight the scale, then the 'preference' of Athena, the child of her father, will not be for a murderess-wife as against a murdered husband. Hence is to be explained not only the personal quality of her motives, but the very form, the negative turn, of her ruling, which deprecates such a standard even in using it. If judgments are equal and some one must be preferred, then the preference, falling to Athena, will *not* be given to Clytaemnestra,—*ἐγὼ... γυναικὸς οὐ προτιμήσω μόνον*.

I hold therefore with K. O. Müller, Schoemann, Paley, Prof. Wecklein, Mr Sidgwick, and many others, that according to Aeschylus the vote of Athena makes inequality. But must we say, as some on both sides do, that she votes 'in favour of mercy', and represents the principle that divine justice inclines to spare? There may be proof, though I do not assert it, that her vote, and the consequent votes of her successors the Athenian magistrates, were by some so interpreted. But was this the view of Aeschylus? Nothing in the play suggests it; and surely the vote, if so intended, would have been so motivated and explained. To say the truth, I doubt whether, to an Athenian in the fifth century, such a conception would have commended itself, nor, if that matters, does it commend itself to me. This is no place, nor have we need, for the discussion of theology. The Divine Mercy may be a

¹ v. 474.

legitimate idea ; it may (though this should be proved) be an idea belonging to the age of Aeschylus ; but it has really no bearing on the question, what is to be done with a defendant, about whose guilt a human jury, an ordinary human jury, is equally divided. To divine judgment the guilt or innocence of such a defendant may be supposed patent ; and that judgment may be invoked with as much reason, or rather as little, on one side as the other. Nor is there any principle applicable, and the only candid answer is that of Athens in general and of Aeschylus, that a certain result follows in practice because such is the usage, and (if you ask for the beginning of that usage) because, upon the first occasion and from the accidental circumstances of that occasion, the person, who had the power, so chose and preferred.

Nor does Athena's vote (and this too is of some importance to the effect) give us any information upon the merits of the cause, or imply any inferiority of justice in the condemning jurors as compared with the absolving. It would be hard, and disagreeable, that such an imputation should be conveyed, and that Athena, having refused to direct the judgment, should reflect upon it after it has passed. But she implies no such criticism. She decides a question different in nature from that submitted to the jurors, upon grounds which the jurors could not entertain. The moral question, the question of right, remains where they leave it. By her personal favour, Orestes, who after all must either be released or not released, does in fact escape. The Erinyes protest, not specifically against the act of the goddess, but against the whole proceeding, as inconsistent with the very nature of justice. Whether they protest with justice is the all-important question ; and this remains to be answered in the sequel.

From Aeschylus we should naturally infer, that in his time an Areopagite jury was even in number, and that the president, the Archon Basileus, voted, but voted always, according to the precedent of Athena, for acquittal, thus securing a decision on that side in case the other votes were equally divided. Later notices¹ agree with this as far as they go, by saying that the Basileus voted (*καὶ τὸν στέφανον ἀποθέμενος σὺν αὐτοῖς τοῖς δικάσταις δικάζει*), but are too imperfect, and too remote in date from Aeschylus, to give much or certain light upon his picture. That however is in itself clear.

An open, but unimportant, question is whether, in the dramatic action, Athena's vote is given, like those of the jurors, by an actual pebble or counter, put by her in an urn or added to a heap, or whether

¹ Aristides 57, 4. Pollux 8. 90. See Gilbert, *Greek Constitutional Antiquities*, p. 376, Eng. Transl.

it is only signified by speech and gesture. The text does not determine ; some remarks will be found in the notes.

That the vote of Athena made *equality* was certainly one of the variations in detail with which in course of time the legend of the trial was narrated¹. But these versions no more prove the view of Aeschylus than the more numerous versions, according to which her vote made inequality. The view of Aeschylus can be ascertained only by the fair and exact construction of what is said in the play ; and thus limited, the evidence appears to be all on one side. It is surely forced, for example, to cut down (with Hermann) Athena's disclaimer of the judicial function (*v.* 474) to a statement that she cannot act alone. That, if meant, could have been easily expressed ; but what is said is something different. The whole problem, really simple so far as Aeschylus is concerned, has been perplexed by a superabundance of learning. I have treated it at length, not because I think it doubtful, but because of its capital importance. If Aeschylus meant that Athena's vote, as he presents it, is her sentence upon the issue before the court, as he presents it, he is not only inconsistent but surely frivolous.

It is quite another question, here as elsewhere to be kept carefully distinct, how or whence the language attributed to Athena may, if not invented by Aeschylus, have come into the story, and what bearing on the issue it may have had in some other and older version. We will take that up in its turn. It is enough for the present purpose that, for Aeschylus, what the goddess alleges is a personal inclination, a proper and sufficient motive for an act essentially arbitrary.

Over the end of the trial, the departure of Apollo, the thanks and farewell of Orestes, we need not linger. The result being foreseen, and the immediate issue, the fate of the defendant, being overshadowed and almost lost in the larger and deeper question still pending between the adverse gods, this part of the play could hardly be too brief.

¹ See the examples cited by Hermann, and also those of the opposite view, in Wecklein's note on *Eum.* 738. As none of them are, in my judgment, strictly relevant to our question, I purposely abstain from repeating them. How, for example, can anything be inferred about the story of Aeschylus from this (schol. on Aristid. *Panath.* p. 108. 10) *φασὶ δὲ ὅτι, τῶν ἐξ θεῶν προστιθέντων ταῖς Ἐρινύσι καὶ τῶν πέντε τῷ Ὀρέστη, μετέωρον ἔχουσαν τὴν ψήφον Ἀθηναίων ὑστατον προστιθεῖσαν νικῆσαι αὐτὸν πεπολιχεν?* This

author makes the jury gods,—the popular belief, but inconsistent with Aeschylus both in fact and in principle. Why then should they not be at variance on a minor point? It is however a thing remarkable in itself, that the view, by which Athena made equality, should ever have existed ; for it is contrary to what would seem to have been originally the very purpose of her 'vote', and the cause of the legend about it. For a probable explanation see Wecklein's note above cited.

Orestes is chiefly occupied with promises of recompense, of securing to Athens the faithful alliance of Argos—a topic of interest in the political circumstances of the time, but, as the dramatist indicates when Apollo trenches upon it in the trial, extraneous to the question of right and wrong¹. Upon this the late defendant can tell us nothing, and his views are immaterial². Not unworthy of passing notice is the tacit assumption, necessary to the story in the form given to it by Aeschylus, however incompatible with fact and history, that an order from the president of the Areopagus has a sort of abstract and universal validity, and will be executed in Argos as a matter of course by the political restoration of Orestes, a result which will be cited with approval (he says) by Hellenes in general³. The imagination is bold for Athenian tragedy, sober in political fiction as in fiction generally, and stepping with caution beyond the limits of the actual or the possible. But the position and hopes of the Athenian empire, when the *Oresteia* was preparing, were such as to make this conception attractive and even to some extent practical. Within the empire, the foreign effect of Athenian judgments, especially in questions of crime, must have been a cardinal point. And about the year 458 B.C. the expansion of Athens had so promising an appearance that dreams like this of Aeschylus may have visited less poetical minds⁴.

And now, the man and the affair of the hour being dismissed, the gods, the eternal types of opposed principles, the Erinyes and Athena, are left in presence, with the court and the assembled folk for spectators, to compose their difference if they may. Athena has perforce had her way; the culprit has been tried according to her forms and released by her order; but the divine controversy remains. That justice should be unchangeable and inexorable is a proposition firm and formidable as ever; nay, if anything could seem to prove the prophecy of the Erinyes, that the 'new institutions' will make a moral chaos⁵, it is this trial, of which the result is a mere accident of place. 'Over-ridden' and 'robbed', as they say truly, by younger strength, they burst into furious threats, foreshown during the course of the proceedings⁶, to

¹ See on *v.* 678.

² He assumes, or seems to suggest, that Zeus is for his cause, as the cause of a father (*v.* 763). The Erinyes have shown the weakness of this position (*v.* 643). What 'Zeus' thinks of the matter (that is, of the Areopagus rather than of Orestes), and what (so to put it) he ought to think,—that is just

what we desire to know, but, as yet, do not.

³ *v.* 757—764.

⁴ In the next generation the ambition of the Athenians to extend their judicial system, to become 'judges in Arcadia' and 'Ecbatana', is ridiculed by Aristophanes, *Knights*, 797, 1089.

⁵ *v.* 493 foll.

⁶ *v.* 714—736.

punish with utter devastation the state which has defied them. Their wild and broken lyrics shatter the mould which contains them, and express the very acme of passion. That their threats are vain, that force is with the Daughter of Zeus, 'needs not to be said'¹, but suggests no remedy. Yet it seems for a while that Athena has no other. Her offer of a sanctuary at Athens, a fixed sanctuary, a local worship, an established ritual, when it is heard, is naturally treated as a new insult² by those who long before declared that their ways are not those of 'the gods', that their office is only to pursue, that their home is no other than the underworld, that they have no part in temples and do not listen to supplication³. The pieties and unrivalled destinies of Athens are displayed in vain to those who see but a 'cheat' in the invitation to purchase a detested settlement and unsolicited honours by the surrender of privileges ancient as time and large as the world⁴. Thrice the offer is patiently renewed, but without effect. The Erinyes repeat their refusal, to make mistake impossible, without the change of a word. And then, suddenly, all is over. Athena speaks again⁵. The Chorus, now calm as herself, take up her 'loathsome', 'contemptible', 'dishonourable', 'fraudulent' proposal, and promptly accept it⁶. Thenceforward they breathe only blessings.

Now here is a solution indeed, a solution not of any particular casuistical or judicial problem (we may notice that after the trial the specific crime of Orestes is ignored completely), but of the universal problem, the discordance of principles, the antithesis of Right against Right. If the Inexorable can indeed be pacified, then there is somewhere One Right, one universal principle, something upon which 'the fallen house of Justice' may be builded again. Let us but know *why* this pacification takes place, upon what grounds and by what persuasions, and we shall be admitted to the very secret of things. We turn to the speech which effects all this, but—no explanation appears. At a certain point⁷ it is *assumed* by Athena that the adversaries are content, as they prove to be; it is *assumed* that this content proceeds from something just said or done. And just before stands—an unfinished sentence. *Ah, if sacred Suasion be holy unto thee, the appeasement of my tongue, and the soothing....Thou, then, wilt belike abide, or if it should be thy will not to abide*—but that is not their will. A hiatus (it would appear), an injury singularly deplorable, has obliterated the words of the Eternal

¹ v. 829.

² vv. 840—842.

³ vv. 420 foll., v. 355, and the *θυμὸς δέσμιος* (vv. 307 foll.) *passim*.

⁴ v. 849.

⁵ vv. 882—892.

⁶ vv. 893—901.

⁷ v. 888; see the notes.

and the wisdom of the Most High. But never (we may hope) were they written. It is a gap which Aeschylus could no more have filled, nor would, than Dante could have told us what was the song which, on the Mount of Purgatory, hailed the forgiveness of sin and the restoration of man: "I understood it not, nor here is sung the hymn which that folk then sang¹." Not Aeschylus, nor any one who had felt, like him, that 'burden of thought' which can be lifted away only in the name of Zeus, would pretend to tell us, what thought or thing it was, with which Athena won the Erinyes. He that would put it in words, in his own words, would not be worth our hearing.

Such a conciliation, if it is to command faith, cannot and must not be explicit. Something there must be, which by men is not understood nor even heard, some place for the miraculous, mystic, and incomprehensible. The broken grammar of the text does but indicate a silence, which we should have supposed, and supposed here, if the imperfect sentence had run to a full stop. The action offers no difficulty for those who believe that Aeschylus at any rate knew no barrier to the movements and intercourse of his performers, as this whole scene itself tends to show. It is but natural to suppose (and indeed otherwise the expostulations of Athena would appear frigid) that she has quitted her chair, and that by this time she and the Chorus are together. In this situation, nothing would be easier than to suggest that *something* here passes between them, not worded nor wordable at all, of which the human witnesses know and can know nothing but the effect,—the instantaneous achievement of the impossible, the appeasement of the unappeasable, the conversion of the Erinyes.

They are not bought. The poet, whose high and spiritual thoughts of the divine would with difficulty find a use for the chasm and tripod of Delphi, would not easily have imagined that a cave, or altars, or processions, or any local and limited function, however august, could purchase an alliance between Punishment and Pardon. The honours of Athens are soon accepted,—when the Erinyes entertain the offer; but the miracle is that they should entertain it; and this miracle is wrought by no bribe, but by the blessing of Zeus upon the mysterious persuasion of Athena². The acceptance of local worship, though not essential to the peace (as Athena expressly indicates³), is an impressive proof of it, and the induction of the new deities a solemn and dramatic symbol.

The place, rites, and powers, which they thus acquire, are those of

¹ Io non lo intesi, nè qui non si canta
L' inno che quella gente allor can-
taro. *Purg.* 32. 61.

² *vv.* 971—974.

³ *vv.* 888 foll.

The Holy Goddesses (αἱ Σεμναὶ Θεαί), primitive deities of the earth, who were worshipped at a cave by the Areopagus as givers of fertility, whether of the earth itself or of living things, and were thus specially powerful over birth¹. The blessings, which in their new benignity they invoke upon land and people, take even a larger range, and cover in fact all material and moral good; but it is not always clear whether these blessings will be given by their power or procured, as is sometimes indicated², by their influence. The distinction however is of no importance to the poetical effect, and concerns only a historical question to be touched hereafter. That the Erinyes are or now become the 'Semnai Theai', is nowhere said in terms; indeed that title does not occur in the play³. There were reasons, as we shall see, why the question of identity should be touched with caution. But at the close⁴, the conducting choir invokes them by this epithet, *Holy* (δεῦρ' ἔτε, σεμναί), and the general import of the scene is plain. Nevertheless, neither the name⁵ nor the dread⁶ of the Avengers is to be lost, though it is now Athena, not they, who magnifies these, and insists upon the gain to peace and order from the abiding presence of salutary fear⁷. The new denizens⁸ themselves also preach concord, not without allusion to the strife of factions at the date of the play and to the settlement then recent; and the citizens present testify their submission and good resolves⁹.

In becoming guardians of Athens, the Erinyes become of course custodians, as well as proselytes, of the new justice, of its organs, and of its procedure. A reader of the play must be sensible of this, as an element in the general effect. But it is the more remarkable to find no statement, or even suggestion, that, in their new character as 'The Holy Goddesses', they will be connected with the Athenian tribunals. Even the neighbourhood of the sanctuary to the Areopagus is not noticed, and to the Court, after the conclusion of the trial, there is no explicit allusion¹⁰. Some connexion between the Court and the Semnai Theai is demonstrable in later times, though the extent of it may not be clear; but if the connexion existed and was commonly

¹ *vv.* 837—839, 856—871, 895—898, 907—912, 917 foll., etc.

² *vv.* 951, 961, 970.

³ Unless we introduce it by conjecture in *v.* 1042, where see note. The description 'the Semnai' appears to have no ancient authority.

⁴ *v.* 1042. See also *v.* 386 and note.

⁵ *v.* 952.

⁶ *vv.* 933 foll., 951 foll.

⁷ *vv.* 928 foll., 991 foll.

⁸ μέτοικοι, *vv.* 1012, 1019. For the spectacular importance of this conception, see note to *v.* 1029.

⁹ *vv.* 989, 990.

¹⁰ *v.* 913 (τῶν δικαίων τῶνδε) and *v.* 999 (ἡμενοί) are the nearest approaches to such allusion, but cannot be called explicit.

recognised in the time of Aeschylus, all we can say is that, somewhat strangely, he has not made use of it.

Superlatives are hazardous; but nothing in art will easily be found more beautiful, in the simple and popular sense of the word, than the closing scene of the *Eumenides*, from the conversion of the Erinyes to the exit. It is the very perfection of concord, of harmony, of solemn joy and rapturous awe, happiness that provokes no fear and fear that is no burden upon happiness, of that peace and union within and without, which the world does not offer, nay, seems to forbid, but which yet must be hoped, dreamed, supposed, believed, as an ideal possible and existing to thought and faith, if the struggle of life and travail of the creation is to have purpose and meaning,—all this enhanced by contrast with the sharp and persistent discords which precede. Even read, it is exquisitely delightful and impressive; but no book can properly represent it. Aeschylus has here found that rare thing which Racine found in *Athalie*, a moral theme essentially theatrical, which not only may be expressed by the organised action of a company, but cannot fully and naturally be expressed otherwise, so that spectacular drama, with its peculiar properties of responsions, movements, choirs, processions, and the like, has all its powers and none of its faults. The religious pomp of the induction, the leading goddess, her attendants, the train of concordant citizens, the lights and offerings,—all this not only graces but *is* the thought and thing to be set forth.

The performance at Athens, the diapason of the *Oresteia*, must have been the crowning moment of theatric art. Even a humble performance of the play at Cambridge in 1885¹, under all the defective conditions, left in the memory of some who saw it an impression never to be effaced.

We must conclude with a few words about the title, which, by a strange but not inexplicable exception, is in this case not deducible from the play, but an addition to it, a new point. The name 'Eumenides'—which after Aeschylus and through the effect of his work became at last so completely synonymous with 'Erinyes', that Latin poets can actually speak of an Erinyes as a 'Eumenis'²—does not occur in the play as we have it. We can hardly say that it is even suggested. The final scene throws emphasis on the epithet εὐφρων, *kindly*³, and still more upon εὖ⁴, but these approaches are distant; we are not

¹ With the music of Sir C. V. Stanford. Repeated in 1906.

² Whether any Greek goes as far as this, I do not know. It could not be

natural to a Greek ear.

³ *vv.* 993, 1031.

⁴ *v.* 870, and elsewhere.

brought even as near as *εὐμενής*¹. If therefore the title of the play comes from Aeschylus, as seems nevertheless probable², we can only suppose that he *desired* so to name his converted Erinyes, but would not venture beyond a hint. Such an attitude is however perfectly intelligible, as is also the way in which he deals with the title *Semnai Theai*, if all this conversion and identification was a new thing, invented or first popularized by himself. We shall see hereafter that it probably was. This supposed, the process is natural.

The play demands a fusion of the Erinyes with deities domiciled within the city of Athens, which the Semnai Theai were, but the Eumenides, so far as we know, were not. One such step at once was enough. An innovator might well hesitate to challenge a theatrical audience with yet another unfamiliar conjunction. Yet just because the Chorus are first Erinyes and also, or next, Semnai Theai, neither name well sums the story of the pacification; and neither suggests it by meaning³. 'Eumenides' (*εὐμενεῖς*, *gracious*) does, and lay not far. It was the name applied at Sicyon, at Argos, at Colonus close to Athens, and probably elsewhere, to certain deities having a strong resemblance to the Semnai Theai, three in number, primitive, benign. It is slipped in by way of title; and another step is taken towards that simplification of the divine catalogue which Aeschylus must naturally have desired.

We have indeed an ancient statement⁴ that the name 'Eumenides' is conferred, by Athena, in the play⁵. But this, a very probable error of memory, is combined with another, and indisputable, misrepresentation of the drama, and is therefore not to be trusted.

It is not confirmed, though it may partly be accounted for⁶, by

¹ Unless it is to be introduced by conjecture; see on *v.* 1041; *πρευμενῶς* occurs in *v.* 924.

² The association certainly existed not long after; the goddesses of the Oresteian story are 'Eumenides' already in Euripides, *Orest.* 38 etc. On the other hand, Euripides, even in this late work (408 B.C.), treats the name as still open to criticism (*Orest. l.c.*): see hereafter.

³ As to the import of the epithet *Σεμναι*, see *v.* 386.

⁴ Harpocration *s.v.* *Εὐμενίδες*. *Αισχύλος ἐν Εὐμενίαισι, εἰπὼν τὰ περὶ τὴν κρίσει τὴν Ὀρέστου, φησὶν ὡς ἡ Ἀθηναῖα, πρῶτα τὰς Ἐρινύας ὥστε μὴ χαλεπῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν Ὀρέστην, Εὐμενίδας ὠνό-*

μασεν. Here, in the words *πρὸς τὴν Ὀρέστην*, there is at all events one error; to represent Aeschylus we should have *πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους*.

⁵ At least the author, it seems, must mean this, though his expression, 'Aeschylus in the *Eumenides* says that Athena ...named' etc., does not well represent that meaning.

⁶ The resemblance in language, *τὰς Ἐρινύας πρῶτας (πρῶτασας)*, points to a common origin. Hermann and others would correct the summary, as well as the play, from Harpocration, although his statement, to be valid, must itself be corrected on another point. See on *vv.* 1025 foll., and *supra* note 4.

the summary prefixed to the play in the principal ms. and printed hereafter with the *dramatis personae*. It concludes thus: [Ὀρέστης] κατήλθεν εἰς Ἄργος. τὰς δὲ Ἐρινύας πρᾶννας προσηγόρευσεν Εὐμενίδας. παρ' οὐδετέρῳ κείται ἡ μυθοποιία. This may be understood in two ways. (1) It is Orestes (this is the obvious construction) who, after his return to Argos, propitiated the Erinyes and named them accordingly¹. On this supposition, the writer explains the origin of the name (because it is the title of the play) according to a version which certainly existed², but without noticing that this explanation, though perhaps reconcilable with Aeschylus, is not derived from him. In a document so extremely brief, imperfect, and faulty³, this appears quite possible. But (2) the same excessive concision admits the view that the writer, or the authority whom he abbreviates⁴, really meant what seems to be the truth, that it was *Aeschylus* who made the Erinyes gentle, and, by the title of the play, conferred on them the name Eumenides. Where παρ' οὐδετέρῳ κείται ἡ μυθοποιία can, by convention, signify without more that 'the plot [of Aeschylus' play] does not occur either in [Sophocles or Euripides]', we cannot exclude the possibility of a too ambiguous 'he'. In either case, the summary affords no evidence for supposing that the name Eumenides, and the conferring of it, ever were found in the play itself. It is a highly significant fact that they are not.

The Legend before Aeschylus. The innovations of Aeschylus.

We now pass from the primary question, what are the conceptions of the dramatist, to the secondary though not immaterial question, whence did they come and upon what foundation did he build. Direct evidence upon this head, scanty for all the plays of Aeschylus, in this case fails altogether. Though the legend was doubtless old, we have no version of it, not even an outline and scarcely a fragment, which is prior to Aeschylus and certainly independent of his influence. In later versions, such influence is everywhere probable and often plainly paramount. To extract from these versions an answer to our question is so difficult, and the answer must be so uncertain, that, though the investigation is necessary and has seldom been strictly pursued⁵, it will be treated here as briefly as possible.

¹ This is suggested by Miss Harrison.

² Suidas, *s.v.* Εὐμενίδες.

³ Note particularly the strange phrase

ἡς βουλῆ νικήσας.

⁴ The summary purports to be by

'Aristophanes the scholar' of Alexandria. But one must hope that it does not fairly represent him.

⁵ See however the *Prolegomena to Greek Mythology* of Miss J. E. Harrison.

Of what is commonly admitted as evidence the greater part is irrelevant and fit only to mislead. For example, Pausanias' description of the Semnai Theai and their sanctuary was written six hundred years after Aeschylus, when his play, ideas, and representations had for ages been dominant over the whole subject of the Erinyes, and had moulded countless works of literature and art. Pausanias, in this description, expressly refers to Aeschylus and to no other author; he notes, as if it were matter for surprise, that the images of the sanctuary had no terror, nothing, that is to say, of the Aeschylean type. In short, his whole treatment shows that, for him, the deities of the sanctuary were nothing else, as indeed they could be nothing else, than the deities of our play. If then we will allow such a writer to be an authority for the present purpose, if we will take it from Pausanias, as true universally and therefore before Aeschylus, that "Semnai Theai was the Athenian name for those generally called the Erinyes", our question is answered by presumption. The conceptions of Aeschylus prove at this rate their own antiquity, and we may spare enquiry.

That a legend gave the main fact, the prosecution of Orestes by the Erinyes before a tribunal at Athens and his acquittal there, might safely be inferred from the play and is beyond doubt; and we may add, as an ancient datum, that the result was decided by the vote of Athena, not only because this feature is constantly associated with the story in all forms, but because here is the most obvious and probable origin of it. The Athenian practice of acquitting in case of equality, a custom laudable but not self-justifying, was the very case for an 'aetiological' or explanatory story. But apart from this, the invention of the story was natural enough. The enterprise of Orestes against the murderers of his father, according to one version, actually started from Athens, the place of his exile¹. That he should return there, and be there called in question, was in that case obvious to suppose. 'Erinyes' were *ex officio* pursuers; and to make them legal 'pursuers', instead of literal, was no great stretch of imagination, and was suitable to the Athenian interest in forensic affairs. Religious or political motives, dissatisfaction with the older treatment of crime as a mere matter of 'purgation', and the desire to magnify civic law, may also have contributed to the making or the credit of the legend. At all events it existed and was well established.

But with all this, the prosecution, the acquittal, and Athena's vote, we are still a long way from the *Eumenides*. Equally essential and more important to the conception of Aeschylus are these propositions: (1) that the trial of Orestes was *the first* trial for bloodshed², and that

¹ Hom. *Od.* 3. 306.

² *Eum.* 68g.

upon this occasion the Areopagus, *the first court of the kind, was founded*; (2) that the trial was in all respects normal, and especially *the jury a normal jury*, so that by this instance the competence of such a judicature was solemnly established; (3) that the 'pursuers' not only submitted to the decision but themselves *became denizens of the city and defenders of the new institution*. These are the piers of Aeschylus' fabric, and all indispensable; remove one of them, and the structure falls to pieces.

What reason then is there to think that these conceptions were formed or accepted before the appearance of the *Eumenides*? There is none. The evidence, inconclusive but not inconsiderable, is all on the other side, and indicates that all these notions, if not altogether invented, were first defined, and were established so far as they ever were established, by Aeschylus.

On the first point indeed it seems possible to have certainty. It cannot have been, before Aeschylus, an established tradition that the Areopagus was founded for the trial of Orestes, because a different legend, which held its ground in spite of Aeschylus and continued solely to possess official sanction, is shown to have been already established, when he wrote, by his own allusive attacks. In the extant Athenian oratory of the fourth century, about a hundred years after the *Eumenides*, we have two references¹ to the sacred legends of the Areopagus, references far more weighty, upon the point of public recognition, than the literary notes and notices, mostly dateless, which make the chief part of our material. The two are closely similar, and show that, by that time at least, there was a sort of canon upon the subject. Both orators place first the legend that on the Areopagus ('the Hill of Ares') Ares was tried by a jury for the slaying of Halirrhothios son of Poseidon. This is an 'aetiological' legend of the common popular type, accounting for a fact not self-explained, to wit, why the court sat in a certain place and why that place was called *Areios Pagos*. Both orators subjoin to this, evidently as a later incident, the trial of Orestes. Now if we follow Aeschylus, the legend which with the orators is primary and fundamental, the legend of Ares, is not

¹ Demosth. (?) *Or.* 23, p. 641, § 66 τούτο μὲν τοίνυν τὰ παλαιά, ὡς ἡμῖν ἀκούειν παραδέδοται· ἐν μόνῳ τούτῳ τῷ δικαστηρίῳ δικασ φόνου θεοὶ καὶ δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν ἤξιωσαν καὶ δικασταὶ γενέσθαι διενεχθεῖσιν ἀλλήλοις, ὡς λόγος· λαβεῖν μὲν Ποσειδῶν ὑπὲρ Ἀλιρροθίου τοῦ υἱοῦ παρὰ Ἄρεως, δικασαὶ δὲ Εὐμένισι καὶ Ὀρέστῃ οἱ δώδεκα θεοί.

Dinarch. *Or.* 1. p. 101, § 87 κρίσει Ποσειδῶν ἀποτυχῶν, τῇ ὑπὲρ Ἀλιρροθίου πρὸς Ἄρη γενομένη ἐνέμεινεν· [ἐνέμειναν] αὐταὶ αἱ σεμναὶ θεαὶ τῇ πρὸς Ὀρέστην ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συνεδρίῳ κρίσει γενομένη, καὶ τῇ τούτου ἀληθείᾳ συνοίκους ἑαυτὰς εἰς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον κατέστησαν.

merely ignored and contradicted but condemned, as upon the theological principles of Aeschylus it well might be. The abhorrence with which Athena rejects the office of judge in a cause of blood¹ could not more sharply stigmatize the trial of Ares, with its jury of gods² sitting upon a god-murderer, if it were designed for that purpose. And that it is so designed, that Aeschylus knew the story of Ares for the established foundation-legend of the court and, as such, an obstacle to the acceptance of his own version, appears when he introduces into his play an irrelevant explanation of the name *Areios Pagos*. His story of the foundation, whatever its moral and theological merit, has from a popular point of view the defect that it does not connect the tribunal essentially with its consecrated title 'the Council of the Hill of Ares'. The defect is irreparable; but Aeschylus does his best to compensate for it by offering a derivation interesting to Athenian patriotism. The hill, as Athena informs us in a digression, is the place where the Amazons, defeated by Theseus, endeavoured to found a fortress rival and hostile to the Acropolis, and celebrated the worship of their god Ares³. The statement, probably his own invention, has no bearing on the play, and must be understood as a polemical and contradictory substitute for the derivation previously (and subsequently) accepted, and for the legend therewith connected⁴.

On the second point, the constitution of the jury, the case is scarcely less clear. Of the two orators, one, in the name of ancient tradition, expressly contradicts Aeschylus: the jury (he says) in the case of Orestes were gods. The other contradicts him by implication⁵. And the energy with which Aeschylus repudiates the notion of making Athena a juror has in itself a combative air, seeming to assume and almost to assert an adverse prepossession in the audience. In this point also therefore, a point vital to the conception of the play, Aeschylus appears as an inventor and innovator.

But on the third and most interesting point, the conversion of the Erinyes, the testimony of the fourth century is, as to the origin of the conception, indecisive. Here both orators are with Aeschylus, one saying plainly that "the *Semnai Theai* consented to dwell thereafter

¹ *Eum.* 474.

² Not specified for this case by Demosthenes, but see Eur. *El.* 1258:

ἔστιν δ' Ἄρεώς τις ὄχθος, οὗ πρῶτον θεοὶ ἔξοντ' ἐπὶ ψήφοισιν αἵματος πέρι, Ἄλιπρόθιον δὲ ἔκταν' ὀμόφρων Ἄρης.

³ *Eum.* 688.

⁴ So Paley and others.

⁵ Dinarch. *L.c.* § 86 οὐδὲ [ἴσθιον ὑμῶν] τοὺς θεοὺς δμωμοκόσι περὶ ταύτης τῆς κρίσεως ταῖς αὐτῶν τῶν θεῶν πράξεσιν ἐναντίας τῆν ψήφον ἐνεγκεῖν, and here follow the examples. The reference to the oaths and votes of the jury would have no point unless the 'proceedings of the gods' had been conducted with juries of gods.

with the Court", the other giving to the prosecutors the significant title *Eumenides*. This part of the Aeschylean version was therefore then established. Since the intervening century gives ample time for the adoption of this incident, we cannot yet tell whether it was from Aeschylus himself, or from some earlier authority, that it came.

No earlier authority is extant. In no authority, not certainly or probably influenced by Aeschylus, is any trace of the triple identification, *Erinyes*, *Semnai Theai*, *Eumenides*, or of any part of it, now to be found. So far indeed as concerns the purely local cult of the Semnai Theai, the almost entire loss of all earlier literature belonging and relating specially to Athens makes an argument *a silentio* inapplicable. But not so with the Eumenides; these were not Athenian, nor confined, it seems, to any one place. If, before Aeschylus, they had been known as identical with the Erinyes, it is remarkable that we must descend below Aeschylus for the exchangeable use of the names, and that Aeschylus himself, for example, gives no hint of it before he puts the title upon his final play.

And when we do descend lower, the argument from silence, slightly modified, becomes strong. Whatever germs of the triple identification existed before must have been powerfully quickened by this play. At least then afterwards, and especially in later tragedy, they should put forth promptly and abundantly. But the fact is otherwise. It is but slowly, and as it were with difficulty, that the seed comes up at all. Euripides does not recognise the identification except in connexion with Orestes, that is to say, only when he is directly referring (generally for the purpose of hostile or sarcastic comment) to the doctrine assumed in Aeschylus' play¹. Sophocles, till we reach the *Oedipus at Colonus*, does not apparently notice the identification at all. Both he and Euripides, it is needless to say, refer to Erinyes or an Erinyes often, but they call them Erinyes, like Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, like Aeschylus before the *Eumenides*, not Eumenides or Semnai Theai². Not till the *Oedipus at Colonus*, fifty years after the *Eumenides*, does the triple identity now appear as an accepted and general truth. There indeed it appears complete, and detached, for the first time so far as

¹ In the *Orestes* (38, 312 etc.), the *Electra* 1270, and the *Iphigenia in Tauris* 968. The name *Eumenides* seems to occur in the *Orestes* alone, where on its first appearance (v. 38) its kindly significance is the subject of a sneer. In the *Iphigenia* the whole story of the trial, as conceived by Aeschylus, becomes the

delusion of a monomaniac; see *Euripides the Rationalist*, pp. 183—189.

² The occasional appearance of *σεμνός* as an epithet (e.g. *σεμνός Ἐρινύς*, Soph. *Ai.* 836) may possibly allude to the doctrine of Aeschylus, but is no adoption of it.

we know, from the case of Orestes. The Eumenides of Colonus, who receive the long-suffering Oedipus to his final rest, are seen to be mysteriously identical with the Avengers of his unhappy past; they are *Semnai Theai*, and their identity with the goddesses of the Areopagus, though not perhaps expressly asserted, is plainly suggested; and it is hinted, in perfect harmony with the spirit of the Aeschylean doctrine, that under other names the same Powers are to be recognised elsewhere¹. But for how much of this should we take Sophocles to be an authority independent of Aeschylus? Surely at most for the fact that the tenants of the simple sanctuary at Colonus were and at all times had been worshipped under the name 'Eumenides'². This was enough to justify the illustrious Coloniote in conferring upon his birth-place, together with much else which certainly or probably did not belong there, the honours, stamped as public property by fifty years' approval, of Aeschylus' triple mystery. It would be a bold inference indeed that the Coloniates knew of any such doctrine in (let us say) 460 B.C. It may be doubted whether they had much suspicion of it in the year 406.

As, before Aeschylus, there is no authority for the mystic conversion, so neither is there any plain foundation for it. Between the Eumenides and the *Semnai Theai* indeed, so far as we know anything about the earlier history of either, there was resemblance enough. But between these and the Erinyes, as the Erinyes figure in previous literature, there is broad unlikeness: the Erinyes are vague, figureless, numberless, homeless, essentially punitive; the *Semnai Theai*, and probably the Eumenides, in all respects different, local, visible, authors rather of boons than of punishment. Nor was it apparently the Athenian tradition before Aeschylus, as we shall presently see, that the Erinyes after the trial of Orestes were appeased at all, much less converted.

Was there at that time such a tradition anywhere? None, we may say, of a conversion; whether any of an appeasement, it is difficult to be sure. Six hundred years after Aeschylus there was shown to travellers, in the Peloponnese, between Megalopolis and Messene, the place where Orestes made his peace with 'the Eumenides', who thereupon appeared to him white instead of black³. If this story, and some others resting on similar authority, were told exactly as we now read them in the days of Aeschylus, and if Aeschylus knew them, he may have received from them a hint for his own deeper treatment. But who is to assure us that the religious ideas and language of Messenia had not undergone some change in six centuries,

¹ O.C. 40 foll., 89, 458, 944—949, etc.

² O.C. 42.

³ Pausanias 8. 34.

or that in this change no part is attributable to infiltration from the catholic literature of Athens? In any case, such tales did not import a conversion of the kind suggested by Aeschylus.

Indeed the strongest reason for believing, provisionally and until the contrary is proved, that the mystic and miraculous conversion of Vengeance to Grace, the sudden revelation that, in some incomprehensible way, Vengeance and Grace are the same, punishment and prosperity parts and aspects of one Providence, was the thought, substantially new and original, of Aeschylus himself, is its profound unlikeness and immense superiority to the common religious products of the Greek mind. It has the stamp of Aeschylus, perhaps the only Greek who shows a strong genius for religious invention, not metaphysical, or moral, or artistic, or imaginative, or ritual, or anything else but religious. The conversion of the Erinyes is a religious idea, awful, dark, and intensely satisfying. If Hellenic paganism had been generally capable of such thoughts, of comprehending them even, and adopting them when they had been invented, it might not have died when it did. What meaning could such a thought have conveyed to a mind like that of Herodotus or that of Pindar, men both much-worshipping in their own ways? Sophocles of course understood it; Euripides divined its power, and disliked it in a just proportion. Doubtless many other Athenians were capable of it, or an Athenian would not have been the originator. But the Athenian public dealt with it as the public does. In the official oratory of the fourth century, as above quoted¹, we find the Aeschylean account of the Semnai Theai reduced to a thing commonplace and, except to Athenian vanity, utterly uninteresting. The conversion of the Erinyes, torn away from all that in Aeschylus gives it significance, is incongruously tacked to a theology and a legend which Aeschylus contemptuously disowns. It has become just a piece in the canonical patchwork, an object in the mythical museum. But it is something more in Aeschylus, and that something more is from his own brain.

It need not however and perhaps cannot easily be supposed, that between the Erinyes and the sanctuary on the Areopagus there was, before Aeschylus, no connexion at all. Something of this kind to work upon was perhaps necessary to the reception, if not to the conception, of the *Eumenides*. And there remains what may be a trace of it. The *Electra* of Euripides, presenting the murder of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra, concludes with a sketch of the future fortunes of the slayers, in a divine and mechanical epilogue of the usual Euripidean type. There

¹ p. xxxix, note.

we are told that, when Orestes is acquitted by the Areopagus, "the strange dread goddesses, under this grievous blow, shall descend into a chasm in the ground, hard by the Hill¹." Now Euripides may be inventing here, or putting on a colour of his own; but that is not likely. For his very purpose in these epilogues is to make a perfunctory, pretended reconciliation between his nonconformist plays and popular tradition; and the rest of the prophecy is just common fable, with nothing of the author except the indifference with which it is related. Probably therefore the descent of the disappointed demons into 'a chasm in the ground' is really the end of the trial, the natural end, as before Aeschylus it was commonly related. It is further probable, perhaps certain, when we lay Euripides and Aeschylus together, that this chasm was located at the sanctuary of the Semnai Theai. If so, when Aeschylus conducted the Erinyes to that sanctuary as possessors, the audience was so far ready for him, that thither at least, though not as the Semnai Theai nor as friends of Athens, they were expected to go. Nor is it surprising that in time the makers of tradition should recognise the Aeschylean account of the matter as more ornamental to the city than the old one, and, without caring what Aeschylus meant or themselves meaning anything in particular, should put 'the settlement of the Semnai Theai or Eumenides', as a brilliant bit of colour, into the incongruous mosaic of official legend.

Further we must not deny, if we may not assert, that before Aeschylus there was in the popular consciousness some negative adumbration of his idea, some notion that the vast variety of local polytheism might be at bottom partly a question of names, and that, for example, powers classable as *chthonian*, such as were the Semnai Theai of the Areopagus, the Eumenides of Colonus, and the Erinyes of everywhere and nowhere, however different, might not be different altogether. Popular thinking is not apt to be clear either in conjunction or division. This at least should be noted, that if Aeschylus ends with union, he begins by accenting separation. The Erinyes, before he put them on the stage, were distinguished from other and from gentler beings of the nether world, but were not so monstrously and definitely unlike as he makes them. The horrid form, traits, description, action of them are all created or developed by him. It is likely that, if we could follow the conceptions of the Erinyes and the Semnai Theai back from the days of Aeschylus to their beginnings, the ghost-spirits of the earth who avenge, and the life-spirits of the earth

¹ Eur. *El.* 1270 δεινὰ μὲν οὖν θεαὶ τῶδ' ἄχει πεπληγμέναι | πάγον παρ' αὐτὸν χάσμα δύσσονται χθονός.

who give increase, might come out much the same, and be seen to branch from one common base of savage imagination. It is not improbable that, with all the refining of art and speculation, something of that simplicity or confusion lived on, to predispose in a certain direction the poet, or his audience, or both. This is the line of investigation followed, with instructive results, by Miss Harrison in the *Prolegomena to Greek Mythology*¹, to which I would refer for much information which, though beyond the scope of a commentary on Aeschylus, as not demonstrably recognised by him, helps to account for his ideas historically. All men, and most of all the most original, use much which they do not know.

The *Eumenides* itself supplies one reason for supposing that the identification of Erinyes and Semnai Theai was a novelty. There is no sign that the audience are in the secret beforehand. If the conversion of the pursuers had been familiar, even as a possible and alternative termination to the story, there could not have been a finer opportunity for that 'irony', those covert or involuntary forecasts, in which the Attic theatre, and Aeschylus especially, took so much delight. Apollo, Orestes, the Erinyes themselves, and above all Athena, might be expected, if we judge by the method followed in the *Agamemnon*, *Choephoroi*, *Seven Against Thebes* and elsewhere, to hint in various ways the nature of the foreknown conclusion. But nothing of the kind is to be found. In the case of Athena particularly, it is made clear that, according to the conception of Aeschylus, she does *not* foresee the relations which, by the will of the supreme powers, are to be established between Athens and its formidable visitors². The conversion, when it comes, comes, for anything that appears in the play, as a complete and universal surprise. Probably therefore it was a surprise; probably both dramatist and audience here enjoyed an effect less common in the conditions of the earlier Attic stage, but not less valuable, than satisfied anticipation.

However we cannot be sure. The only sure ground for asserting that the conversion of the Erinyes was not known before Aeschylus would be an argument *a silentio*, based upon a large mass of contemporary or earlier Athenian literature. We have almost none. But seeing how the indications lie, we must at all events not decide the other way.

¹ Chapter v, pp. 163 foll., especially pp. 213 foll. 'The Ker as Erinys',

² *vv.* 479 foll.

The legal issue in and before Aeschylus. Father and Mother.

If the antecedents of the *Eumenides* are on the religious side partly uncertain, so also, and more so, is the legal side. Of the source, if source there was, from which Aeschylus took the details of the forensic argument, we know nothing. We do not even know, and must not assume, that before this play the legend of Orestes' trial had even been developed in such a shape as to require the production of arguments. As a mythical precedent for the rule about equality of votes (and this seems to be the only known legal use of it), it may have existed for ages without any such development; and the arguments, for anything which can be proved to the contrary, may be the invention of the poet, guided by such notions of law as he had or could pick up.

What is certain is that in the law of the matter, the law proper, he took little interest. The ultimate issue of his play is not legal, but religious; and if he commends (as he does) the method of trial by jury as an engine of politics, he shows not less clearly, what as a fact is plainly true, that *even after* such a decision, we may be as far as ever from a revelation of right: For this purpose the instrument is inefficient, and the true judgment, the divine and ultimate judgment, will remain in suspense.

To this end it matters almost nothing, upon what statements of the case the court pronounces its ambiguous and unsatisfactory verdict. It matters nothing that, as before remarked, the prosecutors, in different parts of the play, assume, respecting the limits of punishable homicide, views which are not compatible; or again, that the question of the validity of the oracular command, though it is a main point in the defence, and though the jury must be supposed to disagree about it, is not argued, unless contradiction is argument, at all¹. The whole debate, though adequate and effective for the poet's purpose, is curt, superficial, and without pretence to accuracy.

On law therefore, and the history of law, the *Eumenides* is but a dubious authority; and the reader or expositor of Aeschylus as such is not bound, or perhaps entitled, to consider the play from this point of view. There is however one aspect upon which we must touch, if only by way of caution. It has been alleged, sometimes that the *Eumenides* exhibits a contest between an older system of kinship through the mother and a later system of kinship through the father, sometimes that it retains the traces of such a contest. The former

¹ See *vv.* 618—627.

statement, as we have seen¹, is indefensible; the Erinyes, whatever they may have been once, are not in Aeschylus the defenders of maternal rights, either solely, or preferentially as compared with the paternal. The latter statement has some appearance of truth.

Much indeed of what has been cited for it is irrelevant. It is nothing to the purpose that the Erinyes insist upon the guilt of matricide. Such is the case in question; and the frequency of reference to it implies neither exclusion nor partiality. The admissible evidence for an opposition between paternal and maternal rights reduces itself, upon inspection, to two passages: (1) the final argument of Apollo, that, as the earth is not the parent of the seed which grows in it, so the mother is no parent of the child²; and (2) the preference of the male side declared by Athena as the motive of her casting-vote³. It may well be thought that, though Aeschylus himself does not present the case of Orestes as turning upon adverse views of parentage, these passages were suggested to him by some version or tradition which did. But even here the ground is not very safe; to suppose an external source is not necessary, the context, properly considered, supplying in each instance sufficient reason for the invention.

Of Athena's vote we have spoken before⁴. What is expressed by this, according to the scheme of Aeschylus, is no legal or moral theory, but a personal preference, a personal partiality for fathers. To find a motive for such partiality in Athena, it was scarcely necessary to consult authorities, even if (which, let it be said once more, we do not know) the arguments in the case, and among them those of Athena, had ever before been stated.

Nor did Aeschylus need the pressure of authority for placing, as he places it, the theory of Apollo on the nature of parentage. We must observe, first, that the god-advocate does not produce this theory until (*salva reverentia*) he is driven to it⁵; his spontaneous defence ignores it completely; and secondly, that it is not produced upon the main issue, but upon an objection ingeniously raised by the prosecutors, that Orestes, even if formally acquitted, will be incapable of rehabilitation, because he cannot be restored to Argos⁶. The first fact goes with other signs⁷ to show that Aeschylus held the theory to be, as it is, extravagant and fallacious. It is the sort of argument which illustrates

¹ pp. xviii—xxi.

² *v.* 661.

³ *v.* 732. See also *vv.* 643 foll., 762 foll., with the notes. *Vv.* 603—606 may imply knowledge of *some* arguments on

this or like cases, but do not touch the present question.

⁴ pp. xxv—xxx.

⁵ See on *vv.* 643—659.

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ See notes *ad loc.*

the sarcasm of Mephistopheles, that man uses reason for the increase of folly. For Aeschylus, it seems to mark, as Prof. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf suggests, the extreme of what a pleader, with his back to the wall, might be found to say. To introduce it for dramatic colour in this way, the dramatist need not have been prompted by any tradition about the legal issue of the trial. It would be enough that he had heard of such a theory, which is not unlikely, as it seems to have been held in Egypt¹, and has since been advanced at divers times and by sundry sapient persons down to the eighteenth century and James Boswell, the biographer of Johnson. If we suppose that Aeschylus knew it to have been used in an Athenian court, then, following his indications, we should also suppose it used as by Apollo, that is to say, on the question, not whether a certain homicide should be condemned or absolved, but whether the absolution of a homicide properly carried with it the admission of him to such local rites and privileges as those of a deme or phratry. Such questions may well have arisen and been contested bitterly, if not within Attica, yet within the Athenian empire, in cases where defendants, like Orestes, were of foreign domicile. Whether the absolution of an Athenian jury bound a religious brotherhood in Naxos or Mytilene to admit a member who, according to the law of that association, was tainted with 'kindred blood', is the sort of question which the quasi-imperial posture and ambition of Athens was certain to raise. It is also the sort of question in which a theory destructive of parentage,—for it is equally destructive, if admitted at all, of parentage on both sides, at all events as importing connexion by 'blood', and may be applied to either at pleasure²,—however extravagant, might be practically useful; because, if the disproof of kinship was unreal, so also, in the case of the religious 'brotherhoods', the ancient tribes, phratries, demes and the like, was the kinship which *ex hypothesi* was to be disproved. The descent of the members from a common ancestor (father or mother, as the case might be) was commonly a fiction. And the adoption of a convenient pretence, to meet a pretence which has become inconvenient, is a not unfrequent incident in the development of law. But that the relationship between mother and child, and the obligation founded upon it, was or ever had been

¹ Dr Headlam (*Class. Rev.* XII. 248), citing Diod. Sic. I. 80.

² It is in this respect like all arguments, if they deserve the name, which rest upon the assumption of a false analogy. If we are to assume that a plant has 'blood',

how does it appear that the 'blood' of a plant is derived solely from the seed, and not rather solely from the earth?—Euripides assigns the theory (plainly as absurd) to the perverse 'Orestes' of his play so called.

generally denied, at Athens, at Delphi, or elsewhere—this, though it may be true, is more than we could infer from Aeschylus.

The general question, whether the Erinyes ever had been associated specially with the mother¹, is beyond our present limits. The evidence is slight and insufficient for a positive conclusion. Nor must we be positive about Aeschylus, except so far as this, that he did not definitely recognise the case of Orestes as turning, or having been supposed to turn, upon theories of kinship. He does not adopt this view; he does not reject or avoid it, like the Delphian legends of which he disapproved, or the legends about the origin of the Areopagus. He is neutral about it, or rather null; and his reader, if he pleases, may take the same line².

The Politics of the Play.

This topic, though not unimportant, is everywhere secondary and subordinate. It is clear from the tone of the final scene, and is generally recognised, that Aeschylus did not intend at least to appear as a partisan, that he supposed himself to be a peacemaker, and to have advanced only what would be generally approved. He justifies trial by jury; he extols the Areopagus as a court of crime; he leaves room, but in vague terms, for a larger execution of its 'vigilant protection'³. On the other hand, he reprobates 'tyranny' and 'encroachment', and implies that the excellent institution of Athena had suffered abuses⁴. He is an ardent patriot, who greatly admires the energy of Athens, and sympathizes with her imperial mission, provided always that this does not imply arrogance or violence⁵. He is for the middle way, 'neither tyranny nor anarchy', and above all things preaches respect for the law and *internal concord*, to which, as a final object-lesson, the whole play leads up⁶. All this is edifying, though vague, and corresponds to what we may suppose to have been the sentiments of moderate persons in the year of the play (458 B.C.), on the morrow or in the midst (the dates and details are not precisely known) of the *κόλουσις* or curtailment of

¹ See Deecke, in Roscher's *Lexicon of Gr. and Rom. Mythology*, s.v. *Erinyes*, p. 1321, where the matter is stated with caution.

² For possible traces of legal discussion about the case of Orestes, or of like cases, see on *vv.* 603—611.

³ See *v.* 708, and the whole foundation-speech of Athena. The language used is wider, or admits at least a wider con-

struction, than corresponds to the position of the Areopagus after the democratic constitution had been fully developed.

⁴ See *vv.* 520—568, and the closely connected *vv.* 693—702.

⁵ See *vv.* 292 foll., 361 foll., 369 foll., 400 foll., 520 foll., 703 foll., 757 foll. and *passim*.

⁶ *vv.* 860 foll., 977 foll. and the finale *passim*.

the Areopagus, the reduction of the ancient Council from a censorial function, extended after the Persian wars so as almost to embrace the whole government, down to limited competence as a judicial tribunal. It corresponds also to the moment when the expansion of Athens had perhaps the brightest prospects. But the attitude of the poet is not that of a practical politician. Religion, always first with him, in the *Eumenides* covers the whole field.

The external relations of Athens, and the importance attached about this time to the recently-formed alliance between the city and Argos¹, account for certain passages², not otherwise relevant and perhaps not very happily conceived, in which it is suggested that, by the trial and discharge of Orestes, Argos is laid under a permanent obligation to Athens, or that at all events, with Orestes, the Argive 'hero', as a friend, hostility from Argos to Athens is not to be feared. The impression conveyed is that the solidity of the alliance was for the moment a subject rather of anxiety than of confidence³. The history of the period is too little known to afford more than a general explanation of these allusions, which however are of no importance to the total effect. That they are, strictly speaking, irrelevant to the issue, is indicated by Aeschylus himself⁴.

More important, as well as more relevant, is the suggestion, which engrafts itself naturally and almost necessarily upon the ancient legend as modified by Aeschylus, that decrees of the Areopagus, and by implication, those of Athenian courts generally, had or should have a sort of universal validity, and be operative everywhere⁵. In the legendary version, when the acquittal of Orestes was entirely the work of gods, and the trial altogether of an extraordinary and superhuman character, the competence of the tribunal did not come into question. Aeschylus, by making the jury Athenian citizens and the whole proceeding, so far as possible, ordinary, necessarily raises the question of competence; and by assuming that it is decided in favour of Athens, he falls in with a tendency of the first importance to the imperial ambitions of the city.

¹ Grote, *Hist. Greece* II. Chap. xlv., Vol. 4, p. 71 (8 vol. edition).

² *vv.* 289 foll., 670 foll., 765 foll. The last passage differs somewhat in substance and tone from the others, and doubts

have been raised upon it, but see the notes.

³ See especially *vv.* 765 foll.

⁴ *vv.* 677, 678.

⁵ *vv.* 757 foll.

The Divisions of the Play. Time. Scenery.

In structure and division the *Eumenides*, though simple in itself, is among Greek plays remarkable. The conventional division, established for tragedy when fully developed, into *prologos*, *parodos*, certain *episodia*, and *exodos*, marked off by movements or stationary songs of the Chorus, has in this case little or no application. There are two breaks¹, and two only, in the action, dividing the play into three Acts. One of these breaks certainly, the other probably², is marked by an 'empty stage' (that is, an exit of all the performers), by a change in the imaginary place of action, and by some change at least, whether we suppose it small or great, in the actual scenic representation³. The *stasima*, the great choric odes, are also two⁴. The second of these coincides with, or rather immediately precedes, the second break in the action; but the first, the ὕμνος δέσμιος, does not coincide with the first break, and, regard being had to the circumstances, can scarcely be said to break or suspend the action at all; it is merely a part of the scene in which it occurs.

The place of action is in Act I. at Delphi, before the temple of Apollo, but within the sacred precincts⁵. In Act II. it is at a sanctuary in Athens, exhibiting an altar, 'house', and ancient image of Pallas Athena⁶. In Act III. it is, I think (though this is disputed), on the Areopagus, at the place where the Court regularly sat⁷.

Between Act I. and Act II. take place the wanderings of Orestes, hunted by the Erinyes, from his leaving Delphi to his reaching Athens. The references to these⁸ show that they are supposed to extend over a wide space and long time, including voyages by sea, but give no description or limit, unless we so understand the statement they have covered 'every region of the earth'⁹. Between Act II. and Act III. occurs whatever must or may be supposed to take place

¹ v. 234, v. 568.

² The question is discussed upon vv. 568, 569. See Appendix I.

³ This sentence applies, in my opinion, also to the *Choephoroi* (see the Introduction to that play) where however the division is more difficult and uncertain.

⁴ v. 307, v. 493.

⁵ Hence έξω τῶνδε δωμάτων in v. 179, where δώματα means the whole oracular sanctuary. See on this and other points The Relative Position of Actors and

Chorus in the Greek Theatre of the V. Century B.C. (John Pickard), *American Journal of Philology*, Vol. xiv. p. 208.

⁶ Commonly supposed hitherto to be the ancient temple on the Acropolis. But see note to vv. 79, 80, and Appendix I. to vv. 568, 569.

⁷ See Appendix I. to vv. 568, 569.

⁸ vv. 75-77, 239-243, 249-251, 276-286, 454.

⁹ v. 249.

between the declaration of Athena, that the cause shall be tried by a jury, and the actual assembling of the court,—an indefinite interval, but naturally neither very long nor very short. Since the scene is cleared (see above), the imagination of the audience is left perfectly free in estimating the interval supposed.

When from the imaginary scene we pass to the actual representation, we can say little that is certain. Two things, however, seem clear. First, the scenery was simple; the remarkable absence of all local allusions is so far conclusive. Secondly, a scenic change of some sort took place at each division. Act I., upon the assumption respecting the conduct of the action which seems most probable (see below), requires only a temple-front, or something which may be taken for such. In Act II. the things visible are the altar, house, and image of Pallas Athena; and the image must be accessible, since Orestes is directed to embrace it, and is actually found by the Erinyes in that attitude¹. Some change from the arrangements of Act I., not necessarily great, is required, and could be easily made while the scene was empty. So also between Act II. and Act III. The representation of the place of trial, however symbolic and rudimentary, would require some new arrangements, if it were only seats for the judges and a table or altar with urns for the voting. This strengthens, and decisively, the other reasons for thinking that between these two Acts also the scene was empty.

Of machinery there is no certain trace. A scholium at *v.* 64 seems to suggest that Apollo then 'appears' above the temple, and states that simultaneously 'the turning of machinery' exhibits the group in the interior, Orestes surrounded by the Erinyes². I agree with those who reject this³. The latter statement would indeed be impossible, if it refers to the *eccyclema*⁴, and if, as has commonly been thought, the *eccyclema* was a platform run out through one of the entrances in the back-scene. No such platform could contain the supposed group, thirteen figures (at least) and the *omphalos*. It has however recently been suggested⁵, with much probability, that the *eccyclema* was a semi-

¹ *vv.* 258—260; see also *vv.* 80, 240—243, 412, 442, 448.

² ἐπιφανείς Ἀπόλλων συμβουλευεί Ὀρέστη καταλιπεῖν μὲν τὸ μαντεῖον φυγεῖν δὲ εἰς Ἀθήνας. καὶ δευτέρα δὲ γίνεται φαντασία. στραφέντα γὰρ μηχανήματα ἐνδηλα ποιεῖ τὰ κατὰ τὸ μαντεῖον ὡς ἔχει. καὶ γίνεται ὄψις τραγική· τὸ μὲν ξίφος ἡμαγμένον ἔτι κατέχων Ὀρέστης, αἱ δὲ κύκλιφ φρουρούσαι αὐτόν. (As to the ξίφος see on *v.* 42.)

The word ἐπιφανείς and the expression δευτέρα φαντασία seem to imply a machine for Apollo.

³ See Pickard, *American Journal of Philology*, XIV. 208.

⁴ Use of the *eccyclema* is supposed in the *Agamemnon* (1371) and *Choephori* (971), but is not certain; see notes there.

⁵ By Mr Charles Oxon, *Hermathena* XI. p. 132.

circular platform attached at the back to a portion of the back-scene, and revolving, together with it, about a pivot. Such a platform might perhaps give sufficient space to be used here; and the scholium, if worthy of trust¹, proves that at some time the scene was so exhibited. But it may still be held that such was not the arrangement of Aeschylus. The effect of the entrance of the Chorus (at *v.* 140) would be spoiled, as I think, by such a previous exhibition, whether we suppose or not that the *eccyclema* was withdrawn again before that point. At all events the Aeschylean text admits the view that all the personages of Act I. enter by one of the usual ways, the Prophetess, on her first appearance, by one of the *parodoi*, the others, including the ghost of Clytaemnestra, from the temple.

The question whether Athena, at her entrance in Act II., has a visible car (*ὄχημα*), or a car at all, is discussed in the notes to *vv.* 400—408. I incline to the opinion that at all events none is visible.

There is no internal evidence of a 'stage', that is, for the elevation of any part of the acting-place above the level of the orchestra. If there was any, it must, as appears everywhere and especially in the first and last Acts, have been of such elevation only, and so arranged, as to afford perfectly easy passage to and from the orchestra.

The Dramatis Personae.

As in the other plays of the trilogy, so in this, the simplicity of material setting contrasts forcibly with the abundance of human assistants, the only kind of pomp which Aeschylus could freely command. Like the *Agamemnon* and *Choephoroi*, the *Eumenides* concludes with a crowded scene of great animation, and the textual evidence for the crowd and its component parts is more explicit than in the other plays².

Three 'actors', in the limited sense, are required. The list of parts given in the Medicean ms.³ is for this play, as for the others, incomplete. A passage in the finale, which has consequently been found inexplicable, indicates that here also, as we should expect, Aeschylus has used his full strength for the conclusion, and that the two actors released by the retirement of Apollo and Orestes come on again in the character of citizens⁴. These should be added to the Prophetess, Apollo, Orestes, the ghost of Clytaemnestra, and Athena.

¹ It should be remembered that we know nothing of the author and his qualifications or sources of information.

² See on *v.* 569, and the Third Act *passim*.

³ See below, immediately before the text.

⁴ *vv.* 989, 990. Cp. *Ag.* 1522, 1650, *Cho.* 1041, 1049, etc. The parallel with the *Eumenides* is particularly close in the *Choephoroi*.

The *Agamemnon*, as I hold, has two distinct troops of singers or *choreutae*¹; so probably has the *Choephoroi*²; and so has the *Eumenides*. The principal Chorus are the Erinyes, the secondary³ are persons (*προπομποί*) in the procession which escorts the Erinyes in the final exit. The number of these last is indeterminate, and that of the Erinyes is not certain. A scholium to *v.* 588, where they call themselves 'many', makes them fifteen⁴. This however may be based on nothing more than the author's knowledge that such was the regular number of the tragic chorus when fully developed; and the same statement is elsewhere made about the *Agamemnon*, where nevertheless the principal Chorus was almost certainly twelve⁵. We must not however presume that the number was the same in all three plays. There is a possible reason why the *Eumenides* should have had additional *choreutae*, and precisely three such. The Eumenides were a trinity⁶. The Semnai Theai, originally perhaps two, became a trinity⁷, probably had become a trinity before Aeschylus⁸, and were represented like the Eumenides by three images. The Erinyes, before this play, were unnumbered, or rather there were innumerable Erinyes⁹. There was therefore no difficulty in bringing upon the stage any number, twelve or fifteen. But there was a difficulty, a great difficulty, in suggesting identity between this multitude and the respective trinities. A group of three principal or leading Erinyes¹⁰, made prominent by being an addition to the Chorus as it had appeared in the previous two plays, would aid the connexion, both for eye and mind, and would suggest, what Aeschylus evidently believed and meant, that the individual characteristics of these and all divinities, their number, figures and so forth, are mere symbols, signs for expressing an unknown Reality, 'whose pleasure it is to be called Zeus'¹¹. However

¹ See on *Ag.* 363 etc.

² See on *Cho.* 583, 649 etc.

³ *vv.* 1033 foll.; see notes from *v.* 1004 to the end.

⁴ *τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς τὰς τρεῖς (the three Erinyes of later literature), ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν χορὸν, εἴ γὰρ ἦσαν.* As to the text here, and its bearing on the question, see the note.

⁵ See on *Ag.* 1347.

⁶ See the representation of them found at Argos, J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to Greek Mythology*, p. 255, and note the importance of the number *three* in the rites of Colonus, Soph. *O.C.* 479, 483.

⁷ Harrison, *Prolegomena*, p. 242.

⁸ Probably, because the threefold

identification assumed by Aeschylus, difficult enough in any case, could scarcely have been attempted, if even the Eumenides and the Semnai Theai had presented so plain a difference as that of number.

⁹ The first hint of 'the three Furies' seems to be Eur. *Iph. Taur.* 285—290, and the first definite mention, Eur. *Orest.* 1650 *Εὐμενίστι τριπλοῖσσι*, both passages pointing directly to the story of Orestes as exhibited in our play.

¹⁰ For possible traces of such a group see the two 'parodoi', or entrances of the Chorus, *vv.* 140 foll., *vv.* 244—255.

¹¹ *Ag.* 170, where see the context.

this may be, the poet's mysticism was over the heads of his average fellow-countrymen, then and for long after; and one practical result of the *Eumenides*, preposterous but inevitable, was to aid in producing the pedantic triplicity of 'Allecto, Tisiphone, and Megaera'.

The 'mute persons' and 'supers' (in modern phrase) are of great importance. That the 'Hermes' addressed at *v.* 89 actually appears is not clear; the effect would perhaps be better otherwise. But in the Third Act there is a literal crowd of assistants, including the most important 'mutes' of extant Greek drama (excepting the champions in the *Seven against Thebes*), the jury of the Areopagus. Their number is even¹; I believe it to be ten (or some multiple of ten)², but this is not certain, and nothing of importance turns upon it. The herald³, who introduces the Court and prepares for the singularly impressive entrance of Apollo, is also a prominent figure; and probably, from the nature of the case, there are other apparitors, who do not happen to be singled out. But beyond these, and most important, is the 'multitude', the folk of Athens assembled to witness the great 'first judgment' and receive the instructions of the Foundress⁴. This people, the symbol of a disciplined humanity, 'virtuous at last'⁵, is the object upon which the vast and mysterious lights of the *Oresteia* finally converge, and it is they who have the last word and the last act.

The Text.

The text of this play requires little particular remark. The *Codex Medicus* (M), the primary authority for the text of Aeschylus, contains the whole play. Wherever the text here printed departs from the letters of the ms., the variation, if it seems to be of the least possible moment (and sometimes, to illustrate the ms. spelling, even where it is of no moment), is indicated by printing the substituted letters in a different type; and the reading of the ms. is given below. In this record, and in quotations from the scholia to the ms., I follow the critical edition of Wecklein (Berlin 1885), as also, unless the contrary appears, in the names cited for the authorship of particular corrections. The reading of later MSS., one or more, is indicated (by *rec.* or *recc.*) only when that reading is adopted, as a correction, in preference to that of M.

The ms. text, as a whole, is good. There are in this play many

¹ See above, on Athena's vote.

² See on *v.* 687, *vv.* 714 foll.

³ *vv.* 569 foll.

⁴ *v.* 569 and the final scene *passim*.

⁵ *v.* 1001.

signs of careful, and also scrupulous, correction, including an abundance of 'queries'. That the scholars, who supervised the production, were imperfect in information, is sometimes only too evident; but evidently they did their best to preserve the tradition, which ought to be regarded as of great weight. In the 63 verses of the prologue, if we ignore a few irregularities of spelling (such as λέχος for λόχος in *v.* 46), there is, in my judgment, but one place (*vv.* 40, 41) where the reading of M should be disputed, and even here the case against it is not absolutely clear. Alterations have indeed been made by editors in several other places; but all these changes are dubious, and some of them unfortunate.

If the average condition of the play does not reach this level, yet neither does it fall much below, except in the last 23 verses, where the haste of some copyist, or (perhaps more probably) some damage to the end of a roll, has produced irremediable injuries.

In admitting conjectural emendations, I have adopted, as in other plays, a somewhat severe standard, which I will briefly explain.

I. There are certain confusions which, in favouring circumstances, occur in the MS. so often, that, where such conditions occur, the tradition must be taken as simply ambiguous, equally valid for the reading actually presented or for one slightly different. Thus in *v.* 965 παντὶ δόμῳ μέγα κοινοί (M), it would be vain to plead the authority of the MS. against the correction of Turnebus, μετάκοινοί. Apparent confusions of τ and ρ, and of μέγα in particular with μετα, are numerous enough to show that, in an uncommon word, such as μετάκοινος, the choice of the copyist would be quite uncertain. This is no reason indeed for changing μέγα, but μετα-, if better, as none will doubt, is equally entitled to the support of tradition. For another example see *v.* 913. The range of such doubts is not very large, and must not be exaggerated. For example, in *v.* 911, we cannot say that τῶν δυσσεβούντων δ' (M) is equally valid in favour of the conjecture τῶν δ' εὐσεβούντων. The supposed error is not improbable, and the conjecture may be right, as I think it is; but the choice, in point of traditional authority, is by no means indifferent. Still less so is it, for instance, in *v.* 11: erroneous substitutions of σθ for θ may indeed be found in the MS.; but confusion in this matter does not nearly approach the point of indifference, and, in the particular circumstances, would be most unlikely.

II. Even where the MS. is not, in the sense just defined, ambiguous, conjectural changes, slight, probable, and properly notified as such, may be admitted to the text, if the traditional reading is

linguistically (or rhythmically) impossible, *if it has no sense (or no metre) at all*. But this licence should be construed strictly. In the state of our knowledge, it cannot be safely extended to cases of aesthetic, as distinct from linguistic objection, where the sense of the traditional reading is, to our estimate, not satisfactory. For example, in *v. 911*, the MS. gives

τῶν δυσσεβούντων δ' ἔκφορτέρα πέλοις,

which the writer, whether poet or editor, evidently took to mean, 'May you rather *remove (destroy)* the wicked'. Now such a use of ἔκφορος (commonly *productive*) is unexampled, forced, and, as some have observed, peculiarly unsuitable to the context (see note). And it will be avoided, if we accept from Heath the change of τῶν δυσσεβούντων δ' into τῶν δ' εὐσεβούντων,—'May you be more *productive of the good*'. This observation, and some other not impossible suggestions, go far to invalidate the MS. reading, as evidence that Aeschylus used ἔκφορος here in the bold and apparently perverse way which it assumes. Should we then be justified in admitting Heath's correction, or some other, to the text? I think not. Strange as the given expression would be, we cannot say that it would be unintelligible. The MS. reading is not, properly speaking, nonsense. And as to its propriety, in the first place, we cannot, with our limited materials, be absolutely sure that it was even linguistically improper, or that, if it was so, Aeschylus had not reason for choosing, with a view to some literary allusion, a term not linguistically proper. Such phenomena, certified beyond doubt, occur in modern composers. And further, be it assumed that there was no justification, but that the given expression would have appeared to Phrynichus or Sophocles as unfortunate as it did to Heath, and does (I admit) to me. What then? The greatest composers, the greatest poets, do not, as a fact, always abstain from unfortunate or perverse licences of language. Milton, Pope, Shelley, Tennyson,—in any of these, or perhaps in any remarkable writer of English, may be found expressions not a few, which no one, except the author, would have approved or permitted. It is proper indeed, in such a case, that a commentary should give the reader full notice of the objections to which the tradition is apparently liable,—a requirement which, as a recent critic remarks, has hardly been satisfied, for the most part, in the case of *v. 911*. But beyond this we cannot safely go.

The tendency however, not in this place but generally, has been to go farther. The readings now commonly adopted depart from the MS. in very many places where the MS. is defensible, in not a few where it is clearly right. This occurs chiefly in the case of 'obvious corrections',

made when Aeschylus was first studied in the West, and repeated since, as may be suspected, without much, if any, reconsideration. It is not easy—I speak for myself—even to realise that a very familiar reading has no traditional authority, still less easy to put it aside and to review the case without prejudice. But this should be done. There is no reason (I submit), and never was any, to suppose that in *v. 11* Aeschylus wrote what is now universally printed. And similar instances may be found throughout.

But although the *ms.* may deserve a more invariable and uniform consideration than it is apt to receive, I would say here, once for all, that, by retaining its reading in my text, I do not always, or even generally, mean that the reading is, in my opinion, certain; or even that no other doubts upon it could reasonably be entertained, than those which are noticed in the commentary. I mean only that the tradition appears to me in that place as well warranted as usual, or as ever. I will give one instance of the sort of doubt which, though not baseless, may legitimately and, as I think, should be ignored. In *vv. 44, 45*, the emblematic olive-bough of a suppliant is described as

λήνει μεγίστῳ σωφρόνως ἔστεμμένον,
ἀργῆτι μαλλῶ· τῆδε γὰρ τρανῶς ἔρῳ.

About the meaning of this, especially the last clause, I, like others, am uncertain. But the late Dr Rutherford, than whom none had better right to an opinion, proposed (*Classical Review* II. 291) to cut away the ground of speculation, by reducing the two verses to one :

ἀργῆτι λήνει σωφρόνως ἔστεμμένον.

The rest of the *ms.* text he supposed to consist of glosses, interpretations (*μαλλῶ* on *λήνει*, for instance), trimmed and filled up so as to make out metre. Now this, I admit, is possible. But the mere possibility surely does not add anything substantial to the general, abstract doubt, which we must feel about a text, having such a history as that of Aeschylus, wherever we find it hard, and which we might feel, not less warrantably, where we find it easy. Anywhere and everywhere, not least where it looks simplest, it *may* have undergone some such complicated remodelling, part injury and part restoration, as is here suggested. We are not therefore bound, nor even logically entitled, to apply such treatment to a particular passage, which, for anything that appears, might be transparent, if we had a little more knowledge of its subject. And under this category fall the vast majority of conjectures. They have, or may have, a use in exhibiting some point of difficulty. But for the constitution of the text, they ought not, we may hold, to be

entertained. Either they are founded upon suspicions not really justifiable, or (a not less common case) they assume in the ms. errors possible no doubt, but not, in any proper and distinctive sense, probable. They signify only that the particular sentence, like any other sentence of Aeschylus, *may conceivably* have been depraved beyond our means of tracing and restoration. Such, for example, is the most familiar conjectural version of *vv.* 448, 449 :

οὐκ εἰμι προστρόπαιος, οὐδ' ἔχων μύσος
πρὸς χειρὶ τῆμῃ τὸ σὸν ἐφεζόμεν βρέτας.

The ms. has

οὐκ εἰμι προστρόπαιος, οὐδ' ἔχει μύσος
πρὸς χειρὶ τῆμῃ τὸ σὸν ἐφεζομένη βρέτας.

By no process deserving to be called probable, as distinct from merely possible, could this arise out of the conjectural version, which, though not disprovable, is nevertheless not to be entertained.

At the other end of the scale stand a certain number of 'obvious' corrections, which it is not worth while to dispute, although, to a strict judgment, the tradition would not appear absolutely impossible. For example, in *vv.* 217, 218 the ms. has

εὐνή γὰρ ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ μόρσιμοι
ὄρκου ὅτι μείζων τῇ δίκῃ φρουρουμένη.

It is obvious to conjecture either *μόρσιμος* (as the copyists of two later mss.) or *μορσίμοις* (Hartung), and we may best follow convention in adopting *μόρσιμος*. But there would be little ground for surprise, if in the autograph of Aeschylus, could we obtain it, we found exactly what is offered by M. The subject of the sentence may be regarded indifferently as singular or as plural; and a fluctuation between the two numbers, though offensive to scientific grammar, is an irregularity of that kind which, in English writers of repute, may be found not rarely down to, at least, the age of Dryden. Questions similar, but more worth discussion, occur, for example, in *v.* 621 and *vv.* 770—774.

In four places (I think only four) I have changed the letters of the ms. upon my own conjecture: *vv.* 224, 390, 448, 913. In all these, except the last, the ms. reading is universally condemned; in the last it has been doubted, but, for the most part, allowed to pass.

Once or twice (555, 556, 947), where the text seems to be literally defective, where something is lost, I have suggested supplements upon the only method which may be called strictly *probable*, the repetition of letters.

In a few others (*e.g.* 133, 277, 687) I suggest changes in the accentuation, the division of the words, or the like. But in these the tradition is not authoritative; and they stand upon the same footing as an interpretation. The same principle applies, but ambiguously, to *v.* 570.

Far more often I retain the *ms.* reading, sometimes with confidence, sometimes provisionally, where it is commonly changed. Indeed no small part of my commentary might be described as 'considerations in favour of M'. This, I hope, can at all events do no harm.

Of a spurious verse or verses there is no certain example; one I think probable (*v.* 449); see also *vv.* 286, 765 foll., 860 foll. Loss of a verse or verses must probably be assumed at *v.* 1029, but the loss may be small.

The scholia to this play (I mean those of M), though miscellaneous and various in value, are, on the whole, uncommonly sensible and learned, as well as uncommonly full, presenting in both respects a remarkable contrast to those (for example) upon the *Choephori*. Evidently the *Eumenides*, as might be expected from its contents, was specially attractive to the ancient scholars. I regret that the form of this book prevents me from appending the scholia to the text. To print them as a supplement, since they are easily accessible elsewhere, seemed useless. It has been my intention to notice them, wherever, in my judgment, they should affect the reading or interpretation; but doubtless, in this matter, there will be found oversights and defects. For example, in the note to *v.* 54 (now beyond correction) I should have cited the scholium, *οἶον αιματηράν*, which, since the writer must have read or assumed in the text a word which he took to be *acc. fem. sing.*, may be held to support the conjecture *λίβα*. The inference would not indeed be justified; since the commentator may just as well have guessed (or have known as a fact) that *δία* was singular and feminine, though I should rather suppose it to be plural and neuter. And on the other hand, if the words on which he comments were *δυσφιλή λίβα*, we might well ask why he should connect them, as he does, with *blood*. But for connecting *δία* with blood, he might find plausible authority in the *Eumenides* itself (*v.* 263 τὸ διερόν); and indeed that word, or some of this class, may actually have acquired such an association, and the commentator, if the note is ancient and of good origin, may have known this for a fact. The note therefore, as between the readings, is indifferent, or favours, if either, that of the *ms.* But it should have been cited.

In general, nothing is so difficult as to deal surely, or even fairly, with the evidence of the scholia. They admit no uniform measure.

Bits of sound learning and information stand side by side with ridiculous shots; and sometimes, in the state of the tradition, we can hardly judge concerning a given note, whether it is a wild interpretation of the existing text, or a sound interpretation of some other. The tendency has been, I think, rather to over-value the scholia as compared with the text, for a reason which I have noted before: the foolish scholia, though numerous and conspicuous, get little attention, even from editors, and naturally are hardly ever cited. Thus there arises a sort of presumption, not justified by the facts, that a scholiast must be writing with some reason and discretion. Much speculation, for instance, has been spent on the note *οἶον ἐνόρκους δικαστάς*, as testimony against the soundness of the text to which it is appended,

v. 486 φόνων δικαστὰς ὀρκίων αἰρουμένους...

But however plain it may be that, upon this text, no one *ought* to have propounded such a guess, yet if we have studied the scholia as a whole, we shall easily suppose, that upon this very text it may have been in fact propounded: see, for instance, the note to *v. 488*. In such a case, interpretation of the text takes, at most, a slight increase of uncertainty, —no great matter where, as the most expert will best understand, almost every assertion is provisional, and subject to the enlargement of our scanty and difficult evidence.

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΦΑΝΟΥΣ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΤΉ ΤΠΟΘΕΣΙΣ¹.

Ὁρέστης ἐν Δελφοῖς περιεχόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν Ἐρινύων βουλῇ Ἀπόλλωνος παρεγένετο εἰς Ἀθήνας εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς· ἧς βουλῇ νικήσας κατήλθεν εἰς Ἄργος. τὰς δὲ Ἐρινύας πρᾶννας προσηγόρευσεν Εὐμενίδας. παρ' οὐδετέρῳ κείται ἡ μυθοποιία.

ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΡΑΜΑΤΟΣ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ².

ΠΥΘΙΑΣ ΠΡΟΦΗΤΙΣ³!

ΑΠΟΛΛΩΝ.

ΟΡΕΣΤΗΣ.

ΚΛΥΤΑΙΜΗΣΤΡΑΣ ΕΙΔΩΛΩΝ.

ΧΟΡΟΣ ΕΥΜΕΝΙΔΩΝ.

ΑΘΗΝΑ.

ΠΡΟΠΟΜΠΟΙ.

¹ See Introduction, p. xxxvii.

² See Introduction, p. liii.

ΑΙΣΧΥΛΟΥ ΕΥΜΕΝΙΔΕΣ

ΕΥΜΕΝΙΔΕΣ

ΠΡΟΦΗΤΙΣ.

Πρῶτον μὲν εὐχῆ τῆδε πρεσβεύω θεῶν
τὴν πρωτόμαντιν Γαῖαν· ἐκ δὲ τῆς Θέμιμ,
ἧ δὴ τὸ μητρὸς δευτέρα τόδ' ἔζετο
μαντεῖον, ὡς λόγος τις· ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ
λάχει, θελούσης οὐδὲ πρὸς βίαν τινός;

5

The reading here recorded, unless otherwise described, is that of M, the first hand of the *Codex Medicus*.

4. τίς.

For the situation and scenic conditions see the Introduction.

1—33. The Pythia, or prophetess of Delphi, is about to enter the temple as usual for the reception of those consulting the oracle (see *vv.* 30—33 and the prologue to Euripides' *Ion*), and invokes upon her entrance the blessing of the Delphian gods. These are divided into two classes, first (1—19) the former and present possessors of the sanctuary, who have the honour of 'prayer', and secondly (20—29) those less directly connected with it, to whom belongs rather 'mention' (*εὐχαί, λόγοι, vv.* 20, 21). The reason and significance of this distinction, and the bearing of the whole on the drama, have been considered in the Introduction. The chief point, for Aeschylus, is that both series lead, as a climax, to Zeus (*vv.* 19, 28).

1. εὐχῆ strictly instrumental, 'by thus invoking first'.—θεῶν both with *πρῶτον*

and *πρεσβεύω*: Gaia, by being put *first* of the deities, receives *precedence over* them.

2. τὴν πρωτόμαντιν: because first prophetess, both generally and at Delphi in particular. The hollow (*γύαλον*) or depression in the earth, over which the temple was built, the tripod was placed, and the prophetess sat, was, according to the primitive conception, the source and cause of the oracular inspiration. Such however is not the conception of Aeschylus; see *v.* 17.—ἐκ δὲ τῆς and after her.—Θέμιμ. The selection of 'Right' 'Law' or 'Justice' as patron of the oracle was probably in the first instance an independent myth, representing a higher and more spiritual view of the oracular function than the attribution of its origin to Earth. Later reconcilers invented links between the two, either of relationship (as here, Hesiod *Theog.* 135, etc.) or, as speculation became more subtle, of

EUMENIDES.

ACT I.

The scene is before the temple of Apollo at Delphi.

Enter the Pythian Prophetess.

The Prophetess. First for my prayer: whereby I give precedence among gods to the first giver of oracles, Earth; and after her to Themis, who came second to this oracular seat, her mother's, with good right; and at the third succession, with consent of Themis and without violence to any, one

identity, as Aeschylus in *P.V.* 225. See next note.

3, 4. $\delta\eta$ therefore, of course, accordingly, explained by τὸ μητρὸς 'as being that of her mother', by natural succession. The emphasis justifies a suspicion that here, as in the sequel (*v.* 5), Aeschylus is mending tradition, and that the transition from Gaia to Themis had not always or originally been represented as peaceful.—ὡς λόγος τις: either (1) as reason good is, that a daughter should succeed her mother, the qualifying τις, some, being used, as often, by a certain irony or understatement, for much, great, considerable; for the sense of λόγος see λόγον ἔχει it is reasonable, and similar uses, in L. and Sc. s.v. λόγος: or (2) as a certain legend declares. There is a general, perhaps universal, agreement in favour of (2), which is supported, as (1) is not, by parallel uses of ὡς λόγος elsewhere, and would point to the fact, undoubtedly true, that the legends varied. But to raise and

leave such a doubt seems inconsistent with the office and attitude of the speaker. Who should know the truth, if not the Pythia, and how can she claim (in *v.* 5 and elsewhere) to correct error, if, where traditions disagree, she has no better authority or criterion than others? The context and voice would suffice to make clear a use of ὡς λόγος ἐστὶ, which, though apparently not elsewhere extant, is natural to the language.

4, 5. λάχει, lit. 'obtaining, reception, taking into possession', at the third reception for 'as third possessor'.—θελοῦσῆς (τῆς Θέμιδος). Themis consented to the succession of her kinswoman Phoebe, a daughter of Earth like herself (*Hesiod Theog.* 136), who is inserted as a link of peaceful transition, 'without violence to any', to Phoebeus Apollo. The common legend, representing Apollo as an invader, expelling Earth and her family by force, and defending his usurpation with some difficulty, is set forth with graceful malice

Τιτανὶς ἄλλη παῖς χθονὸς καθέζετο
 Φοίβη· δίδωσιν δ' ἢ γενέθλιον δόσω
 Φοίβῳ· τὸ Φοίβης δ' ὄνομ' ἔχει παρώνυμον.

λιπὼν δὲ λίμνην Δηλίαν τε χοιράδα,
 κέλσας ἐπ' ἀκτὰς ναυπόρους τὰς Παλλάδος, 10
 ἐς τήνδε γαῖαν ἦλθε παρνήσους θ' ἔδρας.
 πέμπουσι δ' αὐτὸν καὶ σεβίζουσιν μέγα
 κελευθοποιοὶ παῖδες Ἐφαιστου χθόνα
 ἀνήμερον τιθέντες ἡμερωμένην.
 μολόντα δ' αὐτὸν κάρτα τιμαλφεῖ λεώς, 15

9. λιπὼν τε originally.

11. παρνησοῦσθ' (a erased).

by Euripides (*Iph. T.* 1249 foll.), and, according to a schol. here (Πίνδαρός φησι πρὸς βίαν κρατήσαι Πυθοῦς τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα· διὸ καὶ παρπαρώσαι αὐτὸν ἐξήτει ἢ Γῆ), had, even in the days of Aeschylus, the grave authority of Pindar.

7, 8. ἢ: demonstrative, *she*: so placed (as in ἢ δ' ἢ *she said*) only here; elsewhere only in the connexion ἢ δέ, ἢ γάρ, καὶ ἢ (Wecklein). The use is archaistic, and as such suitable to the sacred style.—According to Hesiod (*Theog.* 403) Phoebe was mother of Leto, and therefore grandmother of Phoebus. Since an Athenian boy was commonly named from his grandfather, the relationship is probably suggested here; but it is not desirable to make this more explicit by changing Φοίβης (as some do) to τῆθης *grandmother*. This expedient of the 'birth-gift', when we remember that it was probably new and certainly not an established belief, is sufficiently hazardous to be left in some obscurity.—δόσω, as a gift, in apposition to *it* (αὐτό), the oracle. Presents were customary at Athenian birth-festivals, but the suggestion here seems rather to be that of a provision or settlement made upon the birth of an heir.—παρώνυμον, 'in a similar (imitated) form',—*Phoebus*.

9—14. The journey *by way of Athens* is assumed, by a schol. here, to be invented by the poet, and probably was so, as no

coeval or older testimony for it appears. Even Herodotus (6. 34) who speaks of 'the sacred way through Phocis and Boeotia', implies rather that it did not extend to Athens (note *ἐκτράπονται ἐπ' Ἀθηνῶν*) than that it did. It may be doubted whether any very ancient legend connected Delos and Delphi at all; the notion of combining and reconciling the legends of different sanctuaries belongs to an order of ideas which hardly became important before the middle of the sixth century B.C. and the beginnings of history. The Homeric 'Hymn to Apollo', in its present form a work of about that date, makes the connexion, but not by way of Attica. For the purpose of this play, an early and intimate union between Athens and Delphi, however little warranted by history, is essential.—Even Aeschylus himself, it should be noted, rather suggests, than positively asserts, that *Athens* was the landing-place of Apollo. The account ultimately established placed 'the sacred harbour called the Delphinion' in the territory of Oropus, in the neighbourhood of the temple called 'the Delion' (Delium), which appears to have commemorated the journey (Strabo 9, p. 403). This account seems to have had the best authority even in the fifth century, being implied in the version attributed by a schol. here to Pindar, that the god arrived 'from Tanagra' (see a map). Since the

Titan-born, she too Earth's child, took the seat,—Phoebe, who gave it for a birth-gift to Phoebus, bearing her name to him derived. He, leaving the pool and crag of Delos, put in to the haven-shores of Pallas, and came to this land, his own *Parnasian* seat; him with great worship did the road-makers bring upon his way, the servants of Hephaistos, turning the wildness of the land to gentleness; he, at his coming, had high honour

Athenians always claimed and generally held Oropus, as a part of Attica, it is covered by the notably vague expression 'haven-shores of Pallas', nor is this ambiguity likely to be accidental. The poet, for good reasons, prefers not to be explicit.

9. *The water and rock-ridge of Delos.* The water is the famous *τροχοειδῆς λιμνη* (Herod. 2. 170, Eur. *Iph. Taur.* 1104 etc.), an oval basin associated with the birth of the god. The *χοιράς* appears to be the island itself, or possibly the hill Cynthus; the word is evidently used as specially appropriate and distinctive, though the reason is not now ascertainable. The suggestion of a schol., that it is depreciatory, and signifies τὸ εὐτελὲς τοῦ χωρίου, does not seem to suit the tone of the speaker, or the Athenian sentiment about Delos.

11. *παρνήσους θ' ἔδρας* or *παρνήσους θ' ἔδρας*: *his home on Parnassus, his bourne 'from the isle'*. The reading of the ms. is right in respect of the letters, and, had it not been right, could hardly have come into existence. The accentuation *παρνησούς* arises merely from confusion with a (correct) explanation, *Παρνησοῦ*,—'meaning of *Parnassus*'. The point is, to *explain* the name *Παρνησός*, after the fashion beloved by Greek religion and especially by oracles, as foreshewing divinely the destiny of the mountain to receive Apollo *πὰρ νήσου* or *παρὰ τῆς νήσου*, that is, from the natal island of Delos. Such a confirmation was particularly desirable for a legend open, like that connecting Delos and Delphi, to many objections. The interpretation put upon the assumed adjective, *παράνησος*, is somewhat strained; but this might be

expected in such a device. Compare the exposition of the name 'Helena' in the *Agamemnon* (692), that of 'Pleistos' *infra* 27, and many others. Whether Aeschylus is here original, or follows authority, we cannot say.—A schol. to *v.* 22 (ὁ Παρνασσός) somewhat strengthens the ms., by suggesting that the actual name of the mountain was not in the text.—*Παρνησοῦ θ'* Robortello, and modern texts.

12. *πέμπουσι δ' αὐτόν... μολόντα δ' αὐτόν...* The use of *αὐτός*, where superfluous, is exceptional in Aeschylus; and a parallel to this, two instances close together and so placed as to catch the ear, will hardly be found. A certain emphasis must be intended, as if each place in succession recognised *him*, Apollo, for the rightful claimant of service.

13. *κελευθοποιοί.* On the *ιερά ὁδός*, here supposed to be made for the coming of the god, see above on *v.* 9. The road-making is the sign of improved civilisation, as indicated in *v.* 14, 'turning the savagery of the land to gentleness'.—*παῖδες Ἡφαίστου*: *the servants* (not 'sons' or 'children') of *Hephaistos* (the patron of crafts in general and popular in this aspect at Athens) are the artisans or engineers, as such, ('Leute mit Äxten' Wecklein). The meaning is simply that a road was made.—A schol. here interprets '*sons of Hephaistos*' as the Athenians, which may be justified by a somewhat obscure genealogy, but seems artificial and unnecessary.—*ὅταν πέμπωσιν (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι) εἰς Δελφοῦς θεωρίαν, προέρχονται ἔχοντες πελέκεις ὡς διημερῶσοντες τὴν γῆν*, schol. If this custom is as old as Aeschylus, he doubtless had it in view, but the text does not require or prove it.

Δελφός τε χώρας τῆσδε πρυμνήτης ἀναξ.
 τέχνης δέ νιν Ζεὺς ἔνθεον κτίσας φρένα
 ἵζει τέταρτον τόνδε μάντιν ἐν χρόνοις,
 Διὸς προφήτης δ' ἐστὶ Λοξίας πατρός.

τούτους ἐν εὐχαῖς φροιμιάζομαι θεούς. 20
 Παλλὰς προναία δ' ἐν λόγοις πρεσβεύεται.
 σέβω δὲ νύμφας, ἔνθα Κωρυκίς πέτρα,

19. ἐστίν.

16. **Δελφός.** The name of this eponymous personage suggests, and is meant to suggest, that the *χώρα* was already called *Δελφοί*, when Apollo came. For the importance of this innuendo, and the reason for putting it in this covert way, see the Introduction.

17—19. This purely spiritual view of inspiration, though necessary to the feelings and theological system of the poet, obviously cuts away the basis of ideas for a *local* oracle such as Delphi, with its inspiration from a spot of ground and its recipient prophetess. The reference to Zeus seems to be now found first in the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* 132, *χρήσω δ' ἀνθρώποισι Διὸς νημερτέα βουλήν*, but in connexion with Delos, not with Delphi. Delos, which we may suspect not to have been originally, as it never was principally, oracular in function, was a more open field for an improved conception. Here the notion is tacked on, as best may be, by help of the suggestion or assumption (not true, contrast *v.* 29) that it was Apollo himself who sat in the seat and delivered the revelation. As a fact, the worship of Zeus, the key-stone and essence of religion according to Aeschylus, was at Delphi of remarkably small importance or prominence, even when, as in the fifth century, the filial dependence of Apollo was universally accepted. See further the Introduction.—*τέχνης...ἐνθεον*: the construction of the genitive follows the analogy of *ἐμπειρος* or *ἐμπλεως*.—*κτίσας*: *ποίησας*.—*νιν* is principal object both to *κτίσας* and *ἵζει*, *φρένα* a secondary

limiting accusative joined to *κτίσας* only, cf. *v.* 88 *μὴ φόβος σε νικάτω φρένας*.—*τόνδε* marks that we have reached the end of the series, as in *Theb.* 618 *τὸν ἑβδομον δὴ τόνδ' ἐφ' ἑβδομαίς πύλαις | λέξω*. 'Fourth and present' (Paley) is right, except that it rather suggests others to follow, which *τόνδε* does not. We have no exact equivalent in English, but it is natural to Greek and should not be suspected.—*τέταρτον...ἐν χρόνοις, Διὸς...δὲ...πατρός*: 'fourth *in date*, but *speaking* for Zeus his father'. These phrases are closely connected and antithetical, as if we had *τέταρτον μὲν...προφήτην δὲ...*, for which the actual form is a variation. The point, vital to the poet, though unreconcilable with the true and primitive theory of the Delphian oracle and indeed with the very existence of such a sanctuary, is that the wisdom of the oracle is *not derived from or dependent on the place*, a notion no more tolerable to the elevated and quasi-monotheistic paganism of Aeschylus than to Christianity itself. By deducing Apollo's right of property in the soil, he fears, very naturally, that, even with every precaution, he may seem to leave this notion subsisting, and accordingly he emphatically and explicitly denies it. Though Apollo is only fourth possessor, it is not through the genealogical and chronological series that he comes by his wisdom; *that* comes direct from Zeus (we must say 'God' if we would have the idea), his *father*. See further the Introduction.—*ἐν χρόνοις* literally 'in the periods of time', *i.e.*

from the people of this place, and from Delphos, the lord and governor thereof. With divination Zeus did inspire his heart, and set him in the chair as prophet now in reckoning of times the fourth, but speaking, as Loxias, on behalf of Zeus, his sire.

These are the gods who receive my opening prayer. In mention, first comes Pallas Pronaia; and with her I honour the nymphs of that place where is the Corycian rock, hollow,

successive possessions.—The commonly received changes *τοῖσδε...θρόνοις* are, I think, mistaken.

20. *ἐν εὐχαῖς...ἐν λόγοις*. See above on *v. 1*, and the Introduction.

21. *Παλλὰς προναία*. The temple dedicated to the goddess by this title at Delphi lay, as the name seems to indicate, before the entrance of the sanctuary (*πρό, ναός*), and therefore she may not unnaturally lead the secondary class, the non-possessors. But the real reason for giving her this precedence is partly to emphasize the point of connexion with Athens, and partly to throw into the shade both Poseidon (*v. 27*) and, above all, Bacchus (Bromios *v. 24*), who, truly and by tradition, were possessors. See the Introduction. On the temple, see Pausanias 8. 6, and Frazer's note there.

22—27. All these, the Corycian cave and its nymphs, the river Pleistos, and Poseidon, as god of water (not of the sea), represent collectively the elemental forces of the country as a whole.—*νύμφας ἐνθα...* 'nymphs of the place where...', a connexion the more natural as nymphs are a very slight personification and almost equivalent to 'waters'.—*ἀναστροφή*: so cited by schol. to *v. 24*. But it is not impossible that Aeschylus, for some reason of literary association, wrote *ἀναστροφά* as M gives.—*Κωρυκίς πέτρα*: a very large cavern in the table-land between the cliffs overhanging Delphi and the upper part of Parnassus (see a full description in Frazer's note to Pausanias 10. 32. 2), mentioned also by Sophocles in *Ant.* 1126, where, as here, the nymphs

are associated with Bacchus.—*τὸν χῶρον*: that region, i.e., Parnassus and perhaps especially the cave.—*οὐδ' ἀμνημονῶ*: as I do not forget. The prophetess, or rather the poet, is aware that the relegation of Bromios (otherwise Bacchus or Dionysus) to this entirely subordinate, parenthetic, and almost accidental position in the history and religion of Delphi may surprise the hearer, who may even, he apprehends, be wondering whether that deity is forgotten. As to the grounds of this justifiable apprehension, see the Introduction.—*ἐξ οὐτε...θεός*: since he came as a god leading his host of Bacchantes. *ἐξ οὐτε*: ex quo, since, from the archaic form of the relative *οὐτε*.—*ἔστρατήγησεν*. The character of an aggressive invasion, encountering violent opposition, belongs generally and historically to the Bacchic religion, and is typified by the legend of Pentheus immediately mentioned.—*θεός*: not a mere pronominal equivalent for 'Bromios', but 'as a god', 'deified'. That the god was a deified man was the essence and *differentia* of the Bacchic religion.—*Πενθεῖ*. Pentheus, king of Thebes, was hunted (note *λαγῶ δικην like a hare*) and torn to pieces by the Bacchantes for opposing the new god. The legend is the subject of Euripides' *Bacchae*. There, and also (according to a schol. here) in Aeschylus' play *Xantriae*, the scene of the death is not Parnassus, but Cithaeron, a place much more probable, from its vicinity to Thebes. Wecklein points out that we need not (with the schol.) suppose otherwise here.

κοίλη, φίλορρις, δαιμόνων ἀναστροφῆ
 (Βρόμιος ἔχει τὸν χῶρον, οὐδ' ἀμνημονῶ,
 ἐξ οὔτε βάκχαις ἐστρατήγησεν θεός, 25
 λαγῶ δίκην Πενθεὶ καταρράψας μόρον).
 πλήστους τε πηγὰς καὶ Ποσειδῶνος κράτος
 καλοῦσα καὶ τέλειον ὕψιστον Δία,
 ἔπειτα μάντις εἰς θρόνους καθιζάνω.
 καὶ νῦν τυχεῖν με τῶν πρὶν εἰσόδων μακρῶ 30
 ἄριστα δοῖεν κεῖ παρ' Ἑλλήνων τινὲς
 ἴτων, πάλω λαχόντες, ὡς νομίζεται.
 μαντεύομαι γὰρ ὡς ἂν ἡγήται θεός.

ἦ δεινὰ λέξαι, δεινὰ δ' ὀφθαλμοῖς δρακεῖν
 πάλιν μ' ἔπεμψεν ἐκ δόμων τῶν Λοξίου, 35

23. ἀναστροφῆ. ἀναστροφῆ recc. 26. πενθεῖ* (ν erased).

27. πλήστουσ altered to πλείστουσ.

The invasion of the whole region, Phocis as well as Boeotia, by Bacchus, may be dated by the death of Pentheus as its chief and decisive incident.—This verse has no caesura either in the 3rd foot or the 4th, a phenomenon which (except in parts of the *Persae*, 468—474 and 483—517, where, doubtless for some reason, it is common) is extremely rare in Aeschylus, and probably always due to some literary influence not now traceable. *Suῖpp.* 920 ἔλξεν ἔοιχ' ὑμᾶς ἀποσπάσας κῆμης and *P. V.* 667 οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ὑμῖν ἀπιστήσαι με χρῆ suggest a common origin by their resemblance (ὑμᾶς ἀπ., ὑμῖν ἀπ.). In so careful a composition as this prologue, fortuitous irregularity is scarcely conceivable; perhaps the line is a quotation from some earlier dramatist or other poet. Such quotation would suit well with a 'reminiscence' (οὐδ' ἀμνημονῶ).—**πλήστους...κράτος**: 'and the full-fed (Pleistos-) founts and Poseidon's power (which feeds them)'. This, the primitive reading of M, is right, and is supported by the parallel in *v.* 11. Here it is the

name of the Delphian stream *Pleistos*, which is mystically and etymologically interpreted, as signifying in itself that the place, by the blessing of the gods, is rich in water. For the form *πλήστος* (or perhaps rather *πληστός*) *fillēd*, a passive adj. of two terminations, cf. *πλήσ-μη* the *filling*, *rising* of a stream in Hesiod, *fr.* 25 ἐν πλήσμησι δῦπετέος ποταμοῖο, cited by L. and Sc. *s.v.* *πλήσμη*; and see also *πλήρης*, *πῖμπλημι* etc.; the whole class of words is frequently so applied. Whether we write *πλείστους* or *πλήστους* (see the MS.) is in the circumstances indifferent, and the pronunciation must have been nearly the same.—**Ποσειδῶνος**, modern texts.—**Ποσειδῶνος**. As to the real part of this deity in Delphi, see the Introduction; Aeschylus narrows it, as he does that of Bacchus, necessarily and deliberately.

30—32. 'And now may they bless the going-in more than ever before to me and to all those who, from the cities of Hellas, are admitted, as the custom is, by permission of the lot.' εἰ...τινὲς...ἴτων :

beloved of birds, and haunt of beings divine;—Bromios possesses the region, as I do not forget, since the day when, as a god, he brought his army of Bacchanals, and contrived for Pentheus the death of a hunted hare;—and also the *full* founts of *Pleistos* I invoke, with Poseidon's might, and, crown of all, Zeus the Supreme;—then I take, as prophetess, my place and seat.

And this time may they bless the going-in much more than ever before, both to me and to all from Hellas who are admitted, as the custom is, by fall of the lot; for I give response according as the god may lead. (*She enters the temple and almost immediately returns.*)

...Verily things dreadful to tell, dreadful for eyes to behold, have sent me back from the house of Loxias,—so dreadful that

whosoever are to go in, a relative clause of which the tacit antecedent is an accusative (*εκεινους*) coupled by *καί* to *με*. For the exceptional use of the imperative in such a clause, cf. the conversational formulae *οισθ' δ' δρῶσον*; 'do you know what you have to do?' etc., preserved in tragedy. The full sense is 'any of whom *ἔτων* (*εἰσῆτων*) *let them come* is said'. For other examples more or less similar in poetry and prose, e.g. Plato, *Laws* 935 E *ῶ δ' ἐξέστω καὶ μή, τοῦτο νομοθετησώμεθα* 'let us determine to whom it is to be permitted', see Krüger, *Greek Grammar* § 397, notes 5 and 6, Gildersleeve, *Syntax of Classical Greek* § 422. That *εἰ τιwes ἔτων*, like *οισθ' δ' δρῶσον*, is a fixed formula, probably sacred and Delphian, or closely imitated from such, is indicated not only by the syntax, but by the peculiar form of the 3 pers. plural *ἔτων* (common *ἴοντων* and later *ἔωσαν*), which arrests the ear.—I suggest this as the best explanation of the grammar. If *ἔτων* be the principal verb, the clause *εἰ παρ' Ἑλλήνων τιwές* must be complete in itself. We have then a choice of unsatisfactory suppositions: (1) the verb must be supplied, which the verb required (*πᾶρειαι*, not *εἰσί*) hardly can be; or (2) *πᾶρ'* (*sic*, i.e. *πάρα*) must be read as a verb (Abresch and others), in which

case the elision of it, apart from other doubts, is unusual and unpleasing; or (3) we must emend more boldly, as *εἰ τις Ἑλλήνων πάρα* (Burgess and others). All these interpretations suggest the possibility that there may be no consultants, an hypothesis not favourable to the dignity of the oracle. On the other hand, the distinction, suggested by *εἰ τιwes ἔτων*, between those who will and will not now be admitted, is favourable to that dignity, as implying numbers, and a choice on the part of the god; the lot might exclude some, at any rate for this particular day; and indeed it is obvious that the lot not only determined precedence, but also served, when necessary, as the instrument of an indispensable discretion. The ballots for certain advantages in modern clubs offer a humble analogy.—*παρ' Ἑλλήνων*, properly 'from Hellenic places', suggests primarily public emissaries, but does not exclude private enquirers. That Hellas only is noticed, whereas in the time of Aeschylus the area of Delphian influence had long been wider, is perhaps to be explained as a natural and instinctive archaism.

33. She enters the temple and almost immediately re-appears, exhibiting extreme astonishment and horror.

ὡς μήτε σωκεῖν μήτε μ' ἀκταίνειν στάσιν,
τρέχω δὲ χερσίν, οὐ ποδωκεία σκελῶν·
δείσασα γὰρ γραῦς οὐδέν, ἀντίπαις μὲν οὖν.

ἐγὼ μὲν ἔρπω πρὸς πολυστεφῆ μυχόν·
ὄρῳ δ' ἐπ' ὀμφαλῷ μὲν ἄνδρα θεομυσεῖ,
ἔδραν ἔχοντι προστρόπαιον, αἵματι
στάζοντα χεῖρας, καὶ νεοσπαδῆς ξίφος

40

36. γρ. βάσω (written above) m. 37. ὄπρω δοκία. ὄπρω* δοκία m. οὐ ποδωκεία rec.
40. θεομυσῆι.

41. ἔχοντα rec.

36. ὡς: ὥστε.—ἀκταίνειν στάσιν: uncertain; either 'move my standing', *i.e.* move from my place, or 'move my stature', *i.e.* walk erect, or again 'lift my stature', *i.e.* keep erect, is possible. The schol. (κουφίζειν. σημαίνει δὲ καὶ τὸ γαυρίαν καὶ ἀτάκτως πηδᾶν) and Hesychius (μετεωρίζειν) point rather to *move* as the meaning of ἀκταίνειν, which may be supported by derivation from the stem of ἄγω, through ἀκτός *moved*; cf. the Latin *ago*. If οὐκέτ' ἀκταίνω was used by Aeschylus for οὐκέτι δόναμαι ὀρθοῦν ἐμαντήν (Bekker, *Anecdota* p. 23, 12 cited by Wecklein), the word must have also meant *lift*; but the citation looks like a loose reminiscence of this passage.—βάσω is mentioned as a conjecture in M, 'but not as having any authority. With στάσιν to be accounted for, βάσω is not very probable.—μηδ' ἔτ' (for μήτε μ' Weil), 'so that I had not strength even to...', is an apparent improvement; but the foundation is too unsure to be touched.

37. She crawled away upon hands and knees. We need not however assume, with a schol., that she enters the scene in this attitude.

38. "γραῦς: according to Diod. xvi. 26, the prophetesses were originally young women; but after the seduction of one, it was decided to admit only women over fifty. Aeschylus transfers to antiquity the use of later times" (Wecklein). The text however, it should be observed, does not necessarily imply any rule.

39. πολυστεφῆ: 'covered with στέμ-

ματα', the bands of wool, or rather skeins tied at intervals, which were the sign of sacred, and especially of oracular, things and persons. They are worn for example by Cassandra in the *Agamemnon* (μαντεία περὶ δέρη στέφη 1264).—μυχόν: the interior chamber of the temple, where was, *inter alia*, the tripod: *to* this the prophetess was going, when in the outer chamber (*pronaos*), where apparently in the fifth century stood the Holy Stone (ὀμφαλός), she saw Orestes and the Erinyes.

40—45. Upon the Holy Stone sat a man who, by many signs, appeared to be a homicide, and to be receiving purgation there as a προστρόπαιος or petitioner for purgation.—ὄρῳ...χεῖρας. *First, I saw upon the omphalos, polluted by his sitting there, a suppliant for purgation, from whose hands the blood dripped thereon.*—ἐπ' ὀμφαλῷ is to be taken both with ἄνδρα, the man being (seated) *on* the stone, and also with στάζοντα, the blood dripping from his hands *upon* it.—θεομυσεῖ (?). The Stone had itself become 'abominable', like the homicide for whose purgation it served, the very essence of the rite (for which see references below) being that the 'pollution' was transferred to, or shared by, the house and hearth of the purgator, on to which it was washed off.—ἔδραν ἔχοντι (?) προστρόπαιον: lit. 'as bearing the sitting (on it) of a suppliant for purgation', in apposition to θεομυσεῖ, which it explains. The phrase ἔδραν ἔχειν means usually *to sit*, but the

I had no strength nor moved as I stood, but ran with speed of my hands instead of the leg and foot; for an old woman scared is nought, nay, even as a child.

As I went towards the inner place, with fillets all bedecked, I saw upon the Centre-Stone, horribly polluted by the sitting there of such a suppliant, a man whose hands dripped with blood upon it, and who held a new-drawn sword and a high-grown

sense here given to it is legitimate, and is made clear by the context. ἔχοντι has a strong force, implying a burden, something sustained unwillingly.—προστρόπαιον has a special and technical sense, derived from προστροπή, the application of a homicide for purging, and secondarily, the rite itself by which purgation was conferred; see references below.—The readings of M, θεομυστή (that is, θεομυστή) and ἔχοντι, are not to be lightly dismissed. The common reading, established upon the evidence of the later MSS. before the general superiority of M was recognised, is ἄνδρα θεομυστή | ἔδραν ἔχοντα προστρόπαιον, a man abominable, sitting there for the purpose of purgation. This is simpler, but less vividly expresses the point, which is, that the place itself, the omphalos and the sanctuary, has incurred the pollution. But the two accusatives should perhaps be accepted.—αἵματι: that is, the blood of the ceremony of religious purification, which Apollo has performed upon him. See Cho. 1032—1037 and notes there, and the sequel here *passim*, especially vv. 232—234, 280—283, 451—455, 581. That the purgation of Orestes was performed at the omphalos, and so as to stain it, appears in vv. 164—171; and we should naturally suppose, that it has already been performed before the commencement of the action; indeed there is no time afterwards. It is from this principally, the blood streaming from the hands, that the prophetess infers the man to be one who has committed homicide and is receiving purgation. The blood is that of the animal used for the purpose of the rite.—The supposition that the

'blood' here meant is that of Orestes' victims, Aegisthus and Clytaemnestra, killed some days before and a hundred miles away, is unnecessary, and (as I think) erroneous. It is not only impossible in fact (which might signify little), but so palpably false as to defy the imagination. It also seems to imply, what is apparently unacceptable and not true, that Orestes, in the final scene of the *Choephoroi*, appears 'dripping' with blood. These however are doubtful questions; it is sufficient to say, that even if the blood of Clytaemnestra were on Orestes' hands, it could not be seen by the prophetess, because it would be hidden by that of the purgatory animal.—καὶ νεοσπαδῆς κ.τ.λ.: 'holding a fresh-drawn sword and a bough of olive' etc. In pursuance of the view that the 'blood' is that of Clytaemnestra, it has been further supposed that the sword is that of the murder, which, like the hands, shows marks of the murder, and is blood-stained with recent use. But νεοσπαδῆς (νεωστὶ ἔσπασμένον schol.), so far from asserting this, seems to imply the contrary. 'New-drawn' is not 'newly used', but 'fresh from the sheath'. It suggests a clean sword, and as to use, implies, if anything, that the weapon is new and has not been used at all. To find the notion of blood and staining, the word must be changed (νεοσπαγῆς Burges). In *Euripides the Rationalist* p. 185, I assumed this conjecture, but we should seek rather another explanation. Now Orestes, having received the ceremonial rite, is about to set forth on the expiatory wanderings mentioned in vv. 74 foll.

ἔχοντ' ἐλαίας θ' ὑψηγέννητον κλάδου,
 λήνει μεγίστῳ σωφρόνως ἔστεμμένον,
 ἀργῆτι μαλλῶ· τῆδε γὰρ τρανῶς ἐρῶ. 45
 πρόσθεν δὲ τάνδρὸς τοῦδε θαυμαστὸς λόχος
 εὔδει γυναικῶν ἐν θρόνοισιν ἡμενος.
 οὔτοι γυναῖκας ἀλλὰ Γοργόνας λέγω,
 οὐδ' αὐτε Γοργείοισιν εἰκάσω τύποις.—
 εἶδόν ποτ' ἤδη Φινέως γεγραμμένας 50
 δεῖπνον φερούσας· ἄπτεροί γε μὴν ἰδεῖν
 αὐται, ... μέλαιναι δ', ἐς τὸ πᾶν βδελύκτροποι, ...

46. λέχοσ. λόχος recc.

235 foll., 284 foll., etc., as completing his purgation. The sword and olive-branch should signify this condition, and should belong to the preparations for the sending-forth. Since such a wanderer, in the days when the purgation was a reality, must have been in much peril, at once dependent on good reception and uncertain of finding it, it is natural to put in his hands the emblems and instruments both of appeal and defence. From **νεοσπαδῆς** we should infer that the 'householder' who conferred the rite (in this case Apollo) either cleansed the weapon of the recipient, or (more probably) gave him a new one, either action being an appropriate symbol of the situation. The suppliant who had not yet received the rite, but was seeking it, of course also bore the bough, as Orestes did (*Cho.* 1033); but this does not affect the present question; and it is worth notice, that in that place nothing is said of the sword. The details, that the branch is 'high-grown' or taken from high upon the tree, and the woollen bands upon it conspicuously large and white, are probably also significant, but apparently cannot now be interpreted. From the whole spectacle the prophetess infers the fact, that the man is a homicide, to whom Apollo, incredible as it appears (note *θεομυσῆς*, and compare the attitude of

Athena in *vv.* 442 foll.), is acting as purgator, thereby taking the blood-pollution actually and visibly upon his own house. Hence also *δεσπότη δόμων* below (*v.* 60); Apollo is 'master of the house'; he is acting according to his pleasure, and the consequences can and must be left to him. The god is not at the moment present, for which, if the question occurred to the spectators (as it would not), reasons are easily supposable.—**μεγίστῳ σωφρόνως** seem to be pointedly contrasted (Wecklein); great size is *prima facie* not *σώφρον*, which imports rather moderation; but in a thing which, like the *στέμμα* of the suppliant, itself expresses humility, dependence, and deprecation, the larger the emblem, the more the *σωφροσύνη*. However, any explanation of these details must be given with reserve.—**τῆδε γὰρ τρανῶς ἐρῶ** for *so I will (or can) describe it clearly*. This (subject still to reserve) is most simply taken as meaning, that, about the *στέμμα*, its size and whiteness, she can and will be particularly clear, because, in her hasty glance, the object specially caught her eye, and because in itself it was, to a religious mind, an acceptable and reassuring sign. This appears to be a sufficient explanation, though possibly more may be meant.—Wecklein supposes that by *ἀργῆτι μαλλῶ* she interprets *λήνει*, as a rare and

branch of olive, decently wreathed with wool-band very large,—white flock; for so will I plainly say. And in front of this man a wondrous band of women sat asleep upon the chairs... Not women sure, but Gorgons I call them,... nor yet to Gorgon forms can I liken them—.... I have seen erewhile in picture creatures that bore away the banquet of Phineus.... Nay, but these here are wingless in form,... But, for blackness, they are utterly

technical term; and he cites *Theb.* 476, where » metaphor is somewhat similarly explained, ἄλω δὲ πολλήν, ἀσπίδος κύκλον λέγω. This may be right; but it would not be very dramatic.

46—59. The Erinyes, whom she saw sleeping round the omphalos, are described so as to excite the interest of the spectators in their future appearance. The exhibition of the Erinyes upon the stage was a novelty, nor was any visible form for them apparently yet fixed in literature or art. Accordingly the dramatist prepares the way for his conception, indicating that it is derived from familiar types of monsters (Gorgons, Harpies, and the like), but is more human (*γυναικας*), not having, for example, the grotesque mouth, tongue, and tusks of the Gorgon, nor (this is particularly noticed) the wings of the Harpy. See further *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (J. E. Harrison) p. 223.

47. *θρόνοισιν*: the seats which commonly served for those consulting the god.

50—54. *εἶδον*. The absence of copula marks a pause before this. Then she develops further her new suggestion.—*Φινέως...φερούσας*: '(creatures) in a picture carrying off the food of Phineus', *i.e.* the Harpies, appointed to punish Phineus by starvation, snatching away or fouling his food, whenever he attempted to eat. She speaks as if she did not at the instant recall the name; such a device, to diversify and animate a discussion which runs the risk of being frigid, seems natural, and, though irregular, should not be suspected for an error.—*ἄπτεροι...δία*. Speaking as if to

herself, she rapidly debates the resemblance to Harpies *pro* and *contra*; note the curt clauses, and the conjunctions, 'and yet—but—but—but'. That they have no wings is against the identification; so is the fact that they were asleep, since the Harpies were, by their very office and nature, perpetually vigilant. On the other hand, the 'dark hue and foul favour' and the 'odious distillation' were traits of the Harpy.—*βέγκουσι δὲ κ.τ.λ.*: 'But they snored fiercely, and with no pretence.' *οὐ πλαστοῖσι φυσιάμασιν*: literally 'with no feigned pantings' (see *πλαστός, πλάσσω*). Objections to this reading seem to depend on the assumption that the purpose is *merely* to describe the invaders as dreadful. But the prophetess, whose function here is to stimulate the imagination of the audience, is not only horrified, but also curious; and she is discussing, without result, her own conjecture. The point here is, that these strange beings were really and undoubtedly *asleep* (by the sound of their tremendous breathing), and therefore were not exactly Harpies. Harpies might have *feigned* sleep, but these did not feign. Probably there is an allusion to some representation of the Harpies, as feigning sleep, in literature or art; but I cannot discover it.—*οὐ πλατοῖσι* (Elmsley) is technically little less probable than the reading of M, such forms being frequently confused; the sense (*not approachable, terrible*) is less pointed. Moreover *ἄπλατος (g.v.)* is not exactly equivalent to *οὐ πλατός*, and it is not surprising that the positive *πλατός* seems to be without extant example.

ῥέγκουσι δ' οὐ πλαστοῖσι φυσιάμασιν, ...
 ἐκ δ' ὀμμάτων λείβουσι δυσφιλή δία. —
 καὶ κόσμος οὔτε πρὸς θεῶν ἀγάλματα 55
 φέρειν δίκαιος οὔτ' ἐς ἀνθρώπων στέγας. —
 τὸ φύλον οὐκ ὄπωπα τῆσδ' ὀμιλίας,
 οὐδ' ἦτις αἶα τοῦτ' ἐπεύχεται γένος
 τρέφουσ' ἀνατεῖ μὴ μεταστένειν πόνον.
 τὰν τεύθειν ἤδη τῶνδε δεσπότη δόμων 60
 αὐτῷ μελέσθω Λοξία μεγασθενεῖ.
 • ἱατρόμαντις δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τερασκόπος
 καὶ τοῖσιν ἄλλοις δωμαίων καθάρσιος.

ΑΠΟΛΛΩΝ.

οὔτοι προδώσω· διὰ τέλους δέ σοι φύλαξ
 ἐγγὺς παρεστῶς, καὶ πρόσω δ' ἀποστατῶν, 65
 ἐχθροῖσι τοῖς σοῖς οὐ γενήσομαι πέπων.
 καὶ νῦν ἀλούσας τάσδε τὰς μάργους ὄρας·

53. ζτ (ζήτει) in the margin.

57. φύλλον. φύλον m.

59. πόνων m.

54. **δία** (neuter plural of sing. *διον* ?), *drops, moisture*, from the root of *δι-ερός, wet, liquid, δι-αίνω, moisten*, perhaps also of *δῦπερής (ποταμός)*, though this can be otherwise interpreted.—**λίβα** (Burgess and modern texts) might doubtless have been corrupted to *δία* by confusion of Δ and Λ (though not easily, with *λείβουσι* in the context to explain and protect it), and might be accepted, if **δία** were disproved. But there is no reason for suspecting **δία**, since the required sense is justified by etymology. We might have presumed that a substantive or substantives from this root once existed, even if we did not find one, as here we do.

55, 56. **καὶ κόσμος κ.τ.λ.**: not to be connected closely with what precedes. The question of personality is dismissed, after a slight pause, for a new subject.—The costume was invented by Aeschylus

himself; the chief feature was the snakes in the hair, and perhaps elsewhere; borrowed from the Gorgons. The dress was long, but girt up for running, the colours apparently black and dark red. This last quality, from the general prevalence of white in Greek costume and specially in connexion with religion (see below *π.* 353 foll.), would have a more startling effect than we easily realise. For later theatrical tradition commentators cite Strabo 3, p. 175, Diogenes Laertius 6. 102.—**οὔτε πρὸς θεῶν κ.τ.λ.** 'not fit to be carried to the images of the holy gods nor into the houses of men', *i.e.* to be worn on any occasion, sacred or profane.—**πρὸς θεῶν ἀγάλματα φέρειν** may suggest a reference to the 'carrying' of raiment (for example, the *perplos* of Athena at Athens) to statues (*ἀγάλματα*) which were decorated with it; and some,

loathsome in favour.... And again, they snore, with no feigned blasts of the breath,... And their eyes shed loathly drops—... Their apparel too,...it is not fit to be carried to images of gods, nor into chambers of men—... The breed of these visitors have I never seen, nor know any land which boasts to rear this kind, and not to suffer for it and to repent the pains.

For what is to come, to Him I here leave it, who is master of this house, the mighty Loxias himself: revealer of remedies he is, and judge of prodigies, and houses of others he knoweth to purge. (*Exit.—Enter, from the temple, APOLLO and ORESTES.*)

Apollo. Be sure I will not prove false, but watch over thee to the end; near I shall be to thee, ay, even when far away; and to thy foes I will not be soft.

For the present, thou see'st, these ravening creatures are

perhaps rightly, would understand *φέρειν* carry, for the first part of the phrase, in this sense. The transition to that of wear, necessary in the second part (*φέρειν ἐς ἀνθρώπων στέγας*), is quite conceivable. But on the other hand, such a reference to the dressing of images would be somewhat irrelevant, since the action of the Erinyes suggests no such use; what they have done is to carry the dress on themselves, to wear it, into a sacred place, and it is against this that the protest seems to be directed. It is better therefore to take *φέρειν* as a poetical equivalent to *φορεῖν* (wear) throughout; carry to the images is 'wear in approaching the images', in *πρόσοδοι* (processions) and other ritual. Nevertheless the use of *θεῶν ἀγάλματα* (adorned gods), instead of *θεούς*, may imply a contrast between the divine robes and those of the Erinyes.

57—59. *φύλον*, in modern phrase 'species'.—*ὄμιλλας*: abstract for concrete, *ὄμιλοῦντες visitors*, as in *v.* 409.—*οὐδ' ἤτις κ.τ.λ.* 'nor (know) a land that boasts such an offspring reared with impunity and with travail not repented.' There is a slight but natural transition of thought from 'such creatures are not produced anywhere' to 'they must destroy any place where they are produced'. The more general verb, *know*, have experience of, is

to be supplied from the more definite *ὄπωπα*.

64. Exit the Prophetess. For a short interval the scene is empty.—Apollo and Orestes enter: on the question whether they are accompanied by Hermes, as a mute personage, see *v.* 89.—As to what change of scene (if any) was made here, see the Introduction. It seems most probable that the two actors simply enter from the temple.

65. *Near at hand, but moreover (at hand) even when I am far away.* This means that *ἐγγύς παρεστῶς* covers even (*καί*) the case *πρόσω ἀποστατῶν*, by virtue of the divine power and the miraculous range of the divine perceptions (*v.* 297, 400). This point is marked here, to prepare the way for the effective and instantaneous response and appearance of Apollo at *v.* 576, where see note.—The difficulties raised as to the use of *καί...δέ* seem to ignore the corrective purpose of the addition. Hence *καί πρόσω γε* (Hermann) and other suggestions. But the conjunctions are correct, and the use somewhat similar to *P. V.* 1004...*τοῦς ἐμοῦς...ἐχθροῦς· καί σ' ἐν τούτοις λέγω.*

67. *νῦν, for the present*, see *v.* 74.—*ἀλούσας*: beaten, i.e. overcome, stopped.—*τάσδε*. He points within.

ὑπνω πεσοῦσαι δ' αἱ κατάπτυστοι κόραι—
 γραῖαι παλαιαὶ παῖδες, αἷς οὐ μίγνυται
 θεῶν τις οὐδ' ἄνθρωπος οὐδὲ θήρ ποτε, 70
 κακῶν δ' ἕκατι κἀγένοντ', ἐπεὶ κακόν,—
 σκότον νέμονται Τάρταρόν θ' ὑπὸ χθονός,
 μισήματ' ἀνδρῶν καὶ θεῶν Ὀλυμπίων.
 ὄμως δὲ φεῦγε μηδὲ μαλθακὸς γένη.
 ἐλῶσι γάρ σε καὶ δι' ἠπείρου μακρᾶς 75
 βιβῶντ' ἀν' αἰεὶ τὴν πλανοστιβῆ χθόνα
 ὑπὲρ τε πόντον καὶ περιρρύτας πόλεις.

68. πεσοῦσα. πεσοῦσαι m. 76. βεβῶντ' ἄν. 77. πόντου.

68—73. *And sunk in sleep the loathly maids...are ranging the darkness of Tartarus' pit, realm abhorred by mortals and by gods above.* The 'sleep' of beings who are native to the lower world, but are for the present moment in this, is conceived by the poet on the analogy of accepted doctrines respecting sleep in general. In human sleep or trance, the soul, free or partly free from the body, can visit regions and receive impressions from which it is commonly debarred; and in particular it is then uncommonly near to the powers of darkness. Hence the phenomena of dreams, visions, and above all ghosts (see *Theb.* 370, *inf.* 104). Similarly the spiritual being of the Erinyes is now disjoined from their sleeping forms, and has passed into the dark world, but with this grim difference, that, whereas to creatures of light that world is repellent, and to mortals even formidable as savouring of death (*v.* 73), to the Erinyes it is a place of pure refreshment, and they are (as Apollo conceives) now pursuing there their accustomed prey (see *v.* 340, and note *μάργους ραυενίng* in *v.* 67). The conception is important, as obliterating the touch of weakness, which their sleep in itself might imply. For the sake of his dramatic situation, the poet has allowed the Erinyes to sleep; but this very sleep is other than ours, and is itself a horror.—

νέμονται, *range*, like beasts of prey; Eur. *El.* 1163 ὄρεα τις ὡς λέων' ὀργάδων δρόχα νεμομένα.—See also next note.

69—71. *Grey, olden maids, with whom never meteth god, nor human creature, nor monster; but because of the evil (only) they even came to be,—only because evil came.* The parenthesis, developing *κατάπτυστοι*, expresses partly the physical loathing of the beautiful Olympian for what is hideous, partly such repugnance as men feel towards the executioner (see *vv.* 185 foll.). The 'sleeping maids' suggests a contrasted sentiment.—*θήρ*. Wecklein points out that this word, in the language of antique poetry, includes Centaurs, Satyrs and the like (Soph. *Trach.* 1096, 556, 568 etc.), and appositely quotes *Συμπλ.* 1010 θῆρες δὲ κηραίνουσι καὶ βροτοί, τί μὴν;—ἐπεὶ κακόν (ἐγένετο), supplied from ἐγένοντο. Cf. Thuc. 6. 79 θταν ὑπ' ἄλλων (ἀδικῶνται), καὶ μὴ αὐτοὶ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς πέλας ἀδικῶσι, Eur. *Or.* 644 χρήματ', ἦν ψυχὴν ἐμὴν | σώσης, (σώσεις), and *inf.* 140 ἐγὼ δὲ σέ (ἐγείρω). See also on *Theb.* 2, *inf.* 355. Such ellipses are in Greek not uncommon, and often, as in the first two examples cited, are used with a freedom startling to us, who are accustomed to the habit of a language almost without inflexions. The present case however is simple and natural enough.—*κακόν* is (I think) masculine, *sinner*, rather than neuter, *sins*. The

overcome. Fallen on sleep, these loathly virgins—grey, ancient maids, with whom never mingles god, nor man, nor monster; who only for the evil, only because evil was, were e'en created—are taking their range of darkness and the nether deep, which men do abhor and the gods that dwell on high.

Nevertheless fly thou on, and relax not; for they will chase thee even through the far continent, over land, ever land, for thy wandering foot to pace, and beyond sea and cities islanded. And

latter idea (*sin*) is expressed by **κακόν**.—The Erinyes were created solely to punish crime, and partake of the evil which produced them. The thought is somewhat similar to Milton's "Created evil, for evil only good".—This passage (68—73) has been hitherto punctuated without a parenthesis, and with a full stop at *ποτε*. But (1) the sentence *ἔπηνφ...ποτε* has then no verb: hence *παρεῖνται* (for *πεσοῦσαι*, Wecklein) and other changes: (2) there is no correct sequence of thought in *κακῶν ἕκατι κάγένοντο, ἐπεὶ κακὸν σκότον νέμονται*: 'to inhabit evil darkness' is no proof that the inhabitant was 'created for evil's sake': and (3) the passage as a whole is not properly adapted to the context: *θμως* in *v. 74* takes up *νῦν* in *v. 67*, which connexion is perceptible if (but hardly unless) the sentence beginning at *v. 67* is continued down to *v. 73*.

75. **καί**: *even* (not *both*).

76. Literally, *striding up ever the land for thy wandering foot*.—**βιβῶντα**, as from the intransitive present *βιβῶ*, an archaic form occurring in Homer and Pindar. The conjecture (Stephanus) is perhaps right, but **βεβῶντα** must not be thought impossible. The formation of a present tense by combination of present inflexion with perfect stem is seen in *κεκλήγοντες* (Homer), *ἐρρηγοντι* (Hesiod) etc.; see Curtius, *Greek Verb* p. 393 (Eng. transl.); and from *βεβῶσα* (with *βεβαυία*) it appears that the process occurred with this particular stem. In *sense* *βεβῶσα* followed its stem, not its termination, counting as the feminine of *βεβῶς*, but its existence seems to imply that of *βεβῶν* as an

archaic present (continuous); nor have we evidence to determine how far it was (in archaic literature) common, or by what circumstances such a writer as Aeschylus might be justified in retaining it.—**ἀν'**, *ἀνά*, Hermann.—The position of **αἰεὶ** should not raise difficulty; it is not a licence but a poetic device, necessary to the intended effect. The word *ever*, and the description *ever the land (as before)*, are used to express sympathy with the wanderer, as he sees the horizon still rise before him. The passage cited by Hermann, Plato *Laws* 832 C *ἐκόντων γὰρ ἐκούσα οὐδεμία, ἀλλ' ἀκόντων ἐκούσα ἀρχεὶ ξὺν αἰετῶν βία* (*by shifting superiority of force*) illustrates the grammatical principle, but has a different colour.

77. **πόντον** Turnebus.—**περιρρήτας**: *islanded*. For the fem. termination, contrary to the normal treatment of compounds, cf. *Pers.* 599 *Αἰαντος περικλύστα νᾶσος* (Paley), Hom. *Hymn. Apoll.* 251 *ἀμφιρῆτας κατὰ νήσους* (Wecklein). The retention of the archaic irregularity is probably due in most cases to some literary association.—As to the length and extent of Orestes' wanderings see *vv. 249, 284*. They were no doubt suggested (as Paley remarks) by the appearance of legends connected with him in different places. From a dramatic and moral point of view, they are important to this play, as constituting a real, and not merely ceremonial, expiation of his act: if he is finally released, he attains to this only through intense suffering (see the scene commencing at *v. 235*). There is moreover, let us carefully observe, nothing to show that the

καὶ μὴ πρόκαμνε τόνδε βουκολούμενος
 πόνον· μολῶν δὲ Παλλάδος ποτὶ πτόλι
 ἴζου παλαιὸν ἄγκαθεν λαβῶν βρέτας. 80
 κἀκεῖ δικαστὰς τῶνδε καὶ θελκτηρίου
 μύθους ἔχοντες μηχανὰς εὐρήσομεν,
 ὥστ' ἐς τὸ πᾶν σε τῶνδ' ἀπαλλάξαι πόνων.
 καὶ γὰρ κτανεῖν σ' ἔπεισα μητρῶν δέμας.

ΟΡΕΣΤΗΣ.

ἄναξ * Ἀπολλον, οἴσθα μὲν τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν· 85
 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπίστα, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀμελεῖν μάθε·
 σθένος δὲ ποιεῖν εὖ φερέγγυον τὸ σόν.

ΑΠ. μέμνησο, μὴ φόβος σε νικάτω φρένας.
 σὺ δ', αὐτάδελφον αἶμα καὶ κοινοῦ πατρός,
 Ἐρμῆ, φύλασσε, κάρτα δ' ὧν ἐπώνυμος 90
 πομπάιος ἴσθι, τόνδε ποιμαίνων ἐμόν
 ἰκέτην—σέβει τοι Ζεὺς τόδ' ἐκνόμων σέβας—
 ὀρμώμενον βροτοῖσι εὐπόμπω τύχη.

prolongation of the penitential wandering is due to the Erinyes. Until he is discharged from them, by the act of Athena and the Areopagus, they haunt and torment him; but that he shall not seek Athens at once must be a condition imposed by some other power, and is attributable under the circumstances only to Zeus and Apollo, of whose will we are to suppose that Orestes has already been informed at length.

78. *μὴ πρόκαμνε*, i.e. bear up until the end.—*τόνδε βουκολούμενος πόνον*: lit. 'ruminating this toil', chewing it repeatedly after the manner of the ox. Like rumination, the destined suffering will be slow, long, and profitable: this seems to be the point of the comparison, which partly resembles *Ag.* 674 *ἔβουκολοῦμεν φροντίσι νεὸν πάθος*, cited by Paley. *βουκολούμενος* is (I think) middle (not passive) and differs from *βουκολῶν* in suggesting that the act is for the benefit

of the 'ruminator'. But the acc. *πόνον* does not exclude the possibility of a passive, 'being fed with this toil'.—Some interpret by '*driven* like a herd'; but a pasturing herd is not driven, or at least not violently.

79. *ποτὶ*. For this form in the iambic dialogue Wecklein cites *Soph. Trach.* 1214 *ποτιψάων*.

80. *βρέτας*. This is commonly supposed to be the ancient wooden image of Athena preserved on the Athenian acropolis, and rescued at the time of the Persian sack (*v.* 1025). But the identification depends on the assumption that the place where Orestes takes sanctuary, the scene of the 'Second Act' (*vv.* 235—568), is the Acropolis, of which there is no proof in the text. Prof. Ridgeway has recently suggested that the sanctuary meant is the place of the murder-court known as *ἐπι Παλλαδῶν*. So far as I see, this is quite possible, and it suits perhaps better with

be not weary to chew upon this toil, till thou come to Pallas' burgh. There take sanctuary, embracing her ancient image. And there, with judges to try this matter, and speech to soothe, we will find means to rid thee of these pains for ever; for it was by my counsel that thou didst take thy mother's life.

Orestes. Lord Apollo, the way of right thou knowest; which knowing, study likewise the way of heedfulness; for the power to serve, *thy* power is good warranty.

Apollo. Remember that. Let not fear overcome thy wit. And thou, (*to Hermes, present but unseen*) my very brother, born of my father's blood, guard him, and, as thou art *god of leading*, be all that thy name imports in shepherding the suppliant (forasmuch as the outlaw thus consecrate hath regard from Zeus) whom now I send forth with prospering commendation unto mankind.

(*Exit ORESTES. APOLLO re-enters the temple; the Ghost of CLYTAEMNESTRA appears.*)

the very slight depiction of the locality, somewhat strange if the Acropolis is intended. As to the scene of *the trial*, 'Act III.', see the Appendix to *v.* 569 and the Introduction.

85—87. For the performance of a duty three things are required, the knowledge of it, the will, and the power. Apollo has shown that he knows his obligation, and, his power being unquestionable, nothing is wanted but perseverance. The form of expression suggests a reference to some current text or school-maxim (such as "Duty learnt, the next lesson is to mind it" etc.). Note particularly the word *μάθε*, which is scarcely suitable to the relations between the present speakers. Delphi was an eminent patron of moral proverbs, and this one may well have been Delphian.—*ποιεῖν εὖ* together, *to do right*.—*φερέγγυον*: *assuring*, lit. 'warranty-bringing'.

88. *μύμησο*: *bear (it) in mind*, i.e. Apollo's power.

89. This invocation does not prove that Hermes appears on the stage, or is supposed present and visible to Orestes. It would not prove this, even if the

formal apostrophe was addressed to a mortal (see on *Ag.* 83), much less in the case of a god. Apollo calls on 'Hermes the Conductor', as a mortal would do, to bless the departing; but naturally his invocation is to be deemed more effective. Since Hermes is not seen, so far as appears, in company with Orestes hereafter, dramatic effect and propriety seem rather to indicate that he is not here seen, than that he is.—*ἀντάδελφον*: *my very brother*. The stress laid upon the completeness of the kinship by the common father (the mothers, *Leto* and *Maia*, being different) is appropriate to the case of Orestes, as representing the claims of paternity; see the argument from generation, *vv.* 660 foll.

90—93. *κάρτα* with *πομπαῖος ἔσθι*: *ὦν ἐπώνυμος τῆς πομπῆς*: *be conspicuously the 'Conductor' that thou art called*. It is perhaps also possible to take together *κάρτα ἐπώνυμος ἔσθι*, 'be conspicuously what thy name signifies, that is to say *πομπαῖος*', as in *Theb.* 645 *ἐπώνυμῳ κάρτα*, *Πολυέλκει λέγω*, but then the participle (*ὦν*) would be otiose and scarcely correct. The order of the words

ΚΑΤΤΑΙΜΗΣΤΡΑΣ ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ.

εὔδοιτ' ἄν, ὡῆ, καὶ καθευδουσῶν τί δεῖ;
 ἐγὼ δ' ὑφ' ὑμῶν ὧδ' ἀπηγίμασμένη 95
 ἄλλοισιν ἐν νεκροῖσιν,—ὡς μὲν ἔκτανον
 ὄνειδος ἐν φθιτοῖσιν οὐκ ἐκλείπεται,
 αἰσχρῶς δ' ἀλῶμαι,—προυννέπω δ' ὑμῖν ὅτι
 ἔχω μεγίστην αἰτίαν κείνων ὑπο·
 παθοῦσα δ' οὕτω δεινὰ πρὸς τῶν φιλτάτων, 100
 οὐδεὶς ὑπέρ μου δαιμόνων μηγίεται,
 κατασφαγείσης πρὸς χερῶν μητροκτόνων.
 ὄρα δὲ πληγὰς τάσδε καρδίᾳ σέθεν·
 εὔδουσα γὰρ φρῆν ὄμμασιν λαμπρύνεται,
 ἐν ἡμέρᾳ δὲ μοῖρ' ἀπρόσκοπος βροτῶν. 105

103. καρδία. καρδίαι m.

104. ὄμμασι.

105. μοῖρα πρόσκοπος.

is equally right in either case.—ἐμὸν
 ἰκέτην: in the technical sense as an
 accepted *προστρόπιος*, a criminal re-
 ceiving purgation.—σέβει...σέβας: *this*
reverend character in the outcast is re-
spected (sanctioned) by Zeus. Apollo
 reminds Hermes, that the validity of
 purgation, and the bond thereby created
 between the giver and receiver of pur-
 gation, are sanctioned by their common
 father Zeus, who had himself set a
 precedent in the leading case of the
 homicide Ixion; see *νν.* 444, 720.—
 ἐκνόμων: persons who for blood-guilt
 have been put beyond the pale of laws;
 so Hermann, citing the schol. τὸ τῶν
 ἰκετῶν σέβισμα καὶ δέημα οὐ μόνον τιμῆ
 Ζεὺς, ἀλλὰ καὶ σέβει, ὁρῶν αὐτὸ ὀρμώμενον
 προσηκούση τύχη, and Suidas ἐκνόμοις·
 παρανόμοις.—ὀρμώμενον κ.τ.λ.: *setting*
forth (or more exactly 'being set forth')
with fair commendation to mankind. The
 description is attached to ἰκέτην, and
 refers to the particular case of Orestes
 and to the present moment, the appeal
 to Zeus being parenthetical.—βροτοῖσιν:
 dative 'ethical' or 'of relation' depending
 generally upon the whole conception
 ὀρμώμενον...τύχη.—εὐπόμπη τύχη: *i.e.*

εὐτυχεῖ πομπῇ.—If ὀρμώμενον κ.τ.λ. be
 taken with σέβας, it seems to limit, and
 limit inappropriately, the bearing of the
 statement Ζεὺς σέβει. There is no reason
 to think that the validity or sanctity of
 purgation depended on the proper 'send-
 ing forth' of the person purged, or that,
 as a rule, he would be 'sent forth' at all.

94. Orestes departs, Apollo retires
 within the temple; the ghost of Clytae-
 mnestra appears. As to the manner of the
 entrance, see Introduction. It seems prob-
 able that, in the time of Aeschylus, the
 ghost simply entered from the temple (or
 possibly from the side, by the *πάροδος*), and
 spoke from the door of the temple to the
 Erinyes within.

95—99. *I, thus slighted by you among*
other dead, although my rebuke for
murder ceases not among the perished,
and (even for that) I wander in disgrace,
yet tell you plainly that the chief of my
reproach proceeds from those (other dead,
who are avenged while I am not). She
 bears in the other world a double re-
 proach, both as a murderess and as a
 neglected victim of murder. First, even
there, ἐν φθιτοῖσιν, where all are dead, it
 is still a brand of disgrace to have taken

Clytaemnestra (at the door, to the Erinyes within). Would you sleep? Oh, shame! And if ye sleep, what serve you? I, whom compared with other dead ye thus disregard, declare to you, that, albeit my reproach as murderess cleaves to me yet in the world of the perished, it is by *those others* that I am most beshamed. Wronged so foully by my nearest kin, no power is wroth on my behalf, though slaughtered by matricidal hands... But see these wounds,...see with thy soul,—even as in men the mind asleep is illumined with eyes, and foresees the destiny which by day they cannot see.

away life; the grim suggestion, that the murderess had hoped otherwise, is in the poet's most poignant style. This however is not the complaint which she lays before the Erinyes, because they could not remedy it. But her *worst* disgrace (*μεγίστη ατρία*) is due to their neglect, and for this she comes to them.—*ἄλλοισιν ἐν νεκροῖσιν*: 'among', i.e. as compared with others, whom the Erinyes have avenged (Paley).—*ὡς μὲν κ.τ.λ.*: answered by *προσυνέπω δὲ κ.τ.λ.* The preceding *δέ* (in *αἰσχροῦς δέ*) marks a subordinate antithesis contained within the protasis or *μὲν*-clause itself; 'the reproach (of murderess) is *not* dropped, *but* makes me a disgraced wanderer'.—*μεγίστην*: the full force of this superlative (*greatest*, not merely *great*) is important, and is in fact the key to the sentence.—*κείνων ὑπο*: not the dead in general, but the *ἄλλοι νεκροί*, the avenged, with whose case hers is unfavourably contrasted. The phrase does not imply that these alone feel or express contempt on this ground, but that they are the source and cause of the contempt.—*ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐφόνευσα Ἀγαμέμνονα, ἀπώσασθε, καὶ οἱ ἐμὲ φονεύσαντες οὐκ ἀτιμάζονται*, schol. to v. 95. Here, *ὑπὲρ ὧν...ἀπώσασθε* is a comment on *ὑφ' ὑμῶν*, 'you, on whose behalf (because avenging Iphigenia) I killed Agamemnon, have rejected me', while *οἱ...ἀτιμάζονται* refers to *ἄλλοισιν ἐν νεκροῖσιν*, which words the commentator referred to Agamemnon, or rather to an 'Agamemnon-party' among the dead, in

accordance with another note on v. 99, *σφαγεῖσα αἰτιῶμαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν, τῶν περὶ Ἀγαμέμνονα*. He took the meaning to be that the husband, having avenged himself through Orestes, has escaped the dishonour to which the unavenged wife is still subject. This is not perfectly correct, the limitation of the *οὐκ ἀτιμάζόμενοι* to Agamemnon being needless and not to the point; but nothing can be inferred from the notes to the prejudice of the traditional text.—The word *νεκροῖσιν* has been suspected, as possibly due to an interpretation of *φθιτοῖσιν*, but, as I think, without reason.—The remainder of the schol. (*παιδευτικὰ δὲ ταῦτα. τὸ γὰρ τοὺς ἐναγείς καὶ μετὰ θάνατον ὑπὸ νεκρῶν ἀτιμάζεσθαι ἱκανῶς ἔχεται παιδευσεως*) explains very fairly the separate point of the *ὄνειδος ἐν φθιτοῖσιν*.—On the slight anacoluthon, see next note.

100—101. *παθούσα...μουν*. For the change in the form of the sentence see *inf.* 480. The sequence in v. 95 foll. *ἐγὼ...ἀπρηγμισμένη...ὄνειδος οὐκ ἐκλείπεται* is not exactly comparable, because there the intended construction, though suspended by the clause with *μὲν* and the answering words *προσυνέπω δ' ὑμῖν ὅτι*, is really carried out correctly by *ἔχω μεγίστην αἰτίαν*.

103. *ἄρα...σέθεν*. For greater emphasis, she speaks as if to one in particular.—*καρδίᾳ σέθεν*, with that inner sense, which is active when the eye is closed; see the next lines.

104, 105. For the mind asleep is

ἢ πολλὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἐμῶν ἐλείξατε,
 χοάς τ' αἰόινους, νηφάλια μειλίγματα,
 καὶ νυκτίσεμνα δείπν' ἐπ' ἔσχαρα πυρρὸς
 ἔθνον, ὦραν οὐδενὸς κοινὴν θεῶν.
 καὶ πάντα ταῦτα λάξ ὀρῶ πατούμενα.
 ὁ δ' ἐξαλύξας οἴχεται νεβροῦ δίκην,
 καὶ ταῦτα κούφως ἐκ μέσων ἀρκυστάτων
 ὠρουσεν, ὑμῖν ἐγκατιλλώψας μέγα.
 ἀκούσαθ' ὡς ἔλεξα τῆς ἐμῆς περι

110

107. νηφάλια.

108. νυκτί σεμνά (i substituted for o).

112. ἀρκυσμάτων.

113. ἐκκαταλλώψασ.

lightened with eyes, whereas in daylight men's destiny is beyond their foresight': as we should put it, 'Asleep men foresee the future, which awake they cannot foresee'. For this doctrine Hermann (after Stanley) quotes Cic. *de Divinatione* 1. 30, 'cum ergo est somno sevocatus animus a societate et a contagione corporis, tum meminit praeteritorum, praesentia cernit, futura providet; iacet enim corpus dormientis ut mortui, viget autem et vivit animus'. See also Pind. *frag.* 108 εὐδει δὲ πρᾶσσόντων μελέων· ἀτὰρ εὐδόντεσσιν ἐν πολλοῖς ὄνειροις δεικνυσι τερπνῶν ἐφέρποισαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσις, Xen. *Cyr.* 8. 7. 21, etc. (Wecklein). The two verses, which are probably in substance, if not in terms, a quotation from some ancient text, bear upon the present case by analogy: "what is true of mankind ordinarily is true *a fortiori* of supernatural beings" (Paley): the mental sense in these may be supposed to be enlarged during sleep, as that of human beings is, though of course not exactly in the same way.—ἀπρόσκοπος passive, *unforeseen, not to be foreseen* (Paley).—μοῖρ' ἀπρόσκοπος Turnebus, from schol. ἡ τῆς φρενὸς μοῖρα οὐ προορᾷ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ. But this note gives no support to the substitution (Hermann and others) of φρενῶν for βροτῶν. The phrase ἡ τῆς φρενὸς μοῖρα, perhaps originally an independent gloss, signifies, that in μοῖρα βροτῶν, wrongly taken by the commentator to mean 'that

part of man', the 'part' intended is 'the mental part', so that μοῖρα (βροτῶν) would be here equivalent to ἡ φρήν. The gloss would convey nothing, if φρενῶν were in the text. Moreover, since to the case of the Erinyes the statement is not directly applicable, without βροτῶν its bearing could hardly be understood. And on the other hand μοῖρα φρενῶν, in the sense 'nature of the mind', would form an expression wanting authority. Paley's defence of βροτῶν seems to be sound.

106. τῶν ἐμῶν: propitiations offered to the Erinyes by Clytaemnestra, as murderess, during her life.—ἐλείξατε anticipates the comparison, pursued in the sequel, to hounds.

107. νηφάλια Robortello.—τε may be taken either (1) as joining χοάς to πολλά, 'many an offering and in particular your wineless libations', or (2) as coupling the sentence χοάς...θεῶν to the preceding: in that case, from ἔθνον, adapted to δείπνα, we take the general notion 'I offered' as applicable to χοάς. I prefer (with Wecklein) the first.—αἰόινους. οἶνος γὰρ οὐ σπένδεται Ἐρινύσιν schol. See Soph. *O.C.* 100, 469, 481, where water and honey (but not wine) are prescribed as an offering to the 'Eumenides' of Colonus. It is to be noted that the scholia, both here and at *v.* 109 (ἐν γὰρ τῷ μεσονυκτικῷ μόναις Ἐρινύσιν ἀπάρχονται.—ὅτι ταύταις μόναις ἐν νυκτὶ θύουσιν), may be invented from the text, and give no trustworthy

Verily oft indeed did ye lap of my offerings, libations not of wine, but sober, to propitiate you, and feasts in the solemn darkness, ritual of no god but you, which I would sacrifice upon the place of burning. And all this, I see, is trampled under foot. The man hath gone, escaped like a fawn out of the snare, ay, lightly leaped out of the midst, making at you the mouth of great mockery.

Oh, hear me plead for my life! Oh, wake to consciousness,

information, either about the times of the annotators, or about that of Aeschylus. Nor does the text prove, that any such worship of the *Erinyes*, as Aeschylus here describes, was sanctioned by custom or regularly practised by honest people. It suggests rather, I think, the fantastic ritual of guilt and terror. The doctrine of Aeschylus in this play is, that the *Erinyes could in no way be propitiated*; crime, where they recognise it, they pursue *inexorably*. Why they did not pursue Clytaemnestra, they explain in *vv.* 212, 603.—*ἐπ' ἑσχάρᾳ πυρός*: *ἔπι* the fire-place, *i.e.* that of her own house. The point is added partly for picturesqueness, but chiefly to mark privacy and secrecy.—*ἄραν*. For the acc. cf. Eur. *Bacch.* 723 *αἱ δὲ τὴν τεταγμένην | ἄραν ἐκίνοῦν θύσον ἐς βακχεύματα*, said of the Bacchanals, commencing their morning-rite. That in either place the word marks the *point* of time (*at*), is improbable, as there is no authority for such a use. Here it is possible to suppose that the case denotes duration. But this is not satisfactory, and in the *Bacchae* it is not admissible, for the rite of the Bacchanals is only commencing, and is not continued for 'the appointed space of time'; but soon interrupted by an attack upon them. On the other hand the coincidence of the grammatical peculiarity, in the same word *ἄρα*, and in similar references to a peculiar ritual, suggests that both passages should have a common explanation. Moreover it should be noticed, that if *ἄραν* here is referred merely to *time*, whether point or duration, the description 'not shared by any other

god' is untrue. Night was the time actually preferred for the rites of Bacchus for example (Eur. *Bacch.* 486 *νύκτωρ τὰ πολλά*), a fact not easily to be forgotten or overlooked. These things together suggest, that *ἄρα*, in connexion with the more punctilious and severe rituals (especially the Bacchic), had already passed from the sense 'proper time (for a function)' to that of *function, rite proper* to a particular time. The present Christian usage (*Hours, i.e. offices* of a special worship) supplies at least an illustration, and may well be, like much else in Christian language and symbolism, an actual descendant. In both passages, the sense 'function, office' brings the case within the ordinary use of the accusative, as a description of the whole action, and it fits well with Nonnus 46. 158 *καὶ τότε Βασσαρίδεσσι χοριτίδες ἤλυθον ἄραι* (cited by Tyrrell on *Bacch. l.c.*). It will also justify *οὐδενὸς κοινὴν θεῶν*: for the rite of Clytaemnestra, with its 'food served on the hearth-fire', differed from bacchanalia totally, and the poet leaves us free to invest it in fancy with any peculiarities which we think suitable. From the bacchanalia *hē* borrows only the mystic circumstance of darkness and, apparently, the term *ἄρα*.

112. *ταῦτα*: adverbial acc., *herein*, 'in doing this', *Anglice* 'ay, and hath sprung' etc.—*ἀρκυστάτων* Turnebus.

113. *ἐγκατιλλώψας* Turnebus; *χλευάσας, ἐγγελάσας* schol.: *ἐν* in such compounds answers to the English *at*.

114. *ὡς*: *because, for* (not *how*).—*περὶ ψυχῆς* as in Hom. *Od.* 9. 423 *πάντας τε δόλους καὶ μῆτην ὑφαίνοιν | ὡς τε*

ψυχῆς· φρονήσατ', ὧ κατὰ χθονὸς θεαί· 115
 ὄναρ γὰρ ὑμᾶς νῦν Κλυταιμῆστρα καλῶ.

ΧΟΡΟΣ.

(μυγμός)

ΚΛ. μύζοιτ' ἄν, ἀνὴρ δ' οἴχεται φεύγων πρόσω·
 † φίλοις γάρ εἰσιω οὐκ ἐμοῖς προσίκτορες.

ΧΟ. (μυγμός) 120

ΚΛ. ἄγαν ὑπνώσσεις κοῦ κατοικτίζεις πάθος·
 φονεὺς δ' Ὀρέστης τῆσδε μητρὸς οἴχεται.

ΧΟ. (ὠγμός)

ΚΛ. ὦζεις, ὑπνώσσεις· οὐκ ἀναστήσει τάχος;
 τί σοι πέπρακται πρᾶγμα πλὴν τεύχειν κακά; 125

ΧΟ. (ὠγμός)

ΚΛ. ὕπνος πόνος τε, κύριοι συνωμόται,
 δεινῆς δρακαίνης ἐξέκηραν μένος.

ΧΟ. (μυγμὸς διπλοῦς ὀξύς) 130
 λαβὲ λαβὲ λαβὲ λαβέ,—φράζου.

116. κλυταιμῆστρα.

περὶ ψυχῆς, Eur. *Hel.* 946 τοὺς δὲ Μενέλεω ποθῶ | λόγους ἀκοῦσαι τίνας ἐρεῖ ψυχῆς πέρι, and in expressions like μάχεσθαι, θέειν, τρέχειν περὶ ψυχῆς, ὁ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀγών (Soph. *El.* 1492), but here rather in the metaphorical sense 'I am desperately in earnest.'" Wecklein.—**φρονήσατε**: note the tense, 'become conscious', 'take φρόνημα', in the sense of *Cho.* 322 φρόνημα τοῦ θανόντος οὐ δαμάζει πυρὸς γνάθος. The invocation ὧ κατὰ χθονὸς θεαί, *goddesses of the nether world*, is selected with reference to the summons φρονήσατε, since it is into that world that their separated consciousness (φρόνημα) has passed; see on *vv.* 72, 73.—Mr Edwin Abbott has directed my attention to the fact, that, as a general rule, though with some exceptions (as *v.* 71), Aeschylus avoids the termination of the iambic senarius with two *oxytones* dissyllables (as χθονὸς θεαί). The comparative frequency of the double dissyllable with

other accentuations (as in *ἐμῆς περὶ v.* 114) indicates that the avoidance is intentional. But *the preposition and case* (as κατὰ χθονὸς) appears to be a standing exception, possibly because such a phrase was not really pronounced as a double oxytone: and the present instance would fall within the same principle. The point, which requires to be treated in connexion with other phenomena, is of interest as going to show that in tragic recitation the tonic accent was not without effect.

116. 'At present (νῦν) my summons comes to you (only) as a dream', *i.e.* the summons has no substantial effect upon the real chase of Orestes, though (as the sequel shows) it starts the sleepers upon an imaginary chase.—**ὄναρ**: cf. 131.—The name, reserved till now, comes in with startling and imperious effect.—Κλυταιμῆστρα M, here only, elsewhere as in text.

117. The terms μυγμός and ὠγμός are

ye goddesses of the deep; for now the call of Clytaemnestra comes to you but as a dream. (*The Erinyes make a sound of whining.*)

Ah, ye may whine; but the man is gone, far on his flight. For 'the suppliant' hath friends, and friends that serve (?). (*The whining is heard again.*)

Too much thou slumberest, and pitiest not the wrong, though Orestes, murderer of me his mother, is fled. (*A sound as of barking.*)

Thou bayest—slumbering! Rise up, oh, quickly rise. What work hast thou wrought, save to make mischief? (*The barking is heard again.*)

Sleep and labour, licensed conspirators, have spoiled the fell serpent of her force. (*Two sharp howls are heard; then the voices of the Erinyes crying confusedly Catch...catch, catch... catch...; then a single voice, saying, Look out!*)

derived respectively, through *μῶζω* and *ῶζω*, from the sounds *μν* and *ω*, the first being, as it were, a *whimper* or *whine* (cf. v. 189), the second, like the *au au* of Aristophanes, a sort of bark. The directions (*παρεπιγραφὰς*) probably represent tradition rather than the hand of the author; but are suggested necessarily or naturally by the text.

119. No explanation of this verse seems possible, and no correction has been suggested, which is simple enough to command confidence. That of Hermann *φίλοι γὰρ εἰσιν, οὐκ ἔμοι, προσίκτορες*, 'my kinsman (Orestes) has protectors, and I have none', is objectionable both in the want of *ἐμοῖς*; and in the rendering of *προσίκτορες*: for that *προσίκτωρ* (*comer*) could describe the person *protecting a suppliant* as well as the suppliant himself, is not proved either by the natural application of the epithet *προστρόπαιος* (lit. *concerned with supplication*) to both suppliant and protector, nor by the title *Zeὺς Ἀφίκτωρ* (*Suppl.* 1), which admits of a different explanation. By combining suggestions from Burges (*προσίκτορος*) and Wieseler (*οὐ κενοῖς*) we might obtain a good sense: *φίλοι γὰρ εἰσιν, οὐ κενοί, προσίκτορες*, 'for there are

those who befriend the suppliant, and not useless friends (like mine)'. The reading of Weil, *φίλοι γὰρ εἰσιν οὐκ ἔμοις προσεϊκότες* 'for he has friends, not like mine', is possible, though, since the emphasis here should be on *ἔμω*, the omission of the pronoun (*ἐκείνῳ*) is dubious. But this also is too far from the tradition to be trusted.

127. *κύριοι συνωμόται*: 'authorised' or 'licensed conspirators'. The forced term, like the ironical *δευῆς*, expresses indignation and contempt; *conspiracy* and *τὸ κύριον* (*legitimate authority*) are natural enemies; but here Sleep and Toil, since they work unresisted, are like conspirators approved by the government.

128. *ἔξεκίραναν*: 'have robbed the formidable snake of her spoiled power', lit. 'have spoiled it out' of her.—The appellation *δράκαινα* is probably intended chiefly as a symbol of 'chthonian' character, the snake being a normal representative of spirits and other beings of the underworld. But it also points to the serpentine attributes or insignia devised for the Erinyes by Aeschylus,—snakes in the hair, as girdles, etc.

130. *λαβέ catch!—φράζου*: *look out!* 'have a care'.—Cries of the chase.

ΚΛ. ὄναρ διώκεις θήρα, κλαγγάνεις δ' ἄπερ
 κύων μέριμναν οὔποτ' ἐκλίπων πόνου.
 τί δρᾶς; ἀνίστω, μὴ σέ νικάτω πόνος,
 μηδ' ἀγνοήσης πῆμα μαλθαχθεῖσ' ὑπνω.
 ἄλγησον ἦπαρ ἐνδίκους ὀνειδέσιν.
 τοῖς σώφροσιν γὰρ ἀντίκεντρα γίγνεται.
 †οὐδ' αἵματηρὸν πνεῦμ' ἐπουρίσασα τῶ,
 ἀτμῶ κατισχναίνουσα, νηδύος πυρί·
 ἔπου, μάραινε δευτέροις διώγμασιν.

135

ΧΟ. ἔγειρ', ἔγειρε καὶ σὺ τήνδ', ἐγὼ δὲ σέ.

140

131. κλαγγάνεις.

133. μὴ σε.

136. γίνεται.

138. κατισχναίνουσα.

131. ὄναρ: emphatic; 'you pursue the dream-quarry instead of the real'. See on *v.* 116.—κλαγγάνεις: Wakefield, on the analogy of λαγγάνω, φυγγάνω, θιγγάνω, τυγγάνω etc.

132. Between ἐκλίπων (M) and ἐκλείπων (Blomfield) the authority of the MS. is nothing, and both are admissible. With the aorist the description must be generic, 'like the dog, whose eager brain never quits the chase'; with the present, it is, or may be, individual and particular, 'like a dog, still in fancy cleaving to his sport': the present is the more picturesque.—οὔποτε, that is, not even in sleep.—πόνου: in the special sense of *exercise*, athletic practice: cf. *πονεῖν* and *πονεῖσθαι* to *train* (intransitive), *be trained*.

133. τί δρᾶς; not 'what are you about?' but 'what are you effecting?' *i.e.* you are effecting nothing: cf. *Ag.* 1352 ψηφίζομαι τι δρᾶν (to do something), and the adj. δραστήριος *effective*. Possible also is τι δρᾶς; (Hermann) 'are you effecting anything?'—μὴ σέ νικάτω πόνος, lit. 'let not your sport be defeating you (yourself)' instead of the prey: that is, 'quit this dream-chase, in which you run only to your own loss, and spend your eagerness in breaking the strength of your quarry'. That the negative and emphasis fall on the pronoun σέ appears from the repetition of πόνος, which is weak unless it refers in-

tionally to πόνου (see on *v.* 132): hence the conjectures πῶρος (Wakefield), κόπος (Halm). The accentuation of M is mistaken. To the emphatic σέ answers (if it is right, see note there) the emphatic τῶ (*the fugitive*) in *v.* 137. For the metaphor νίκη, applied to the hunting-down of a quarry, see Eur. *Bacch.* 1200 σὴν νικηφόρον...ἄγραν.

134. πῆμα: hurt, or harm, which you are incurring.

136. ἀντίκεντρα: 'equal to (sharp as) a goad'.

137. For οὐδ', σοῦ δ(ἐ) was proposed by Musgrave: cf. σοῦσθε *Theb.* 31, and Hesych. σοῦ· ἴθι, τρέχε, ἔρμα.—σὺ δ(ἐ) Pearson, with comma at πυρί, 'do thou rather follow'. This is in itself admissible, but less likely to have been corrupted.—αἵματηρὸν κ.τ.λ.: 'having set fairly after you fugitive thy blood-laden breath', *i.e.* 'having got well upon his track'. For αἵματηρὸν see *v.* 184.—τῶ: demonstrative (?), for ἐκείνω, 'you fugitive', explained by gesture.—I have no confidence in any proposed reading of this verse. The abrupt effect of the pronoun τῶ, though perhaps justified by the energy of the passage, is not above suspicion, and strengthens the doubt raised by οὐδέ. Possibly something is lost between *v.* 137 and *v.* 138, completing the sense 'you have not yet even got fairly on to the quarry': πω (for τῶ)

In dreams thou pursuest the quarry, giving tongue like the hound that never quits to think of his sport. What dost thou so? Arise! Let not thy sport defeat thyself; nor in weakness of sleep forget to feel a hurt. Thy heart should ache with just reproach, which to virtue is sharp as any goad. But speed (?); set fair after yon fugitive thy blood-laden breath, and with fiery vapour of thy belly make him lean. After him! And with the second chase, oh wither him up. (*The Ghost disappears. The Chorus of Erinyes begin to wake, and come, as they wake, from within the temple.*)

First Erinyes (in the doorway, speaking to another, and pointing towards a third). Awake her! Waken thou her; and

was proposed by Butler. The schol., *έφορηήσασα τῷ Ὀρέστη*, seems to ignore τῷ, but may be punctuated (Bothe), so as to confirm it—*έφορηήσασα. τῷ Ὀρέστη*.

138. *ἀτμῷ...πυρῖ*: metaphorical merely, for breath heated with the chase: a breath literally 'of fire' would not accord with the Aeschylean conception of the Erinyes. But the expression probably helped (with *αἱματηρὸν πνεῦμα*) to suggest the extravagant and grotesque phrase, which Euripides, by way of caricature, puts into the mouth of Orestes when, in the delusion of madness, he describes one of his imaginary Erinyes as 'blowing fire and blood from her skirts', *έκ χιτῶνων πῦρ πνέουσα καὶ φόνον* (*Ιρῆ. T.* 288); see *Euripides the Rationalist*, p. 184.—*κατισχναίνουσα* Robortello.

140. The Leader appears in the doorway, speaking as if to a second Erinyes, whom she has just aroused, and bidding her arouse a third (*τήνδε*) to whom she points. At the same moment the figure of Clytaemnestra rushes off (by the *parodos*), as if calling them on to the pursuit. After *v.* 142 the Erinyes, having observed the abandoned omphalos, come, one after another, from within. Whether the choric passage, *vv.* 143—178, or any part of it, was sung during this entrance, or whether, on the other hand, the entrance was accompanied only by music, and the singing commenced only when

the complete Chorus had entered the orchestra, it seems impossible to say. The words (for example *vv.* 143, 144) indicate clearly a division between voices: *κομματικῶς ἕκαστον κατ' ἴδιαν προενεκτέον*: *αἱ γὰρ διακοπαὶ πρόσφοροι τοῖς πάθεσιν*, schol. But no distribution can be made with certainty.—*ἐγὼ δὲ σέ*: 'and I (will waken) you'. She turns towards the other side, and makes as if she awakened a sleeper there. This seems better, both in sense and action, than Paley's 'as I rouse you'.—*ἀπολακτίσασα...ιδώμεθα*, cf. *Aristoph. Birds* 203 *ἀνεγείρας τὴν ἐμὴν ἀηδόνα | καλοῦμεν αὐτοῦς* (Wecklein).— 'Let us see whether in this beginning there is perchance a failure', *i.e.* 'whether our pursuit, so far, has missed its purpose'. *τοῦδε φροίμιου*, 'this commencement' or 'first movement', may have either of two meanings, (1) the chase from Argos to Delphi, which now, by the escape of Orestes, is disappointed and must be recommenced, or (2) *the chase which they have made in their dream*, or rather in the process of waking (*vv.* 117—139); in the first moment of complete return to day they do not fully realise that the dream-chase was not real. I prefer the second interpretation. In either case the expression *φροίμιον* is relative to the 'second pursuit' of *v.* 139, as if the speaker, in the moment of waking, fixes upon the last words of the ghost, and

εὔδεις; ἀνίστω, κάπολακτίσασ' ὕπνον,
ιδώμεθ' εἴ τι τοῦδε φροίμιου ματᾶ.

ιοὺν ἰού, πύπαξ. ἐπάθομεν, φίλαι,— στρ. α΄.

ἦ πολλὰ δὴ παθοῦσα καὶ μάτην ἐγώ,—
ἐπάθομεν πάθος δυσαχές, ὦ πόποι, 145

ἄφερτον κακόν.—

ἐξ ἀρκύων πέπτωκεν, οἴχεται δ' ὁ θῆρ.—

ὑπνω κρατηθεῖς' ἄγραν ὤλεσα.—

ἰὼ, παῖ Διός, ἐπικλοπος πέλει, ἀντ. α΄.

νέος δὲ γραίας δαίμονας καθιππάσω, 150

τὸν ἰκέταν σέβων ἄθεον ἄνδρα καὶ

τοκεῦσιν πικρόν.—

τὸν μητραλοῖαν δ' ἐξέκλεψας ὦν θεός.—

τί τῶνδ' ἐρεῖ τις δικαίως ἔχειν;—

ἐμοὶ δ' ὄνειδος ἐξ ὄνειράτων μολὸν στρ. β΄. 155

ἔτυψεν δίκαν διφρηλάτου

μεσολαβεῖ κέντρῳ

ὑπὸ φρένας, ὑπὸ λοβόν.—

142. εἰδώμεθ'.

154. τίς.

draws from them a suspicion of what has happened, which she hastens to verify. The term *φροίμιον*, which Aeschylus employs freely (see *Ag.* 820, 1215), is metaphorical merely, and though appropriate, in its sense of 'prelude, first movement of a tune', to the proceedings of a chorus, does not here (I think) refer to any performance on the stage, unless the dream-chase can be so called.—The prevalent view (Paley, Wecklein) refers *φροίμιον τῶδε*, taken literally, to the following *strophæ*, regarded as a *prelude* to the further pursuit; but (1) the exclamations of *v.* 143 appear to mark the discovery that Orestes is gone, which must not therefore be assumed as certain in the previous verse, and (2) the question *εἰ ματᾶ* cannot, it seems, be applied to the ode without some forced interpretation:

"Let us see, she says, whether we can induce Apollo to give Orestes up" (Paley); "The ode is to serve as a mere prelude, a temporary manifestation of what their rage can effect" (Wecklein). The first question for the awakened pursuers is, naturally, what has happened during their sleep, and *ιδώμεθα* can scarcely refer to anything but this.—*ιδώμεθ'* Turnebus.

144. A second voice interrupts.

147. *He has slipped out of the net, and the quarry is gone.* The subject of *πέπτωκεν* is understood. By changing *δ'* to *θ'* (Abresch), so that *ὁ θῆρ* is the subject of both verbs, the sentence is made smoother, but less dramatic.

150. *νέος*: both in his youthful figure and as one of the *νεώτεροι θεοί* (*v.* 162), the dynasty of Zeus. For the

I (*turning to another*) will waken thee. Sleepest thou? Rise up, spurn slumber away, and let us see if in our first move hath been found a fault... (*Perceiving that Orestes is gone, she utters a cry of astonishment and rage, and rushes out as if looking for him; the rest follow, with like exclamations*):

Ah!...Soho!...Oh sisters, we have suffered...Ay, much have I undergone, and all for nought, if — ...Hurt, wound, and pain... oh shame!...intolerable!...He hath slipped the net, and the quarry is gone away! Sleep mastered me, and I lost the prey.

Ah, Son of Zeus, a thief thou art, and thy youth hath ridden proud over powers of eld, doing respect to yon suppliant, a godless man, a child unkind; the slayer of a mother thou, a god, hast stolen away! Who will find justice here?

For me, it is the reproach that came in dream which, like a charioteer with hand on the midst of his goad, hath struck into

legendary succession, and the poet's view of it, see *Ag.* 178 foll. The Erinyes represent the elder powers both personally and also morally, in their rigid but narrow justice of the family (see *v.* 152), for which the new gods are about to substitute the larger and more equitable justice of the state. See particularly the ode beginning at *v.* 493; but this conception runs throughout the play and is in fact the basis of it.

152. *τοκεῦσιν πικρὸν*: *cruel to his parent*. *τοκεῦσιν* is plural according to rule, because, though the mother only is in question, it is in her character as parent, not as an individual.

154. *τίς* (M) gives a double interrogative *τί...τίς*; equivalent to *οὐδὲν οὐδὲν...* This is not inconceivable, but *τίς* (generally read) is better; and see *τίς* (M), for *τίς*, in *v.* 4 and elsewhere.

155. Another voice: 'What I feel most keenly is the reproach which has been cast on us'.—*ἔμολ...μολὸν*: 'the reproach passed upon me by the voice of my dream' (Clytaemnestra).—*ῥνειδος... ὄνειράτων*. The assonance, though it does not represent any point of sense, is

doubtless intentional and characteristic; cf. *δαῖνον δαίμων* in *v.* 160. Wecklein, who points it out, also calls attention to the close resemblance of sound, which indeed cannot escape notice, between the strophe and the antistrophe. The result of this, combined with the metrical or rhythmical effects (see Appendix II.), is an astonishing vigour of emphasis. The accumulation of such devices is not specially Hellenic, still less Attic; and critics of the Euripidean age would probably have held, that the whole passage appealed too much to the ear, and too little to the intelligence. But it is marvellously impressive in its way.—On the general use of assonant correspondences in *strophæ*, see examples collected by Mr C. Brennan, *Classical Review*, vol. xx. p. 339.—*ἔτυψεν...λοβόν*. 'The reproach has wounded my heart like the driver's goad': a reminiscence from the dream, *v.* 136.—*μεσολαβεί*: 'gripped in the middle' for a firmer hold.—*ὑπὸ φρένας*. Between metaphor and fact, the speaker is driven to a half-conscious extravagance.

πάρεστι μαστίκτορος
 δαίτου δαμίου 160
 βαρὺ τὸ περίβαρυ κρύος ἔχειν.—
 τοιαῦτα δρῶσιν οἱ νεώτεροι θεοί, ἀντ. β΄.
 κρατοῦντες τὸ πᾶν δίκας πλέον.
 φονολιβῆ θρόνον,
 περὶ πόδα, περὶ κάρα, 165
 πάρεστι γὰς ὀμφαλὸν
 προσδρακεῖν αἱμάτων
 βλοσυρὸν ἀρόμενον ἄγος ἔχειν.
 ἐφεστίω δὲ μάντις ᾧ μιάσματι στρ. γ΄.
 μυχὸν ἐχράνατ' αὐ- 170
 τόσσυτος, αὐτόκλητος,
 παρὰ νόμον θεῶν βρότεια μὲν τίων,
 παλαιγενεῖς δὲ μοίρας φθίσας.

164. φονολιβῆ.

167. προσδρακῆσ altered to προσδρακεῖν.

168. αἰρούμενον.

169. μάντι σῶ.

170. μυκὸν ἐχρανά τ'.

159—161. *It hath left on me, like public punishment by flagellant fierce, a smart that aches, that aches intolerably: i.e. 'it is as though I had been scourged for a crime'.—δαίτου δαμίου: one 'who wreaks (upon the criminal) the enmity (δαίτου) of the state (δαμίον)'.—ὁ δῆμιος was the Athenian title for the executioner: see L. and Sc. s.v.—πάρεστι... ἔχειν: lit. 'there is present (remains) the smart to keep (bear)'.*

162. A new speaker, who reverts to the denunciation of Apollo: **τοιαῦτα** refers not to what immediately precedes, but to *v.* 154.

163. **κρατοῦντες...πλέον**: *who regard not right, but will have all*, lit. 'who seize the whole, though it be more than their right', **δίκας πλέον** (δύ). In the new order, under the dynasty of Zeus, there is one universal undivided power, and privileges are not respected. This is the repeated complaint of the Erinyes: see especially *vv.* 227, 348—368, 577, 718, 730 *παλαιὰς διανομὰς καταφθίσας*, etc.

In a theological view, from the ground taken by Aeschylus, the controversy is of supreme importance. It is precisely because, in the Olympian system as he conceives and represents it, there is but one absolute authority, with divers representatives and dependencies but no fundamental partition, that this system is morally superior to those which preceded it, and signifies the achievement of order. It is the lesson of the play, that this moral supremacy imposes itself by its intrinsic virtue even upon powers infringing, and therefore disposed to rebellion.—**παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ πᾶν ἔχοντες**, schol., not exact, but right in the main.—For the connexion of thought between this *v.* and the next, see *vv.* 577, 618.

163. 'With gore from head to foot is flecked yon seat, the earth-stone, and hath taken, as must be seen, a grim defilement of blood that stays on it.'—**θρόνον**: in apposition to **ὀμφαλόν**. The word, which in English seems superfluous, expresses in Greek the precise

my bosom, into my heart. The doomster's cruel scourge, the sore, sore ache of it, I must feel and bear!

Such things do these younger gods, who will have more than right, who will have *all*. (*They gather towards the temple, taunting the god within.*) Flowing with gore from head to foot, the seat, the Earth-Stone, hath taken, as must be seen, a grim defilement of blood that abides on it.

The prophet, himself defiling his home, hath fouled his secret place, by none impelled or invited but himself. Defying law divine, he respecteth the cause of man, but ancient apportionment he hath done away!

cause of the pollution; the stone is 'blood-stained as a seat', because, that is, a murderer has sat upon it.—τὸν θρόνον, οὐ'Ορέστης καθήστω, schol., rightly.—The change of voices (and of construction) supposed by Paley and others between *v.* 165 and *v.* 166 is not absolutely necessary unless θρόνον be altered to θρόμβον, as to which see below. But such an interruption is in itself suitable to the wording, and accords with the (probable) change of voices at *v.* 159.—ὄμφαλόν: see *v.* 40.—ἔχειν: consecutive, depending on ἀρόμενον ἄγος, 'having taken pollution to keep'. It is possible also to make ἀρόμενον ἔχειν, as compound perfect in the infinitive (*to have taken on*), depend as a whole upon προσδρακεῖν: but the participial construction προσδρακεῖν τὸν ὄμφαλὸν ἀρόμενον is more regular, and a consecutive use of ἔχειν answers better to *v.* 161.—On the metre (θρόνον *v.* 164 compared with κέντρῳ *v.* 157) see Appendix II. θρόμβον Wakefield, whence φονολιβῆ θρόμβων (genitive analogous to construction of πλήρης) *flecked with gowls of blood* (Bamberger), φονολιβεί θρόμβῳ Keyser. But no change is required.—πάρεστι...προσδρακεῖν: the infinitive clause is the subject of πάρεστι: lit. 'to contemplate is present'. The analogy of πάρεστι in the corresponding *v.* 159, and the sense of προσδρακεῖν (*look at*, not *see*), show the meaning to be not merely that the stone is visibly stained, but that henceforth Apollo, in his oracular seat,

'has before his eyes' a polluted sanctuary; see the following lines, which pursue the same thought, and *v.* 719 μαντεῖα δ' οὐκέθ' ἀγνὰ μαντεύσει. The subject of προσδρακεῖν (Apollo) is supplied from οἱ νεώτεροι θεοί.—ἀρόμενον Abresch.

169—173. 'The prophet-god, himself desecrating his home', etc. ἐφέστιῳ... ᾧ μιάσματι: *domestica sua pollutione*, 'by desecration of his own, done upon his hearth'. For the point of ἐφέστιος see *v.* 580: it refers to the act of ceremonial purgation, in which the house and hearth was an essential instrument.—The reading μάντις ᾧ (Merkel) is preferable to μάντι, σῶ (M) not only as permitting the retention of ἐχράνατ(ο), which, with the vocative, must be changed to ἐχρανᾶς (Turnebus), but also because of the form in which the whole concluding passage is cast: see the notes on *v.* 174 foll.; μάντις δν (Heimsoeth) is also acceptable, but less warranted, and less forcible. By entertaining and purging the murderer, Apollo has made the pollution itself *his own*; he has taken the guilt upon himself, and thus now is an offence in his own sanctuary.—μάντις, with contemptuous emphasis; he might at least have foreseen the result of his own act.—μυχδὸν (Robortello): that is, properly speaking, the μυχδὸς χθονὸς (*Cho.* 954), the hole in the earth, with a chamber built over it, which was the original nucleus of the Delphian sanctuary and the place where the deity, in the person of the Pythia, sat

κάμοί τε λυπρός, καὶ τὸν οὐκ ἐκλύσεται, ἀντ. γ'.
 ὑπό τε γᾶν φγγῶν 175
 οὐποτ' ἐλευθεροῦται,
 ποτιτρόπαιος δ' ὦν ἕτερον ἐν κάρᾳ
 μιάστορ' ἐκ κείνου πάσεται.

ΑΠ. ἔξω, κελεύω, τῶνδε δωμάτων τάχος
 χωρεῖτ', ἀπαλλάσσεσθε μαντικῶν μυχῶν, 180

175. φεύγων.

178. ἐκείνου. παύσεται altered to πάσεται.

and responded. The Erinyes suppose Apollo to be now, as in fact he is, somewhere in this inner place, and they vent their rage by speaking, as the popular phrase is, *at* him, that is, of him, but so that he shall hear. It is this which explains the sequel.—On the 'chasm' at Delphi, and on the earlier and later beliefs respecting it, see a full and interesting article by A. P. Oppé (*Journal of Hellenic Studies*, xxiv. 214). I should concede to the author that there was, possibly or probably, nothing like a 'cavern' there; the Greek imagination in such matters was extremely vigorous. On the other hand, the language of Aeschylus here (see next note) and in the *Choephoroi* (*l.c.*) shows, I think, clearly that the place was *supposed* to communicate with the subterranean world. Nor do I see reason to doubt, though it is not provable, that in, and long before, the time of Aeschylus, such communication was believed, as in later times, to be a condition of the oracular power.—**αὐτόκλητος**: *not* bidden by any other.—**παρὰ νόμον κ.τ.λ.**: see on *v.* 162.—**βρότεια**: βρότεια (πράγματα).—**μοίρας**, *divisions*, should perhaps not have a capital letter, since, notwithstanding *παλαγενεῖς*, the reference is not so much to the Μοίραι, the mythical persons, as to the established *partition* and *distribution* of the world, the conception out of which their personality was developed.

174—178. *And not only is he detested by me, but he hath also this criminal,*

whom he shall not loose. He flies to earth, but there is no escape for him. He hath opened his door to guilt, and wretch after wretch upon his shoulders he shall have. The harm, they say, which the oracle must sustain, is only beginning. If, in the new order of things, the possessor of Delphi is a receiver of murderers, there will be no end to Orestes and the trouble of him. The sacred hollow (*v.* 170), to which the deity has retired, will be no refuge from those who will certainly follow so attractive a precedent, and Apollo will soon have another Orestes at the omphalos.—**ἐμοί τε λυπρός (ἔστι), καὶ κ.τ.λ.**: *in addition* to the enmity of the older gods, which Apollo has earned, he must expect other trouble as the natural sequel of the patronage extended to Orestes. The former **καί** (in *κάμοί*) couples the whole paragraph to the preceding.—**γε** (for **τε**) Casaubon, but the text seems right; **ἐμοί λυπρός ἔστι** has no separate emphasis.—**τὸν**: *you (mas)*, Orestes: demonstrative accompanied by a gesture.—**ἐκλύσεται**: *he shall loose off*. Two meanings are possible, (1) *shall deliver from us*, the middle voice then expressing only, as in *P.V.* 251, *Suppl.* 1076, the interest of the releaser in the released; and (2) *shall loose from himself*, shake off, get quit of. We shall say most truly, that the phrase is projected in the first sense, but taken up by the sequel in the second.—**ὑπό τε γᾶν...ἐλευθεροῦται**: the subject here and throughout is still Apollo, but the language

He hath our hate; and, moreover, his criminal he shall not loose. Though he fly to earth, there is no freedom for him. A patron of guilt he is; and wretch after wretch he shall have upon his head! (*They are pressing into the temple, but are suddenly driven back by Apollo.*)

Apollo. Out, I command you, quick out of this house depart, and rid of your presence the sanctuary of prophecy,—ay, thou,

used is intentionally such as would apply also to Orestes. It is the very point of this denunciation, that the deity, having identified himself with the criminal, shares his guilt and uncleanness. Moreover, the Erinyes are in doubt, as yet, whether Apollo has not conveyed Orestes along with him into the depth of his sanctuary. It is not until *vv.* 226 (and 230) that, assured that he has fled, they strike upon the new trail.—This clause is antithetic to the following (ποιτιτρόπαιος δὲ κ.τ.λ.), not to the preceding; τε therefore (not δὲ as some would read) is the right conjunction.—**ΠΟΙΤΙΤΡΟΠΑΙΟΣ**: in its widest sense, 'a party to the rite of *προστροπή*'; both the parties to purgation, the purger and the purged, are *προστροπαιοι*.—**ἐν κάρῳ**: primarily metaphorical, as of a burden taken upon the head and shoulders, but also adapted, with sarcasm, to the situation, the god below, the refugees above.—**ἕτερον ... ἐκ κελῖνου**: a second... after (in succession to) that one (Orestes), with suggestion of a future series.—We should not assume that ὑπὸ γᾶν φυγῶν refers here to the death of the criminal. The words themselves do not naturally import this. In *v.* 340, where the language is in some respects similar, γᾶν ὑπελθεῖν is used for 'to die'; but it is the context there, which requires and furnishes this interpretation. Here it is not suggested, and, if imported, it creates insuperable difficulties. To suppose a change of subject between ἐκλύσεται and ἐλευθεροῦται is not easy; and the last clause, ποιτιτρόπαιος...πάσεται, if we take the criminal to be the subject of it, is unintelligible and incorrigible. Even if a

punishing deity could be called *μίστωρ*, which is not proved by the passages cited (see L. and Sc. *s.v.*), there is still no point in *ἕτερος μίστωρ*: in both worlds the pursuit and torture of the damned is the function of the same power, the Erinyes themselves.—**ἐκ κελῖνου**. This reading (for the MS. *ἐκείνου*) is confirmed by the second paraphrase in the schol., *οἱ ἐξ αὐτοῦ δικας ἡμῖν δώσουσιν, his posterity shall be punished by us*. This commentator took together *ποιτιτρόπαιος ὧν ἐκ κελῖνου the criminal descended from him*, and supposed a reference to the doctrine of hereditary guilt, as laid down in *vv.* 933—938. For the metre see Appendix II. The reading was long ago suggested (by Bothe) but has received little attention, because on the prevalent assumption that the subject of the clause is the criminal, *ἐκ κελῖνου* is not explicable.—**φυγῶν**, and *ποιτιτρόπαιος ὧν δ'*, Porson, for syllabic correspondence of metre, but see Appendix II. The aorist **φυγῶν** is perhaps the preferable tense, though **φεύγων** (*trying to escape*) is admissible.

179. Here the Chorus, or some of them, probably make as though to enter the temple again and search it further, but are met by Apollo, bearing his bow, and driving them away.—Nevertheless *δωμάτων* probably signifies the whole sanctuary, including the precinct, where the Chorus are now supposed to be, rather than the temple strictly.

179, 180. **τάχος** adverbial acc., *with speed*.—**δωμάτων...μυχῶν**: the temple and its chambers with their appurtenance, the precinct.

μὴ καὶ λαβοῦσα πτηνὸν ἀργηστὴν ὄφιν,
 χρυσηλάτου θώμιγγος ἐξορμώμενον,
 ἀνῆς ὑπ' ἄλγους μέλαν' ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων † ἀφρόν,
 ἐμοῦσα θρόμβους οὓς ἀφείλκυσας φόνου.

οὔτοι δόμοισι τοῖσδε χρίμπτεσθαι πρέπει. 185
 ἀλλ' οὗ καραμιστῆρες ὀφθαλμωρῦχοι
 δίκαι σφαγαί τε, σπέρματός τ' ἀποφθορᾶ
 παίδων κακοῦται χλοῦνις, ἥδ' ἀκρωνία
 λευσμός τε, καὶ μύζουσιν οἰκτισμὸν πολλὸν
 ὑπὸ ράχιν παγέντες. ἀρ' ἀκούετε 190
 οἷας ἐορτῆς ἔστ' ἀπόπτυστοι θεοῖς
 στέργηθρ' ἔχουσαι; πᾶς δ' ὑφηγεῖται τρόπος
 μορφῆς. λέοντος ἄντρον αἵματορρόφου

183. μέλαν ἀπ' ἀνῶν. ἀπ' ἄνων m.
 (v for original a). 187. ἀποφθοραί.

186. οὐ καραμιστῆρες ὀφθαλμωρῦχοι.
 189. λευσμός. 190. ἴ. ορράχιν.

181. 'Lest thou shouldst e'en receive a snake, winged and wind-swift'; the metaphorical description of the arrow is so turned as to reflect by contrast upon the serpents which they themselves bear as part of them.—**λαβοῦσα**: turning to one of them.

182. The 'gold-wrought string' is suggested (Wecklein) by the standing epithet of Apollo *χρυσότοξος*, derived from the gilding of the bow in representations of him, but would seem to signify something more definite, perhaps a bow-string in which the overlaying wire was of gold. Many such may probably have been seen among the spoils of the Persians.

183. **μέλαν' ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἀφρόν** (?): 'spume red from human beings,' *i.e.* reddened with the blood sucked from human beings (see *vv.* 264—266); *sed quæere*. The schol. rather impeaches than confirms the reading: τὸ αἷμα μέλανα ἀφρόν εἶπεν, οὐ δῆπου τὸ ἐμφυτον αὐτῶν· ἀναίμονες γὰρ οἱ θεοί· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἠθροισμένον, ὡς τούτῳ τροφῆν χρωμένων αὐτῶν. The commentator's difficulty, about divine beings having

blood, would probably not have troubled the poet; but if the text had *ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων*, his doubt could not easily arise, and we may suspect on the contrary that *ἀνῶν* (*i.e.* ἀνθρώπων) in M is due to the note.—**ἐντέρων** (Wecklein) points to a possible sense. Note however, that *ἀφείλκυσας* in *v.* 184 rather suggests some previous mention of the victims. Whichever view be taken, the word must remain uncertain; possibly it should be one not now extant.

186 foll. οὐ Turnebus.—'But (ye should go) where (there are) bloody punishments, heading, gouging of the eyes, and where' etc.: *i.e.* to places savage and barbarous in their customs. The poet is probably thinking particularly of the Persians and their usages.—**δίκαι σφαγαί τε**: 'things which are punishments and also bloody outrages'.—**καραμιστῆρες** (Stanley): adjective, parallel to *ὀφθαλμωρῦχοι*.—**σπέρματος ... χλοῦνις**: *i.e.* 'where castration is in vogue'.—**ἀποφθορᾶ** Musgrave. If this is right, as it seems to be, we may assume that *χλοῦνις*, for Aeschylus, signified *virility*, and may compare Hom. *Il.* 9. 539 *χλοῦνην σὺν*

lest thou e'en receive the winged shining snake which is ready to speed from my golden string, and vent for pain the dark spume from...(?) vomiting the gowts which from slaughter thou hast sucked. This dwelling is no fit place for you to approach, but rather some place of murderous punishments, lopping of heads, gouging of eyes, where boys are maimed and the virile seed destroyed, where men are quartered and stoned, or long and piteously moan upon the impaling stake. Do ye hear? Such is the feast, for desire whereof ye are to the gods abominable. And all your form and fashion doth point thereto; in a blood-

ἀγριον, taking for χλοῦνης the alternative interpretation *entire*.—ἡδέ is used by Aeschylus almost exclusively in catalogues of names, titles, etc., in the *Persae* thus frequently. Here the long string of copulae makes a variety desirable, though the examples must not be reckoned as certain. ἡ τε(ε), 'and where (there is)...', is possible, and would clear the construction.—ἀκρωνία: some species of torture, perhaps ἀκρωτηριασμός, *dismemberment*, from ἀκρα *extremities*, though the formation is unusual.—λευσμός Casaubon. The corruption λευσμόν, due to the division of the sense according to the verses, seems to have contributed to produce the errors of the scholia: see below. λευσμόν is not unconstruable, as obj. to μύζουσιν, coupled (by καί) to οἰκτισμόν, and leaving τε to couple the sentences. But such an arrangement would be uncouth, and ἡδ' ἀκρωνία, as a clause by itself, is not harmonious.—The obscurity arising from the unique words, χλοῦνης and ἀκρωνία, is increased by doubts affecting the cognate χλοῦνης, and by a medley in the schol., χλοῦνης ἀκρωνία· ἡ ἀκμαία ἀποκοπή. παρὰ τὴν χλόην· ἡ ἐπεὶ χλοῦνης ὁ σὺς, καπροὶ δὲ συνεχῶς εὐνουχίζονται, διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἀποκοπὴν συνίκτην εἶπεν, οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνην.—ἡ ἐκτομὴ μορίων.—κακῶν ἄθροισις, ἡ λιθοβολίας(?). 'Ἡρωδιανὸς δὲ τὸ σύστημα καὶ ἄθροισμα. Nothing can be inferred from this, except perhaps that the ancient commentators had no light to give. For discussions of the scholia and of the problem generally, see Hermann,

Paley, Rutherford (*Class. Rev.* II. 291), Dr Headlam (*Class. Rev.* XIX. 396). The last concludes as I do, reserving the doubt that χλοῦνης may be an adjective (see the scholia), in which case something, after this word, must be lost. If the MS. text is, as seems probable, substantially right, all is clear, so far as Aeschylus is concerned, except the precise species of torture signified by ἀκρωνία. If it is deeply injured (as is possible), there are no sound materials with which to mend it. In the final gloss, κακῶν ἄθροισις κ.τ.λ., interpretations of ἀκρωνία (ἄθροισις?) and λευσμόν (λιθοβολίας) seem to be combined. Moreover, the interpretation ἄθροισις for ἀκρωνία may be due to misunderstanding of a primitive note, κακῶν ἄθροισις a catalogue of ruins (Davies), intended not for any particular word, but for the whole passage; as to this, however, see Headlam, *l.c.*

189. μύζουσιν...πολὺν: 'wail most pitifully'.

190. ὑπόρραχιν (M) or ὑπὸ ράχιν. Either is possible (Wecklein).—παγίντες: *impaled*.

191, 192. οἶας ἐορτῆς...στέρηθηρα ἔχουσαι, together: literally 'for finding charms in what manner of feast, ye are detested by the gods'.

192. ὕφηγείται: 'your appearance suggests' your inner nature.

194. τοιαύτας: 'such (as the lion)', *i.e.* αἱματορρόφους, drinkers of blood themselves; see *v.* 184.

οἰκεῖν τοιαύτας εἰκός, οὐ χρηστηρίους
ἐν τοῖσδε πλησίοισι τρίβεσθαι μύσος. 195

χωρεῖτ' ἄνευ βοτῆρος αἰπολούμεναι·
ποιμνης τοιαύτης δ' οὔτις εὐφιλῆς θεῶν.

ΧΟ. ἄναξ Ἄπολλον, ἀντάκουσον ἐν μέρει.
αὐτὸς σὺ τούτων οὐ μεταίτιος πέλει,
ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ πᾶν ἔπραξας ὡς παναίτιος. 200

ΑΠ. πῶς δῆ; τοσοῦτο μῆκος ἔκτεινον λόγου.

ΧΟ. ἔχρησας ὥστε τὸν ξένον μητροκτονεῖν.

ΑΠ. ἔχρησα ποιναὶς τοῦ πατρὸς πέμψαι. τί μῆν;

195. πλησίοισι.

200. εἰς.

203. τι.

194, 195. *And not, in this place of sacred consultation, to spread infection by your touch.* *πλησίοισι τρίβεσθαι μύσος*: literally 'to rub off pollution upon your neighbours'; *μύσος προστρίβεσθαι* schol. rightly; the dative case *πλησίοισι* (of the person affected) is constructed, in the archaic fashion of poetry, with the simple verb, as it would be in prose with the more precise compound; cf. *στρατοῦ* in *Theb.* 117. The mutual action of rubbing is properly described by the middle voice. The text should not be suspected. The phrase *τρίβεσθαι μύσος* requires some remoter object, and none is better than *πλησίοισι*. It was because of the inevitable contact among a crowd of worshippers that the presence of the polluted in a sanctuary was especially to be deprecated. The suggested corrections proceed generally on the assumption that we should seek an epithet for *χρηστηρίους* (*πλουσίοισι*, *Πυθλοισι*, etc.). On the other hand *πλησίοισι* itself, taken (as Hermann) with *χρηστηρίους*, would be pointless. The Chorus are still *in*, not *near*, the oracular sanctuary.

196. *Go feed, without shepherd to pasture you*: the god is thinking of himself in his pastoral character as *Nomios* (Paley, Wecklein).

197. *With a flock like you, it is no agreeable spectacle.* *ποιμνης τοιαύτης*

(*οὔσης*): gen. absolute, 'the flock being such': the position of *δέ* throws the two words together and serves to mark this construction.—*οὔτις εὐφιλῆς θεῶν* (*ἔσσι*): the subject, 'the feeding, pasturing', is supplied from the sense of the preceding *χωρεῖτε αἰπολούμεναι*. The negative expression *οὐκ εὐφιλῆς τις* is ironically moderate and equivalent to 'the most disgusting', *δυσφιλεστάτη*: cf. *δυσφιλή δια* in *v.* 54.—*θεῶν*, partitive gen., depends on *τις*: lit. 'among sights'. To watch and contemplate his flock, as it feeds, is the characteristic pleasure of the herdsman, but to see the Erinyes feed is anything but a delight,—would be horrible. Compare *v.* 184.—*θέα* Burges. This change of *case* is not necessary, but Burges was right in seeking here *θέα sight*, not *θεός god*. Assuming *θεός*, the verse has been rendered 'of such a flock no god would willingly be herdsman'. But (1) the use of *εὐφιλῆς* for *ἐκῶν*, *ἄσμενος*, *libens*, is not proved, nor (I think) probable; (2) to restrict *οὔτις νομιοῦ* by the addition of *θεῶν* (*no god*) not only weakens the expression, but suggests that others, human beings for instance, might like the task; (3) the natural, if not necessary, mood for the verb would be the potential (*ἂν εἴη βοτῆρ*), but this cannot legitimately be supplied.

200. *εἰς*: Canter.—*ὡς παναίτιος*: 'in

gorged lion's cave such mates should dwell, not spread the contagion of your neighbourhood in this oracular place. Go! without shepherd feed. No pleasant thing to see is the pasture of such a flock!

The Leader of the Erinyes. Lord Apollo, hear thou in turn our answer.

Thyself of this art cause, not in part but sole,—doer of all and all to blame.

Ap. How so? Thou mayst speak so far as to answer that.

Erin. Thine oracle gave such command that the guest became matricide.

Ap. I commanded (and what then?) to conduct the avenging of his sire.

such a way as to be responsible for all.'—*ων* Wakefield.

201. *τοσοῦτο*: cf. *P. V.* 827 *τοιούτο μὲν σοι τοῦτο φρούριον λέγω*, where *τοιούτον*, the normal 'Attic' form, is inadmissible. On the whole question see Dindorf *Lexicon Aeschyleum*, s.v. *τοιούτος*.—*τοσοῦτον* rec.—'I will hear thee on this point, but this only.'

202. *τὸν ξένον*: 'the entertained guest', pointing to the fact that Orestes achieved the death of his mother and her paramour only by a treacherous deception upon their *hospitality*, so that his deed was a breach of both the supreme obligations, that of the *parent* and that of the *host* (*inf. vv.* 548 foll.). His character as *ξένος* is perpetually noted in the *Choephori* (558, 560, 573, 652, 664, 696, 706, 726 (where he is *ἀνὴρ ὁ ξένος*), etc.; and this unhappy aggravation of horror causes searchings of conscience even among his supporters (*ib.* 624 foll.).—*ὥστε* .. *μητροκτονεῖν* is to be distinguished from the simple *μητροκτονεῖν*: it would not have been exactly true to say that the oracle commanded the commission of the murder by the guest, since the stratagem of Orestes, at least in its details, was not dictated by Apollo: see on *Cho.* 558 foll. But it was the *result*, and the foreseen result, of Apollo's command.—As the *ικέρης* of Apollo, Orestes might also be

called *ξένος* in relation to him; see the converse *ικέρης* for 'one seeking hospitality' in *Cho.* 567; nor is this suggestion excluded by the other. But the other is chiefly in view.

203. *I gave command to avenge the father by arms*, literally 'to send and conduct an (expedition for the) avenging of the father'. *πῶνός* is a brachylogy. The word *πέμψαι* is chosen (1) to shift the principal part from Orestes to the Delphian representatives of the god, especially Pylades, who received the command as well as Orestes (*Cho.* 899—900), and who actually conducted him throughout to the accomplishment; and (2) because the term has military associations and suggests an operation of legitimate war. In this light the enterprise appears as an 'expedition' sent by Delphi against the enemies of the god; and the personal relations of Orestes the instrument, his fraud and crime as denounced in the preceding verse, are mere natural incidents of the campaign.—The objections taken to *πέμψαι* (with conjectures *πᾶξαι*, *κλέψαι*, etc.) assume that the term used should be exactly appropriate to the personal action of Orestes. But it suits the case and speaker, that the part of the matricide should be as much as possible effaced; and the subject of *πέμψαι* is left in an advantageous obscurity. Probably

- ΧΟ. κάπειθ' ὑπέστης αἵματος δέκτωρ νέου.
 ΑΠ. καὶ προστραπέσθαι τοῦσδ' ἐπέστελλον δόμους. 205
 ΧΟ. καὶ τὰς προπομπούς δῆτα τάσδε λαιδορεῖς;
 ΑΠ. οὐ γὰρ δόμοισι τοῖσδε πρόσφορον μολεῖν.
 ΧΟ. ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡμῖν τοῦτο προστεταγμένον.
 ΑΠ. τίς ἦδε τιμή; κόμπασον γέρας καλόν.
 ΧΟ. τοὺς μητραλοίας ἐκ δόμων ἐλαύνομεν. 210
 ΑΠ. τί γὰρ γυναῖκας ἦτις ἄνδρα νοσφίση;
 ΧΟ. οὐκ ἂν γένοιθ' ὄμαιμος αὐθέντης φόνος.

204. δ' ἔκτωρ. In margin ζτ οἶμαι δέκτωρ m.

211. γυναϊκός.

the objections are also connected with the more than dubious supposition, that, according to Aeschylus, the punishment of Clytaemnestra is accomplished by Orestes with the assistance of Pylades alone. The whole enterprise, as described in the *Choephori*, including the surprise of the castle and guard, might well be called a *πομπή*, or *expedition*, by those predisposed to that view of it (see on *Cho.* 581, 582, 649, 709, etc.).—*τίμην*; *What then?* i.e. *naturally, of course.*

204. 'Thou didst take it upon thee to receive him fresh from the bloody deed!'

205. *προστραπέσθαι*...*τοῦσδε*...*δόμους*, 'to come for purification to this house'. *προστραπέσθαι* refers to the technical sense of *προστροπή*, *προστρόπαιος*; see *v.* 448, etc. As to the essential connexion of this office with the house (*δῶμος*, *οἶκος*) and the householder, see *vv.* 455, 579, etc.; and for Apollo's command see *Cho.* 1036.

206. *προπομπούς*: with irony, in reference to the pursuit. 'Thou wouldst have him come to the sanctuary, and yet receivest ill us who *sped him on his way.*' The force of *προ-* is here temporal, 'who conducted him *forwardly*' and so brought him here sooner than he would have come otherwise. In *v.* 1006 (see *v.* 1004) it is local, 'an escort preceding'.

207. οὐ...*δόμοισι*: 'because *this house* admits not your coming'. The dat. depends on *πρόσφορον*, *suitable*. The conjecture *πρόσφοροι* (*ἔσσε*), Stanley, is acceptable, but not necessary.

208. *Nay, this belongs to us, is our duty.* Note the emphasis on *ἔστι*, here practically equivalent to *ἔξεστι*.—*τοῦτο*: τὸ μολεῖν *eis* *δόμους* to enter houses; see the preceding verse, and the explanation in *v.* 210. Apollo insists that the character of his house, as a sanctuary, proves their pursuit improper; they, inverting the argument, maintain that, since it is their special office to 'chase' such criminals 'out of houses', the 'house', which harboured one, is no sanctuary as against them.—Paley explains *τοῦτο* by τὸ προπέμειν, in the sense *to pursue*, supplied from *προπομπούς* in *v.* 206. But this is remote; and moreover the point, as appears by the sequence of *δόμους*—*δόμοις*—*δόμων*, turns upon the 'house'.

209. *κόμπασον*: set forth, like a herald proclaiming a personage by his style: see on *Theb.* 525 *ἀκόμπαστος*.—*γέρας καλόν*: ironically.

210. *ἐκ δόμων*: from houses, dwelling-places in general; not 'from their houses' (Paley). Haunted by the Erinyes, the criminal was to be debarred for life from all domestic association. See *vv.* 424 foll., and *Cho.* 282, 294.—The *parents*, not the mother only, were protected by the Erinyes according to Aeschylus (*vv.* 516, 548); but the mother is specified here and in some other places, because such is the present case.

211. *How then do you deal with wives who slay their husbands?* The pronoun

Erin. And next didst offer thyself for receiver of that fresh blood!

Ap. And charged him to seek purgation at this very house.

Erin. And then upbraidedst us, who brought him upon his way!

Ap. Because it fits not this house that ye should come there.

Erin. Nay, but we *are* so charged.

Ap. What office is this? Proclaim the noble privilege.

Erin. Sinners against motherhood we drive from houses forth.

Ap. And what do ye to a wife who slays her husband?

Erin. Such murder will not come to the shedding of *her own blood*.

τί stands for a verb (see *Ag.* 79, 926); or we may say, that the general idea of action is supplied from the verb *ἐλαύνομεν*.—*ἦτις*, as virtually plural, is allowed with a plural antecedent. Wecklein refers to *Soph. El.* 1606, *Ai.* 760, *Eur. Hec.* 359 *δεσποτῶν ὤμων φρένας | τύχοιμ' ἂν ὅστις ἀργύρου μ' ὀνήσεται*, *Med.* 320, etc.—The subj., without *ἂν*, in a generic description, is archaic, but in tragedy not uncommon.—*γυναικας* (Paley) should perhaps be accepted. If we retain *γυναικός*, we should punctuate thus: *τί γάρ; γυναικός, ἦτις ἄνδρα νοσφίση*,... The reply will then interrupt the question, completing the understood purport of it, so that the genitive will depend upon *φόνος*: nor is this improbable. *What then? (The deed) of a wife, who slays her husband... | ... Will be no kin-murder*.—Other suggestions are (1) to supply from *μητραλοίας* the general idea 'murderer'; 'how do you treat *the murderer of a wife, who*' etc.; but this is too difficult; and (2) to take *γυναικός* with *τί*, 'What in the case of...' etc.; but no parallel example seems to be found.

212. 'In that case it would not be the slayer's *own blood* that was shed.' *οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο*. The *φόνος* would not *become*, i.e. *come to* or *amount to*, *δμαιμος φόνος*: it would not *reach* the qualification *δμαιμος*,

necessary (according to the present argument) to bring in the Erinyes.—It should however be carefully noted, that this restriction of the Erinyes' function is not maintained by Aeschylus thoroughly and consistently. See *vv.* 313 foll., 424, and *vv.* 269 foll., 548 foll., where it is implied that they regard the tie of hospitality as sacred, and the breach of it criminal, as well as the bond and violation of parentage. Here (and also in *v.* 603) they assume the limitation for the purpose of the moment, arguing sophistically and rhetorically, as Apollo himself does at the trial. For the purpose of Aeschylus in this play, the truly important character of the Erinyes is to maintain the necessary *fixity and certainty* of punishment (where crime is found) against the uncertain equity patronised by Athena and embodied in the Areopagus. For this purpose, it matters not what acts, other than that of Orestes, they would admit into their definition of crime; nor has Aeschylus taken any pains to determine their definition. The limitation of murder to the shedding of kindred blood (according to various conceptions of kindred) was a view which had had authority, and the Erinyes of Aeschylus adopt it, *when it suits them*, but generally disregard it. See further the Introduction.—*αὐθέντης*

ΑΠ. ἦ κάρτ' ἄτιμα καὶ παρ' οὐδὲν ἠρκέσω
 Ἕρας τελείας καὶ Διὸς πιστώματα·
 Κύπρις δ' ἄτιμος τῷδ' ἀπέρριπται λόγῳ, 215
 ὄθεν βροτοῖσι γίγνεται τὰ φίλτατα.
 εὐνὴ γὰρ ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ μόρσιμος
 ὄρκου ὅτι μείζων τῇ δίκη φρουρουμένη.
 εἰ τοῖσιν οὖν κτείνουσιν ἀλλήλους χαλᾶς
 τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι μηδ' ἐποπτεύειν κότῳ, 220

217. μόρσιμοι. μόρσιμοι^{νε} f, g. 219. ἦ.

may be either (1) part of the subject, *αὐθέντης φόνος* the deed of murder, or perhaps also (2) part of the predicate, *kin-slaying*, a repetition and equivalent of ὄμαιμος. The second is generally supported, but it is open to the objection that in *Ag.* 1572 ἄλλην γενεὰν τρίβειν θανάτοις αὐθένταισι, the only other example of αὐθέντης in Aeschylus, it is so applied, by Clytaemnestra herself, as to include by implication her slaying of Agamemnon, the very instance which it is here supposed to exclude: his death is one of those 'self-originated (by the γενεά)'. Moreover, since αὐθέντης (αὐτοέντης) was certainly used (see L. and Sc. s.v.) of murder in general, without regard to the relationship of the parties, it would scarcely be a convenient term to mark a distinction based upon this relationship. Nor is there apparently any case in which it does clearly mean *kin-slaying*; in *Eur. H. F.* 839, for instance, though *kin-slaying* is admissible, *murderous* is sufficient. Strictly speaking, it means *self-originating* or *self-originated*: an αὐθέντης φόνος is not a slaying done by a man upon himself, or upon his kin as part of himself, but simply a slaying of which some one is the *originating author*, which is caused by the *own act* of some one, i.e. a murder; and an αὐθέντης properly meant simply an original doer, though by association the word became almost restricted to the author of a slaying, a *murderer*. Cf. Jebb on *Soph. Ant.* 57:

of this whole class of words, *αὐτοσφαγῆς*, *αὐτοκτόνος*, *αὐτόχειρ*, etc., he remarks that "the compound merely expresses that the deed is done with one's own hand, implying that such a use of one's own hand is unnatural." See further below on *αὐτουργία* v. 337. The strictly limited sense *kin-slaying*, necessary here if the word is to be predicate and equivalent to ὄμαιμος, could have been acquired only by confusion of thought; and though such confusion is quite possible, it does not appear to be proved. The act of Clytaemnestra was an αὐθέντης φόνος in the full sense of the words, nor is the speaker concerned to deny this; but it was not within the ban of the Erinyes (as they here allege), because the victim was not ὄμαιμος.

213. ἄτιμα: adverbial (*with dishonour*) rather than adjectival (*contemned*), as appears from the junction to παρ' οὐδὲν *with no respect*, literally 'at nothing', i.e. on the footing, level or estimate of nothing; cf. *Ag.* 239 παρ' οὐδὲν ἔθεντο 'they reckoned at nought'.—ἠρκέσω: a difficult word, and perhaps erroneous, though none of the proposed corrections are satisfactory: in ἠκέ σοι (Hermann), 'amount to nothing in your judgment', the imperfect tense is objectionable and not appropriate: ἠκεσε (Musgrave), 'have availed nothing', gives a wrong sense; the essential σοι, *in your judgment*, should not be left to implication; ἠδέσω (Wellauer) will hardly con-

Ap. A slighting parry indeed, and a contemptuous, thou makest against troth-pledge, the crown of Hera and of Zeus! And the Queen of Love by this plea is slighted off, source of man's dearest joys. For the sharing of the bed between husband and wife is, in strength of right, a guard stronger than oath. If then to murder between these thou art thus indulgent, if 'it doth not come to' so much as an angry regard, then this I say,—

strue; ἡργάσω (*i.e.* ἐποιήσω) Rutherford, *Class. Rev.* II. 292. The last I think possible.—But ἡρκέσω itself is not disprovable. In archaic (and tragic) Greek ἀρκέω is regularly used of defensive weapons and the like, as in σάκος, τό οἱ ἦρκεσε λυγρὸν δλεθρον, *the shield which warder from him death*, etc.; thus ἀρκέομαι would be said of the combatant who wards, parries, repels an attack or stroke (cf. φυλάσσομαι), and would apply, by a common metaphor, to a combat of arguments. The middle voice, in this sense, does not seem to be elsewhere found, but we must not infer from this, that it was not available. If therefore for "Ἡρας καὶ Διὸς πιστώματα we had "Ἡρας καὶ Διὸς πιστωμάτων λόγον, *i.e.* 'the argument founded upon marriage', instead of simply 'marriage', all would be plain; and the question is, whether the brachylogy, πιστώματα for πιστωμάτων λόγον, is impossible. In this context it appears sufficiently clear, and I therefore retain ἡρκέσω, under reserve, translating, *With small regard and slight indeed hast thou refuted the rightful pledge of Hera and of Zeus.* The notion λόγος (*argument*), latent here, is expressed in the next verse (τῷδε...λόγῳ).—τελείας: the fixed epithet of *Hera the Wife* as goddess of marriage. For a full discussion of it, see an article in *Class. Rev.* xv. 445 (M. A. Bayfield). Two lines of association may be traced in it, the physical, as in Aesch. *frag.* 44 (Wecklein) δενδρῶτις ὦρα δ' ἐκ νοτίζοντος γάμου (γάμου) τέλειός ἐστι, and the social, from τέλος *authority, right*; but the second is the principal, if not the sole origin. Marriage itself is

γαμήλιον τέλος (*v.* 838), and the espousals are προτέλεια, *Ag.* 65.

217. μόρσιμοι, the reading of M, points to a confusion between μόρσιμος (*superscr. in recc.*) and μορσίμοις (*Hartung*). In either case, the sense is that marriage unites the destinies of man and wife, with special reference to the fundamental meaning of μοῖρα, *part or share*. Cf. Aesch. *frag.* 13 (Weckl.) σοὶ μὲν γαμείσθαι μόρσιμον, γαμεῖν δ' ἐμοί. For the personified Μοῖραι as patrons of marriage, see *v.* 962.

218. τῇ δίκη φρουρουμένη: *being guarded by a stronger right*, literally 'it is mightier in being guarded by its right'. Note the article, which is necessary to the meaning, as generally in Aeschylus, when used at all; a prose-writer would have said τῇ δίκη φρουρουμένη μείζου, and in fact the Aeschylean phrase is a brachylogy for this.—The rendering 'guarded by *Justice*', the personified abstraction, would suggest, what cannot be meant, that an oath is not so guarded.

219—221. εἰ Canter.—"If then to them (husband or wife), when either slays the other, you concede that 'it does not come to' so much as an angry regard, then I say...' etc.—τοῖσιν demonstrative.—κτείνουσιν ἀλλήλους, though verbally open to the misinterpretation 'when each slays the other', is practically clear, and should not be suspected.—τὸ μὴ...κότῳ: literally '(this indulgence), that there does not result (from the deed) even the regarding (the deed) with wrath'. Grammatically, μηδ' ἐποπτεύειν is the subject of γενέσθαι. Paley is right in defending γενέσθαι, and in his analysis of the con-

οὐ φημ' Ὀρέστην γ' ἐνδίκως ε' ἀνδρηλατεῖν.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ οἶδα κάρτα σ' ἐνθυμουμένην,
τὰ δ' ἐμφανῶς πρᾶσσοσαν ἡσυχαιτέραν.
δίκας δ' ἐπαλλάξ τῶνδ' ἐποπτεύσει θεά.

ΧΟ. τὸν ἄνδρ' ἐκείνου οὐ τι μὴ λίπω ποτέ. 225

ΑΠ. σὺ δ' οὖν δίωκε καὶ πόνον πλέον τίθου.

ΧΟ. τιμὰς σὺ μὴ σύντεμνε τὰς ἐμὰς λόγῳ.

ΑΠ. οὐδ' ἂν δεχοίμην ὥστ' ἔχειν τιμὰς σέθεν.

ΧΟ. μέγας γὰρ ἔμπας παρ Διὸς θρόνοις λέγει.

ἐγὼ δ', ἄγει γὰρ αἷμα μητρῶν, δίκας 230

224. ἐπάλλας (with ζτ in margin).

225. λείπω.

230. ἄγειν...μητρῶν.

Text f, g.

struction: the construction of the infinitive *μηδ' ἐποπτεύειν* as the subject of *γενέσθαι* he defends by several citations, e.g. Lysias, *περὶ Ἐρατοσθ.* p. 120, 7 πάντως τὴν μὲν πόλιν γενέσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν δεῖσθαι χρημάτων, and indeed it scarcely requires authority. But it is not necessary, taking this view, to exclude the suggestion of others, that *μὴ γενέσθαι* takes up and retorts the words of the opponent, *οὐκ ἂν γένοιθ' ἑμαιοις αὐθέντης φόβος* *That would not come to (amount to) the shedding of kindred blood*: that the words are slightly twisted from their original application is only what might be expected in making a sarcastic point. This reference seems clear, and should exclude changes which remove *γενέσθαι* (as *τίνεσθαι*, *μέλεισθαι*, and others).—*μηδέ*: *not even* to regard with anger, still less to punish.

221. γε: 'then *at all events* I deny your right to pursue *Orestes*'. Your lenity, whether right or wrong, *at least* condemns your inconsistent severity.—σε, though necessary, should not be substituted (as by Robortello) for γε, which is correct, but inserted as in the text (Merkel), where the loss of it is explained by the final ε of *ἐνδίκως*.

223. 'For it is plain, I trow, that you punish here with much heat and there with more of calm', i.e. your justice depends not on principle but passion.

πρᾶσσοσαν exacting (as Paley suggests) rather than *acting*; see v. 627. This participle belongs to both clauses, and the antithetic phrases, *κάρτα ἐνθυμουμένην* and *ἡσυχαιτέραν*, are both constructed with it as qualifications. The last expression is ironically weak.

224. 'But *the rights* in this matter will be regarded reversely by the goddess.' The prospective tribunal of Athena (v. 81) will reverse the prejudiced decision of the Erinyes, and will hold that, in the present instance, it is the act of the wife that is unpardonable, and the act of the son that is pardonable. *δίκας* has an emphasis. By such fixed and arbitrary limits as the Erinyes favour, the *δικαί τῶνδε* (moral rights of the particular case) are put out of sight.—*ἐπαλλάξ*: *contrariwise, reversely*. The common reading here, *δίκας δὲ Παλλάς*, is open to grave objections, both technical and literary. (1) M has δ' ἐπάλλας with ζτ (i.e. *quaere*) in the margin; the blindness, which, given the letters *δεπαλλας*, could not find in them the words *δὲ Παλλάς*, is more than can be proved against the ancient editors of Aeschylus, and particularly those of the *Eumenides*, where the scholia are above the average: the division of the letters shows that, when they were first so divided, the word was plainly *not Παλλάς*, and the marginal

thou hast no right to pursue Orestes. For it is plain, I trow, that thou punishest *here* with much anger, and *there* with more of calm! (*The Erinyes begin to move.*) But the rights of the matter, to the eye of the goddess, will lie the other way.

Erinyes (*going*). Yon man will I never, never quit.

Ap. Pursue him then, and fill up the measure of thy toil.

Erin. My privilege! Think not by an ill word to make it less.

Ap. I would not take it to keep,—thy privilege!

Erin. No! Without privilege, thou hast high rank by the throne of Zeus. But for me, (*casting about*) led by a mother's

doubt indicates that the true word was probably not common. (2) Still stronger is the literary objection: it would surely be unnatural, that a reference to 'Pallas', *ipse nomine*, in this connexion should not awake the curiosity of the pursuers. The design of a reference to Athena is at present a secret between the god and the fugitive. Why should he thus reveal it to the Erinyes, and how does it pass without notice? But remove the name, and there is nothing to arrest notice; the sentence, half-heard and in the last word scarcely heard, is not intelligible, except with knowledge of the plan to which Apollo refers; and the course of the scene is therefore natural.

225. *λίπω* (Porson): *quit*.

226. *πόνον πλέον τιθου* is disputable. (1) We may refer *πλέον* (or *πλέων*) to *πλέως full*: *And fill up the measure of thy toil*: the expression, suggesting an imposed task, would suit not ill the tone of the speaker. As to the form, it does not seem possible to say whether Aeschylus would have been restricted everywhere to the normal Attic *πλέως*, *πλέων*, or whether generally, or in a particular phrase, there would be open to him, as an alternative, the Ionic (Herodotean) *πλέος*, *πλέον*: on such a point the MSS. give no information, since for Aeschylus the long and short *o* were probably indistinguishable. In Eur. *Ion* 603 (see my note) *πλέον* occurs where, as I think, the meaning *full* is required,

and the same question therefore arises as to the form. (2) We may refer *πλέον* to *πλέων more*: *And so increase thy toil, 'make it more'*. The neuter *πλέον* (instead of the masc. *πλέω*) is perhaps admissible, as *πλέον τιθεσθαι*, *to increase*, might conceivably have coalesced into a fixed phrase, though we should expect rather *πλέω* (Auratus) concordant with *πόνον*. To read *πλέω* is unsatisfactory, as it would hardly have been corrupted to *πλέον*. On the whole I prefer the first interpretation.

227. 'Seek not by a word to abridge what is my privilege,' *i.e.* 'Our *privilege* shall be fully executed, though you please to call it a *weariness*.' The *λόγος* is the term *πόνος*.

228. *οὐδ'...ἔχειν*: 'I would not even accept on condition of keeping...,' *i.e.* 'I would not have as a gift.'

229. *ἔμπας*: *in any case*; 'Without my privilege, or any separate and independent privilege, you stand high in the court of Zeus.' The expression reflects, in half-contempt, upon the concentrated subordination of the new hierarchy: see above on *vv.* 162—173.

230, 231. *ἄγει αἷμα μητρῶν* must not be limited, or even referred, to that blood of Clytaemnestra, which the murderer may have once had *upon* him. However completely that stain might be purged, physically or ceremonially, the man must bear with him 'the blood of his mother', so long as he himself lives.

μέτειμι τόνδε φῶτα, κάκκυνηγέτης.....

ΑΠ. ἐγὼ δ' ἀρήξω τὸν ἰκέτην τε ῥύσομαι.
δεινὴ γὰρ ἐν βροτοῖσι κὰν θεοῖς πέλει
τοῦ προστροπαίου μῆνις, εἰ προδῶ σφ' ἐκῶν.

ΟΡ. ἄνασσο' Ἀθάνα, Δοξίου κελείμασιν 235
ἦκω, δέχου δὲ πρευμενῶς ἀλάστορα,
οὐ προστρόπαιον οὐδ' ἀφοίβαντον χέρα,
ἀλλ' ἀμβλὺν ἤδη, προστετριμμένον τε πρὸς,

231. κάκκυνηγέτης (with ἕτ in margin). 235. κελευσμασιν. κελεύμασι h.

This, his own blood which is also hers, is the scent by which the avengers follow him. See further on *vv.* 244, 253.—**δικας μέτειμι τόνδε.** The two possible accusatives, that of the direct object (*τόνδε*) and the 'inner' or 'adverbial' which describes the action (*δικας*), are combined, as in Eur. *Bacch.* 345 *τῆς σῆς δ' ἀνοίας τόνδε τὸν διδάσκαλον δικην μέτειμι.*—**κάκκυνηγέτης...** (or perhaps *καὶ κυνηγέτης*, but the preposition, *leader off*, has point). The translation will show how I would explain this (the *ms.*) reading. At such a point, the most stately composer might surely feel, that a broken sentence was admissible, and even indispensable.—If **κάκκυνηγετῶ** (*Erfurd* and modern texts) is right, the change from **μέτειμι** (future) to **ἐκκυνηγετῶ** must be explained (as Wecklein) by the action accompanying the last word; 'and thus I set upon his track'.

234. **τοῦ προστροπαίου μῆνις**, wrath excited by and on behalf of the suppliant: *ικέτης* and *προστρόπαιος* are here synonyms; see on *v.* 205.—**εἰ προδῶ σφ' ἐκῶν.** Two points are to be noted in this construction. (1) The subj. with *εἰ*: the limits of this 'epic' archaism in Attic tragedy, and particularly in dialogue, are not easily defined, and we can scarcely expect always to ascertain or feel the justifying cause; but in maxims and expressions of a proverbial cast, archaisms of all kinds are to be expected and are actually found: in this respect, the present

example is parallel to Soph. *Ant.* 710 *ἀλλ' ἀνδρα, κελ τις ἦ σοφός, τὸ μανθάνειν | πῶλλ' αἰσχρὸν οὐδέν*: it seems therefore that *εἰ τις προδῶ σφ' ἐκῶν* would certainly be defensible. And (2) the hypothesis in the *first person* is here used as an equivalent for the general hypothesis; *if I abandon* means *if one abandons*, the maxim being cast in the form of advice given by the moralist to himself: this, though not usual apparently in Greek, is familiar elsewhere, and not a ground for suspicion.—*δε προδῶ* Weil, Wecklein, and (as an alternative) Paley, 'the wrath for the suppliant against whosoever betrays...' etc.: see *v.* 211. But after all, this is irregular still by the 'Attic' standard, and in the same way, though not exactly to the same extent, as the traditional text: *ἦν τις προδῶ* or *ὅστις ἀνπροδῶ* are the forms of classical rule. We are safer therefore in standing by what we find.—Note however that the general hypothesis is distinguishable for this purpose from a particular hypothesis present or future. Whether Aeschylus, or the tragedians, extended the licence to this last, and with what limit, will be more conveniently considered on *Pers.* 793 *μηδ' εἰ στράτευμα πλείον ἢ τὸ Μηδικόν.*—**σφε**: not 'Orestes', but the *προστρόπαιος* as such.—Here Apollo retires, and the stage is left empty. Between this 'Act' and the next we have to suppose (1) a long interval of time for the appointed wanderings of Orestes (*vv.* 75, 240, 249,

blood, I will pursue justice upon you wight (*striking the trail*)... And as leader of the hounds.....(*She rushes off, in the direction taken by Orestes, and the rest, in full cry, rush after.*)

Apollo. And for me, I will succour and save my suppliant. For dreaded among men, and among gods, is the wrath for such an appellant, if by my consent betrayed. [Exit.

ACT II.

The scene is at Athens, before a shrine and ancient image of Pallas Athena. Enter ORESTES, weary to death.

Orestes. O Lady Athena, by Loxias' command am I come hither. Graciously receive a wanderer, who comes...not needing purgation, nor with hand unpurified. Nay, I have put off the

284), ending with his arrival at Athens; (2) the transference of the scene to a place in Athens (commonly supposed to be the Acropolis, but see on *v.* 80) before a shrine and image (*v.* 242) of Athena. On the question whether any change, and what, was made in the actual decoration, see the Introduction.—Prof. Seymour (*Class. Rev.* VIII. 438) would compress the action of the whole Oresteia into about ten days, and maintains, as part of this view, that no long interval occurs here, but Orestes and the Erinyes pass, with little or no delay, from Delphi to Athens. If this was the intention, the language used by all speakers about the journey (see passages above cited) is strange, if not incomprehensible. See further on *vv.* 401, 461.

236. *ἀλάστορα*: in its proper sense, *the wanderer* (*ἀλάομαι*), as Wecklein notes. It imports (by usage) the obligatory wandering of one who has shed blood, but scarcely admits moral guilt. Even from a ceremonial and religious point of view, he is, as he proceeds to explain, now pure.

237. *οὐ προστρόπαιον*: 'not a petitioner for purification', which has already been bestowed by Apollo, and confirmed by lapse of time and innocent association

with mankind: *vv.* 281 foll., 446 foll.—*ἀφοίβαντον*: *ἀκάθαρτον* schol.—*χέρα*: acc. of the part affected, 'unpurged in hand'.

238. *ἀμβλύν...προστετριμμένον*. 'I have put off the freshness (of my deed), ay, worn it away, upon other dwelling-places and travelled paths among mankind.' The epithets *dulled* and *worn* are transferred from the sin (if that term may be used) to the sinner, not merely as a figure of poetry, but to suggest the physical suffering which he has himself undergone in his pilgrimage. That he has suffered severely, and reaches Athens only in the last stage of exhaustion, is important to remember, both for the explanation and dramatic effect of points in the present scene and for the moral doctrine of the play as a whole. It would be further expressed by the performance of the actor.—*πρός* may be taken in two ways, (1) as a repetition of the compounded preposition in *προστετριμμένον*, and as governing the datives which follow, (2) adverbially in the sense of *moreover*, as in *P. V.* 73 ἢ μὴν κελεύσω κάπιθωύξω γε *πρός*, *inf.* 595. As *προστετριμμένος* is a stronger term, in the suggestion of personal suffering, than *ἀμβλύν*, the climax is appropriate. Nor is it any

ἄλλοισιν οἴκοις καὶ πορεύμασιν βροτῶν.—
 ὅμοια χέρσον καὶ θάλασσαν ἐκπερῶν 240
 σῶζων ἐφετμὰς Λοξίου χρηστηρίους,
 πρόσσειμι δῶμα καὶ βρέτας τὸ σόν, θεά.—
 αὐτοῦ φυλάσσω ἀναμένω τέλος δίκης.

ΧΟ. εἶεν· τόδ' ἐστὶ τὰνδρὸς ἐκφανὲς τέκμαρ.
 ἔπου δὲ μηνυτῆρος ἀφθέγκτου φραδαῖς. 245
 τετραυματισμένον γὰρ ὡς κύων νεβρὸν
 πρὸς αἶμα καὶ σταλαγμὸν ἐκμαστεύομεν.
 πολλοῖς δὲ μόχθοις ἀνδροκμηῆσι φυσιαῖ :

239. πορεύμασι.

246. νεκρὸν.

objection, considering the style of Aeschylus, that to use the word so in this connexion suggests a sort of equivocation upon its two meanings. On the other hand, to neglect the division of the verses so completely as to put it between preposition and case, though it is done several times by Sophocles (*O. T.* 555, *Phil.* 626, *O. C.* 495 are cited by Wecklein), is less likely in Aeschylus. I prefer therefore the second interpretation.—ἀμβλὺς...προσ-τετριμμένος Prien, Paley, and others, but see next note.

240—243. *Alike in every passage of land and sea having been obedient to the oracular command of Loxias, (so now) I will approach the shrine and thy very image, goddess.—Here watching I await the final trial.* The complete break of continuity, marked by the absence of any copula, at *v.* 240, and again at *v.* 243, is intentional, and corresponds to stages in the action. The very stress which Orestes lays on his purity reveals his fear that he may even now be repelled; and at the last moment he hesitates to approach the shrine and lay hands on the image. This hesitation is represented by the break before *v.* 240. He encourages himself however (*vv.* 240—242) by the reflexion that the command of Apollo, in obedience to which he has performed his

wanderings and has been brought to the destined city, extended expressly to the act from which he shrinks (*v.* 80), and resolves therefore to venture on it. Between *v.* 242 and *v.* 243 he actually does so, *v.* 243 being spoken after he has taken his place in sanctuary. With proper stage-directions, the distribution of the sentences would appear natural and necessary.—It seems therefore a mistake to obliterate these divisions partially by making one clause (with ἀμβλὺς and προστετριμμένος) of *vv.* 238—242 ἀλλὰ ἀμβλὺς...πρόσειμι δῶμα κ.τ.λ.; and the more so, as the break between *v.* 243 and *v.* 244 remains, and loses its point.—ὅμοια leads up to the point that his action now will be guided by Apollo, as it has been everywhere hitherto.—σῶζων: continuous time, including both past and present.—πρόσειμι: from εἶμι, and with the usual future sense.—τέλος δίκης: the trial which, according to Apollo's promise (*v.* 81), is to end his troubles. δίκης is gen. of equivalent or definition.—ἀναμενῶ Stanley, ἀμμενῶ Dindorf, perhaps rightly.

244. The Chorus enter irregularly, as in pursuit. *Vv.* 244—253 belong to the Leader. As to the following lyrical passage (*vv.* 254—275), which is not strophic, we can determine only that it is divided between different voices, and

freshness of my offence, ay, worn it away, upon other dwelling-places and travelled paths of men.... Alike in every passage of land and sea have I been obedient to the oracular hest of Loxias, ...and obedient now, I will approach thy house,...and thine image, goddess (*He sits, embracing the image*).... Here do I watch and await the end, the trial that is to be.

(*Enter the Erinyes, as in pursuit, two first, then another, then the rest.*)

The Leader. Dost see? (*pointing to the ground*). Here is a plain sign of the man; so follow the unspoken witness, which it tells. For as a hound the wounded fawn, so by the dropping blood do we search him out. Many, and to a mortal deadly,

apparently in seven parts. The opening words of the Leader show that one at least enters with the Leader; see also on *v.* 255.—**τόδε**: a drop of blood upon the ground; see the following lines. It is generally assumed, that this blood is that of the mother, which, to the eye of the avengers, still drips from the matricide, or from his sword. But surely in the circumstances, and after the language just before used by Orestes (*v.* 237—239), the extravagance of this conception, which is admitted (*ὄρα δὲ μὴ ἐκβαίνει τὴν πίστιν κ.τ.λ.* schol.), would exceed the limits of the sublime, and must spoil the picture. Can any parallel case be cited from Greek poetry, or from any artist of approved imagination? Further, if it be defensible in itself, it would still seem inconsistent with the context. To such a conception, the simile of the wounded fawn would be irrelevant, since a wounded fawn does not drip with the blood of its victim, but with its own. We should infer, that here also the blood is that of the pursued, of Orestes himself, as it naturally may be. It is not strange, and it is a circumstance of pathos, that after travels so prolonged and so cruel the very steps of the fugitive should be bloody. Nor is this all: the phenomena of internal bleeding and the dripping of blood from the mouth, as marks of extreme physical exhaustion, as well as of certain wasting diseases, must

have been familiar to the Greeks; and it seems clear from *v.* 248, 249, taken in connexion with the context, that the poet, following probably tradition as to the effect of the Erinyes' pursuit, has invested his Orestes with such traits. See further on *v.* 264 foll. The fact thus indicated, that the strength of the tormented wanderer has barely carried him to the final refuge, is much to the purpose of the tragedy. As to *ἀγεί αἷμα μητρῶνον* (*v.* 230) see note there. Neither that passage, nor this, nor any in the play, seems to support the view that the matricide is supposed by Aeschylus to drip for ever with the blood of his mother.

246, 247. *Like a wounded fawn*, that is, bleeding, helpless, and soon to be pulled down. They believe their last horrible triumph (see *v.* 264 foll.) to be very near, as in fact it would have been, but for the interference of Athena and Apollo.—**πρὸς**: *by, according to*; Wecklein compares *Ag.* 344 *πρὸς οὐδὲν ἐν μέρει τεκμήριον*.—Dindorf, here and generally, substitutes *ματεύω* for *μαστήω*: but the latter form (cf. *μαστήρ*) is possible, and not disproved, I think, by the fact that *ματεύω* is admissible.

248. *Many, and to a mortal deadly, have been the toils of the panting breast.* This explains the foregoing: it is the 'killing' labour, again and again repeated, which accounts for the blood-

σπλάγχχνον· χθονὸς γὰρ πᾶς πεποίμανται τόπος,
 ὑπέρ τε πόντον ἀπτέροις πωτήμασιν 250
 ἦλθον διώκουσ', οὐδὲν ὑστέρα νεώς.

καὶ νῦν ὄδ' ἐνθάδ' ἐστὶ που καταπτακῶν·
 ὁσμή βροτείων αἱμάτων με προσγελαῖ.—

ὄρα, ὄρα μάλ' αὖ,
 λεύσσετον πάντα, μὴ 255
 λάθη φύγα βᾶς

ὁ ματροφόνος ἀτίτας.—

ὄδ' αὖτε γοῦν ἀλλὰν ἔχων
 περὶ βρέτει πλεχθεὶς θεᾶς ἀμβρότου
 ὑπόδικος θέλει γενέσθαι χερῶν.— 260

255. λεύσσε (letters erased) τον. 256. φυγάδα, φύγα m. 258. αὐτέ γ' οὖν.

track of the sinking fugitive. In *ἀνδροκμήσι*, *man-killing*, *ἀνήρ*, as frequently in poetry, has the signification of *ἄνθρωπος* or *βροτός*, a *human being*. So also *inf.* 957, and so also, but with a glance at *ἀνὴρ husband*, in *Cho.* 888 *ἀνδροκμήτα πέλεκυν*.—The odd-looking scholium *μεγαλοκμήσιν* is, I believe, genuine and uncorrupt; the commentator would explain *ἀνδροκμήσ* *μόχθοι* (by reference to the division, familiar to Greek athletes, between 'men' and 'boys') as 'a race severe enough to kill one full-grown (*μέγας*)'; the idea, though here far-fetched, is not irrational, and indeed we may well suppose that somewhere else the word actually occurred in this sense.—The 'labour' and the 'panting breast' are applicable both to pursued and pursuers; for since the Erinyes could sleep, they may also pant; but *ἀνδροκμήσ* points specially to the distress of the pursued: thus the sentence makes a transition between what precedes and what follows.—The schol. *τὸ ἡμέτερον σπλάγχχνον* is therefore wrong, in so far as it excludes the pursued; the ambiguity, which the note would remove, is tolerable only because both the possible references are actually in view. If *τὸ ἡμέτερον* only were meant, we should require *φυσικῶς ἡμῶν σπλάγχχνον*,

and even then, the sentence would lack connexion with the foregoing. But it is the error there, as to the significance of the blood, which makes difficulty here; and *vice versa*, a fair interpretation here confirms the better explanation there.

249. *πεποίμανται*: *has been quartered*, 'journeyed over' as it were systematically, as a pasture-ground by a shepherd. It seems probable that, according to the Delphian legend, the wanderings of Orestes were to cover 'the whole earth', as the earth was conceived at Delphi when the legend first took shape.

250. *πωτήμασι* or *ποτήμασι* (Dindorf). The 'epic' form *πωτάομαι* seems to be not otherwise proved for tragedy. On the other hand we can hardly estimate the reasons which might justify it to Aeschylus in a particular place.

251. *οὐδὲν...νεώς*: *keeping pace with the ship* (of Orestes).

252. *καταπτακῶν*: *in covert, lying low*, as an animal hunted. The usage of prose would have demanded rather a pf. part. (*κατεπτηκώς*); but cf. the common poetical *θανών* for *τεθνηκώς* *dead*, *καμῶν* for *κεκμηκώς*, etc.

253. Equivalent to *ὁσμή γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, the omission of the copula being regular in an *explanation* (Wecklein).—*προσ-*

have been the toils of the panting breast. For of earth every region hath seen our shepherding, and over sea our pursuit, with wingless flight, kept pace with the ship.

And now he is here,...hereabouts,...lying low. The glad smell of human blood saluteth me. (*A third enters.*)

Beware, and again beware; spy, both of you, everything, lest privily he escape, the matricide, unpunished.

Ay, there he is, embracing the image of the goddess immortal, and fain to commit himself for justice to her arms.

γελῶ: for προσσάινει (schol.) but more picturesque: 'woos me', *i.e.* pleases and attracts my sense.—The 'human blood', or rather 'living blood', which they now smell, is that of Orestes' own body, the blood which they hope to drink (*v.* 264), not that (whatever it be) which has dripped from him. The trail could not prove him to be 'somewhere near'.

255. λεύσσειτον: 'search both of you all around, lest...' etc. If the dual here is right, the new-comer speaks to the *two* that have preceded her, the speaker and the auditor of *vv.* 244 foll., addressing perhaps ὄρα to one, ὄρα μάλ' αὐτῷ to the other, and λεύσσειτον to both. Nothing can be inferred from the erasure in M: such erasures occur, from the repetition of letters and other such accidents, in many places not open to suspicion. As to the metre, the cretics (—) are in themselves rhythmical, and the passage, not being strophic, demands no more. See also *v.* 268. Under reserve therefore, the text is left as it stands.—πάντα *m.*, pointing perhaps to παντᾶ *everywhere*. But 'see everything' seems a possible expression for 'let nothing escape your eyes', and the short vowel is preferable in rhythm.—λεύσσε τε πάντα Hermann.

257. ὁ ματροφόνος ἀτίτας: a *doctimus* (irregular) with an 'anacrusis' (ὀ), as in *v.* 263 κε-χυμένον οἴχεται.—ματροφόνος, without ὀ, here (and there χύμενον) Porson, perhaps rightly.—ἀτίτας: *unpunished*, ἀτιμώρητος (schol.), literally 'not paying'.

258—260. 'Yes, there he is, once

more finding refuge, embracing the image of the goddess immortal, and fain to commit himself for justice to her arms.'—αὐτε: they are reminded of Delphi, and presumably of many other sanctuaries in which Orestes had found refuge for a time.—Dr Headlam (*C. R.* xiv. 258), remarking that we should rather expect αὐτῷ, proposes ὁ δ' αὐτῷ τέγειον ἀλλὰν (*covert* protection) ἔχων.—γούν is condemned by some, but seems to have its regular force: it denotes evidence going to support what has been said; that Orestes has taken sanctuary is a *step towards* a complete escape (*v.* 256) and *confirms* the necessity for watching him carefully (*v.* 254).—The rhythm is *iambic dimeter*.—ὁ δ' αὐτε γ' ἀλλὰν ἔχων Hermann; *alii aliter*.—ὑπόδικος...γενέσθαι χερῶν: literally 'to become justice-subject to her hands (or 'arms')', *i.e.* hers to be dealt with as her justice shall please. The γεν. χερῶν depends upon the compounded preposition ὑπὸ *under*, or rather on the sense given by the preposition to *υπόδικος*: cf. ὄρκων in *v.* 492. The reference of the χεῖρες to the goddess is determined by *περὶ βρέτει πλεχθῆς*: by embracing the image the suppliant symbolically seems to 'put himself in the arms', or as we should say 'in the hands', of her whom it represents. As Greek poetry has the same word (*χεῖρ*) for *hand* and *arm*, whereas we sharply distinguish them, the expression is not easily transferred to English; but it is natural in itself. As to the construction therefore, I follow Paley (and others), though not in the

τὸ δ' οὐ πάρεστιν· αἷμα μητρώον χαμαὶ
 δυσαγκόμιστον, παπαῖ·

τὸ διερόν πέδοι κεχυμένον οἴχεται.—

ἀλλ' ἀντιδοῦναι δεῖ σ' ἀπὸ ζῶντος ῥοφεῖν
 ἔρυθρόν ἐκ μελέων πέλανον· ἀπὸ δὲ σοῦ
 βοσκὰν φέροισ' ἂν πάματος δυσπότου.—

265

καὶ ζῶντά σ' ἰσχνάνας' ἀπάξομαι κάτω,
 ἀντιποίνους † τείνης μητροφόνας δύας.—

263. πέδωι. 266. φεροίμαν. 267. ἰσχνάνας'. ἰσχάνας' recc. 268. τείνησ
 (with ·ει· written over η by m). τίνης recc.

rendering 'put himself in *our* hands' (Paley), which is scarcely admitted by the words, or by the facts.—Others (followed by Wecklein) explain *χερῶν* as a brachylogy for *act of violence*, 'hands' for 'handiwork', comparing *αὐτόχειρ*, *criminal*, *murderer*, so that *ὑπόδικος χερῶν* would mean 'liable to be tried for his deed'. Such a use of *χέρες*, if not exemplified, is possible; but we should expect, to make it intelligible, more indication from the context.—*ἀνθ' ᾧν ἡμῖν χρεωστέι, πρόσφυξ θέλει γενέσθαι τῆς θεοῦ* schol., 'because of his debt to us, he would put himself in the protection of the goddess', like a Roman *nexus* invoking the tribune. Following Scaliger (and others), I think that this note assumes for the text the reading *ὑπόδικος ... χρεῶν*, 'liable to justice for his debt'. The gloss of Hesychius cited by Hermann, *ὑπόδικος· ὑπεύθυνος, (χρεώστης) ἔνοχος δικῆς* (so to be punctuated), is derived probably from this passage (with *χερῶν*), but does not prove that, even in the opinion of the writer, *ὑπόδικος* meant *χρεώστης*, a *debtor*. Without *χερῶν* in the text the interpretation could hardly arise. *χερῶν* therefore seems to have been a variant here, probably a conjecture to avoid the difficulty of *χερῶν*, which on the other hand is not easily accounted for as a conjecture, and is on this ground, as well as for the sense, to be preferred.

262. *παπαῖ* expresses indignant protest.

263. *τὸ διερόν κ.τ.λ.* may be taken either (1) as above (*τὸ* relative), 'which (or 'for it') as liquid, when shed upon earth, is gone', or (2) as an independent sentence (asyndeton, see *v.* 253), 'for that which flows (*τὸ διερόν*), when shed...' etc. A similar illustration from water spilt, but differently handled, occurs in *Cho.* 64, 65, and see also *Cho.* 400, *inf.* 980, etc.—*χόμενον* Porson, perhaps rightly, from *Cho.* 400, but either form is correct, nor is the metre affected, as the syllable *κε* merely fills up the time which, without it, is filled by a pause. See on *v.* 257.—*πέδοι* Porson.

264—266. This horrible conception (that the Erinyes finally devoured their victim) had probably been, if it was not still in the time of Aeschylus, an article of popular belief; and indeed in primitive times the murder-branded outcast must often have died, by various forms of disease, in such a manner as might naturally suggest it. Similarly, avenging deities were supposed to inflict the cancerous diseases, which such unfortunate wretches contracted from bad and scanty food: see *Cho.* 64 foll., 277 foll., etc. In the present case, consumption has already furnished a hint (*vv.* 245 foll.), and a common end of such disease is here vividly suggested by the 'thick

But that may not be. A mother's blood, shed on the ground, is hard, oh hard indeed, to win back again; it flows, and being spilt upon earth—is lost.

Nay, thou must give me for quittance to drink from thy living body the red, rich liquid of thy veins,—though food from *thee* will be draught not easy to draw!

And when living I have made thee lean, I shall drag thee away below, there still to pay in pain for thy murdered mother's agony.

red drink'.—*ἀντιδοῦναι* κ.τ.λ. The construction is *δεῖ σ' ἀντιδοῦναι πέλανον ῥοφεῖν* (epexegetic inf.) *ἀπὸ ζῶντος*, 'thou must give thick drink to drain'. *ἀντι* : 'for the blood which he shed'.—*ἀπὸ δὲ σοῦ* κ.τ.λ. : '...though food *from thee* will be a draught hard to draw', an exulting mockery of his emaciation: cf. in *v.* 302 *ἀναίματον βόσκημα*. He is already, as it were, shrivelled and dried; it might be said of him that, like the victim of divine vengeance in *Cho.* 295, he will be 'mummied ere he dies', so that at the last it will be 'hard to suck from him'.—Literally, 'though *from thee* I shall win food consisting of a draught hard to drink'. *ἀπὸ σοῦ*: emphatic by position; this is essential to the point.—*φέρομι' ἄν* Wordsworth. For *φέρειν* to *gel*, *win* (in prose usually *φέρεσθαι*) see *L.* and *Sc.* *s.v.* If *φερόιμαν* be read, it must be an 'epic' use, as in Homer, for *φερόιμαν ἄν*: a future or conditional verb is necessary, since a mere wish or hope, after *δεῖ*, would be an anti-climax. But this is scarcely the place for such an archaism as the pure optative with conditional sense; contrast (if it be correct) *Ag.* 1162, a traditional formula or proverb. For supposed examples in tragedy (but the list is both incomplete and redundant) see Kühner *Greek Grammar* § 395, 3.—*πώματος δυσπότου*: gen. of definition or equivalent.—*L.* and *Sc.* translate *δύσπορος* here (the only example given) by *unpalatable*. The commentaries say little, but seem to assume some such

version as 'I shall get (or 'I hope to get') from thee my odious draught'. But this (1) does not suit the order of the words, and (2) gives to *δύσπορος* a sense unsuitable to the speaker, though in itself proper.—*φερόιμαν βόσκαν* (a dochmius with 'irrational' long syllable for short) Wellauer. This may be right, but see on *v.* 255.

267. *ισχνάνας*: Turnebus.

268. *ἀντίποι(α) ὡς τίνης* Schütz: 'that thou mayest pay in pain for the agony of thy murdered mother'. This is the only acceptable correction offered, but not very trustworthy: a misreading of *ἀντίποι(α) ὡς* should have produced not *ἀντιποίου(α)ς* but *ἀντιποίνως*: and a final clause, proper to intentions which may conceivably fail, is not quite in tone with the rest. Better in these respects would be *ἀντίποι(α) ὄ τενεῖς* κ.τ.λ. 'and there thou shalt still pay in pain for...' etc., lit. 'prolong payment for...'. This also escapes the fault of seeming to suggest that his sufferings in this life are *not* punitive. And note that *m* (the corrector of *M*) actually indicates *eis* as the final syllable. For *οἶ* see *P. V.* 840, *Pers.* 809 *οἶ σφω κακῶν ὕψιστ' ἐπαμμένει παθεῖν*. Since the gen. *ἀντιποίου* gives no meaning, the origin of *ἀντιποίου(α)ς* is then obvious.—*δύας* may be either gen. sing. depending on *ἀντίποινα*, or acc. plural, *ἀντίποινα* being then adverbial.—For *μητροφόνως*, if genitive, read perhaps *ματροφόνου* (Casaubon), but see *v.* 77 and *v.* 272.

ὄψει δὲ κεῖ τις ἄλλος ἤλιτεν βροτῶν
ἢ θεὸν ἢ ξένον 270

τιν' ἀσεβῶν ἢ τοκῆας φίλους,
ἔχουθ' ἕκαστον τῆς δίκης ἐπάξια.—

μέγας γὰρ Ἄιδης ἐστὶν εὐθυνος βροτῶν
ἐνερθε χθονός,

δελτογράφῳ δὲ πάντ' ἐπωπᾶ φρενί. 275

OP. ἐγὼ διδασκθεὶς ἐν κακοῖς ἐπίσταμαι
πολλοὺς καθ' ἄρμους καὶ λέγειν ὅπου δίκη
σιγᾶν θ' ὁμοίως· ἐν δὲ τῷδε πράγματι
φωνεῖν ἐτάχθην πρὸς σοφοῦ διδασκάλου.
βρίζει γὰρ αἶμα καὶ μαραίνεται χερός, 280

269. δ' ἐκεῖ, τίς ἄλλον.

271. τίν'...τοκέας.

277. καθαρμοῦς.

269—272. ὄψει δὲ κεῖ τις Schütz. The ancient editors (M) apparently supposed *τίς* (*sic*) to be used for *ὅστις*.—*ἄλλος* Heath. The *ἄλλον* of M (depending on *ἤλιτεν*) is grammatical, and can be interpreted as 'another', 'his neighbour'. But it disturbs the connexion of thought.—*θεόν*. For the acc. depending on *ἤλιτεν* (as well as on *ἀσεβῶν*), see Hom. *Od.* 4. 378 *ἀθανάτους ἀλιτέσθαι*. This gives the sense, 'whosoever of men sins against god, or ξένος, or parent'. But *quaere*: should we not read *ἢ θεῶν*?—'any one, man or more than man, who...' etc. That the Erinyes avenge offences 'against gods' in general seems not to be the doctrine of the play. See especially the sharp opposition of their functions to those of 'the gods' throughout the ode 307 foll. On the other hand, it is a proper and effective point, that super-human beings, as well as human, are liable to their peculiar office in the included cases. See further on *v.* 273.—For the inclusion, within the province of Erinyes, of offences against hospitality, compare *vv.* 548 foll. These passages and others show that Aeschylus attached no importance to such legal subtleties as

that of *v.* 212, where see note.—The cases of the Titans, Prometheus, and others, punished in Hades, would sufficiently justify the inclusion of *θεοί*.—*τοκῆας*, 'epic' form (suggested by Hermann), is probably right, as the rhythm appears to be cretic: the *ms.* is equally good for this or for *τοκέας*.—*τῆς δίκης*: *the* justice of their case. The Attic *-η* here, as contrasted with *βουκᾶν* in *v.* 266, and *δύας* (if genitive) in *v.* 268, is *perhaps* to be explained by the variation between lyric metre and the iambic of dialogue. But the evidence as to this whole matter is insufficient for determination, nor is it likely that we could always follow the feelings which guided the Attic poets, even if we were sure of what they wrote. In such a case as the present, the mere metre of the individual verse can hardly have been a decisive consideration. An artificial literary dialect, such as that of the tragic chorus, is likely to be full of inconsistencies. Compare the 'Scotch' of our novelists.

273. *βροτῶν* is not 'otiose', and the addition of it somewhat strengthens the reasons for reading *ἢ θεῶν* in *v.* 270, where see note. The point emphasized here, in *vv.* 273—275, is that the being,

All sinners shalt thou see, be they men or more than man (?), who have offended against a plighted friend or a parent dear, receiving each his merited punishment.

For there is One Mighty there, who calls men to account in the underworld; all things he doth survey, and all in memory writes.

Orestes. My own distresses have taught me the lore, in many conjunctures, to speak or to keep silence, where each is right; and in the case now present, a wise instructor bade me open my lips. For the blood slumbereth, and is fading away from my

and the responsibility, of *mortals* continues beyond the mortal life.

276 foll. Orestes prepares to invoke the actual presence of the goddess (*v.* 287). Since a polluted person was debarred, more or less completely, from intercourse with others by sight and speech, this may be taken as a trespass upon her sanctity even beyond the boldness (see *v.* 235 foll.) of entering the shrine and touching the image. Accordingly he encourages and justifies himself by a yet more full and emphatic assertion of his right. Long and painful experience has given him an instinct for the proprieties of his situation; and for the present case, the invocation of Athena, he has the authority of Apollo, implied in *v.* 81, and presumably given more expressly in previous instructions (*v.* 241).

276. ἐγὼ: *I myself.*

277. πολλοὺς καθ' ἄρμους: *in many conjunctures*: constr. with διδαχθεῖς. That ἄρμους *conjuncture* (for which see L. and Sc. *s.v.*) was applied in antique usage to 'time', in a sense nearly equivalent to *καιρός*, is shown by the persistence of this association in the locative ἄρμῳ, *just now, just at the time, recently.* Cf. the use of ἄρμῶζει, 'it is proper, suitable to the situation', as in Soph. *Trach.* 731 σιγῶν ἂν ἄρμῶζει σε τὸν πλείω λόγον, etc.—πολλοὺς καθαρμούς (M) seems irrelevant if καθαρμούς be taken in the sense of *purifications.* Even if, which is nowhere else suggested, Orestes had learnt and

practised, in the course of his wanderings, other 'means of cleansing' in addition to his purification by Apollo, it is plain that he does not now use or propose to use them. The suggestion of Herwerden, πολλοῖσι καιροῦς, is right in sense, and is confirmed, so far, by the schol., which, after a note on καθαρμούς in the sense of *purifications*, continues thus: ἄλλως· οἱ ἐναγεῖς...οὐ διελέγοντό τι· ἐπεὶ οὖν Ὀρέστης μέλλει διαλέγεσθαι..., ἐγὼ, φησι, διδαχθεῖς σὺν κακῷ τῷ ἔμμαντοῦ, καὶ ὅσον διδασκάλους χρησάμενος ταῖς ἐμαῖς συμφοραῖς, ἐπίσταμαι καὶ σιγῶν καὶ λαλεῖν ὅπου δεῖ, ἐκατέρου καιρὸν γινώσκων. This ignores the supposed 'purifications', and explains (διδαχθεῖς) πολλοὺς καθαρμούς by ἐκατέρου καιρὸν γινώσκων. But it does not imply a different text from that of M: the writer took καθαρμούς itself (on the analogy of καθαρμῶζω) as a compound of *κατὰ* and ἄρμους, and thus interpreted διδαχθεῖς πολλοὺς καθαρμούς as 'having learnt much about fitness of times' (πολλοὺς καιροῦς). This is not impossible, and the word may have been actually known; but the division καθ' ἄρμους seems better. See further on *v.* 283.—καί: 'among other such things, this *also*'; not 'both'.

280. χερὸς is in sense 'ablative' with *μαραίνεται*, 'is fading from my hand', but is helped (grammatically) by a possible dependence on *αἷμα*. *κάκμα-ραίνεται* Richards, perhaps rightly.

μητροκτόνον μίασμα δ' ἔκπλυτον πέλει.
 ποταίνιον γὰρ ὄν πρὸς ἐστία θεοῦ
 Φοίβου καθαρμοῖς ἠλάθη χοιροκτόνοις.
 πολὺς δέ μοι γένοιτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγος,
 ὅσοις προσῆλθον ἀβλαβεῖ ξυνουσία. 285
 χρόνος καθαιρεῖ πάντα γηράσκων ὁμοῦ.
 καὶ νῦν ἀφ' ἀγνοῦ στόματος εὐφήμως καλῶ
 χώρας ἀνασσαν τῆσδ' Ἀθηναίαν ἐμοὶ
 μολεῖν ἀρωγόν· κτήσεται δ' ἄνευ δορὸς
 αὐτόν τε καὶ γῆν καὶ τὸν Ἀργεῖον λεῶν 290
 πιστὸν δικαίως ἐς τὸ πᾶν τε σύμμαχον.
 ἀλλ' εἴτε χώρας ἐν τόποις Λιβυστικοῖς,
 Τρίτωνος ἀμφὶ χεῦμα γενεθλίου πόρου,
 τίθησιν ὀρθὸν ἢ κατηρεφῆ πόδα,
 φίλοις ἀρήγουσ', εἴτε Φλεγραίαν πλάκα 295

281. ἔκπλυτον πέλει: apparently equivalent to a passive verb, *is washed away*, the adj. in -τος serving, as in Latin, the function of a participle. The interpretation 'is capable of being washed away' is equally admissible on the words, but not suitable to the speaker's situation.

283, 284. ἐστία: a house-hearth and householder were essential to the act; see above *vv.* 205 foll., and 579.—καθαρμοῖς. Comparing this with *v.* 277, the echo of sound suggests, what is likely, that the word *καθαρός* was the subject of a traditional and sacred equivocation, such as played so large a part in Greek religion, especially the Apolline: cf. *v.* 286. If, as is here implied (*ποταίνιον ὄν*), the cleansing ceremony must or should be performed promptly, it was obvious, for minds disposed to such observations, to suggest that this was directly shown in the name, which signified, according to its double derivation (*καθαρός καθ' ἄρμόν*), 'a cleansing applied in time'. Apart from fancy or superstition, some doctrine of limitation, in respect of the

time, within which an outcast might qualify himself by purgation for 'in-lawing' and readmission to society, would arise from practical convenience.—χοιροκτόνοις. Whether the blood of the pig was considered specially proper for the purpose, does not seem to be ascertained by evidence exactly in point. It was not necessary; see *v.* 453.

284, 285. The efficiency of the cleansing has been tested by experience, and confirmed by time.—πολὺς λόγος: a long story.—ὅσοις: the dative depends properly on ἀβλαβεῖ ξυνουσία: *quasi ὅσους προσῆλθον* (I have visited) ὥστε ἀβλαβῆ αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὴν ξυνουσίαν.

286. Aging time brings all that ages with it to an end: time, as it takes away all things, takes away also pollution. καθαιρεῖ 'brings down', 'destroys', or rather 'brings toward destruction'. This (and not καθαίρει, Stanley) must be the true reading, as appears from γηράσκων ὁμοῦ: Time 'destroys' all things 'by aging along with them', or in other words 'because they age along with him', but he does not, merely for this reason, 'purge' them.—Whether the verse is

hand, and the pollution of matricide is washed off from it; for that, when yet it was fresh, at a god's hearth, at Phoebus' hearth, with purging swine's blood it was expelled. Long were it for me to reckon, from the beginning, the many, who from my visit and company have taken no harm. By aging time, all things, that age with it, are done away. And now, with pure lips religiously, I invoke the Queen of this land, the Lady of Athens, to come to my aid, thereby to win without war myself, and Argos, and Argos' people, in bounden faith to her and alliance for ever. So whether she be in the parts of Libya, beside the flow of Triton, her natal stream, there aiding a friend, with foot forthset or under cover of the robe, or whether, like manly marshal bold, she watches over Phlegra's plain, I pray

authentic, or (Musgrave) an illustrative quotation grafted upon the text, is a more difficult question. Whoever placed it here, poet or reader, was prompted by the resemblance between *καθαίρει* and *καθαίρει*, and sought, in fact, this assonance or equivocation. What is the proper inference from this may be disputed: I think the point unlikely in a reader, and characteristic of Aeschylus, whose works, especially when he touches directly on topics of religion, abound in such points; see *vv.* 11, 27, 283, 491, 536, and *passim*. But the verse may be authentic, and yet a quotation (either in words or in substance) nevertheless; and this would best account for its detachment.

288. 'Αθηναίαν. "This ancient and solemn form, which is frequent in inscriptions, generally as ἡ 'Αθηναία with the article, down to the time of Euclides, occurs in *vv.* 299, 617, and in Eur. *Iph. T.* 1436," where Athena, as the goddess of Athens, announces herself by this title. "Elsewhere the tragedians by use 'Αθάνα" (Wecklein).—*ἔμολ.* Note the emphasis. As sovereign of the place (*χώρας*) she is entitled and bound to claim as hers *even an Orestes*.

289—291. See *vv.* 670 foll., 765 foll., and the Introduction.—*αὐτόν: myself.*

292—295. *ἔλτε... ἀρήγουσα.* The

birth of Athena was associated with a mystical water, *Triton*, from which was derived, rightly or wrongly, the sacred epithet *Τριτογένεια*. According to some, this water was the actual *Τριτωνίς λίμνη*, a stream or streams with lakes, in Libya; the inhabitants of the region worshipped a goddess whom the Greeks identified with Athena (Herod. 4. 180). Here however the mythical geography, like that of Phlegra in the following lines, serves merely as an excuse to indicate, by reference to remote and opposite points, the vast area covered by the martial activity of Athens' Queen, conterminous, in the imagination of the poet, with the sphere of her imperial ambition at the time when he was writing, the height of her power, about the year 458. And indeed, as observed by Weil, in Egypt, and thus for poetical purposes within the 'regions of Libya', the Athenian arms were actually engaged in supporting the revolt of the Libyan Inaros against the Persians (Thuc. 1. 104, 109). Nor would the audience forget Cyrene, to the tottering fortunes of whose tyrannical and 'medizing' dynasty there is apparently an allusion in *Cho.* 633.—*χώρας* is perhaps here γῆς, 'the earth'; or we may regard the epithet *Διβουρτικοῖς* as 'transferred' from *χώρας*, that is to say, belonging to *χώρας* according to our modern treatment

θρασύς ταγούχος ὡς ἀνὴρ ἐπισκοπεῖ,
 ἔλθοι—κλύει δὲ καὶ πρόσωθεν ὦν θεός—
 ὅπως γένοιτο τῶνδ' ἔμοι λυτήριος.

XO. οὔτοι σ' Ἀπόλλων οὐδ' Ἀθηναίας σθένος
 ῥύσαιτ' ἂν ὥστε μὴ οὐ παρημελημένον 300
 ἔρρειν, τὸ χαίρειν μὴ μαθόνθ' ὅπου φρενῶν.—
 ἀναίματον βόσκημα δ', αἰμόνων σκιά,

302. δαιμόνων.

of epithets. On such 'transferences' generally, see Headlam, *Class. Rev.* xvi. 434. I take this opportunity of saying that my note βλαχαῖ κ.τ.λ. (*Theb.* 335) is too strongly put, though the ms. text, if right, is extremely bold.—**τίθεισιν... πόδα**: she is planting a foot straight forth or overhung. It is not certain either what attitudes are indicated or what is their significance; but the prevalent opinion that **κατηρεφή** means 'covered by the drapery' can scarcely, so far, be wrong. In antithesis to this, **ὀρθός** would naturally describe the limb advanced, as in movement, so as to be visible within or beyond the drapery (so Paley and others). The stiff manner in which, partly from simplicity and partly from hieratic tradition, a figure in motion was often represented in art (see for example Artemis in Plate XIX. of *Greek Vase Paintings*, Harrison and McColl), may have helped to mould the expression, though it is possible that 'lifted', rather than 'straightened', was the notion meant. Nor is it unlikely that **κατηρεφή** suggests (Wecklein) the letting down of the robe, which for marching was girt up. A contrast between 'standing' and 'sitting' is scarcely consistent with **τίθεισιν πόδα**, applied to both positions. We may interpret therefore by 'marching forth to her goal or planted there at rest'. It remains however to find the reasons, which led the poet to associate these postures of the goddess with the wars of Athens; but such reasons must have existed, and may easily be imagined.

295—297. **Φλεγραῖαν πλάκα**. Phle-

gra, the scene of the battle between the gods and the giants, and for that reason associated with Athena, belongs properly to the geography of myth and, like Triton, was variously placed by local fancy and changing knowledge of the world. But it seems certain, though little if at all noticed in commentary, that Aeschylus here has in view the Chalcidic peninsula of Pallene, formerly *Phlegra* according to Herod. 7. 123, and particularly its principal city, Potidaea. The town with the whole region had been subjected by Xerxes, had recovered liberty after Salamis, and was now one of the most important among the allied and protected dependencies of Athens. Lying at the northern edge of the Athenian area, it makes a natural antithesis to Libya in the south, and completes the sweeping glance over 'liberated Hellas'. The allusion is reinforced by **ἐπισκοπεῖ**, the natural word, to an Athenian ear, for the supervision of their patroness, inasmuch as the title **ἐπίσκοποι** was borne (see Smith, *Dict. Ant. s.v.*) by the officers through whom, when necessary, the cities of the empire were actually controlled. See on **ἐπίσκοπον** v. 521. Nor is the peculiar word **ταγούχος** chosen at random. The Thesalians, as well as the Argives, had joined the alliance; pointed at in v. 290, which was at this time exciting such splendid hopes. Had it been maintained, Athens, as the predominant partner, would have strengthened her hold upon the north by all the power of a Thessalian **ταγή** and **ταγός** (of which

her come,—a god hears even from far,—that deliverance from these woes she may bring to me.

Erinyes. Never shall Apollo nor Athena's might save thee from passing unregarded away,—no sense of joy in all thy soul!...(*She pauses, but he does not reply*). . And dost thou, a

latter word *ταγοῦχος ἀνὴρ* is a poetical paraphrase); and in that direction, as Aeschylus himself suggests (*v.* 706), there might soon have been nothing not, in some sense, Athenian within the confines of Hellenism. These imperial ambitions have a bearing on the play (see the Introduction), and this invocation is designed to express them. That, as in the case of Libya, the reference to Chalcidice is pointed at military operations of the moment, is likely enough, but not a necessary supposition. The delicate and vital interests of Athens in that region were incessantly requiring and receiving 'supervision'; and it was in the natural course of things when, a generation later, the final contest between the empire and its enemies was precipitated by a quarrel with Potidaea.—A reference to the *Phlegraei campi* of Campania (Paley) is hardly conceivable. This Italian version of the legend has been made familiar by the Romans, but to Aeschylus it was probably foreign, nor was Athena yet concerned with the far west.—*ὡς θρασὺς ἡγεμῶν ἀρμύτρον σα δὲ ἡ εὐχὴ· δέεται γὰρ ἔδρανοῦς βοηθοῦ* ('quasi fortis imperator; et convenit precatio, cum curuli opus sit auxiliatore') schol. The note is not, I think, corrupt. The writer, a subject of the Graeco-Roman empire, wants to explain why, since the purpose, for which the goddess comes, is judicial, the terms of invocation should be military, and he does this by applying to the Athenian empire the notion of *imperium* familiar to himself. Athena, in constituting and directing the court from her *ἔδραν* (*sella, chair*), will be acting like a magistrate *cum imperio*. Probably, like many since, he took the *κατηρεφῆς πούς* of *v.* 294 to indicate *sitting*, and he

may even have noticed, as bearing on *ἐπίσκοπεῖ* here, the *ἐπίσκοπος καθήμενος* of *v.* 522, which does actually refer to the officer's *tribunal*. However his difficulty need not be raised: the prayer relates to the general functions of the 'Empress', and not specially to the present occasion.

298. *γένονται* follows, as frequently in all styles, the mood of *ἔλθοι*, Kühner, § 399, 6 b.

300. *μὴ οὐ*, regular in consecutive clauses after the *negative* principal sentence.

301. 'Having found no place for joy in all thy heart', literally, 'not having found out where in the heart (*φρενῶν* partitive gen.) joy is'; cf. *v.* 426.—Here a pause; Orestes makes no answer.

302. 'And dost thou, a fatling bloodless, a shadow of things which have blood, dare to answer me with silence and scorn, a victim fed and entirely consecrated for me?' The text is Wecklein's, suggested apparently by *ἀναίματων βόσκημ' ἐναιμόνων σκιά* (Todt), and is the only conjecture which makes satisfactory sense out of the letters. The use of *αἷμων* for *ἐναιμων*, *ἐναιματος* is not certified, but, with an explanatory context, not improbable.—*βόσκημα*: properly 'an animal fed up for sacrifice and banquet' (Paley, see *v.* 304): *ἀναίματων* is a contrasted epithet of the kind familiar to Greek poetry (*v.* 333). A *βόσκημα* should naturally be rich in blood, but not so that of the Erinyes: see on *v.* 265.—*δέ* marks that *ἀναίματων βόσκημα* (*βν*) is an objection, a criticism upon his silence; the position of the *δέ* is justified by the close antithetic connexion of *ἀναίματων* and *βόσκημα*.—*βόσκημα δαιμόνων*, *fatting of the gods*, is

οὐδ' ἀντιφωνεῖς, ἀλλ' ἀποπτύεις λόγους,
 ἔμοι τραφεῖς τε καὶ καθιερωμένος;
 καὶ ζῶν με δαίσεις οὐδὲ πρὸς βωμῶ σφαγείς· 305
 ὕμνον δ' ἀκούσει τόνδε δέσμιον σέθεν.

ἄγε δὴ καὶ χορὸν ἄψωμεν, ἐπεὶ
 μοῦσαν στυγερὰν
 ἀποφαίνεσθαι δεδόκηκεν,
 λέξαι τε λάχῃ τὰ κατ' ἀνθρώπους 310
 ὡς ἐπινωμᾶ στάσις ἀμά,
 εὐθύδικαι θ' αἶδ' οἴομεθ' εἶναι·
 τοὺς μὲν καθαρὰς
 < φανερώς > χεῖρας προνέμοντας
 οὗτις ἐφέρειπει μῆνις ἀφ' ἡμῶν, 315

311. ἄμα. 312. εὐθύδικαι θ' οἶδ' (with ζτ in margin). οἴμεθ'.
 314. προσνέμοντας. προνέμοντας recc. 315. ἀφ' ἡμῶν μῆνις ἐφέρειπει.

possible, but weak in sense. Also the rhythm (*ἀναίματον βόσκημα δαιμόνων, σκιά*), since it obliterates the caesura, would be irregular, though this might be justified.—οὐδ(έ): *not even*.

306. ὕμνον: pursuing the figure of a religious ceremony.—δέσμιον *to bind thee* to the place, like a spell, but with allusion to the binding of a sacrificial victim. The (objective) gen. σέθεν depends on ὕμνον δέσμιον, but practically, in sense, upon the adj. only.

307—321. During this anapaestic march the Chorus take up their position for the following *stasimon*, which is apparently the first perfectly complete and regular movement in the play. In fact (Paley) the *choreutae*, who have hitherto acted with unusual liberty, here take up the more formal and disciplined manner, which belonged to them by tradition, and this adds an appropriateness to χορὸν ἄψωμεν. The anapaests correspond to the *πάροδος* of the *Supplicantes*, *Persae*, *Agamemnon*, *Choephori*.

307. καὶ χορὸν: 'let us link a dance to accompany our hymn'.

308. στυγερὰν: *horror-striking*, a music to freeze the blood, according to the full sense of the word: cf. *στύξ, στύγες*.

310. λάχῃ τὰ κατ' ἀνθρώπους: not 'the fates of men' but 'our function' or 'office in relation to men', as appears from the repeated use of λάχος in the exposition which follows, *v.* 335, 348, 389. This is their whole contention here, that they have a λάχος, τιμὴ, γέρας, μοῖρα, etc., a privilege wholly independent of all other authority. Hence the emphasis on λάχῃ in this clause: see further the next note, and contrast *v.* 931.—στάσις, *comprany*, with reference to the ode (*στάσιμον μέλος*) which they are about to sing.—ἀμά Canter. ἀμή Wecklein, but see on *v.* 443, and on *v.* 272.

312. '...and hold that we here appear as justicers absolute', lit. 'and hold that we here are direct in the exercise of justice'. οἴομεθ' Ahrens. For αἶδε, which

fatling bloodless, mere shadow of that which hath blood, dost thou dare to answer me with silence and scorn, though bred and consecrate for me?... A living victim shalt thou feed me, a living sacrifice; and now shalt thou hear a hymn that shall bind thee fast.

Chorus. Come then, let us even link the dance; since our purpose is to utter a song of dread, telling how this our company portions the governance of mankind, and how we hold, that we here appear as claimants absolute.

Whosoever holds forth clean hands, no wrath from us doth

I suggest myself, see a parallel in *v.* 361. *oid'* (M) has probably come in from a proposed correction of the fem. termination in the compound *εὐθύδικαι*: but see *v.* 77 etc. The sense is continued without regard to the termination (at *v.* 311) of the anapaestic system. In prose-style, the last clause would be subordinate, 'we so govern as to have here, we throw, an absolute claim'; but in Aeschylus the co-ordination is natural.—*εὐθύδικαι*. The full and exact sense of this word is important. It is not to be confused with *εὐθύδικος* in *Ag.* 758, nor does it mean simply *just*. It is *active* in sense, as the MS. accent, though dubious, was meant to show, and it is used with reference to the Athenian meaning of *εὐθύδικτα* and *εὐθεία δικη*. These terms were applied (see *v.* 436) to a forensic proceeding *clear of (preliminary) objections*, either because none were laid, or because they were overruled. In the like sense, the Erinyes describe themselves, with regard to all possible impediments, as 'in the present case *εὐθύδικαι*': they are *prosecuting a justice*, which, within its sphere, is *not to be traversed*. To maintain this, and to protest against the interference invoked, according to the new fashion (*v.* 162), by Apollo, is the purport of the following ode. Here (*vv.* 313—321) they sum up their principles: their function (*λάχος*) is (1) strictly limited, but (2) within the limits exclusive. They meddle with nothing except blood-guilt (*vv.* 313—

316), but where blood-guilt, as they define it, is found, they are absolute, unerring witnesses, final executors (*vv.* 317—321). The appeal therefore to another power is, as it were, an illegal impediment, which ought not to be entertained. Thus, with energetic point, they put, in the forms of law, their protest *ab initio* against 'illegal' intrusion, an attitude which they maintain throughout until the final reconciliation, and which must be carefully borne in mind.—Many put a strong stop at *ἀμά*, and emend *v.* 312 accordingly, e.g. *εὐθύδικαιοι* (Hermann) *μαίμεθ'* (Wecklein) *εἶναι*. This may be right, but the evidence is rather against it.

314. *καθαρῶς*, to complete the metre, Hermann; *φανερῶς* Headlam. It is difficult to choose between this and Hermann's previous suggestion, *τὸν μὲν καθαρὰς χεῖρας προνέμοντ'* | *οὐτὶς κ.τ.λ.*: but, as he remarks, an erroneous insertion of the plural, with *διοιχνεῖ* below, is not likely.—*προνέμοντας*: 'hold forth' in conscious innocence, opposed to *ἐπικρύπτει* in *v.* 318. The antithesis is unfavourable to an alternative interpretation of *ἐπικρύπτει χεῖρας φονίας*, 'does secret murder', nor does this interpretation suit the facts: the Erinyes prosecute *all* murder, within the bounds of their definition, not secret murder only.

315. The change in the order of the words (Poison) corrects the hiatus *ἐφέρπει | ἄσωνής*... (not admitted by the rules of the metre).

ἀσινῆς δ' αἰῶνα διοιχνεῖ.
 ὅστις δ' ἀλιτρῶν ὥσπερ ὄδ' ἀνήρ
 χεῖρας φονίας ἐπικρύπτει,
 μάρτυρες ὀρθαὶ τοῖσι θανοῦσιν
 παραγιγνόμεναι πράκτορες αἵματος 320
 αὐτῷ τελέως ἐφάνημεν.
 μᾶτερ, ἃ μ' ἔτικτες, ὦ μᾶτερ 320
 Νύξ, ἀλαοῖσι καὶ δεδορκόσιν
 ποιάν, κλῦθ'.
 ὁ Λατοῦς γὰρ ἱνὶς μ' ἄτιμον τίθησιν, 325
 τόνδ' ἀφαιρούμενος
 πτώκα, ματρῶον ἄ-
 γνισμα κύριον φόνου.
 ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ τεθυμένῳ
 τόδε μέλος, παρακοπά, 330
 παραφορὰ φρενοδαλῆς,
 ὕμνος ἐξ Ἑρινύων,
 δέσμιος φρενῶν, ἀφόρ-
 μικτος, αὐτὸν βροτοῖς.

317. ἀνήρ. 320. παραγιγνόμεναι. 323. ἀλαοῖσιν. 326. τὸδ'. τόνδ' m.
 327. πτάκα. πτάκα m. 331. παρα*ορά (originally παραφθορά). φρενόδα**σ
 corrected to φρενοδαλις and again to φρενοδαλις. In margin ζτ οἶμαι φρενοδαλῆς m.

316. διοιχνεῖ: for the transition to the singular see *v.* 340.

317. ἀλιτρῶν: partitive genitive depending on ὅστις, 'if any sinner...' etc.—ἀλιτρῶν Auratus, Hermann, a doubtful change, and connected with misconceptions (see above on *v.* 310) as to the general sense. The Erinyes claim power not over all ἀλιτροί (*offenders*) as such, but only over a certain class of them (those guilty of blood), which class they claim as theirs entirely: ἀλιτρῶν therefore is to the point.—ἀνήρ Porson.

319—321. τοῖσι θανοῦσιν: *for, i.e.* in the interest of, *the slain*.—πράκτορες: exactors, avengers.—αὐτῷ. The emphasis thrown on the pronoun by the metre (and indeed according to Aeschylean usage by

the use of αὐτός) is accounted for by the idea of retribution; 'as *he* shed the blood of the murdered, so we exact payment in blood from *him*'; cf. *v.* 777 and see on *Cho.* 118.—τελέως: 'absolutely, finally', with ἐφάνημεν, rather than 'in the end' with πράκτορες. From the moment that the deed is done, we are *once for all* the declared avengers of it. The point, as throughout this passage, is to reject as impossible any justice or enquiry except theirs.

322—399. First Stasimon. The subject of the ode, which is all addressed obliquely to Athena (*v.* 362) and her city (*v.* 392), is, as announced in the anapaests, the dignity, office, and *exclusive rights* of the Erinyes. Its character as a ὕμνος

visit, but harmless he passeth his days. But if any sinner, like this man, hath bloody hands to cover, then as true witnesses for the slain we come, and prove to him our authority by exacting his own heart's blood.

Mother, who barest me, O Mother Night, to punish them that see and that see not, hear! For the whelp of Leto would disprivilege me, by taking from me yon cowering creature, my victim, made mine own by his mother's blood.

But over the sacrifice, this is the song we sing; wild it maketh, wood it maketh, this hymn of the Erinyes, sense-destroying, binding the senses up, life-withering music harsh and untunable.

δέσμιος, an incantation to fascinate their victim Orestes, is exhibited (Wecklein) chiefly in the burdens (*epithymnia*) which follow the first three pairs of *strophææ*, and present, in their rhythm, a dramatic and astounding contrast to the measures of the *strophææ* themselves; see Appendix II. Indeed the expressive power of verse has perhaps never been carried higher than in this ode and the next.

322. *μάτηρ*: *ἐπεὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς μητρὸς Ὀρέστου ἀγωνίζονται, οικειῶς τὴν μητέρα ἐαντῶν ὀνομάζουσι* schol.

323. *ἄλαοίσι... ποιῶν*: *ζῶσι καὶ θανούσων ἔκδικον* schol., 'to be a punishment (punisher) to them that see not and them that see', *i.e.* living and dead, probably a religious formula.

325. *Δατοῦς ἴνις*: *Leto's whelp*. Apollo is the stronger beast, who would snatch away the cowering 'hare', which the Erinyes have run down. The figure is suggested by the association of Apollo (*Δῦκεϊος*) with the wolf and wolf-worship, on which see *Theb.* 131: *ἴνις*, properly the young of an animal, when applied metaphorically takes its colour according to the context. As suggesting strength and purity of breed, it can be used as a term of dignity; thus the king in *Supp.* 257 describes himself with pride as the *ἴνις* of his ancestor Palaechthon, and Heracles is the *ἴνις* of Zeus. But it has a contrary effect here.

325. *ἄτιμον τίθησιν*: 'would oust me

from my *privilege*' (*τιμή*). This is the key-note.

327. *ματρῶν... φόνου*: 'devoted lawfully by his murdered mother's blood': *ἀγνός* signifies properly the savage 'taboo', and has here its full primitive sense. By his mother's blood upon him the murderer is consecrated to the avenger and forbidden to all others.—The grammatical attachment of *ματρῶν* to *ἀγνισμα*, whereas it belongs, according to our rules, to *φόνου*, is a striking example of Greek freedom in this respect.

329—333. *ἐπὶ τῷ τεθυμένῳ*: over the 'victim', who is, as it were, already slain.—*τόδε μέλος (ἔστι)*: 'this is the song we sing'.—*παρακοπά, παραφορά*: *making wood (mad) and making wild*: cf. *ποιῶν v.* 324.—The reading of M points here to *παραφορά*, but *παραφρόνα* (*παραφροσύνη*) is indicated in the antistrophe (*v.* 344) and is also possible.—*φρενοδαλής* from *δηλέομαι* *destroy*. On the metre see App. II.—*ἀφόρμικτος*: contrasted epithet; it is a music 'not of the lyre', *i.e.* not like in its effect, but, contrary to ordinary music, maddening the human soul as the other soothes it.—*αἰονά βροτοῖς*: *ὁ ξηραίνων τοὺς βροτοὺς* schol., 'making men wither away'. This is right so far, but it should be noticed that, in Homeric usage, *αἶος ἀργ*, as a term of sound, denoted the *jangling* of metal in a fight (*κόρυθος δ' ἀμφ' αἶον ἀντευν Il.* 12. 160, etc.), and thus, to the Greek ear, was already associated

τοῦτο γὰρ λάχος διανταία ἀντ. α'. 335
 Μοῖρ' ἐπέκλωσεν ἐμπέδως ἔχειν,
 θνατῶν τοῖ-
 σιν αὐτουργίαι ξυμπατώσιν μάταιοι,
 τοῖς ὀμαρτεῖν, ὄφρ' ἂν
 γὰν ὑπέλθῃ· θανῶν δ' 340
 οὐκ ἄγαν ἐλεύθερος.
 ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ τεθυμένῳ
 τόδε μέλος, παρακοπά,
 παραφορὰ φρενοδαλῆς,
 ὕμνος ἐξ Ἑρινύων, 345
 δέσμιος φρενῶν, ἀφόρ-
 μικτος, αὐονὰ βροτοῖς.
 γιγνομέναισι λάχῃ στρ. β'.
 τάδ' ἐφ' ἀμὶν ἐκράνθη·
 ἀθανάτων δ' ἀπέχειν 350
 χέρας, οὐδέ τις ἐστὶ
 συνδαίτωρ μετὰκοινος·
 παλλεύκων δὲ πέπλων ∪ ∪ - ∪ ᾗ.

337, 338. θανάτων τοῖσιν αὐτουργίαις | ξύμπασ ὡσιν. 344. παράφρονα
 φρενοδαλῆσ. 345. ὕμνοισ. 349. ἀμῖν. 351. ζ' (in margin) m.
 352. συνδάτωρ.

with hideousness of noise. It is this, not less than the primary sense, which makes αὐονὰ a fit description for the 'music of the fiends' over the victim whose life they are about to drain.

335. **λάχος**: predicate; 'this was assigned (*εἰρημ*) by the power of apportionment as our function to hold for ever'. — **διανταία**: 'going right through', elsewhere in Aeschylus of a piercing stroke or wound, but here simply 'thorough', in relation to the metaphor (of work) in *ἐπέκλωσεν*: the 'thread' was perfected, that is to say, the assignment absolute.—The schol. ἡ διαμπὰξ τιμωρουμένη, and the modern 'relentless, irresistible', are not quite correct; but it is possible nevertheless (as suggested by Mr Wedd) that in *λάχος ἐπέκλωσεν* and *διανταία* we have

allusions to the names *Lachesis*, *Clotbo*, and less precisely to *Atropos*, 'not turning'.

337—341. **θνατῶν** (Canter): partitive gen. depending on the (relative) **τοῖσιν**, 'those among mortals, with whom...' etc. The leading position of the word prepares the ear for the antithesis of **θανῶν** (*subject to death...having passed death*) in *v.* 340. — **τοῖσιν...μάταιοι**: *them that are haunted by deeds of wanton crime*, literally 'with whom walk in their path....'—**αὐτουργίαι** properly 'deeds of one's own', for which the doer is personally and without qualification responsible; by association (see on *v.* 212) this whole class of words was specially connected with wilful *murder*, and this is the meaning of the speakers. But it is not without purpose that, even in defining their 'proper portion' in their

This power the spindle of fate did throughly assure to us, that, if any mortal man be companioned by wanton crime, with such we should walk until he pass beneath the ground;... and death itself is for him no mighty deliverance.

But over the sacrifice, *etc.*

From our beginning was this office confirmed to us. The Deathless Ones may not lay finger thereon, nor is any of them coparcener to divide with us. In the white robes was I given

own strict but narrow fashion, they are made to use words which would embrace the whole field of conscience and retribution. It points the way to their place, larger because subordinate, in the better theology of the finale.—**ξύμπατῶσιν** (Weil, but referring *πατεῖν* to the notion *trample*, and making further changes accordingly) 'share their *πάτος*', their walk, haunt, place of being and moving: see L. and Sc. *s.v.* *πάτος*, *πατεῖν*: wherever they go, their sin goes with them. The same metaphor is pursued in *ὀμαρτεῖν*, and in fact the Erinyes here visibly appear as a personification of the sin.—**ξύμπεσσωσι** (Turnebus) is less acceptable, not only in sense, as suggesting rather *accidental* conjunction, but technically, as a common word and not easily missed.—For the (poetic) subj. without *ἄν* see *v.* 211.—**ἑπέ-
ἔβη**: *τις*, the offender. We pass from the general law to the particular case, as in *v.* 317.

348. **γίγνομένοισι**: 'when we were about to come into being'. Hom. *Il.* 20. 127 *πέισεται ἄσσα οἱ ἄλσα | γινομένῳ ἐπένησε λίνῳ, ὅτε μιν τέκε μήτηρ* (Wecklein).—**ἀμῖν** Porson. The short final syllable occurs here only in Aeschylus, in Sophocles frequently, in Euripides not at all (Wecklein).

350. **ἀθανάτων δέ (ἔστι)**: 'and it is the part of the *ἀθάνατοι*...' Cf. *θεῶν*, at the corresponding point of the antistrophe, *v.* 363, similar to this in construction and sense, and suggested by it (Drake, Paley).—**ἀθάνατοι** takes colour from the preceding thoughts (*vv.* 337—341 *θνατῶν...θανῶν*) and signifies not merely

'those who die not', but 'those who have nought to do with death'. It is their interest (see the sequel) as well as their duty, to leave functions, intimately connected with the world of death and darkness, in the hands of those to whom that region is congenial and not repulsive (see *v.* 73, 74 and *infra* 388 foll., 396 foll.).—**ἀπέχειν χέρας**: literally 'to keep their hands away (from it)', not to touch a business neither theirs nor fit for them.—*ἀθανάτων ἄπ' ἔχειν γέρας* Evers, *ἀθανάτων διχ' ἔχειν κρέφας* Martin, whence others *ἀθανάτων διχ' ἔχειν γέρας* 'to hold as a privilege apart from the *ἀθάνατοι*'. This last is admissible, though objection might be made to the curt *διχ'* and the sound of *διχ' ἔχειν*: but there is no need for change. The schol. *μὴ πλησιάζειν ἡμῶς τοῖς θεοῖς* seems to be merely a misinterpretation, taking *ἀθανάτων* with *ἀπέχειν*, of the traditional text.

352. **συνδαίτωρ** (Turnebus): properly here 'co-partner', from the primitive sense of *δαίωμα* *divide*, not sharer of a feast (L. and Sc. *s.v.*), though the common association of *δαίωμα* with feasting helps the transition to the next sentence.

353—355. The limitation is mutual, and on the side of the Erinyes willingly respected: they have not, and they do not choose to have, any part in the joyous splendours of the *ἀθάνατοι*, the temples, the festivals, and the white-robed worshippers, which belong to the gods of light, the gods properly so called. *σύδαμοι ὅπου ἑορτὴ καὶ ἀμπεχβῆ καθαρὰ πάρεμι* schol.—**παλλεύκων**: *λευκῶν*, but with emphasis.—The metre of the *antistrophe*

μοιρος ἀκληρος ἐτύχθην,
 δωμάτων γὰρ εἰλόμαν.

355

ἀνατροπὰς ὅταν Ἄρης

τιθασὸς ἂν φίλον ἔλῃ,

ἐπὶ τόν, ᾧ, διόμεναι

κρατερόν ὄνθ' ὁμοίως

μαυροῦμεν ὑφ' αἵματος νέου.

360

σπεύδομεν αἰδ' ἀφελεῖν

ἀντ. β'.

τινα τάσδε μερίμνας.

θεῶν δ' ἀτέλειαν ἐμαῖ-

357. πῖθασος (τιθασὸς rec.)...φίλος.

361. σπευδόμενα δ' altered to σπευδόμεναι δ'.

(*v.* 366) shows a loss here (after *πέπλων*), probably caused by the fact that the missing word repeated the sense, and perhaps the forms, of its neighbours: *ἀπόμοιρος* (O. Müller) is the most probable; *ἀνέορτος* (Weil) has been deduced, but not safely, from *έορτή* in the schol.; *ἀγέραστος*, *ἀπόφαρος*, and other suggestions are possible.—*ἐτύχθην*: *I was made*, appointed, created.

355. *δωμάτων γὰρ εἰλόμαν* (*ἀμοιρος τυχθῆναι*, *ἀμοιρος εἶναι*): '(I was created without part in their festivals) because it was my choice to have none in their dwelling-places'. For the ellipse, which according to the habit of Greek is in such a case regular and almost obligatory, see examples in Kühner, *Gr. Gramm.* § 597, particularly subsections (i), (k), (m), and see on *supra v.* 71, *Theb.* 2, *Ag.* 796, 855, *Cho.* 793, etc. No ambiguity is raised, the supplement being both indispensable and obvious.—*δωμάτων*. No temple (or even sanctuary), properly belonging to the *Eriinyes* and bearing their name, seems to have existed, at all events in the times of Aeschylus; and indeed the primitive conception of them, as exhibited in this play up to the alleged transformation, was not consistent with a fixed dwelling-place. Their only 'home' was below (*v.* 420), and their one occupation pursuit. They could not therefore receive, in the regular fashion of Greek gods, any worship (see

above on *v.* 106), and held, as they say themselves, in some sense 'a place contemned' (*v.* 388). But to this *λάχος*, such as it is, with all its rights and all its conditions, they hold with obstinate pride: it was defined (they say) with their own consent: they *would not have* any abode, and similarly, when a settlement is hereafter proposed to them, they reject the idea with scorn (*v.* 873).—The received punctuation here, *δωμάτων γὰρ εἰλόμαν ἀνατροπὰς κ.τ.λ.*, is, I think, inadmissible. For (1) it is beyond reasonable doubt that *vv.* 356—360 (to which in the MS. there is no antistrophe) are a burden or *epheumium* (Schneider), and are to be repeated as in the text, after the *antistrophe*; in the first pair of *strophæ*, the burden is actually written twice in the MS., to show the principle; in this and the following pair, it is written, as was to be expected, only once, with the *strophe*. But the *antistrophe* ends (*v.* 368) with a sentence complete, and to construe with it the words *ἀνατροπὰς κ.τ.λ.* is impossible. Therefore the burden must be here, as generally in Aeschylus, separate in construction, and cannot begin in the middle of a clause. This consideration is, in my judgment, decisive; but further (2) to begin a completely independent sentence at *ἐπὶ τόν κ.τ.λ.* makes the use of the demonstrative *τόν* obscure and not natural;

no part or share or portion, because of their dwelling-places I would have nought.

Whensoever the subversive spirit of domestic hate destroys a life that should be dear, then after the destroyer hey! we follow, and whatsoever his strength, by the fresh blood upon him we wear him down.

It is zeal that brings us here, zeal to relieve another of these cares; and the Gods' part it is, to confirm the immunity we pray,

(3) it is not coherent to say, 'I have no part in festivals, for I chose the subversion of (men's) houses.' There is not, between the ideas, sufficient connexion to explain the inference; and (4) *δωμάτων ειλόμεν ἀνατροπᾶς*, with the emphasis, as given by the order, on *δωμάτων*, should mean 'I chose the subversion of houses' in preference to that of something else; but this, in the context, is not intelligible.

356. 'If ever, subverting the peace of the domestic pale, the spirit of hate destroys a life that should be dear, then after that man...' etc. *ἀνατροπᾶς* (*subversively*) is the adverbial accusative, also called 'inner' and (not happily) 'quasi-cognate' (see Kühner *Gr. Gramm.* § 411, 3 b for a large collection of examples). It qualifies *ἔλη*, or rather the whole act *τιθασὸς ὦν φίλον ἔλη*, and defines this act as a *subversion*, contrary to nature and order. It is placed first for emphasis and to mark the point: murder within the home, and especially murder directed against domestic authority, not only 'kills' but 'subverts'; it destroys the very principle of human life (see the following *stasimon*, *v.* 493 foll.); and that is why a special power was constituted to punish it.—A simpler construction, according to our conceptions, would be obtained by reading *ἀνατροπᾶς*, instrumental, by *subversion*; but this is not necessary, nor an improvement.—*Ἄρης τιθασὸς ὦν*: 'Ares, having been domesticated'. The expression, characteristic of primitive and savage ethics, regards hostility as the normal relation of men, but abrogated and forbidden between members of the house.

358—360. *ἐπὶ τὸν δίομεναι*: *ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἐπιδίομεναι pursuing*, cf. *Supp.* 826 *μετὰ με δρόμοισι δίομενοι*.—*ἐπὶ τὸν αἰδ' ἰέμεναι* ('launching ourselves upon him thus', with a movement towards Orestes) E. A. I. Ahrens, perhaps rightly, though one would fain believe that the cry (*ᾠ*) is Aeschylean.—*τόν* refers formally to 'Ares', but in sense to the domestic murderer, of whose act and spirit Ares is a symbol.—*κρατερόν* ... *νέου*: 'whatever his strength, we bring him down with the weight of his crime fresh upon him.' *κρατερόν ὁμοίως* are closely connected; literally 'likewise though strong', that is to say, his strength makes no difference. *ὑπὸ*: nearly equivalent to *διὰ* (by means of) in common prose, but poetically more suggestive. For *αἶμα νέον* cf. *v.* 204.—On the metre of this burden, see App. II.

361—368. The Olympians, and in particular Athena, should gladly acquiesce in a privilege, which spares them disquiet and pollution.

361. 'We come here eager to relieve a certain one from all such care.' *σπεύδομεν αἰδ(ε)*: Doederlein. The 'haste' and 'eagerness' refer, as *αἰδε* shows, to the present occasion. It is zeal, if the goddess will consider, for her own good, which brings them to her city. See above on *v.* 312.—*τινῶ*. This oblique form of address (for these words are addressed to the expected Athena as truly as if she were already present) usually conveys a menace, as in *Soph. Ai.* 1138 *τοῦτ' εἰς ἀλίαν τοῦπος ἐρχεται τινι*, and in fact does so here. Their anger is visible even in the form of a friendly and respectful deprecation.

σι·λιταῖς ἐπικραίνειν,
 μηδ' ἐς ἄγκρισιν ἐλθεῖν.
 Ζεὺς γὰρ αἵματοσταγὲς ἀξιό-
 μισον ἔθνος τόδε λέσχας
 ἄς ἀπηξιώσατο.

365

< ἀνατροπὰς ὅταν Ἄρης
 τιθασὸς ὦν φίλον ἔλη,
 ἐπὶ τόν, ὦ, διόμεναι
 κρατερὸν ὄνθ' ὁμοίως
 μαυροῦμεν ὑφ' αἵματος νέου. >

δόξαί τ' ἀνδρῶν καὶ μάλ' ὑπ' αἰθέρι σεμναὶ στρ. γ'.
 τακόμεναι κατὰ γᾶν μινύθουσιν ἄτιμοι 370
 ἡμετέραις ἐφόδοις μελανείμοσιν
 ὀρχησμοῖς τ' ἐπιφθόνοις ποδός.

μάλα γὰρ οὖν ἀλομένα
 ἀνέκαθεν βαρυνεσῆ
 καταφέρω ποδὸς ἀκμάν,
 σφαλερὰ ταυδρομοῖς
 κῶλα, δύσφορον ἄταν.
 πίπτων δ' οὐκ οἶδεν τόδ' ὑπ' ἄφροσι λύμα. ἀντ. γ'.

375

373. ἐπιφθόνοισ.

375. ἀγκαθεν.

364, 365. Either (1) 'The gods should confirm the immunity for which I appeal, and enter into no question of it' or (2) '...should confirm the immunity of appeals to me, and....' In the first, ἐμαῖσι is subjective, and ἐμαῖσι λιταῖς 'to my appeal' signifies 'to me appealing'. In the second ἐμαῖσι is objective, and the λιταί are those of sufferers who invoke the Erinyes (see v. 511). It is in favour of (2) that λιταί, *prayers, entreaties*, is a more humble word than the speakers would be disposed to use. But in this exaggeration of respect there may be a not unsuitable touch of bitterness and irony; and on the other hand it is natural to suppose a relation, here as usual, between the 'gods' and the 'prayers', and not perhaps easy to bring suddenly into

view the action of the murdered victim, who in this ode is scarcely mentioned. Adding to this that with an 'active' noun, like λιταί, there is always a presumption in favour of the subjective possessive as against the less common objective, we should incline rather to (1).—Headlam (*Class. Rev.* xvii. 286) suggests, for λιταῖς, the sense *leitourgias public services*. This, if possible for Aeschylus, would be very appropriate.—θεῶν δέ (ἔστι): 'and it is the part of the gods...'; see on v. 350.—ἀτέλειαν...ἄγκρισιν. They speak like an advocate from Chios or Samos, pleading 'independence' against the proposal to bring at Athens some action arising in his island. The enquiry (ἀνάκρισις, see below vv. 411 foll.), by which the magistrate in an ordinary case decided

refusing to question it. For Zeus hath rejected from his converse, with merited loathing, this blood-bedabbled sort.

Whensoever the subversive *etc.*

Glory of man, ay, glory proudest beneath the sky, dissolves into the ground, and shrinks to contempt, at the passing of our black robes and malignant dance of our feet.

For with a leap from far, ay, far above, heavily falls the descent of our pointed foot, our limbs that trip the longest runner, with irresistible doom.

Falling, he knoweth this not, because of the bane in his

whether to bring it before a court, is here (as they argue) out of place. The whole proceeding is barred by 'privilege', and there is nothing to be done but to confirm this objection.—It is grammatically possible to join this clause closely with the preceding, (*σπεύδομεν*) δὲ ἐπικραίνειν ἀτέλειαν θεῶν ἐμαῖσι λιταῖς, but this offers no satisfactory meaning: ἀτέλεια, *immunity*, is inapplicable to the position of the gods in the matter, and ἐπικραίνειν to that of the Erinyes, who never pretend to be the superior power. Moreover τε (rather than δέ) would then be the conjunction required.—*els* Pauw, but the correspondence of short and long *in these* is not uncommon.

366—368. *Zeds*: but see *vv.* 92, 720. The assertion, to the extent required, is not true, but is assumed by the Erinyes, as calculated to impress an Olympian opponent. What is the precise position and view of Zeus in these matters, Aeschylus, for good reasons, never declares, just as he does not produce the Supreme Father in person.—*ἔθνος τόδε*: 'this kind, sort', the Latin *patris*. τὸ τῶν φονέων schol.—On the metre see App. II.—As to the insertion here of the *epithymium* or burden, ἀνατροπὰς κ.τ.λ., see on *v.* 355.

369—383. From the gods they turn to men (*ἀνδρῶν*). The proud citizens, as well as their patroness, will do well to consider, before putting themselves in the way of the Erinyes. Here they are not far from the sentiment of the poet himself, whose very patriotism, in one of his

temper, must have made him regard with anxiety some of the high-handed proceedings of the imperial city.

369. καὶ μάλα(α)...σεμναί: 'Ay, the proudest that there are beneath the sky.'

372. ἡμετέροις ἐφόδοις: 'at our passing over them'.

373. ἐπιφθόνους (Heath): 'bringing jealousy, *nemesis*'.

374—378. ἀνέκαθεν Pearson.—μάλα (with ἀνέκαθεν, 'from very far above') replies, as indicated by γὰρ οὖν, to the preceding μάλα in *v.* 369. If pride is high, for all that, vengeance, to crush it, leaps down from far higher.—βαρυπετῆ Blaydes, as in προπετῆς, χαμαιπετῆς etc., perhaps rightly.—σφαλερὰ ταυυδρόμοις κῶλα: 'limbs that can trip the longest runner', if escape is attempted. It seems smoother to take κῶλα in apposition to ποδὸς ἀκμάν, than to make (as Wecklein) σφαλερὰ...κῶλα a parenthesis; though certainly the apposition is loose.—On the metre see Appendix II.

379—382. The pride, which leads a man into transgression, also prevents him from profiting by chastisement. His sin is, as it were, a darkness about him, and he seems, as men sadly say, to dwell in a mist.—πίπτων: note the tense, 'when he begins to fall'.—οὐκ οἶδεν τόδε: he cannot see that his disasters are the work of irresistible *nemesis*, and he goes on to his doom.—τοῖον (for τοῖον γὰρ, Turnebus) 'such as to have this effect'. The conjunction, excluded by the metre, is also contrary to the idiom in such clauses,

τοῖον ἐπὶ κνέφας ἀνδρὶ μύσος πεπόταται, 380
καὶ δυοφεράν τιν' ἀχλὺν κατὰ δώματος
αὐδάται πολύστονος φάτις.

< μάλα γὰρ οὖν ἀλομένα
ἀνέκαθεν βαρυπεσῆ
καταφέρω πόδος ἀκμάν,
σφαλερὰ τανυδρόμοις
κῶλα, δύσφορον ἄταν. >

μένει γάρ. εὐμήχανοί 8τρ. δ.
τε καὶ τέλειοι, κακῶν 385

τε μνήμονες, σεμναὶ
καὶ δυσπαρήγοροι βροτοῖς,
ἄτιμ' ἀτίετα διέπομεν
λάχη θεῶν διχοστατοῦντ'
ἀνηλίφ λάπα, δυσμοδοπαίπαλα 390
δερκομένοισι καὶ δυσομμάτοις ὁμῶς.

τίς οὖν τὰδ' οὐχ ἄζεται 8αντ. δ.
τε καὶ δέδοικεν βροτῶν,
ἐμοῦ κλύων θεσμὸν

380. τοῖον γὰρ ἐπὶ. 385. δέ. 388. ἀτίετα διόμεναι.
390. λαμπαι δυσοδοπαίπαλα. 392. οὐχάζεται. 393. δέδοικε.

which, as in Latin, are regularly *asyndeta*. Constr. τοῖον κνέφας ('as such a darkness, so darkeningly') μύσος ἐπιπεπόταται ἀνδρὶ: grammatically τοῖον κνέφας is in apposition to μύσος.—'Rumour says, with a deep sigh, that there is, as it were (τινα), an obscuring mist over his house.'—αὐδάται. I think (see on *Theb.* 665) that this verb here is not, properly speaking, deponent; in translating into English indeed it is natural to make it so, and to personify φάτις, but according to the Greek the φάτις 'is spoken'. The accusative makes no difficulty; if αὐδῶ φάτιν ἀχλὺν 'I tell a rumour of a mist' is correct, which no one doubts, then φάτις αὐδάται (pass.) ἀχλὺν, 'a rumour is told of a mist', is, by the general law of Greek, equally so. That αὐδῶμαι ἀχλὺν 'I tell of a mist' is correct, has yet to be proved. But the note on

Theb. 665 is incorrect in denying a deponent use of αὐδῶμαι, and not exact in reference to the present example; see also on *Cho.* 151.—πολύστονος. This note of sympathy with the regrets of mankind over the errors of falling greatness belongs rather to the poet than to the speakers. The careers and fates of those who founded the greatness of Athens, Miltiades for example, and more recently Themistocles, had offered only too much occasion for such moralizing. That πολύστονος does indicate *lament*, and not merely indignation against outrage, we must assume from the general use of στένω and its cognates.—As to the insertion here of the *epheumnia* or burden, μάλα κ.τ.λ., see on *v.* 355.

384—399. The last pair of *strophæ* have no burden, doubtless because the whole of them were sung, like the burdens,

wits. In cloud so dark doth his guilt hover over him, and rumour sighing tells how a mist, as it were, of gloom doth cover his house.

For with a leap *etc.*

For so it stands. Skilled to devise and sure to accomplish, and never forgetting sin, unapproachable by human plea, we do an office misprised of gods, misesteemed of them, and from them sundered by sunless mirk,—a twilight, rugged way for the seeing eye alike and for the blind.

What mortal, then, at this feels not awe and fear, hearing what legal power the gods have given and fate confirmed to us

by the full chorus instead of semi-chorus.

384—391. μένει: *it is established*, the law of their being and rights, as summed up in what follows.—εὐμήχανοί...τέλειοι: as well able as sure to accomplish our purposes.—κακῶν, *evil deeds*.—σεμναί...βροτοῖς: 'unbending to supplication of man': σεμναί here has no connexion with the title (*v.* 1042) which they are to assume after their transformation, and has a different sense (*haughty*, not *revered*).—ἀτίετα Canter, διέπομεν Heath. The MS. readings ἀτίετα and διέομεναι are probably connected in origin, arising both from a marginal αι, referring to ἀτίετα: the annotator, objecting to ἀτίετα as tautologous (but see *v.* 354), proposed to transfer ἀτίετα to the subject, and the annotation was applied in the right place (making ἀτίετα), but also attached itself to the last word, making it unmetrical (διεπόμεναι) and thus driving out one of its syllables. Similar phenomena occur elsewhere, see on *v.* 390.—διάνομεν (*ἄνω accomplish*) is also possible, and perhaps more liable to be perverted, ἄνω being rare and the false division δια-νομεν obvious. A verb is necessary, an 'ellipse of ἐόμεν' (schol.) being indefensible.—λάχη...λάπα: 'a function wide-sundered from the divine by a sunless mirk'. λάπα Wieseler.—θεῶν: the ἀθάνατοι of *v.* 349 foll.—ἀνηλίω λάπα: not because their dwelling-place is the underworld, though this is part of the

suggestion, but because their whole relations with man are connected not, like those of the θεοί, with illumination and gladness, but with darkness and obscurity both of soul and of fortune: see the preceding *strophæ*, and the words that follow.—δυσμ-οδο-παίπαλα (so to be divided) κ.τ.λ.: 'where the seeing eye, and the darkened alike, find a rough and twilight way.' That the power extends over living and dead (see *v.* 323) is part of what is conveyed by this impressive symbol, but not all. The point is, that under the malign influence of the Erinyes (see *v.* 379 foll.) the living sinner walks already overcast with the same shades into which he finally passes for ever. Living and dying, he is as helpless as one who travels a difficult path at night-fall (δυσμή, pursuing the idea of ἀνηλίω).—I offer δυσμοδοπαίπαλα as a restoration of the metre (see *v.* 398 and Appendix II.), in preference to δυσπορο-, δυσποδο-, and other suggestions, on the ground that there is some actual evidence for it. That the word was liable to be mistaken for a compound of δυσ- is manifest. Hence the omission of μ. This letter a corrector noted, for re-insertion, in the margin; and thence it has been transferred to λάπα, making the MS. λάμπα, an error equally natural, since there actually was such a word as λάμπα (*shine*). For the triple compound cf. θεοστυρωπός (*Cho.* 734), etc.

392. οὐχ ἄζεται Turnebus.

τὸν μοιρόκραντον ἐκ θεῶν
δοθέντα τέλεον; ἔπι δέ μοι
γέρας <πάλαι> παλαιόν, οὐδ'
ἀτιμίας κυρῶ, καίπερ ὑπὸ χθόνα
τάξιν ἔχουσα καὶ δυσήλιον κνέφας.

395

ΑΘΑΝΑ.

πρόσωθεν ἐξήκουσα κληδόνος βοήν
ἀπὸ Σκαμάνδρου, γῆν καταφθατουμένην,
ἣν δῆτ' Ἀχαιῶν ἄκτορές τε καὶ πρόμοι,
τῶν αἰχμαλώτων χρημάτων λάχος μέγα,
ἔνειμαν αὐτόπρεμνον εἰς τὸ πᾶν ἐμοί,
ἐξάϊρετον δῶρημα Θησέως τόκοις.

400

405

401. τὴν καταφθατουμένην.

395. τὸν...τέλεον: 'which was finally given and confirmed to me by destiny from gods', *i.e.* the elder gods, whose disposition (it is assumed) the new dynasty should confirm.

396. ἔπι: *i.e.* (if it is right) *ἔπεισι* (schol.), 'it is fixed, destined for me': see on *Ag.* 552. But *ἔπι* (Hermann) is not unlikely.

397. *πάλαι παλαιόν* Wieseler, perhaps rather *παλαιπαλαιόν*. The re-inforcement of the idea by repetition is characteristic of the ode (*παρακοπὰ παραφορά, ἀμοιρος ἄκληρος, ἀτιμ' ἀτίετα*).—*μένει γέρας παλαιόν* Hermann.

398. With ms. reading, constr. *ἐχουσα τάξιν ὑπὸ-χθόνα-καὶ-δυσήλιον-κνέφας*.—But *quaere*, should we not read *ὑπὸχθονα*, adj., *subterranean*? This gives a simpler arrangement of words, and removes the objection, that *τάξιν ὑπὸ χθονός* (or *χθονί*) would be expected, rather than the accusative *χθόνα*.

400—492. Athena arrives, and after questioning both the parties, decides that the issue must be referred to a jury of Athenian citizens, and that the court so formed shall be a permanent institution for the future.—As to the manner of her

appearance, and the means by which she is supposed to have come, see on *vv.* 406 foll.: it appears probable that she simply enters, by one of the *πάροδοι*, like the other personages.

401. *γῆν καταφθατουμένην* (Stanley): 'where I was taking possession of a vacant land', literally, 'taking to myself by first occupancy': *κατάφθατος* (*γη*) and *καταφθατόμαι* (rather than *καταφθατέομαι* as L. and Sc.) describe, according to etymology (*φθά-νω*), the right of the first comer, such as the ancient Hellenic and modern European colonists claimed in countries not populated, or populated only by 'savages'. The reason why the term is applied here to the territory of Troy is that the Achaeans had utterly and literally destroyed that *πόλις*, both people and city (*Ag.* 369 foll., 529 foll., 801 foll., etc.), so that what came to Athena by their 'gift' (see below) was the bare land, out of which (as from the stump of a felled tree, see *v.* 404) a new settlement might grow.—If, as is generally and (I think) rightly supposed, a lapse of something like ten years separates this scene from the end of the Trojan war, the word *καταφθατουμένην* (*φθάνω*) is not

once for all? From old, old time it is our appointed privilege; our place is beneath the ground, our darkness barred from the sun, but our office above contempt.

Enter ATHENA.

Athena. A cry of appeal came to mine ear far away by Scamander, where I was taking occupancy of a vacant land, which the Achaean chiefs and leaders 'assigned', of their grace, to *me*, for a mighty share of the wealth their spear had won, in bare and full possession,—a special guerdon given to Theseus'

applicable to an 'occupation' so leisurely. Prof. Seymour (see on *v.* 234) adduces this in favour of his view that the whole action of the *Oresteia* is brief, a few days. But the use of the word, like all this passage (see following note), is merely ironical. The title of Athena to the Troad does not, in her view, depend on 'gift' or 'occupancy' at all. Her real meaning is, that she has been just now engaged there, because the place is, *and always was*, one of her possessions.

402—405. 'Which the Achaean leaders and princes, *as they say*, assigned, for a mighty portion of the wealth their spear had won, stock and base, entirely unto *me*, a gift select for the children of Theseus.' She adopts the donors' view of their liberality, but not without irony (*δῆρα*). The universal *recognition* of her rights in the Troad, and therefore those of Athens, is carried up to the Trojan war—a respectable antiquity; but the rights themselves, according to her representation, by no means flowed from the destruction of Troy, which, considering that in the *Agamemnon* it is treated as an extreme wickedness and a principal cause of punishment, would have been an origin highly unsatisfactory. The citadel of Troy, with all its appurtenances, belonged to 'Tritonian Pallas' (Verg. *Aen.* 2. 226, 615), as truly as the Acropolis of Athens. And though we are doubtless to assume (with Orestes, *inf.* 460) that Athena permitted the punishment of the Trojans, she does not here either approve the sacrilegious destruction of the city, or derive

her rights there from the destroyers. On the contrary, she comments, with some keenness, on the generosity of awarding *to her* (*ἐμοί*), 'stem and all', the bare stump of her own tree, which they had cut down. The figure *νέμειν αὐτόπρεμον*, which lends itself naturally to the double suggestion, is borrowed from the species of property chiefly important in Attica, olive-trees; and it could hardly fail, in this connexion, to remind Athenian hearers of *the tree*, the olive of the Acropolis, destroyed by the Persians, though marvellously afterwards resuscitated. The Persian crime and the Achaean had already been paralleled in the trilogy, and illustrated by a figure resembling *αὐτόπρεμων* here (see on *Ag.* 532).—**Θησέως τόκοις**: "Akamas and Demophon, who were recognised in the Epos, but not until after Homer, as having taken part in the Trojan war. This was stated in the *Iliad* Μικρά of Lesches; cf. Paus. x. 25. 8" (Wecklein). Aeschylus, we may observe, would probably have cited 'Lesches' as 'Homer'; but this is no place for the Homeric question.—Successive Athenian governments had, since the early part of the sixth century, claimed or held possessions in the Troad, with the town of Sigeum; and probably they were in the hands of Athens at this time, though the schol. here says that Aeschylus is urging the recovery of them (*εἰς τὸ ἀντρέχσθαι πάλιν Σιγέλου*). There was a legend (Strabo 13, § 38) that Sigeum had been built with stones brought from the site of Troy: if the legend was known

ἐνθεν διώκουσ' ἦλθον ἄτρυτον πόδα,
 πτερῶν ἄτερ ροιβδοῦσα κόλπον αἰγίδος,
 πῶλοις ἀκμαίοις τόνδ' ἐπιζεύξασ' ὄχον.

καὶ νῦν δ' ὀρώσα τήνδ' ὀμιλίαν χθονὸς
 ταρβῶ μὲν οὐδέν, θαῦμα δ' ὄμμασιν πάρα. 410

τίνες ποτ' ἐστέ; πᾶσι δ' ἐς κοινὸν λέγω,
 βρέτας τε τοῦμὸν τῶδ' ἐφημένῳ ξένῳ,
 ὑμᾶς θ' ὀμοίας οὐδενὶ σπαρτῶν γένει,
 οὗτ' ἐν θέαισι πρὸς θεῶν ὀρωμέναις
 οὗτ' οὖν βροτείοις ἐμφερεῖς μορφώμασιν. 415
 λέγειν δ' ἄμορφον ὄντα τοὺς πέλας κακῶς,
 πρόσω δικαίων ἦδ' ἀποστατεῖ θέμις.

417. ἦδ'. ἦδ' recc.

at Athens and in the time of Aeschylus, his words gain a point, since the Athenian town was thus actually the Ilian 'tree' raised up, and might claim the rights of the ancient capital. That the building was done (Strabo *l.c.*) by a citizen of Mitylene, the rival of Athens in this region, was (we may presume) not a part of the Athenian version.

406—408. No quite satisfactory explanation of this has been given, nor can I offer one. (1) The first two verses, taken alone, give the impression that the goddess *flew* or *sailed* through the air, using instead of wings the *aegis*, the typical mantle which she wore about her shoulders, ὡς ἀρμένῳ χρωμένῃ τῇ αἰγίδι (schol.). Not that this interpretation is absolutely necessary, for it depends on our presuming a connexion between *without wings* and *making my wind-filled aegis sound (upon the air)*, and it is possible not to connect them. But *prima facie* this is the meaning: and so Hermann, with perhaps a majority. On the other hand (2) πῶλοις...ὄχον, with at least equal plainness, suggests *prima facie* a car with horses (O. Müller and others), which would dispense with the supposed use of the aegis, and make rather pointless the words *speeding an un-*

worn foot. If we allow, in favour of (1), that the aegis itself may be the ὄχος, as 'carrying' the goddess though she did not ride upon it, it is not easy to say what is indicated, metaphorically, by the *steeds*, to which the ὄχος is yoked; nor is there anything in the words to show that these πῶλοι are metaphorical. (The question, whether the car, if car there be, is shown to the audience, may be put aside: τόνδε would not require this, but would be satisfied, as in *Cho.* 559, if Athena pointed off the stage to the place where she has just alighted.)—Emendation has not helped. Paley suggests that *v.* 407 and *v.* 408 are alternatives, and perhaps one of them spurious; but this, even if probable, does not clear the case. Hermann adopts κῶλοις (Wakefield), so that the aegis (as car) is yoked or bound to the 'arms' of the goddess (as steeds); but this is not happy. It is preferable, if we pursue this line of interpretation, to suppose that the expression πῶλοι is itself applied, metaphorically, to the arms.—πνόις (for πῶλοις), οὐκ for τόνδ', and other proposed changes are not entertainable.—It may be guessed that the explanation (as in *v.* 294) depends upon some type, then familiar but now lost, in art or literature; but on the present

sons. Thence came I, speeding an unfretted foot, without wing, making my swollen aegis sound on the air, having yoked this carriage to steeds of prime.

And now that I see what visitors Athens hath, the sight astonishes me, though it not dismays. In wonder's name, who are ye? I ask it of all,—of him, whose place, at mine image claims me his friend, and you, not like to aught begotten of seed, not aught among all that eyes of gods behold,...nor yet resembling forms of man....But that, because one lacks beauty, his neighbour should speak him ill,—that is an equity far from the righteous mind.

evidence the language cannot, I think, be interpreted without some unprovable assumption.—**ἄφρυτον** recalls the goddess' title ³**Ἄφρυτώνη** (Wecklein).—**κόλπον** (**αἰγίθος**), *sinu* (aegidis), not because the robe made a **κόλπος** (*curve*) over the bosom of the goddess, but because, in her flight, it was blown into a **κόλπος**, like that of a sail.

409. **καὶ νῦν δ' ὀρώσα** is opposed to **πρόσωθεν ἐξήκουσα** in *v.* 400. When she heard the cry from Athens for help, she was surprised, and, so far as such a feeling was possible to her, alarmed, lest some harm might have been done, or be done before she arrived; and now also that she is on the spot, her eyes perceive what, though it does not terrify, certainly does astonish.—**καινήν** Canter, but without need.—**ὄμιλλαν**: collective for plural, 'visitors of the land', as in *vv.* 714, 1031.

412. Constr. *ἐφημένῳ βρέτας*.

413. **ὕμῃς τε** (*λέγω*): 'and I also mean (speak of) you'; the verb is borrowed from the preceding, with a slight change of construction.—**σπαρτῶν**: *τῶν σπειρομένων* schol. 'creatures begotten'. Cf. *v.* 57 *τὸ φῶλον οὐκ ὄπωπα τῆσδ' ὄμιλλας*.

414, 415: '...not in that world which the eyes of gods behold, nor yet like forms of mortal kind.' The two clauses are not precisely parallel, but varied, as in *ξένῳ...ὕμῃς τε* just above. The first pursues the lead of *οὐδενὶ σπαρτῶν γένει* (not to any kind in the world seen by gods); the second, in that in strict paral-

lelism would be 'nor in the sphere of mortal sight', takes up instead the sense of *ὄμιλλας*.—**θεαῖσι**: *ea quae spectantur*, from *θεά* object of sight (Wieseler, changing also *ἐν* to *οὖν*). The ms. has the accentuation *θεαῖσι*, 'among goddesses whom gods behold', but this is not apt, and the change of *ὄρωμένας* to *ὄρωμένας* (Stanley) will not make it so. The specification of goddesses is not to the purpose: the world of the gods included many creatures, who were not 'goddesses', and with whom, rather than with any goddess, the Erinyes, though dissimilar, might be compared. The Gorgons for example (*v.* 48) were *θεαὶ* *πρὸς θεῶν ὀρώμεναι*, but not *θεαί*.

416, 417. 'But that, because one lacks beauty, his neighbours should speak him ill,—that is an equity far from the mind of the just.' She reminds herself of her duty, and checks the expression of her disgust.—**ἦδε**: the pronoun resumes *λέγω κακῶς*, but is adapted, as often, to the fem. predicate.—**θέμις** might here have the archaic sense *custom, practice*; but the usual Aeschylean sense, *right*, gives a better point. It is in a certain sense 'fair' to tax a person with corporeal defects, which he actually has; but such 'justice' is not good enough for Athena. Contrast the behaviour of Apollo (*v.* 192), to whom Athena is everywhere conspicuously superior. Neither of them fulfils the Aeschylean conception of a God, any more than

- ΧΟ. πεύσει τὰ πάντα συντόμως, Διὸς κόρη.
 ἡμεῖς γάρ ἐσμεν Νυκτὸς αἰανῆ τέκνα.
 Ἄραϊ δ' ἐν οἴκοις γῆς ὑπαὶ κεκλήμεθα. 420
- ΑΘ. γένος μὲν οἶδα κληδόνας τ' ἐπωνύμους.
- ΧΟ. τιμάς γε μὲν δὴ τὰς ἐμὰς πεύσει τάχα.
- ΑΘ. μάθοιμ' ἄν, εἰ λέγοι τις ἐμφανῆ λόγον.
- ΧΟ. βροτοκτονοῦντας ἐκ δόμων ἐλαύνομεν.
- ΑΘ. καὶ τῷ κτανόντι ποῦ τὸ τέρμα τῆς φγγῆς; 425
- ΧΟ. ὅπου τὸ χαίρειν μηδαμοῦ νομίζεται.
- ΑΘ. ἦ καὶ τοιαύτας τῷδ' ἐπιρροίζει φυγάς;
- ΧΟ. φονεὺς γὰρ εἶναι μητρὸς ἠξιώσατο.
- ΑΘ. ἄλλης ἀνάγκης οὔτινος τρέων κότον;
- ΧΟ. ποῦ γὰρ τοσοῦτο κέντρον ὡς μητροκτονεῖν; 430

420. ἀρά. Ἄραϊ recc.

425. τοῦτο...σφαγῆσ.

427. ἐπιρροίζει*

Michael or Raphael fulfils Milton's conception. But the theology of Athens, such as it was, pleased the Athenian prophet better at any rate than that of Delphi, which, even with the boldest remodelling, barely escapes his disapprobation.—With ἡδ' (M), we must supply *ἔστι* to *πρὸσω δικαίων*, but, apart from any question as to the limits of ἡδέ (*and*) in Aeschylus (see on *v.* 188), this produces a tautology.—*τὸν* (for *τοὺς*) Heath.

419. *αἰανῆ*: *eternal*, as in *v.* 575; they assert their divine, or at least non-mortal, quality, answering so far the question left open by Athena in *vv.* 414, 415.—The rendering *gravis, terrible* (Dindorf), is doubtful. If *αἰανῆς* has any sense in Aeschylus except *eternal* and slight modifications of it (which is not certain), the alternative is *woeful, miserable*; but that is not applicable here. See on *v.* 482.

420. Ἄραϊ (recc.): *Dirae, The Spirits of the Curse*, because their power was evoked by the curse of the injured, of which indeed the Erinyes was, in part, a personification. See the Introduction.—Note that their 'name at home', their divine name, as compared with *Erinyes*

(*v.* 332), is the more significant and explains its purport, whereas Ἐρινύς, to the ear of the average Greek, had probably ceased to have any connotation. The latter name they here imply by contrast, and should in strictness specify, though the omission is a natural liberty of art.

421. οἶδα μὲν implies that she waits for more, noting (οἶδα) what has been told. Her calmness is far from pleasing to the interlocutor, who expected the preceding announcement to produce more impression.—*κληδόνας*: here in the sense of *καλέω name, τὰ ὄνματα τὰ ἐφ' ἑμῶν ὀνομαζόμενα, ἃ καλεῖσθε*.

422. Literally, 'Yes, my function—of that indeed (δῆ) thou shalt be informed forthwith.' γε μὲν answers the hint of Athena (see preceding note). There is more to come, there is their office, which they proclaim with eager pride.

423. 'I can understand whatever is plainly told', *i.e.* 'If I do not receive the information forthwith (τάχα), it will be the fault of the telling.' She maintains, under courteous forms, her attitude of superiority.

424. ἐκ δόμων: not 'from their homes' but 'from houses', from dwelling-places

Erinyes. Thou shalt learn the whole in brief, Daughter of Zeus. For us, we are the Eternal Children of Night, the *Araï*, powers of the curse, so named in our home below.

Ath. Ye have told me now your birth, and the name, whereby ye are called,...

Erin. Ay, and mine office, that shalt thou learn with speed.

Ath. I can understand whatever is plainly told.

Erin. We hunt man-slayers out of dwelling-places.

Ath. And the slayer's flight,—where is the end of it?

Erin. There, where there is no use for the word of joy.

Ath. And would thy clamour indeed pursue yon fugitive even to that?

Erin. Ay, for he dared to be his mother's murderer.

Ath. Was there not a compelling power, whose wrath he feared?

Erin. Where is the strong spur, that should compel to such a deed?

of men generally (see *v.* 210). Hence the next question and answer, 'Where is the exile to end?', 'To end? Only where all joy ends.'—**βροτοκτονούντας**: 'destroyers of (human) life'. The largeness of the description is consistent with the language of this play generally (*e.g.* 317 foll., 337 foll.), and should not be abridged, out of respect to casual and inconsistent limitations, such as *v.* 212. The limitation **αὐτοκτονούντας** (*wilful* destroyers, as some would read here) is doubtless intended, but may be understood; **μητροκτονούντας** (as others) is not inadmissible, as a reference to the particular case of Orestes (see *v.* 210); but the more comprehensive term better fits the present situation. In *v.* 210, they speak to one (Ἄπολλο) who knows the story of Orestes; Athena, as yet, knows nothing of it.

425. **ποῦ τὸ** Auratus.—**φυγῆς** Scaliger.

426. 'There where the laws allow no place for joy.' **μηδαμοῦ** may be joined either with **τὸ χαλεπὸν** or with **νομίξεται**. If with **νομίξεται** (which I prefer), it is still right that the negative should be **μή**, not

οὐ, as in Latin the mood of the verb would be subjunctive,—'is terminus est, ubi nusquam *sit* usus laetitiae'—, because the definition is in form general, marking what *is to be* the character of the final place.

427. **ἦ καὶ** emphasizes both **τοιαύτας** and **τῷ δε**.—**τοιαύτας**, *such*, 'flight (exile) with no limit but that'.—**ἐπιρροῦξείς** (Scaliger): **ἐπιβοῶς**, 'force on him with hue and cry'.—The equity of Athena is at once revolted both by the indefinite cruelty of the punishment, and the ferocious manner of execution.

429. 'Was there not some *external* power, whose wrath he feared?' **ἄλλης** contrasts **ἀνάγκη** with the **ἀξίωσις** (*choice* *v.* 428) of the agent himself. To complete the grammar, supply **ἐφόνευε** from **φόνεὺς εἶναι**.

430. 'Where is the spur so strong that it should compel to such a deed?' **ὤς**: **ὥστε**. They evade the question, not choosing to recognize the part of Apollo.

AΘ. δυοῖν παρόντων ἡμισυς λόγου πάρα.

XO. ἀλλ' ὄρκον οὐ δέξαιτ' ἄν, οὐ δοῦναι θέλει.

AΘ. κλύειν δικαίους μᾶλλον ἢ πράξει θέλεις.

XO. πῶς δῆ; δίδαξον· τῶν σοφῶν γὰρ οὐ πένει.

AΘ. ὄρκοις τὰ μὴ δίκαια μὴ νικᾶν λέγω.

435

XO. ἀλλ' ἐξέλεγχε, κρῖνε δ' εὐθείαν δίκην.

AΘ. ἦ καὶ ἐμοὶ τρέποιτ' ἄν αἰτίας τέλος;

XO. πῶς δ' οὔ; σέβουσαί γ' ἀξίαν ἢ ἀπ' ἀξίων.

AΘ. τί πρὸς τὰδ' εἰπέιν, ὦ ξέν', ἐν μέρει θέλεις;
λέξας δὲ χῶραν καὶ γένος καὶ ξυμφορὰς

440

433. In *δικαίους* the *ου* is written on an erasure, and above it *·ω·* (for *δικαίως*) is written by *m.* 438. *ἀξίαν τ' ἐπαξίων.*

431. She turns to Orestes.—*ἡμισυς λόγου*: ὁ ἡμισυς τοῦ λόγου, 'one half (side) of the story.'

432. 'Nay, but the oath,—he cannot accept it, will not tender it.' Seeing that Athena is not to be overborne, the respondent now tries to put her objection to the detested *ἀνάκρισις* (*v.* 365) in a form which, as she supposes, will appeal to the legal spirit. The defendant should be challenged to 'deny the fact' on oath, as they themselves are ready, if he pleases, to assert it; if Orestes refuses, as of course he must, the case should end. The purgatory oath was an ancient Greek institution (see the *Laws of Gortyn, Greek Antiquities*, Gardner and Jevons, p. 571) and was used at Athens (*πρόκλησις εἰς ὄρκον*) in appropriate cases, murder included. To propose such an abuse or it, as the Erinyes here suggest, would probably have been too much, in the fifth century, for any Athenian. But in ruder times and places, such justice may well have been awarded to outcasts stigmatized by superstition as 'under the ban of the fiends', partly from a confused notion that they were not oathworthy. They could not be tried; they belonged to the pursuer. Even the tribunals of the Athenian empire may have heard the plea, or such like pleas, in cases coming, like that of Orestes, from abroad.

433. 'The *justice* you recommend prefers the name to the thing': literally, 'You would have one be just in name rather than act with justice.' The subject of *δικαίους* is grammatically the indefinite, 'people', in effect Athena herself. *κλύειν*: *καλεῖσθαι*. With *πράξει* supply *δικαίους*: cf. (*πράσσοσαν*) *ἠσυχαιτέραν v.* 223.—*δικαίως m.*, *δίκαιος* Dindorf, but the reading of *M* is better. What provokes the severity of the goddess is the implied attribution of such justice to her.

434. *τῶν σοφῶν*: *subtleties*, τὰ σοφά.

435. 'My meaning is that oaths must not give victory to what is not just,' true (moral) justice depending not merely on the fact but on the circumstances. *μὴ*: prohibitive.—See further on *v.* 486.

436. 'Question (him) then, but let your justice be *direct*.' *Εὐθυδικία* (here *εὐθεία δίκη*) was the position of a cause in which 'issue was joined *directly*' (if we may borrow the phrase), without any preliminary objection against the admissibility or the form. It signifies therefore that the Erinyes withdraws her objection. But *κρῖνε δ' εὐθείαν δίκην* is not a mere repetition of *ἐξέλεγχε*. The prosecutors' conception of 'justice direct' (and *fair*, for the word has both meanings) is exactly contrary: in the view of the Erinyes (see *v.* 312) the *ἀνάκρισις* itself (note *κρῖνε*) is the cavil, the unfair im-

Ath. There are two parties here, and only the one hath spoken.

Erin. Nay, but the oath! He will not take or tender it.

Ath. Thou wouldst have one be just in name instead of in deed.

Erin. How so? Explain. In subtlety thou art not poor.

Ath. I will not that an oath should give victory to wrong.

Erin. Question him then,...but let thy justice be 'direct'.

Ath. Would ye verily entrust to me the issue of the charge?

Erin. How should we not,...for respect, for thy fit nobility?

Ath. What reply, my friend, wouldst thou make in thy turn to this? But tell me first thy country, birth, and story, and then

pediment, and they call it *εὐθείαν* with bitterness.

437. 'Will you verily and indeed permit me to deal finally with the charge?' By taking their concession in a large sense, she assumes control, under a polite form, of the whole cause.—Constr. *ἐπιτρέπουτε ἂν ἐμοί*.

438. *πῶς δ' οὐ*; 'How should we not?' 'Of course': conveniently ambiguous between 'What else could I wish?' and 'What else can I do?'. Since Athena, it is clear, will not give up Orestes untried, they bow to *force majeure*, and attempt to propitiate her by a personal compliment. — *σέβουσαι* κ.τ.λ.: 'for reverence, for thy noble quality'. *ἀξίων οὖσαν γονέων* (*i.e.* *ἀξίαν ἀπ' ἀξίων οὖσαν γονέων*) schol. The function, which Athena assumes, in summoning and presiding over the Areopagus, is that of the *archon basileus* (see Gilbert, *Constitutional Antiquities*, p. 253 Eng. transl.). Birth, as a qualification for office, had at Athens, even in the democratic age and as matter of law, a great importance. And this particular office was such in its character and association, that, so long as it was elective, good birth, and even high birth, must have been practically indispensable qualifications. The change, which exposed it, with the rest of the archonships, within certain limits to the chance of the

lot, was but recent (about B.C. 487 apparently). It is therefore natural that, in introducing the first 'president of the Areopagus', Aeschylus should lay this stress upon her nobility as *Διὸς κόρη*.—*γε...γε*, which in English cannot be represented without cumbrousness, emphasize the point that they admit *only* her personal claim: none is more worthy to be judge, *if judge there must be*. The repetition of *γε*, which was approved by Hermann, seems effective, and not unnatural, if we suppose a slight pause after *σέβουσαι γε*. But the evidence for the second *γε* (the *τ* of the ms., pointing to *γ*) is not conclusive, and some would omit it.—*ἀξίαν ἀπ' ἀξίων*: 'deriving worthiness from worthy', *i.e.* worthy by heredity. The adj. is treated, as the schol. indicates, like a participle; see *v.* 444, and on *Ag.* 726. The plural describes, according to rule, the worthy parent regarded as such, and does not imply, in the case of Athena, a plurality of 'ancestors' or even of 'parents'. She had of course only a father.—*ἀπ' ἀξίων*: Stanley, upon the suggestion of the schol.: the first letter seems to have been driven out by the writing in full of *γε* (now *τε*). The reading is not certain, but no better has been suggested, and the general sense at least seems plain.

τὰς σάς, ἔπειτα τόνδ' ἀμυναθοῦ ψόγον.—
εἶπερ πεποιθὼς τῇ δίκη βρέτας τόδε
ἦσαι φυλάσσων ἐστίας ἀμῆς πέλας,
σεμνὸς προσίκτωρ ἐν τρόποις Ἰξίωνος.
τούτοις ἀμείβου πᾶσιν εὐμαθὲς τί μοι.

445

OP. ἄνασσ' Ἀθάνα, πρῶτον ἐκ τῶν ὑστάτων
τῶν σῶν ἐπῶν μέλημ' ἀφαιρήσω μέγα.
οὐκ εἰμι προστρόπαιος, οὐδ' ἐκεῖ μύσος
[πρὸς χειρὶ τῆμῃ τὸ σὸν ἐφεξομένη βρέτας].
τεκμήριον δὲ τῶνδὲ σοι λέξω μέγα.

450

448. προτροπαιος corrected by m.

448, 449. ἔχει...ἐφεξομένη.

441. τόνδε (M): *the present charge.*
τῶνδε (of the Erinyes) the later MSS.

442—444. The sense is—'Provided that, before thus committing yourself to the protection of our sanctuary, you have duly obtained religious purification.' The predicate of the sentence is *σεμνὸς* (ὦν) *προσίκτωρ*.—*βρέτας* depends on the compound phrase *ἦσαι φυλάσσων*, partly on *ἦσαι* for *ἐφήσαι* *sit at* (v. 412) and partly on *φυλάσσων* in the sense of 'keep to', 'abide by', as Hom. ε 208 *ἐνθάδε κ' αὐθι μένων παρ' ἐμοὶ τόδε δῶμα φυλάσσοις* (somewhat similar to *σφρα* v. 243).—*σεμνὸς ἐν τρόποις Ἰξίωνος* together: 'respected by religion after the custom derived from Ixion'. With *σεμνὸς*, 'entitled to religious respect', cf. v. 92. For the precedent of Ixion, see the schol. here, *ὃν τρόπον κάκεινος προσεκάθητο τῷ ναῶ τοῦ Διὸς καθαρισθησόμενος. πρῶτος γὰρ Ἰξίων φόνον ποιήσας ἐκαθαρίσθη ὑπὸ Διός*, and *inf.* v. 721. Pindar (*Pyth.* 2. 32) adds the qualification that Ixion's was the first case of kindred-murder 'with craft' (*i.e.* malicious or intentional), or of purgation from such murder: *ἐμφύλιον αἷμα πρῶτιστος οὐκ ἄτερ τέχνας ἐπέμιξε θνατοῖς*. 'A connection was felt between the name Ἰξίων and *ικ-*, the root of words of supplication; possibly even the origin of the story is, to be sought here' (Sidgwick). The myth is discussed in an article by Cecil Smith in *Classical*

Review IX. 277.—The words in the schol., *ὃν τρόπον κάκεινος προσεκάθητο τῷ ναῶ τοῦ Διὸς καθαρισθησόμενος*, if intended to suggest that the present action of Orestes is compared by Athena to that of Ixion seeking purification, are contrary to the sense. What Athena wishes to ascertain, before proceeding with her investigation, is that the appellant *is already* ceremonially clean, that he does *not* come for purification, but for justice; see his reply. If he had answered otherwise, she would, before holding further intercourse with him (see *vv.* 237, 287), either have performed the rite herself, as Apollo did, or directed him to procure it elsewhere. We may perhaps infer that, even in the fifth century, submission to these rites was imposed on those charged with homicide before the Areopagus, or at least that, in the judgment of religious and conservative persons like Aeschylus, it ought to have been.—*ἀμῆς*: *our* (not *my*), for dignity, and also because the sanctuary is that of Athens as well as of the goddess; see on *Theb.* 404. *ἐμῆς* *recc.*, and some modern texts: for which it may be said, that this is apparently the only example in the tragedians of *ἀμός* so used (in dialogue and in the feminine) as to require the 'Ionic' inflexion in *-η*, which is incongruous with the *α* in the stem (see v. 311). On the other hand, literary language is bound to be inconsistent in

defend thee against the present accusation ;—provided always, that, with right assured, thou hast taken thy suppliant place and watch at this image, hard by my hearth, an appellant entitled, after the manner of Ixion, to respect. To all these questions, I pray thee, give answer plain.

Or. Lady Athena, I will begin with thy last words, and will remove a weighty scruple. I am no suppliant for purgation ; and (*showing his hands and pointing to the image*) there is no pollution *there!* Of this I shall allege to thee weighty proof.

such matters, and an erroneous substitution of the rare ἀμῆς is not very probable.

447. μέλημα : *doubt, scruple.*

448. προστρόπαιος : an applicant for purification, as in *v.* 237.

448, 449. οὐδ' ἐκεῖ μύσος : 'and there is no uncleanness *there!*',—holding forth his hands, as he says the words, and pointing to the image which he has touched. Cf. *v.* 313, where the innocent man is described as καθαρὰς χεῖρας προνέμων, 'one who holds forth clean hands'. For the application of the purge to *the hands*, see on *v.* 42.—πρὸς χειρὶ κ.τ.λ. : 'upon my hand, as suppliant at thine image': an explanation of ἐκεῖ, added to make the text, without stage-directions, intelligible to a reader. The metre, having an anapaest in the fifth foot (as well as a rather rough dactyl in the third), shows the verse to be spurious, and probably of late origin. Moreover, though the personification of the hand is Aeschylean, the metaphor χεῖρ ἐφεζομένη is hardly so; Aeschylus would rather have written ἐφεζομένου.—For accidental confusion (ἔχει) of κ and χ, which is not unknown in M, see μυκὸν in *v.* 170. Here however the change may be intentional, the author of it supposing the construction to be μύσος ἔχει πρὸς χειρὶ, 'pollution holds to my hand'. The dropping of the ε in the dative (ἐφεζομένη) occurs also, and is hardly more than a matter of spelling.—I offer this solution as preferable, both technically and in the resulting sense, to shaping the whole οὐδὲ...βρέτας

into a sentence possible for Aeschylus. The best attempt is Wieseler's—οὐδ' ἔχων μύσος | πρὸς χειρὶ τῆμῃ τὸ σὸν ἐφεζόμεν βρέτας. But here neither of the supposed corruptions is probable, and the sentence drags.

450. 'And for this I shall cite you proof weighty (as the scruple itself).' μέγα echoes μέγα in *v.* 447.—He refers to the evidence hereafter given by Apollo as purgator (*vv.* 579—581). If and so long as the Areopagus required the rite, they presumably required formal proof of it.—It is usual (Paley, Wecklein, and others) to place a colon only at μέγα, as if the τεκμήριον were contained in what immediately follows, *vv.* 451—455. But surely the mere statement of the defendant, or even his oath, could be no proof at all of the point, much less a weighty proof. The sentence ἀφθογγον εἶναι κ.τ.λ. has no copula, not as explaining τεκμήριον, but because it is a repetition in positive form of what is stated negatively in *vv.* 448—450.—It is worth notice that the procedure represented by Aeschylus entirely ignores, both on this point and otherwise, the fundamental rule of Attic law, that the ἀνάκρισις was the proper and only stage for the production of evidence. On the contrary, all evidence is expressly deferred to the trial (*v.* 488), including, as is here specially noticed, evidence which, we might think, if required at all, must be required at the very earliest stage. At this time, however, the jury-system was in its infancy; and it would seem that the rule, if known, was

ἄφθογγον εἶναι τὸν παλαμναῖον νόμος,
 ἔστ' ἂν πρὸς ἀνδρὸς αἵματος καθαρσίῳ
 σφαγαὶ καθαιμάξωσι νεοθήλου βοτοῦ.
 πάλαι πρὸς ἄλλοις ταῦτ' ἀφιερῶμεθα
 οἴκοισι καὶ βοτοῖσι καὶ ῥυτοῖς πόροις. 455

ταύτην μὲν οὕτω φροντίδ' ἐκποδῶν λέγω·
 γένος δὲ τοῦμὸν ὡς ἔχει πείσει τάχα.
 Ἄργεῖός εἰμι, πατέρα δ' ἱστορεῖς καλῶς,
 Ἄγαμέμνον', ἀνδρῶν ναυβατῶν ἀρμόστορα,
 ξὺν ᾧ σὺ Τροίαν ἄπολιν Ἴλίου πόλιν 460
 ἔθηκας. ἔφθιθ' οὗτος οὐ καλῶς, μολῶν
 ἐς οἶκον, ἀλλὰ νιν κελαινόφρων ἐμῇ

453. καθαιμάξουσιν οθηλοῦ (ῥτ in margin).

461. οὔτως. οὗτος recc.

not applied to the Areopagus. As the position of the *basileus* in this court differed essentially (see hereafter) from the common relation between *εἰσαγωγεὺς* and *δικαστήριον*, such a difference of procedure is likely enough. As to evidence of purification, it may be suspected, from the prominence which Aeschylus gives to the matter, that the question, *when* it must or might be produced, was a moot point, upon which he makes such a precedent as he thought most proper, or most likely to please.

451—455. ἄφθογγον: excluded from converse.—ἔστ' ἂν: 'only until'.—πρὸς... καθαρσίῳ: *by the act of a person having power to cleanse from blood*; καθαρσίῳ agrees with ἀνδρὸς and governs αἵματος, as in *v.* 581 φόνου τοῦδ' ἐγὼ καθάρσιος. Thus taken, the words are not superfluous and need not be suspected. Not every person could grant or perform the purification, but only the master of a house and hearth, as is evident from the repeated specification of the οἶκοι, δῶμοι, and ἔστια in connexion with it (*vv.* 60, 64, 205 and *passim*). There may also have been other limitations.—καθαιμάξωσιν (*αὐτῶν*): 'shall have run upon him'.—νεοθήλου (Turnebus) βοτοῦ: in Orestes' case a *rig*, but by rule, as here appears, *any suckling*.

The notion probably was that the blood of the *suckling* was the purest animal-essence, so to speak, nearest therefore to the life-blood which was to be washed off, and most likely to assimilate and absorb it.—πάλαι...πόροις. 'Long ago I have been thus purged, upon the house, beast, and running stream of another.' For πρὸς see *προστετριμμένος* in *v.* 238. The expression is significant of the meaning and purpose, which Aeschylus, at any rate, attached to the ceremony. The blood of the slain, together with that of purification, is washed off with water of the house on to the soil (hearth) of the house, and mingled with the sources, the native earth and water, of the family life. The recipient family and community, by its head, thus expresses, in the most solemn and effective manner, its responsibility for the readmission of the received person into society. The inclusion of the animal, or its blood, among the things *to* which (as well as by which) the transference takes place, is intelligible. The blood, as an animal substance fed upon and derived from the recipient elements (the earth and water), is naturally adapted to permeate them.—It is possible to separate καὶ βοτοῖσι *κ. ρ. π.*, as instrumentals, from οἴκοισι: but this division obscures,

He, that hath done violence, is by law debarred from speech only until, by agency of one who hath power to purify from blood, the blood of a suckling victim be shed upon him. Long ago have I been thus made clean, upon another's house, and victim, and flowing stream.

Thus on the first point do I satisfy thee. For my birth, it shall be told thee without delay. I am of Argos; and my father, to whom thy question aptly leads, was Agamemnon, captain of naval hosts, thine own companion when thou didst take from Troja's state her city of Ilium. He, that Agamemnon, upon his coming home,...was slain dishonourably,...murdered by my

I think, the conception intended.—The schol., *καὶ εἰς οἶκον εἰσῆλθον, καὶ ὕδατων μετέλαβον*, has been supposed to indicate some other text, but without reason. It explains, conjecturally and imperfectly, why the *house* and the *water* are here mentioned as instruments of the purification, as well as the *animal* already specified: the patient, it is suggested, was admitted to the one, and partook of the other.—Wecklein observes that *νεοθήλου* is probably trisyllabic (*νουθήλου?*), as we find in Aeschylus no clear case of a word with the quantities ~--- at this place in the verse.

456. Lit., 'as to this (care), thus I argue care away': not precisely identical with *ταύτην τὴν φροντίδα*, although English has no exact equivalent for the distinction.

458. *ἴστορεῖς καλῶς*: commonly rendered 'you know well', upon the authority of *Pers.* 457 *κακῶς τὸ μέλλον ἱστορῶν* (of Xerxes, misled as to the intention of the Greeks before the battle of Salamis), and *Ag.* 681 *εἴ τις ἀκτίς ἡλίου νιν ἱστορεῖ...βλέποντα*, 'if any sun-beam knows him to be alive'. But are these sufficient? The regular meanings of *ἱστορεῖν* are (1) *to ask, enquire*, (2) *to be informed by enquiry, to learn*. In both citations the sense *learn* is appropriate, though *know* may be a convenient translation. They do not therefore prove that *ἱστορεῖν τινά* could stand for *to know a person* (*connaître quelqu'un*), a use in

which the notion of *enquiry, learning*, altogether disappears. On the other hand, the sense *ask* is here suggested by the context (see *vv.* 440 and 457 *γένος*), and gives the meaning, 'As to my father, your question (respecting my parentage) is good', *i.e.*, it is one which Orestes can readily and proudly answer. The turn of the phrase marks the natural reluctance with which he approaches the mention of his *mother*.

460. *Τροίαν...ἔθηκας*: lit., 'you made Troia into a state dis-stated of her Ilios', *i.e.*, divested the Trojan state of its political form by the conquest of its capital. *Troia* has its larger sense (cf. *Argos, Thebae, Athenae*, etc.) and signifies the territory. Orestes accommodates his language to Athena's views upon the 'vacant' land, as expressed in *vv.* 401 foll., and appeals to her knowledge that the punishment of Troy was permitted and encouraged by her, however she might condemn the barbarity and sacrilege of the final execution.—If *Τροίαν* is correct, *πόλιω* is part of the predicate; *Τρωάν* (Bothe) makes the phrase simpler but less significant.

461—464. For the entangling bathrobe of Clytaemnestra see *Ag.* 1102 foll., 1379 foll.; and for the exhibition of it by Orestes as evidence, *Cho.* 978 foll. The allusion to the latter scene here (*v.* 464) is an excellent dramatic touch; for the notion of *proving* the notorious circumstances of the murder is there the first symptom of

μήτηρ κατέκτα ποικίλοις ἀγρεύμασιν
 κρύψασ', ἃ λουτρῶν ἐξεμαρτύρει φόνον.
 κἀγὼ κατελθὼν, τὸν πρὸ τοῦ φεύγων χρόνον, 465
 ἔκτεινα τὴν τεκοῦσαν, οὐκ ἀρνήσομαι,
 ἀντικτόνοις ποιναῖσι φιλτάτου πατρός.

καὶ τῶνδε κοινῇ Λοξίας ἐπαίτιος,
 ἄλλη προφωνῶν ἀντίκεντρα καρδιά,
 εἰ μή τι τῶνδ' ἔρξαιμι τοὺς ἐπαιτίους· 470
 σύ τ', εἰ δικαίως εἴτε μή, κρῖνον δίκην·
 πράξας γὰρ ἐν σοὶ πανταχῇ τάδ' αἰνέσω.

AΘ. τὸ πρᾶγμα μείζον εἴ τις οἶεται τόδε
 βροτοῖς δικάζειν, οὐδὲ μὴν ἐμοὶ θέμις
 φόνους διαιρεῖν, ὄξυμηνίτου δίκας.— 475

472. πανταχῇ.

a disorder in Orestes' mind, which rapidly passes into madness (see the whole passage, and especially *Cho.* 1008); and therefore the recurrence of the thought here aptly betrays the violence of his feelings.—ἃ...φόνον: the predicate is λουτρῶν, 'which proved the φόνον to be a λουτρῶν-φόνον'. What the bath-robe specially manifested was the horrible abuse of domestic religion by the employment of a rite for the purpose of the murder; see *inf.* v. 636.—ἐξεμαρτύρει: 'continued to prove', 'remained to prove'.—κρύψασ' ἃ Musgrave.—Prof. Seymour (see on v. 234) objects to the implication that Athena, years after the death of Agamemnon, is still ignorant of it. But is this really implied? It is proper, in the circumstances, that Orestes should state the fact, whether known to the goddess or not; and the brevity of his recapitulation would seem rather to suppose knowledge.

467. πατρός depends on the prepositional part of ἀντικτόνοις, and is a compendious term for 'the slaying of my father'.

468. ἐπαίτιος: *responsible for, liable to the charge of.*

469. ἀντίκεντρα καρδιά: *which were*

as goads to my resolution: see v. 136, and for the facts *Cho.* 268 foll.

470. τῶνδε (with ἐπαιτίους): the murder of Agamemnon as above described. The force of τῶνδε, displaced in the sentence and thus emphasized, is to oppose the authors of the original murder to the authors of the revenge (τῶνδε in v. 468): both pronouns would be accompanied by explanatory gestures.—ἔρξαιμι τι, *do the thing*, is a softened expression for κτελναιμι.

471. σύ τε...: 'And so do thou judge' etc. I think it a mistake to replace τ' by δ' (Pearson), thus cutting the sentence off from the preceding statement concerning Apollo. The two are intentionally bound together: the thought which Orestes has in his mind, but dares not fully express, is that he is ready to be judged, *provided that* Apollo is also called upon, as he should be, to meet the accusation. We shall see that Athena respects this condition, *vv.* 571 foll. To the same effect tends the subtle and Attic ambiguity of εἰ δικαίως εἴτε μή. It is true, on the one hand, that we are to supply ἔρεξα, 'I did the deed'; but we cannot escape, especially if we keep τε, an inclination to supply 'he instigated

mother, black of heart, behind a veil, with cunning inveiglements, which remained to tell of his bath and her deadly work. And I, after time of exile, returned, and...took my mother's life—I shall not deny it—in punishment, in revenge for my dearest father. And for this act, Loxias with me is to answer, who spurred my resolve with threat of agonies, if I should not do the deed upon those answerable for what I have said. Whether that was right or no, be thou the judge; before thee, however I fare, I shall be content. (*A pause.*)

Athena. If it be thought by some that this matter is too great for mortal men to judge,—yet neither is it fit for me to give the verdict of passion upon a cause of blood,...especially

me', from the main proposition, instead of the subordinate, in the preceding sentence. And this is the intention: Orestes hints that Apollo should be a defendant, without precisely saying it.

472. *πράξας...πανταχῆ*: 'faring in any way', i.e., *however it may go with me.* —*ἐν σοί*: *in your hands*, with a glance at the legal Attic sense, 'before your tribunal'.—For the compliment to the Areopagus, Wecklein cites Lycurg. c. *Leocrat.* § 12 τὸ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ συνέδριον, δ τοσοῦτον διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων δικαστηρίων, ὥστε καὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὁμολογεῖσθαι τοῖς ἀλίσκομένοις δικαίαν ποιῆσθαι τὴν κρίσιν.

473—492. Athena declares her intention to summon a jury of Athenian citizens, and to make this cause the occasion for a permanent institution.

473, 474. 'If it is thought by some that this cause is too great for mortals to judge, yet neither is it proper for me' etc. I follow Wecklein in retaining *βροτοῖς* (the original reading of M) and taking *οὐδὲ μὴν*, yet neither, to mark the apodosis. —*βροτὸς* (m) is not really supported, as might appear, by the schol. fo M, *εἰ τις οἴεται τὸ πρᾶγμα τόδε βροτὸς δικάζειν, μείζον ἢ κατὰ ἀνθρώπου οἴεται*, which on the contrary requires *βροτοῖς*, and paraphrases *μείζον βροτοῖς* (*too great for mortals*) by *μείζον ἢ κατὰ ἀνθρώπου*. The commentator, thinking himself bound to construe τὸ πρᾶγμα...δικάζειν as a sen-

tence complete, does so, in a fashion, by assuming an ellipse, and supplying a second *οἴεται*, in protasis, from *οἴεται* as the apodosis, and similarly *βροτὸς* from *βροτοῖς*. Thus he evolves the sentence *εἰ τις (οἴεται) τὸ πρᾶγμα τόδε (βροτὸς) δικάζειν, μείζον βροτοῖς οἴεται (πρᾶγμα δικάζειν)*. Neither therefore does the scholium point to ἢ for *εἰ* (Stanley and others). It does however, superficially, suggest the reading *βροτὸς*, and this is probably the origin of the correction by m.—With *βροτὸς* the sentence, however punctuated, and whether we take *εἰ* or ἢ, is incorrect in language.—*τις* points primarily to the Erinyes, who may well think that the impending reference to a jury exceeds (as it does) the terms of their consent (*vv.* 437, 438). See however the next note.

474, 475. *οὐδὲ...δικας*. This proposition formally condemns the commonly accepted legend of the founding of the Areopagus, and the trial of the first cause there by a jury of gods, Athena herself being one (see *vv.* 685 foll., and the Introduction). That legend is incompatible with Aeschylus' play, as well as repugnant to him on religious grounds, partly here indicated. Here, where his intention to discard and contradict it first appears, he aims a first stroke at it. We may consider therefore that *τις* (*v.* 473) includes probable objectors among the audience.

ἄλλως τε καὶ σὺ μὲν κατηρτυκῶς ὄμως
 ἰκέτης προσῆλthes, καθαρός, ἀβλαβῆς δόμοις,
 ὄμως δ' ἄμομφον ὄντα σ' αἰρούμαι πόλει·
 αὐται δ' ἔχουσι μοῖραν οὐκ εὐπέμπειλον,
 καὶ μὴ τυχοῦσαι πράγματος νικηφόρου,... 480
 χώρα μεταῦθις ἰὸς ἐκ φρονημάτων,
 πέδοι πεσῶν ἄφερτος αἰανῆς νόσος...—

481. χῶραι μετ' αὐθιω (ζτ in margin).

482. πέδω.

'You may think', says the author, 'that I degrade our tribunal by making it from the first a tribunal of mere men. I reply, that *your* version of its origin, instead of raising the tribunal, degrades the divine nature itself.'—*φόνους...δίκας*: *to pronounce, on a (case of) murder, the sentence of keen indignation, i.e. to decide a question which, from its nature, cannot be agitated without rousing, in the mind of the judge, passions of a kind and degree not belonging to her condition. The plurals φόνους...δίκας generalise the proposition; for δίκη sentence see L. and Sc. s.v. As to the grammatical analysis of the two accusatives, it may be held either (1) that διαιρεῖν δίκας, to give distinguishing sentence, 'governs' φόνους as an object, in which case the construction is parallel to Soph. *El.* 124 τὰ κεῖς οἰμυγὰν Ἀγαμέμνονα (and see Kühner *Gr. Grammar* § 411 3 δ), or (2) better and more simply, that δίκας stands 'in apposition to' the notion *sentence, decision*, contained in φόνους διαιρεῖν, a brachylogy for φόνου δίκας διαιρεῖν: cf. *v.* 491.—*δέξυμνηττου*: lit. 'of one keenly angered', 'of an anger-moved (judge)'. It corresponds to, and is a Greek equivalent for, the modern use of a personified abstract, *anger*.—The schol. ἐφ' οἷς (*in a case where*) ταχέως μνηστουσι Ἐρινύες, though wrong, is valuable as confirming M against proposed changes (see below). It assumes the rendering 'to decide a murder-case, the cause of a party quickly moved to anger', the singular δέξυμνηττου being supposed to represent the Ἐρινύες as one party to the suit. It may however be accommodated to the reading δέξυμνηττου*

by changing ἐφ' οἷς to ἐφ' αἷς (Linwood) *i.e. ἐφ' αἷς δίκαις*.—The conjectures φόνου Robertello, δέξυμνηττου Pearson, are obvious, and simplify the construction; but they obscure the point. The passion, which makes the case unfit for Athena to judge, must be passion arising in the breast of the judge: if the anger of the parties could injure her dignity, it is as thoroughly impaired as it could be, by the part which she actually takes. But if δέξυμνηττου be changed, the reference to the judge becomes unrecognisable.—As to how, and how far, Aeschylus' objection is met or evaded by his own scheme of the trial, see on *vv.* 737 foll.

476—484. More especially must she, if acting as a judge, be moved and perturbed, when her personal feelings and interests are strongly divided. These verses are rather thoughts, a soliloquy, than an address to the adversaries, and express, in their emphasis (*vv.* 476, 478) and broken form (*vv.* 480—482), the very agitation of spirit which the goddess desires to avoid.—σὺ μὲν...αὐται δὲ...: in brief, Orestes is so much the more acceptable of the parties, the Erinyes so much the more formidable.—κατηρτυκῶς ὄμως ἰκέτης: lit. 'a suppliant disciplined (perfected?) nevertheless', *i.e.* 'though a confessed criminal and fugitive, yet at all events one who has been purified and made fit for intercourse': see *vv.* 441—455. The point lies in the implied contrast with his opponents, the Erinyes, who, it must be remembered, affect the goddess with an almost uncontrollable horror; see *vv.* 411 foll. and notes there.

since, on the one part, thou art at worst a suppliant disciplined, coming pure and harmless to the house,...at worst such an innocent associate for Athens as I rather choose ;...and these, on the other part, have a power not lightly to be softened (?); and if they win not victory in the cause,...on the land hereafter the poison of their pride,...plague rained upon the soil, sore and perpetual...(*She remains for a moment silent.*)

What she means here is, that even a criminal, *purified*, is more acceptable personally than they, and that, from this point of view, a decision, which might seem to invite their friendship to herself and Athens, would be almost impossible to her. The words, to be clear, require the accompanying action.—**κατηρτυκῶς**, as applied to animals, especially horses, signified *adult*; see passages cited in L. and Sc. *s.v.*, after the commentators here. Here it must clearly *mean*, that Orestes has gone through the ceremony and period of expiation; but this sense may be reached in two ways. (1) We may suppose a metaphorical application of the sense *adult*,—*mature*, hence *perfected*. So the schol., τέλειος τὴν ἡλικίαν· τοῦτο δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ζώων. Or (2) the use here, and the application to animals (colts), may both be derived from the ordinary sense of *καταρτῶ* *discipline, train* (see L. and Sc. *s.v.*), so that *κατηρτυκῶς* should strictly mean *having passed the stage of discipline, disciplined, broken*: in that case the sense *adult* would be secondary, and would scarcely bear upon the present use. The second view, which is nearly Paley's (he translates by *tamed, spirit-broken*), seems preferable, and rightly deduced from Eurip. *fr.* 818 εἰ μὲν τόδ' ἡμᾶρ πρῶτον ἢν κακουμένῳ... | εἰκὸς σφαδάξεν ἦν ἂν ὡς νεύσῃγα | πῶλον χαλινὸν ἀρτίως δεδεγμένον· | νῦν δ' ἀμβλύς εἰμι καὶ κατηρτυκῶς κακῶν, compared with *sup. vv.* 238 foll., 276 foll.—**δόμοις**: generally, habitations and their inhabitants: see *vv.* 239, 285, 444 etc. Not '*my temple*' only.—**έμοις** (for **δῶμοις**) Pauw, *δρόμοις* Hermann, and see Wecklein *Appendix*; but no change is required.—**ὄμοις δὲ...πόλει**: 'and I prefer

thee as being, after all, a fit associate'. **ὄμοις**: parallel to **δῶμοις** in *v.* 476 and explained by it; whatever he may have been, he is after all *ἀμοιφος πόλει*, which is more than can be said for his opponents. The comparison with them is implied by **αἰροῦμαι**, *I choose rather, prefer*, and by the context. **ἀμοιφον πόλει**: lit. 'unobjectionable to a πόλις, to a society'. The expression is general, though she speaks as an Athenian, and has Athens specially in view.—**δῶμοις, ὄμοις, αἰδοῦμαι**, and other changes have been proposed, but the text, I believe, is sound.

479. **εὐπέπελον**: uncertain in derivation and meaning.—If from *πέμπειν* (which however is open to strong objections), it may mean 'easy to be sent away, to be dismissed' (Lobeck, Wellauer, Hermann). **έχουσι μοῖραν** will then be 'have a condition', that is, 'a claim to respect' (see L. and Sc. *s.v.* μοῖρα).—A more probable connexion is with *πεπ-*, the root of *πέπων* (see Headlam, *Class. Rev.* xvii. 286), *quasi εὐπέπαντος, soft*. Then **μοῖραν** should perhaps mean *μέρος*, 'their part is not weak', *i.e.* 'they are not weak, on their part'.—The general meaning, that they are *formidable*, appears from what follows.

480—482. The broken construction (the 'pendent' nominative **τυχοῦσαι**), and the unfinished sentence, *aying away into a pause of reflexion* (after νόσος), are designed to mark the agitation of her thoughts. To mark this is important in view of οὐκ ἔμοι θέμις in *v.* 474. Compare the perplexed pondering of the King in the *Supplikes* (*vv.* 447 foll.), and the broken language of the *Herald* in the *Agamemnon*, and of the *Nurse* in the

τοιαῦτα μὲν τὰδ' ἔστιν· ἀμφότερα, μένειν
πέμπειν τε, δυσπήματ' † ἀμηχάνως ἐμοί.

ἐπεὶ δὲ πρᾶγμα δεῦρ' ἐπέσκηψεν τόδε, 485
φόνων δικαστὰς ὀρκίων αἰρουμένους
θεσμὸν τὸν εἰς ἅπαντ' ἐγὼ θήσω χρόνον.
ὑμεῖς δὲ μαρτύριά τε καὶ τεκμηρία

484. δέ.

Choephori.—It is just possible to construe *χώρα μεταῦθις ἰός* as a full sentence, supplying *ἔστι*, 'for the land there is hereafter a venom', i.e. 'a venom to come'; but many object to this, and with reason. It does not however follow that the sentence should be completed.—*ἰός ἐκ φρονημάτων*: *the venom from their pride*.—*πέδοι... νόσος*. See *vv.* 782 foll.—*αἰανής*: *everlasting*, from which there is no recovery.—*χώρα μεταῦθις* Wellauer, *πέδοι* Dindorf.

483. *μένειν τὰς Ἐρινύας—πέμπειν αὐτὰς ἐμέ*. To accept the friendship of the Erinyes for Athens, and to risk their hatred, appear to the goddess, at first sight, alternatives equally distressing. We should note how far from the poet is the intention to present even Athena as perfect in intelligence or foresight. She is a *θεός*, but she is not his God.—The peculiar rhythm (*ἀμφότερα*—) of this verse is apparently intended to aid the general effect of disturbance.

484. 'An entanglement that I must not touch'; lit. 'hard of disentanglement in a way (to a degree) impossible for me'. The impossibility lies in the unfitness (*v.* 474).—*ἀμηχάνως ἐμοί*: for the adverb with dependent case, a construction favoured by Aeschylus, see *Ag.* 1581, 1591, *Cho.* 626, 703, 735.—*δυσπήματα* (?). The sense required seems plain, but the word is uncertain: *δυσπήματος* is not derivable from any word now known (though this does not prove non-existence), and the proposed substitutes (*δυσπήματα*, *δυσποίματα* etc.) are mostly inadmissible. *δυσπόνητα* (Wecklein) fits the sense,

but it is hard to account for the corruption of so easy a word. Possibly we should read *δυσπήνητα* or *δυσπήματα* (see *πήνη*, *πηλίον*, *πηλίζομαι*) 'hard to wind off', as a thread on the bobbin. The metaphor from the *ἔργα γυναικῶν* would suit the speaker. The form in *-α-* (*δυσπήματα*) might be accounted for by the *ν*, which seems to have had, to a small extent, the same effect as a *ρ*: cf. *ναμερτής*, *νάιος*, *ποινάτωρ*, *εὐνάτωρ*, *θουνάτωρ*, *εὐνάσιμος*, *κυναγέτης*, *ναός*, *συνάορος*, etc. in Attic poetry.—*τε* Abresch.—The schol., *πέμπειν αὐτὰς ἀμηνίτως δυσχερές ἔστιν ἐμοί*, has been held to require in the text *ἀμηνίτως*. But the meaning of the note is perhaps that, to complete the sense, this notion *must be supplied* (from *vv.* 474, 475, where see the schol.): Athena cannot dismiss the Erinyes without provoking their anger. *ἀμηνίτως*, if read, should be interpreted in connexion with the true sense of *v.* 475: Athena cannot disentangle the problem without temper unfit for her.

486, 487. 'The choosing of judges to try an oath of murder shall be made by me into an ordinance,—the ordinance for all time.' *φόνων...αἰρουμένους*: lit. '(persons) being chosen judges of oaths of murder'. The participial phrase may be regarded as an approach to the Latin gerundive (see on *Theb.* 611, *Ag.* 646, *Cho.* 793), although, without this, it would be natural in poetry to speak of the judges, the tribunal itself, as the 'ordinance', or 'institution'; so in *v.* 617 Apollo addresses them as *ὑμᾶς*, *Ἀθηναῖας μέγαν θεσμὸν*. The *φόνων ὀρκια*, 'oaths

Such is the issue,...both sides, the staying and the sending away,...a tangled skein (?), not possible for me to unwind.

But since this case hath lighted upon Athens, the choosing of judges to decide upon sworn murder shall by me be made an ordinance, the ordinance for all time. You are to summon your

relating to murder', are those of the parties and their witnesses (see *vv.* 489, 492), the sworn information which demands the tribunal and is the matter of judgment.—**αἰρουμένους**: passive; for similar uses of *present tenses* usually deponent (aorists and perfects are comparatively common), compare **βιάζεσθαι** (Homer and Thucyd.), **ὠνεῖσθαι** and **πιπράσκεσθαι** (Plato and others), **λυμάλνεσθαι** (Antiphon, Lysias, Xenophon), **αἰρεῖσθαι** itself (Aristotle, *Politics*), etc.; see L. and Sc. *s.vv.* and Kühner *Gr. Grammar* § 377, 4c. In the case of **αἰρεῖσθαι**, such a use is especially easy, from the familiarity of the passive in **ἤρημαι** and **ἤρέθην**, the latter apparently always passive. In **τὰ ὠνούμενα καὶ πιπρασκόμενα** (Plato *Phaedo* 69 B), and **ἐπὶ τὰ μῶς οὐκ ἀπέτισα περὶ αὐτοῦ** (I refused to pay seven minae for him) **δεδεμένου καὶ λυμαινομένου** (Antiphon 5, § 63), the context explains it. Here the facts explain it: that the judges are to be *chosen* (not *choosers*) is manifest from the situation. Whether the tense refers to the present occasion (*to be chosen now*), or to this and all future occasions (*chosen from time to time*), depends on the question discussed at *v.* 490.—**θεσμὸν τὸν κ.τ.λ.** It has been objected that this article with the predicate is improper, an objection which would perhaps be valid against **τὸν θεσμὸν τὸν κ.τ.λ.** But the predicate is **θεσμὸν** only, to which **τὸν εἰς ἅπαντα χρόνον** is added as a further description, as in the translation above. The sense is, that, since in this case it is inevitable to choose a jury of Athenians, the parties having brought their cause to Athens (**δεῦρο**), and Athena herself refusing to be judge, the goddess by her own act (**ἐγὼ**) will make, out of the occasion, an

ordinance which shall be permanent.—It is commonly assumed (1) that the **ὄρκια** are those of *the judges*; a schol. (**ὄλον ἐνόρκους δικαστὰς**) points to this, but see below; (2) that **αἰρουμένους** must be either (i) passive of **αἰρέω** (*take*), or else (ii) deponent. From (i) proceeds the conjecture **ὄρκιους αἰρουμένους**, supposed (*sed quaere*) to mean 'bound under oath', **captos iure iurando**, and others. From (ii) proceed **ὄρκιους αἰρουμένη**, **ὄρκιων αἰδουμένους θεσμὸν** (*quasi aīd. ὄρκιων θεσμὸν, reverencing the appointed oath*), and many others; see Wecklein, *Appendix*. The simplest is (**ὄρκιους αἰρουμένη**, *choosing...judges* (Casaubon), but it should rather be **ἐλομένη**.—As to the scholium, we must remember that the ancient commentators had no scruple in assuming, where necessary, that one case was used 'for' another. The writer of **ὄλον ἐνόρκους δικαστὰς** is merely trying, on these principles, to construe **ὄρκιων αἰρουμένους**, as if it were **ὄρκιους αἰρουμένους** or the like: it means, he says, 'something like *sworn*'.—See also next notes.

487—489. **μαρτυρία τε κ.τ.λ.**: '*proofs* (*τεκμήρια*), supported by evidence of witnesses (*μαρτύρια*)'.—**ἄρωγά...ὄρκώματα**: *sworn aids*. The use of **ὄρκωμα**, from **ὄρκοιν** (*τινά*) 'to swear a witness', implies, like **καλεῖσθε** (Wecklein), a personification of the **μαρτύρια**.—The direction is made general for the sake of resemblance to ordinary causes, but points chiefly to the evidence promised by Orestes in *vv.* 450 foll.—**ὕμεῖς δὲ ὄρκους αὐτοῦς ἀτήσατε** (*do you demand oaths from them, i.e. from the judges*: schol. on *v.* 488). I cite this note merely to illustrate the true value of **ὄλον ἐνόρκους δικαστὰς** on *v.* 486. It is somewhat misleading, though natural, to cite the scholia only where they are supposed to be right.

καλεῖσθ'. ἀρωγὰ τῆς δίκης ὀρκώματα.
 κρίνασα δ' ἀστῶν τῶν ἐμῶν τὰ βέλτατα 490
 ἤξω διαιρεῖν τοῦτο πρᾶγμ' ἐτητύμως,
 ὀρκων περῶντας μηδὲν ἔκδικον φρεσίν.

ΧΟ. νῦν καταστροφαὶ νέων στρ. α'.
 θεσμίων, εἰ κρατή-
 σει δίκαι καὶ βλάβαι 495
 τοῦδε μητροκτόνου.

489. In ὀρκώματα the letters κώ are written on an erasure.

490—92. κρίνασα...ἤξω διαιρεῖν: 'when I come again, I shall have selected the best of Athens to divide the cause'. διαιρεῖν depends upon κρίνασα.—ἄξω Auratus, *I shall bring*, is more explicit, but hardly necessary.—τὰ βέλτατα: τοὺς βελτίστους. So we might say 'the best material among the citizens'. Compare the application of the neuters in -μα (παίδευμα etc.) to persons, and *Pers.* 1 τάδε πιστὰ καλεῖται, of officials, as here.—διαιρεῖν τοῦτο πρᾶγμα: *to do this dividing of the cause*, διαιρεῖν τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην τὸ πρᾶγμα. τοῦτο, like τὸ σὺν δὴ τοῦτο as you said, marks that διαιρεῖν refers back (to *v.* 475 φόνους διαιρεῖν). The point is, that the 'dividing' and decision, unfit for the goddess, will be proper for the human jurors, not only because human, but because by literal 'division' of votes (see on ἐτητύμως) various aspects can be balanced and responsibility shared. This is in fact the chief, perhaps the only, advantage of a jury. For the adverbial acc. of the neuter pronoun see Kühner *Gr. Gram.* § 410, note 6, § 411, note 4: e.g. Xen. *Anab.* 5. 7. 6 τοῦτο ὑμᾶς ἐξ-απατήσαι, Thuc. 6. 11 ἔπερ οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι ἡμᾶς ἐκφοβοῦσι. The use of it, where (as here) the 'direct object' is neuter, makes an ambiguity in writing, but not in speech. On the other hand, τοῦτο, if joined with πρᾶγμα (*this cause*), is superfluous.—ἐτητύμως. On ἔτυμος, ἐτήτυμος, in Aeschylus, see *vv.* 499, 537, and my edition of *Sept. c. Theb.*, App. I. It marks here, as commonly, that a word

(διαιρεῖν) is to be pressed to its full and literal force. The jury would determine the cause *veritably*, *literally* by division. As a general rule, the word points to an *etymology*, and probably it does so here: δικάζειν (*v.* 486) to the Greek ear actually suggested the notion *divide* (δικάζειν) and was sometimes so explained. See Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 5. 5, §§ 8, 9 θταν δὲ ἄρα διαιρέθη τὸ δλον; τότε φασὶν εχειν τὰ αὐτῶν, θταν λάβωσι τὸ ἴσον. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν, ὡσπερ εἰ τις εἰποι δίχαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς δίχαστῆς. I was directed to this reference by Dr Jackson.—ὀρκων...φρεσίν: *never straying in thought beyond the just limit of the oaths*, i.e., confining themselves strictly to the case as sworn, and ignoring all extraneous prejudice. The gen. ὀρκων depends upon ἔκδικον, as in ἔκτοπος γῆς, δόμων and the like: μηδὲν ἔκδικον is an adverbial acc. (like τοῦτο in *v.* 491), so that the whole is equivalent to περῶντας μηδεμίαν πέρασιν ἔξω τῆς δίκης καὶ τῶν ὀρκων. The δίκη meant is rather 'the cause' than 'justice' in general; what is not within 'the oaths' is not within the δίκη, is ἔκδικον. By 'the oaths', as appears from the context (*vv.* 486, 489), is meant the content or subject-matter of the oaths, what is sworn. The masculine περῶντας agrees with the sense, though not the form, of τὰ βέλτατα.—Here, as at *v.* 486, explanation has been embarrassed by the assumption, promoted by the schol. (see below), that the 'oaths' meant are those of the judges. Thus φρεσίν becomes inappropriate, since

testimony and proofs, sworn aids of the cause. I, ere I come again, shall have selected of my citizens the best, to make division, true 'division', upon the plea, wholly confining their thoughts to the cause as it is sworn. (*Exit ATHENA; ORESTES follows her. The Erinyes watch their departure with angry gestures and murmurs, then break into exclamation.*)

Chorus. Now comes final ruin, even now with the new law, if the injurious plea of yon matricide is to prevail! All

the crime of a judge, who gives an unjust sentence, is not committed only or chiefly 'in his mind'; and we demand some plainer indication connecting these ὅρκου with the judges, and distinguishing them from the ὀρκώματα of *v.* 489. Hence φράσειν (Markland, Hermann) for φρεσίν. ὅρκον πορόντας (Hermann), supposed (*sed quaere*) to mean 'having given', *i.e.* taken, 'an oath', and other changes; see Wecklein, *Appendix*. But the oaths of this passage, ὅρκια, ὀρκώματα, ὅρκοι, are throughout, as we should naturally suppose, the same oaths, those of the parties and their witnesses. The dicastic oath (upon which, as the dicasts are not present, it would be useless to dwell) is not pertinent to the present subject: the parties are to prepare their sworn evidence, and upon the sworn evidence judgment will be given.—The schol., ὅρκον δίδόντας, does not imply a different text; the commentator guesses or assumes, seeing no other way, that περῶντας means δίδόντας, that 'going through an oath' is here used for 'giving an oath', *i.e.* 'swearing'. By ὅρκων μὴδὲν ἔκδικον he understands 'nothing unjust in the way of an oath', 'no unjust oath', quasi μηδὲνα ἔκδικον ὅρκον. The placing of the verse (in the MSS. f and g) after *v.* 488 was suggested probably by the schol. to *v.* 488 in M; see note there.—As to the possible connexion between this passage and the method of forming an Areopagitic jury in historical times, see *Appendix I*.

493. ἡ μὲν Ἀθηναῖ ἀπῆλθεν εὐτρεπίσαι δικαστάς, ὁ δὲ Ὀρέστῃς ἱκετεύων μένει, αἱ δὲ Ἐρινύες φρονουδοῦσιν αὐτόν, schol. As to Athena, this is clearly right: she leaves

the stage here, to make arrangements for the trial. Whether Orestes remains on the scene 'in supplication', or goes into the city, under the safeguard of the goddess, the text nowhere shows. The point may be best considered in connexion with the next scene, *v.* 569.

493 foll. The Erinyes indignantly denounce the 'new law', which interposes a 'trial' between them and their due victim! If it is to prevail, parricides and such will have perfect freedom (493—501). For themselves, they will then leave mankind to their fate; and as for any substitute (such as Athena's 'court'), it will be utterly inefficient (502—510) without their aid (511—519), and also intolerably oppressive (520—528). Government, but not despotism, is the way to virtue and happiness (529—540). From them, the Erinyes, irreverence has its certain punishment (541—552), and voluntary obedience will as surely be rewarded (553—555), as triumphant sin will be finally overwhelmed and lost (556—568).

493—496. νῦν...θεσμίων. *Now comes final ruin, now with the new law!* The emphasis is on νῦν: the new law is a 'subversion' and 'end' (καταστροφή meaning both) in the very moment of beginning, *i.e.*, it will never work at all.—Not exactly 'a revolution caused by new laws' (Paley), which would rather require μεταστροφῆς (Meineke): the conjectures νόμων (Ahrens for νέων), ἐμῶν κ. (Weil), assume the true meaning of καταστροφῆς, but are not required.—δίκη καὶ βλάβη: *the injurious plea*, lit. 'plea and injury (hurt, hindrance)': βλάβη (see βλάπτω,

πάντας ἤδη τόδ' ἔργον εὐχερεΐ-
 α συναρμόσει βροτούς·
 πολλὰ δ' ἔτυμα παιδότηρωτα
 πάθεα προσμένει τοκευ-
 σιν μεταύθις ἐν χρόνῳ.
 οὔτε γὰρ βροτοσκοπῶν
 μαινάδων τῶνδ' ἐφέρ-
 ψει κότος τις ἐργμάτων,—

500

ἀντ. α'.

497. εὐχερῆλαι.

and u. to *Theb.* 183) suggests both *hurt* and *hindrance*; the proposed trial is a *mischievous bar* to the course of justice.—**εἰ κρατήσῃ** does not mean 'if the accused shall succeed in obtaining acquittal', but 'if the trial is to be enforced against the rights of the Erinyes', if Athena is to have her way, now and henceforth, as to the procedure to be followed in cases of blood. The uncertainty thus introduced, the chance of escape, will produce (they say) a flood of crime.—**τοῦδε** does not affect the question, whether Orestes remains on the stage. In any case, he has now barely quitted it, and is still in the view of the speakers (cf. v. 503). On the other hand, it is worth remark, that the rest of the ode ignores him.—**τε καὶ** Heath, for **καὶ**, on metrical grounds, perhaps rightly: see App. II.

497, 498. 'The present deed by its facility will soon unite all the world' in parricide, will make parricides of all. **εὐχερεῖα**, by its facility, means both that parricide is easy in itself, the victims being unsuspecting and ready to hand, and that impunity, or at least the uncertainty of punishment, will make it easy.—**συναρμόσει**, an expression naturally signifying order and discipline, seems to import irony.

499—501. **ἔτυμα παιδότηρωτα**: 'veritably παιδότηρωτα', in the whole sense of the word, see on v. 491. The sarcasm turns on the fact that **παιδότηρωτος** meant both (1) '(wounds) inflicted with the point of a weapon', from a word **παις**,

probably connected with **παίω**, and signifying *point*, preserved in the gloss of Hesychius, **παιδός**· ἀκμῆς, and also (2), less naturally, 'inflicted by a child'. For further illustrations from Aeschylus, see *Verbal Equivocation* in the *Indices* to my editions of the *Septem*, *Agamemnon*, and *Choephori*.—'Real, not mere idle tales', **ἔργῳ καὶ οὐ λόγῳ**, Paley. 'Actual wounds, not metaphorical', Wecklein. The first explanation seems inadmissible; we cannot suppose that parricide was ever a mere fiction. The second is possible, but assumes, for the metaphorical use of **παιδότηρωτον πάθος**, a familiarity not easy to be supposed. My feeling is that the word **ἔτυμος** has, in this connexion, no natural application, and that the passage itself, apart from Aeschylean usage, would point to some linguistic artifice. The references given will confirm this, and show both the feeling of the poet with respect to such interpretations, and their association with the term **ἔτυμος**.—**ἔτυμοπαιδότηρωτα** Headlam, *Class. Rev.* xv. 17. The compound would be possible and natural for Aeschylus, and should probably be read. Dr Headlam interprets by 'wounds of **ἔτυμοι παῖδες**', inflicted by *true, veritable* children. The word can certainly mean this, but would the distinction be relevant?

502—510. **οὔτε**...answers to **τε**..in v. 509, **πάντ' ἐφήσω**...μόχθων being a parenthesis.—**οὐδὲ** Elmsley, *οὐ τι* Casaubon, but see below.—The general sense is clear: 'For there will be no means of preventing

men forthwith will, by facility, be drawn into his crime; and often in time to come the child shall prove his mettle upon the parent's heart.

For, as from these mad watchers of mankind no anger will

or punishing the crimes, to which we, the insulted Erinyes, shall then give free scope.' But there are difficulties of detail.

502—504 offer several questions: (1) *ἐφέρψει*, *will come upon*, requires an object: cf. *ἐφέρει μῆνις* in *v.* 315, where the object is the criminal. It is usual to supply *αὐτὰ* (*ἔργματα the crimes*), taking *ἔργμάτων* with *κότος*, 'anger for the crimes'. But, with the given order of words, this is not natural; we should expect *κότος τις ἐργμάτων ἐφέρψει*. May not the object of *ἐφέρψει* be *ἔργμάτων* itself? The genitive accords with the general analogy of verbs signifying *to reach, come at*; so *ἐπιβαλεῖν*, *ἐπιβατεύειν*, *ἐμβατεύειν*, *ἐφικνεῖσθαι*, *καθικνεῖσθαι*, etc., used in this sense, take genitives (see Kühner *Gr. Gram.* § 416, 2 and 3). If the particular verb *ἐφέρειν* is not found elsewhere with the genitive, this is not a decisive objection, nor that it is found (as at *v.* 315) with the accusative. Other like verbs (e.g. *ἐπιβαλεῖν*, *ἐφικνεῖσθαι*) take both cases with little difference of meaning; and many unquestionable constructions are now represented by single instances. Moreover, between *assail* (*v.* 315) and *come at, reach*, it is possible to draw a distinction in favour of the genitive here.—(2) *τῶνδε* may be taken either with *μαινάδων* or with *ἔργμάτων*. The order favours the first, and see below.—(3) To whom does *βροτοσκόπων μαινάδων* refer? A schol. says *ἡμῶν δῆλον ὅτι*, the Erinyes, and this is the established view. But it assumes a strange use of the word *μαινάς*. Meaning properly *a mad woman* (*Iliad* XXII. 460), it was applied, when the Bacchic religion arose, to women *possessed* by Bacchus. The natural supposition, that it was originally so applied in contempt, is confirmed by the fact that it retained

this shade in the language of those who disliked that religion (*Eur. Bacch.* 224). And except, so far as this is an exception, when it describes *Maenads* proper, women inspired by Bacchus, it remained a term of contempt. Thus in Euripides, Hecuba applies it, with shame and distress, to the frantic Cassandra (*Tro.* 172, 307, 349; see 415), and Clytaemnestra to Cassandra as her rival (*El.* 1032). Similarly, as an adj., it marks the overpowering, degrading, misleading effect of love in Soph. fr. 678, Pind. *Pyth.* 4. 216. Similarly in *Eur. Ion* 552, Xuthus significantly describes as *μαινάδες Βακχίου* a company of Bacchantes, one of whom he seduced. How then should the Erinyes of this play bestow the name, without explanation, upon themselves? How could the audience understand it? As maddening others, the Erinyes were sometimes called Madnesses, *Μανίαι* (though the name is not now found in Aeschylus), but were not called, and were not, *μαινάδες*. They were not *possessed* by Bacchus, or *possessed* at all; and if, as pursuers, they might be *compared* to Maenads, though the play does not anywhere else suggest the comparison, this will not account for their being so called, especially by themselves. *Prima facie* *βροτοσκόπων μαινάδων τῶνδε*, 'these *frantic* beings that watch mankind', is an invective; and so, I suspect, it is meant. It is pointed (by *τῶνδε*, cf. *τοῦδε* above) at the departing Athena, whom they call *μαινάς* in derision of her wisdom, and *βροτοσκόπος* in anger at the range of her supervision (*vv.* 293, 296), the promptitude of her interposition (*v.* 400), and her interest in Orestes. The plural is used to include with her any one, any of the 'new gods', who may pretend to abrogate and replace the Erinyes. Criminals (they imply) will have little to fear from powers whose function, apparently,

πάντ' ἐφήσω μόρον, 505
 πεύσεται δ' ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν, προφω-
 νῶν τὰ τῶν πέλας κακά,
 λῆξιν ὑπόδοσίν τε μόχθων,—
 ἄκεά τ' οὐ βέβαια, τλά-
 μων δέ τις [μάταν] παρηγορεῖ. 510
 μηδέ τις κικλησκέτω στρ. β'.
 ξυμφορᾷ τετυμμένος,
 τοῦτ' ἔπος θροοῦμενος·
 ἰὼ δίκαι,
 ἰὼ θρόνοι τ' Ἐρινύων. 515
 ταῦτά τις τάχ' ἂν πατήρ
 ἦ τεκούσα νεοπαθῆς
 οἶκτον οἰκτίσαιτ', ἐπει-
 δὴ πίτνει δόμος δίκας.
 ἔσθ' ὅπου τὸ δεινὸν εὖ, ἀντ. β' 520
 καὶ φρένων ἐπίσκοπον
 δεῖ μένειν καθήμενον·
 ξυμφέρι
 σωφρονεῖν ὑπὸ στένει·

509. ἄκετ' οὐ (with ζτ in margin).

522. δειμαίνει.

is to protect criminals.—See further on v. 510, and at v. 569, Appendix I.

505—508. Murders to punish, there will be in abundance: that will be the Erinyes' revenge. ἐφήσω: I shall loose and launch on mankind, ἐπὶ τοῖς βροτοῖς. See L. and Sc. s.v. ἐφήμι. It means loose, but also more; the Erinyes could produce crime as well as set it free.—πεύσεται... λῆξιν ὑπόδοσίν τε: 'shall be enquiring for a means to stay or diminish the trouble'.—ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν: sufferers by the increase of crime will enquire of one another. προφωνῶν... κακά: predicting (anticipating) that others, their neighbours, will soon suffer too.—The language, λῆξιν... μόχθων, is medical (Headlam, *Class. Rev.* xvii. 286, adducing the adj. ληξιπύρετος, and a verse from Maximus

περὶ καταρχῶν 254, μείωτερον τελέσειε πόνον λῆξιν τ' ὀδυνάων). See also ἄκεα and παρηγορεῖ below.

509, 510. 'And there is no help in the remedies with which impudence comforts [in vain].' ἄκεα Schuetz.—οὐ βέβαια (ἐστὶ): not firm, untrustworthy.—δε βυί, adversative to οὐ.—τλάμων. παθῶν δέ τις μάτην ἑαυτὸν παραμυθεῖται τῇ εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐλπίδι· ἦ, ἕκαστος δὲ τῶν φονέων παρηγορηθήσεται. τλήμων γὰρ ὁ ἀναιδής: "ἦ δ' ὦδε τλήμων", schol. Here, in the second alternative, we seem to have a late and ignorant commentator, who misapplies earlier and better work. The absurd interpretation, 'every impudent person (murderer) will be comforted' (?) by the new impunity, would hardly occur to a reader capable of recalling and proving

visit the deeds,—and I shall launch death at large upon the world, till each, anticipating the next man's fate, shall be asking, one of another, the way to end the woe or lessen it,—so also infirm are the remedies, wherewith impudence comforteth.

Nor let any, upon whom the blow has fallen, raise with loud voice the appeal to 'Justice and the throned Erinyes'. Thus will some father or some mother soon bemoan their altered case, now that the house of Justice is falling down.

There are times when terror is in place and the inquisitor of hearts must bide in his seat. It is good to learn wisdom by

from Sophocles (*El.* 275) the use of τλήμων for ἀναιδής, *impudent*. But the gloss and citation, ἀναιδής· “ἡ δ' ὦδε τλήμων”, are, I believe, right. ΤΙΣ (see on *Theb.* 389, 1027, and *supra* v. 362) is the ΤΙΣ of angry allusion, and points to Athena, being therefore *feminine*, as the quotation from Sophocles suggests. In proposing to replace the justice of the Erinyes by that of her new tribunal, she is like a *quack*, who dissuades the patient from a sharp and effective treatment, soothing and deluding him (παρηγορεῖ) with the assurance that the nostrum will do as well. ΤΛΑΜΩΝ ΔΕ ΤΙΣ ΠΑΡΗΓΟΡΕΙ is literally ‘but *that person* is impudent in her comforting suggestion’. In παρηγορεῖν there is generally, though not necessarily, the idea of *unsound* persuasion, hence ἄδολοι παρηγορίαί in *Ag.* 95.—ΜΑΤΑΝ (?). If v. 501 is, as it seems, complete, v. 510 is too long by an *iambus*. The remedies are to omit either (1) δέ τις (many comm.), or (2) μάταν (Schoemann, with other changes). In favour of (2) there is some positive evidence: the second alternative in the schol., ‘every murderer will be comforted’, ignores and excludes μάταν, and so therefore, in all probability, did the text of the glossator, the citer of Sophocles (see above), a weighty authority. And on the other hand, the insertion of μάταν can be accounted for. If τλάμων τις be rendered ‘the miserable man’, ‘the sufferer’, as by the *first* alternative in the scholium, and if the whole sentence, ἄκα...παρηγορεῖ, is

taken in close connexion with v. 506—509, to add or understand μάτην is necessary to make sense. As to this connexion in itself, it is scarcely admissible, unless for παρηγορεῖ we substitute some future tense, such as ἐρεῖ (Martin). The future question (πέυσεται) should have a future reply.—The true connexion is with v. 502—504 (οὔτε...τε): the new gods will condone crime, and the ‘court’ is unsure; so there will be no restraint at all.

512—519. ΤΟΥΤ' ἔπος: in this form. See on *Theb.* 566.—ἰὼ...ἰὼ: ὦ...ὦ Pauw. See Appendix II.—ταῦτα: *thus*, adverbial to οἶκτον οἰκτίσαιτο.

520—531. *Sometimes terror is good and the inquisitor of hearts must bide in his seat. It is profitable to learn wisdom (even) under constraint. But who, that never recreates his spirit in the light,—be it city, be it man—can have respect for justice any more? Not ungoverned, nor governed tyrannously—such is the life to be praised, etc.—ἔσθ' ὄπου...: ‘There are places (and occasions) where (and when)...’ ὄπου covers both its strict sense, and the looser poetical (δπόρε) as in v. 277.—τὸ δεινόν: the terrors of a punishing and constraining authority.—εὔ (έστ), so εὔ ἔσται Eur. *Med.* 89.—ἐπίσκοπον. The imperial associations of the word are important (note πόλις in v. 527). It was applied (see L. and Sc. *s.v.*) to the *inspectors* or *intendants* sent from time to time to supervise the subject-cities on behalf of Athens. It thus suggests the idea of a*

τίς δὲ μηδὲν ἐν φάει
 καρδίαν ἀνατρέφω
 ἢ πόλις βροτός θ' ὁμοί-
 ως ἔτ' ἂν σέβει δίκαν;
 μήτ' ἀναρκτον βίον
 μήτε δεσποτούμενον
 αἰνέσῃς.

525

παντὶ μέσῳ τὸ κράτος θεὸς ὤπασεν,
 ἄλλ' ἄλλα δ' ἐφορεύει.
 ζύμμετρον δ' ἔπος λέγω·

στρ. γ'.

530

535

532. ἄπαντι.

533, 534. ἄλλα | ἀλλὰ δέ. δ' recc.—ἐφορεύει (ν inserted by m).

power exerted *on occasion* and *where it is required*. The 'inspector' of hearts will not always 'bide in his seat', but he will bide *ὅπου δεῖ*.—*ξυμφέρει* κ.τ.λ.: asyndeton, because a repetition in sense of what precedes.—*δὲ*: *but*, not *and*.—*μηδὲν*: lit. 'not at all'.—*φάει*: metaphorical, for *relief*, *liberty*, as opposed to *στένος*, *confinement*, *constraint*. Cf. *Pers.* 303 *ἐμοῖς μὲν εἶπας δῶμασιν φάος μέγα* (*relief* from a great fear), *Cho.* 970 *πέρα τὸ φῶς ἰδεῖν* (upon the overthrow of a tyranny).—*ἀνατρέφω* in the full sense, 'rear up again, restore'. Cf. *ἀνατρέφειν τὸ φρόνημα*, *ἀνατρέφεσθαι ἐκ νόσου* (L. and Sc. s.v.), and see *ἀναθάλλειν*, *ἀναθαρσεῖν*, *ἀναπλάττειν*, etc.—*ἢ...ὁμοίως*: lit. 'either city, and likewise a man'.—*ἔτι*: after coming under such a tyranny.—The Erinyes, representing a ruder justice, have assailed the proposed institution, a permanent criminal court, as *uncertain*; it will not be, like themselves, inflexible in principle; it will be capable of sparing a matricide (*vv.* 493—519). They now assail it as *oppressive*. 'Terror should be applied to men and societies, as by themselves, upon definite occasion, not, as by the new justice, indefinitely and always. The subjects overshadowed by such a standing inquisition will become a sort of *slaves and prisoners*, broken in spirit and yet rebels at heart. True government is not despotism...' etc. They appropriate to

themselves, as *argumenta ad homines*, the Hellenic and Attic commonplaces on the golden mean. The argument is partly fallacious, and so intended; but it has nevertheless a grave bearing upon the scope of the play. As a matter of fact, the Areopagus had exercised, not merely the jurisdiction overspecified crimes, which is illustrated by the case of Orestes, but also a general censorship (*κολάζουσα καὶ ζημουσα πάντα τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας κυρίως*, Aristotle *Ath. Pol.* 3, 6); and this power, 'restored' according to tradition by Solon, was denoted by the very word which Aeschylus here uses, *ἐπίσκοπος inquisitor*: *τὴν δὲ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν ἔταξεν ἐπὶ τὸ νομοφυλακεῖν, ὥσπερ ὑπῆρχεν καὶ πρότερον ἐπίσκοπος οὖσα τῆς πολιτείας, ... καὶ τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας εἴθνην κυρία οὖσα καὶ ζημοῦν καὶ κολάζειν κ.τ.λ.*, *ib.* 8, 4, *ἐπίσκοπον πάντων καὶ φύλακα τῶν νόμων ἐκάθισεν* Plutarch, *Solon* 19; cf. the *μένειν καθημέρον* of Aeschylus. But this censorship, extended after the Persian wars, was about this time *abolished as tyrannical* by a democratic revolution (Gilbert, *Constitutional Antiquities*, pp. 115, 137, 154 Eng. transl., Grote, *Hist. Gr.*, see Index s.v. *Areopagus*). Against the Areopagus *in this aspect*, the argument here is by no means evidently fallacious, nor proved to be so by the play; on the contrary the very words of it are echoed by Athena herself in founding the court (*v.* 699).

duress. But who, that never refreshes his spirit in the light, be it city or be it man, can have respect for justice any more?

Not ungoverned, nor governed tyrannously,—such is the life to be praised. God, variable otherwise in his government, gives in all things superiority to the moderate. And a maxim of like

Thus Aeschylus, while defending the *limited* institution, avoids committing himself to a general conflict with the prevalent sentiment, a precaution probably essential to the success of his work.—**δει μένειν** 'anonymus apud Dobraeum'; οὐ πανταχῆ τὸ δεινὸν ἀπέιναι φρενῶν δει schol.—We cannot explain this passage as merely a general argument in favour of τὸ δεινόν. Against this are (1) **ἔσθ' ὄπου...**, which implies the 'not good' as well as the 'good'; (2) **φάει**, for which Auratus, followed by modern editors generally, substituted **δέει**; (3) **ἀνατρέφων καρδίαν**, which cannot signify the effect of fear; (4) **μήτ' ἀναρκτον κ.τ.λ.**, which indicates that the foregoing remarks are two-sided, criticising, as well as defending, the principle of authority.—It is however true, that both sides of the argument have weight, the **ἔσθ' ὄπου εὖ** as well as the **ἔσθ' ὄπου οὐκ εὖ**, and that the first is *hereafter* emphasized by Athena as the more important (v. 701). But that is not the present purpose of the Erinyes.—It is possible to take **ὄπου...καθήμενον** as having only one verb (**δεί**), not two (**ἔστί...καὶ δέει**). Then **ἐπίσκοπον** will be part of the predicate ('as inspector'), and **καὶ** (also, with **φρενῶν**) will mean 'of hearts, as of cities'. I prefer to supply **ἔστί**.

529. On the metre see Appendix II.

532—4. **μέσῳ** (**δντλ**), when it is moderate. Everything (including government) attains its (**τὸ**) best by moderation.—**ἄλλ' ἄλλα** (Wellauer).—**ἄλλ' ἄλλα δ' ἐφορεύει** "serves only to emphasize the principal thought, as at v. 653 τὰ δ' ἄλλ' ἄνω τε κ.τ.λ. To the mean God gives surely and always the preference, although generally he views (*ansieht*) this thing in one way and that in another: i.e., if there is anything upon which the favourable

judgment of the deity is constant, that thing is the just mean" (Wecklein). **ἐφορεύει** however seems to be rather *superintends*, *administers* (**ἐφορος**) than *views*. **ἄλλ' ἄλλα δέ** is put briefly for τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἄλλ' ἄλλα.—**ἐφορεύει** m. But **ἐφορέει** (M) from **ὄρέω** is possibly what Aeschylus wrote, pronouncing it either **ἐφορῆει** or **ἐφορείει**, i.e. **ἐφορᾶ** (schol.). These forms are not correct, but to a non-scientific ear, and for the purpose of poetry, they may be as good as **πνείοντες** (*breathings*), **ὄρηαι** (*thou seest*), **ἀδικήει** (*injures*), and other dialectic, archaic, or pseudo-archaic forms found in the Epos and other ancient literature. Have we the means of ascertaining the limits actually felt or observed in such matters by Aeschylus in his choric language?

535—540. **ξύμμετρον ἔπος**: 'a maxim (verse) of the same measure'; i.e. pointing, like the former, to τὸ μέσον, *the moderate*. But this is only half the meaning. The conjunction of **ἔπος** (verse) and **μέτρον** naturally suggests *metre*, and in fact the two **ἔπη**, which Aeschylus has embodied, are metrically equal, (1) **παντὶ μέσῳ τὸ κράτος θεὸς ὥπασε**, and (2) **δυσσεβίας ὕβρις** (or **κόρος**, see below) **ὡς ἐτόμως τέκος**, both dactylic dimeters. Apparently they come from some collection of **γῶμαι**, resembling 'Phocylides' or the 'Ὁμήρου ῥήματα' cited by Pindar in *Pyth.* 4. 277, but drawn from lyrics and grouped by metres. **ξύμμετρον** is thus itself equivocal; see next note.—**ὡς ἐτόμως**: as the name reveals, see on vv. 491, 499. The *etymon*, or mystic equivocation indicated, turns upon **κόρος**, meaning both *son* (**τέκος**) and *insolence*. It was especially famous, and is noted by Aeschylus again in *Supp.* 83, as well as by other poets. See Appendix to my edition of the *Seven*

δυσσεβίας μὲν ὕβρις τέκος ὡς ἐτύμως,
 ἐκ δ' ὑγιείας
 φρενῶν ὁ πᾶσιν φίλος
 καὶ πολύευκτος ὄλβος. 540
 ἐς τὸ πᾶν δέ σοι λέγω· ἀντ. γ'.
 βωμὸν αἰδεσθαι δίκας,
 μηδέ νιν
 κέρδος ἰδὼν ἀθέω ποδὶ λάξ ἀτί- 545
 σης· ποινὰ γὰρ ἐπέσται.
 κύριον μένει τέλος.
 πρὸς τάδε τις τοκέων σέβας εὖ προτίων
 καὶ ξενοτίμους 550
 δωμάτων ἐπιστροφὰς
 αἰδόμενός τις ἔστω.
 ἐκ τῶνδ' ἀνάγκας ἄτερ στρ. δ'.
 δίκαιος ὢν οὐκ ἄνολβος ἔσται·
 πανώλεθρος <δ'> οὐποτ', <οὐποτ'> ἂν γένοιτο.
 τὸν ἀντίτολμον δὲ φამί <περ> περαι- 556
 βάδαν τὰ πολλὰ παντόφυρτ' ἄνευ δίκης
 536. δυσσεβείασ. 539. πᾶσι.

Against Thebes. As in *v.* 491 and sometimes elsewhere, the *etymon*, being familiar, is conveyed allusively, the keyword (*κόρος*) being left to the hearer. This is a first step to the view, which soon became prevalent, that such points are dubious both in force and taste. Aeschylus is the only serious Greek writer extant, who uses them frequently. The present instance is perhaps the strongest *single* testimony to the Aeschylean sense of *ἔτυμος*. Except for the *etymon* or *etymology*, ὡς ἐτύμως (note especially ὡς) is pointless. The proof however rests on no single instance, but on the comparison and total of them.—ἐκ δ' ὑγ. φρενῶν τέκος ἐστὶ, *i.e.* γίγνεται.—πᾶσιν, Heath.

541—552. ἐς τὸ πᾶν: generally, universally; *i.e.* apart from the polemical and temporary refutation which they

have given to Athena's proposal. There is no ground for suspecting ἐς τὸ πᾶν, as I formerly suggested.—σοι: general, 'anyone', but the personal term sharpens the note. In effect, the warning is addressed to the Athenian people.—βωμὸν: base, foundation (not 'altar'); see λάξ ἀτίσης below, and on *Ag.* 394 λακτίσαντι...δίκας βωμῶν.—κέρδος. Orestes began (*v.* 289) with an appeal to Athenian interests, and the prosecutors expect, with reason (*vv.* 670 foll.), that this will be urged upon the jury.—νιν: βωμῶν.—πρὸς τάδε...ἔστω: 'Therefore let a man, duly putting first reverence for parents, be also a respecter of the stranger who comes with privilege to the house.'—προτίων: preferring, putting before: προτίω, προτιμῶ, with *obj. acc.* as here, generally (perhaps always) mark some comparison, some other object

measure it is, that insolence is the very 'child' of impiety; but from healthfulness of soul cometh what all desire and pray for,—happiness.

In all things, I say to a man, respect the sacred base of right, nor spurn it with godless and dishonouring foot, though thou see a profit thereby. For punishment shall await thee, the sure and certain end. Wherefore let each honour duly before all the sacredness of a parent, and be likewise a respector of the stranger, the reverend guest within his gates.

He who, according to this law, is without compulsion just, shall not miss happiness, and never, never can be utterly undone. As for the bold offender, all the mass, I trow, which by transgres-

relatively postponed. The construction with the genitive (οὐδὲν προτιμῶν του = οὐδὲν φροντίζω, *Ag.* 1672), and the absolute use, should be distinguished. Here the comparison can only be between *τοκέες* and *ξένοι*, which indicates that *καί* is *also*, not *and*. The sense confirms this. The Erinyes, as they here imply, guarded the rights both of the family and of *ξένοι* (and Orestes is liable to them on both counts; see on *Cho.* 624 foll., and *supra* v. 202); but that 'parents come first' is just now a cardinal point for them, since Orestes is the *ξένος* of Athena and Athens, and is offering himself as *δορυξένος* (see v. 439 and the sequel), so that the *αἰδώς ξένου* is likely to tell in his favour. The participial part of the sentence (*τοκέων σεβ. εἰ προτ.*) contains, as often in Greek, the pith of it.—*ξενότιμος ἐπιστροφάς*: τοὺς ἐπιστρεφόμενους, τιμὴν ἔχοντας ξένων. Or *ξενότιμος* may be predicate, with *αἰδόμενος* (Wecklein).—*αἰδόμενός τις ἔστω*: not *αἰδέσθω*, but differing precisely as in English 'be a respector of' from 'respect'. It marks a *general principle*, which will give way, in case of conflict, to the higher claim. Note that the presence of *τις* (a substantive) in the predicate distinguishes this from cases where *εἶναι* with participle makes a compound verb; see *supra* 252, and note on *Cho.* 136.—On the metre see Appendix II.

553—555. *ἐκ τῶνδ'...ῶν*: 'He who on these principles is without compulsion just,' *i.e.* who regulates justice by these principles. For *ἐκ* according to, see L. and Sc. *s.v.* III. 6, Kühner, *Gr. Gramm.* § 430, 2 f. So Demosth. 8. 8, *εἰ ἐκ τούτων τὰ δίκαια τίθενται καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ταύτην ὀρίζονται*, Plato, *Rep.* 465 B *ἐκ τῶν νόμων εἰρήνην πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀξιοῦσι*, Aeschyl. *frag.* 233 *ἐκ Προμηθέως λόγου according to the bidding (or description) of Prometheus*. Akin but different is *ἐκ τῶνδε* (τοῦ) *in consequence of*, v. 787, and see Dindorf, *Lex. Aeschyl. s.v.* The *τάδε* are the foregoing doctrines, and especially the 'foundation' just mentioned, vv. 548—552.—The emphatic *ἐκ τῶνδε* is here appropriate and required. The Erinyes are contending not for 'justice' in general, but for *their own view* of justice, as opposed to the threatened innovations of Athena and her court. We should not therefore substitute *ἐκὼν δ'* (Wieseler and others). See further Appendix II.—*ἀνάγκας ἀπερ.* The Erinyes do not prevent disobedience by constraint (see v. 520 foll.), but they punish, in certain cases, inexorably. The acquittal of a matricide will be one of these cases.—*οὔποτ', οὔποτ'*: as in *P. V.* 715, Eur. *Andr.* 943. See on v. 563.

556—560. 'But as for the daring offender, he, I warrant, shall one day drop perforce all his mingled mass of

βιαίως ξὺν χρόνῳ καθήσειν,

λαΐφος ὅταν λάβῃ πόνος

θρανομένας κεραίας.

560

καλεῖ δ' ἀκούοντας οὐ-

ἀντ. δ'.

δὲν < ἐν > μέσῃ δυσπαλεῖ τε δίνα·

γελᾷ δὲ δαίμων ἐπ' ἀνδρὶ θερμοεργῷ,

τὸν οὐποτ' αὐχοῦντ' ἰδὼν ἀμηχάνοις

δύαις λαπαδνὸν οὐδ' ὑπερθέοντ' ἄκραν·

565

δι' αἰῶνος δὲ τὸν πρὶν, ὄλβον

562. ἐν omitted—δυσπαλεῖται δίναι.

563. θερμοεργῷ. θερμῷ rec.

565. λέπαδνον.

unjust encroachments, when distress descends upon his sail, and the yard is strained to breaking.'—**φαμί, περ...**: imitated from Homeric phrases, such as *θ. 212* (With my *ξένος* I will not fight) *τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐ πέρ τι' ἀναίνομαι*, 'but as for the rest, one of *them* I quite accept'; *Ξ. 416 τὸν δ' οὐ περ ἔχει θράσος δὲ κεν ἰδῆται | ἐγγὺς ἐών*, 'and even he who sees it (a tree struck by lightning), if near, is surely scared.' The effect here would be to emphasize the positive assertion in contrast with the preceding negative, as in *θ. 212* it emphasizes the negative in contrast to the preceding positive. As to the reading see further below.—**περαιβάδαν**, or rather **παραιβάδαν** (*παραιβάταν* Turnebus): literally 'transgressively', 'by transgression' or 'encroachment' (*παράβασις*): cf. *ἀναβάδην, καταβάδην, διαρρύδην* (Aesch.) etc. The prefix *περαι-* (= *πέρᾳ beyond*) seems to be unique, and is (I presume) not scientifically correct; but the *apparent* analogy of *παραι-* (*παρα-*), *καται-*, *μεται-* might suggest and explain it to the ear, and it cannot, I think, safely be declared impossible. The adv. is constructed with **παντόφυρτα** (*τὰ πολλὰ περαιβάδαν ἀνευ δίκης παντόφ.*), but is thrown forward, as in *βροτοῖς τὸν ἀειμνηστον τάφον* (i.e. *τὸν βρ. ἀειμν.*) *Soph. Αἰ. 1166, δι' αἰῶνος ἰψίφα* 566, etc. Strictly, this position

should mark an emphasis (see examples in Kühner *Gr. Gramm.* § 464, 2, but note the citation from Sophocles and parallels given there by Jebb), and it probably does so here.—**καθήσειν**: *δροφ, let fall*, as a pirate his stolen cargo into the sea, in order to lighten the labouring ship. The obj. must be *τὰ πολλὰ κ.τ.λ.* (not, unless the text is to be boldly altered, *λαΐφος*). Nor will this present difficulty, if it be remembered (1) that this denunciation is directed against the Areopagus, and (2) in what position the Areopagus stood, as a political institution, when this play was produced. A popular revolution (see on *νν. 520* foll.) was just wresting from it a vast, irregular and miscellaneous censorship, which, according to the reformers, the Council had usurped. In these circumstances 'the universal mass compounded by unjust encroachment', which 'the offender shall be forced to let fall', is an image not hard to interpret and apply, when presented by those who have just before prophetically denounced the Areopagus as an engine of oppression.—I suggest *περ* as the most probable form of the syllable which (see *v. 564*) appears to be lost before *περ-αιβάδαν*. The similarity of the following letters, *περ-* (or *παρ-*), would account for the loss, the more easily as such a use of the particle

sion he hath unjustly mixed, he in due time perforce shall drop, when the yard-arm is breaking and distress lays hold on the sail.

Then, in the midst of the whirl, he calls to deaf ears and agonizes, while heaven laughs at the rash sinner, to see one, who defied fate, now broken by calamity, and powerless to top the wave. And thus, with the ship of his life-long fortune, he runs

is archaic, and therefore unfamiliar. But the suggestion cannot be proved, and other supplements, such as *τοι*, are admissible. To keep *πραιβάδαν* (or *πραιβάδαν*) seems imperative: we can hardly suppose that such a word, unique but natural, was evolved by accident. This is an objection to those conjectures (e.g. *παρβάδαν ἀγοντα πολλά* O. Müller) which introduce a participle to govern *πολλά*, and leave *καθήσειν* to govern *λαῖφος*: 'he shall let down his sail'. Moreover this sense is less appropriate to the context; when 'the yard is breaking', the 'distressed sail' often *cannot* be let down. In Hom. *Od.* ι. 72, cited for *καθιέναι ἱστία*, the accident described is the 'rending of the sail', a different thing.—The scholia, *παραβεβηκότα* (v. 556), *πάντοθεν συνηγμένα* (v. 557), do not necessarily presume any other text than that of M. The second may support *παντόςφυρτα* (*swept all together*, Meineke), which also fits more smoothly with the adverb. But *παντόφυρτα* is probably right.

561—568. *καλεῖ*: may be either future and particular (like *καθήσειν*), or present and general, painting the sequel vividly. *γελᾷ* and *ᾤλετο* (v. 568) point to a present tense here. This will be certain if *δυσπαλεῖ* (cf. *δυσμαχεῖν*, *δυσοδεῖν*, *δυστοκεῖν*) be a verb, *struggles*. It may, however, be taken as an adj., and the position of *τε* favours this. On the other hand *μέση δυσπαλής τε* is, as Paley suggests, not a very natural combination of epithets.—*ἐν* Abresch. *τε* Turnebus.—*θερμοεργῶ*: antique form, with lost digamma.—*θερμῶ* cod. Farn. (h), a conjecture to suit v. 555 as given by M, and perhaps right. But if *θερμοεργῶ*

were an explanatory gloss, should we not rather expect the common-place form *θερμοεργῶ*?—*τὸν οὔποτ' αὐχούντα* (*τοιοῦτον τι γενήσεσθαι*): 'who fancied it impossible', cf. *Ag.* 511, *P. V.* 715.—*λαπαδνόν* (Musgrave) with *δύαις*, *weak*, *broken* by distresses. Prof. Tyrrell (*Class. Rev.* VI. 301), and others, retain *λέπαδνον collar, yoke*, and emend on the model of *Ag.* 228 *ἀνάγκας ἔδν λέπαδνον*, e.g. *τὸν οὔποτ' αὐχούντ' ἀμαχανίας δέειν* (?) | *λέπαδνον*, answering metrically to v. 556 as given by the MS. But can we safely displace *ἰδῶν*?—*οὐδ'... ἄκραν*: *and unable to ride the wave*, lit. 'not over-running the top'; cf. *Eur. frag.* 232 *οὐ γὰρ ὑπερθεῖν κύματος ἄκραν* | *δυνάμεσθ'*. *ἔτι γὰρ βάλλει πενία*, | *κακὸν ἐχθιστον, φεύγει δ' ἄλβος*, *Theogn.* 619 *πόλλ' ἐν ἀμηχανίῃσι κυλινδομαι ἀχνύμενος κῆρ*. | *ἄκρην γὰρ πενίης οὐχ ὑπερεδράμομεν* (Hermann).—The alternative interpretation, 'not weathering the promontory', would anticipate, and thus somewhat spoil, the effect of *ἔρματι προσβαλῶν*.—*δι' αἰῶνος δὲ τὸν πρὶν ἄλβον*: *τὸν δι' αἰῶνος πρὶν ἄλβον*, 'his hitherto perpetual prosperity', with emphasis on *δι' αἰῶνος*: see on v. 556. So the schol., *τὸν πολυχρόνιον δὲ ἄλβον ἑαυτοῦ προσκρούσας τῷ βράχει τῆς δικῆς ᾤλετο*. It is because he has been prosperous *all his days hitherto*, that the criminal is so confident (v. 564). Cf. *Supp.* 589 *γείνατο παῖδ' ἀμεμφῆ, δι' αἰῶνος μακροῦ πάνολβον*, *Ag.* 558 *τίς δὲ πλὴν θεῶν | ἅπαντ' ἀπήμιων τὸν δι' αἰῶνος χρόνον*; *Cho.* 26, *Soph. El.* 1024, *Eur. Alc.* 475, etc.—An alternative is to take together *δι' αἰῶνος... ᾤλετο*, he is lost 'to all time' (Paley), for ever. But (1) the use of *δι' αἰῶνος*, with such a verb and

ἔρματι προσβαλὼν δίκας
ᾤλετ' ἄκλαυστος, αἴστος.

AΘ. κήρυσσε, κήρυξ, καὶ στρατὸν κατειργαθού.—

ἔιτ' οὖν † διάτορος Τυρσηνικὴ
σάλπιγξ, βροτείου πνεύματος πληρουμένη,
ὑπέρτονον γήρυμα φαινέτω στρατῶ.—
πληρουμένου γὰρ τοῦδε βουλευτηρίου
σιγᾶν ἀρήγει, καὶ μαθεῖν θεσμοὺς ἐμοὺς

570

569. κατεργάθου.

tense as ᾤλετο, seems to be without example and improper; it should signify *continuity*, as in the exx. cited: and (2) the proximity of τὸν πρὶν ἄλβον, with which δι' αἰῶνος can be taken in its ordinary sense, would almost force this connexion upon a hearer.—**αἴστος**: ἄστος Porson; see Appendix II.

568. Here, as I think most probable, the Chorus leave the scene, their exit being accompanied by music. For a discussion of this point, and the place of action in the following scene, see Appendix I.

569. Enter a herald, Athena, the Areopagite jury (for their number see on *vv.* 687, 714), Orestes, and the Chorus.—**κήρυσσε**: supply σιγᾶν or σίγα, *call (for silence)*; cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 1225 σίγα κηρύξαι στρατῶ (Wecklein).—**στρατὸν**: *the folk*, but with the suggestion that they are assembled and drawn up *in order*. This explicit reference to a crowd of Athenians, spectators of the trial, and to the action of the herald in confining them to their place and calling them to order, does not perhaps prove that any crowd, or any performers representing it, are actually visible; but it does (I think) raise a presumption that such is the case. My own belief is that in this scene, as in the final scenes of the

Agamemnon and *Choephoroi*, we have a very large number of supernumeraries, as many as there was room for. They enter at the close of the procession, and when they have been 'ordered' by the herald, are so placed, filling the visible part of the *parodoi*, as to suggest the presence of a great multitude. Further reasons for this supposition will appear, from time to time, in the course of the scene.—**κατειργαθού**: Porson, Dindorf. *κατεργάθου* M: *restrain, keep back*.

570. Reading uncertain. The most attractive, because it explains the loss by similarity of letters, is one of Hermann's, **διάκτωρ διάτορος**. The word *διάκτωρ conductor*, though ill-certified, is probable, especially (cf. *διάκτορος* Ἐρμῆς) in this connexion; but it is then hard to deal with *ἔιτ' οὖν*. Others (after Askew) hold that *οὖν* is the contraction for *οὐρανόν*, and the sense 'piercing the sky': e.g. *εἰς οὐρανόν δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Such contractions are not common in M, but see *ἄραν* (apparently for *ἀνθρώπων*) in *v.* 183. The sense is good; but I have before suggested, and think still, that the addition 'filled with breath of mortal' points to the previous association of the trumpet with some *god*, such as Ἐριουίου **δὲ διάτορος κ.τ.λ.**, *the trumpet of Eriou-*

upon the reef of Justice,...and is lost...unlamented, unremembered. (*Exeunt.*)

ACT III.

The scene is a place of judgment at Athens, apparently the Hill of Ares or Areopagus. Enter, in procession, a Herald, the Jury of Areopagites, the ERINYES, ORESTES, and ATHENA, followed by a crowd of Citizens, till the place is full.

Athena. Proclaim the session, Herald, and bid the folk to their place. And let the piercing Tyrrhene trump, the trump of Hermes (?), filled with the breath of man, utter to all the host a high-sounding cry. (*Trumpet.*)

For while this place of council is filling, it is profitable that there be silence, and that mine ordinance be made known, both

nios, i.e. Hermes Chthonios, the Herald of the Underworld. Since the Areopagite court, in relation to matters of blood, was itself regarded as *χθόνιος* (Soph. *O. C.* 947), and among those who attended its summons would be *the spirits* concerned in the case (*v.* 641), the association is natural enough. There would also be a dramatic propriety in the mention of Hermes here. To the guardianship of Hermes Orestes is committed by Apollo (*v.* 90), and we must suppose that, seen or unseen, he has discharged the trust. Now this trumpet summons *Apollo himself* (see below), and is therefore, in this aspect, the call of Hermes remitting his charge.—**Τυρσηνική**: epith. of the trumpet also in Eur. *Phoen.* 1377, Soph. *Ai.* 17. It probably marks a particular kind of trumpet, and here that form (whatever it was) which was actually employed by the Areopagus. It seems (see Jebb on Soph. *l.c.*) that two forms might be so distinguished. For the carrying power of the *Τυρσηνική* cf. Soph. *l.c.*, where, probably in recollection of the *Eumenides*, it is likened to a *divine voice supernaturally audible*. It speaks here both for Athena and for Hermes, and is heard at least as far

as Delphi. This trumpet may be classed with the 'purple carpet' of the *Agamemnon* (901), as a supreme example of stage-effect.

572. **στρατῶ**.—A pause. Trumpet. Athena continues.

573. **πληρουμένον**: *while it* (the court) *is filling*. This word is open to objection, since (1) there is no apparent significance in the echo of *πληρουμένη* (*v.* 571), and (2) the instructions of the goddess (*v.* 574) would naturally not be given until the audience were in their places. On the other hand, proposed substitutes (*κληρουμένον* Burges, *καθημένον* Heimsoeth, *ιδρυμένον* Weil) are not satisfactory. I believe that **πληρουμένον** is intended to surprise the ear. The court is now apparently *full, complete*, and everything ready for the opening. But Athena speaks as if it were *still incomplete*, because she knows that, for this occasion, the presence of *Apollo* is necessary, and that he will respond to the summons. Her expression is designed, by the poet, to awake and sustain the expectation of the theatre. See following notes.

574. **ἀρήγαι**: *συμφέρει* schol., *aids, is expedient*.

574—576. **καὶ μαθεῖν...δίκη**: *and that*

πόλιν τε πάσαν εἰς τὸν αἰανῆ χρόνον... 575

καὶ τόνδ', ὅπως ἂν εὖ καταγνωσθῆ δίκη.—

ΧΟ. ἀναξ Ἄπολλον, ὦν ἔχεις αὐτὸς κράτει.

τί τοῦδε σοὶ μέτεστι πράγματος, λέγε.

ΑΠ. καὶ μαρτυρήσων ἦλθον—ἔστι γὰρ δόμων

ικέτης ὃδ' ἀνήρ καὶ δόμων ἐφέστιος. 580

ἐμῶν, φόνου δὲ τοῦδ' ἐγὼ καθάρσιος—

καὶ ξυνδικήσων αὐτός· αἰτίαν δ' ἔχω

τῆς τοῦδε μητρὸς τοῦ φόνου.—σὺ δ' εἴσαγε.—

ὅπως ἐπίστα τήνδε κύρωσον δίκην.

ΑΘ. ἰμῶν ὁ μῦθος,—εἰσάγω δὲ τὴν δίκην,— 585

576. δίκη. δίκη recc.

578. τοῦδέ σοι.

579. δημων corrected to δόμων.

580. ἀνήρ.

583. τοῦδε φόνου.

what I ordain be heard both by all the city for (the purposes of) all time to come... (Apollo enters and takes his place by the side of Orestes)...and (pointing) by this deity, that sentence against him (if so it should be) may be given duly.—**θεσμούς ἐμούς**: the formal institution of the court and directions for its procedure,—such an address, but with more detail, as now comes after the arguments (*vv.* 684 foll.). It would naturally have come here, before the opening, but is interrupted and deferred by the appearance of Apollo. He, with a sort of haughty deference, waives all explanation, and requests that the cause be called at once, and the presiding goddess complies (*vv.* 583—585). In fact, from a theatrical point of view, Athena's speech is commenced here only in order that it may be interrupted, and that the advent of Apollo may produce, so far as possible, an effect adequate to his dignity and importance.—**πόλιν πᾶσαν**: the στρατός of *v.* 569.—**καὶ τόνδε κ.τ.λ.** We expect *καὶ τοῦσδε...*, and the jury too, for the present purpose of this cause; but Athena, who, and who alone, is expecting Apollo, calmly continues the sentence as she intended.—**ὅπως ἂν...** The *ἂν* qualifies the final clause, as often, by suggesting contingency. Apollo is

virtually co-defendant (*vv.* 468, 582), and the court may condemn him (καταγωγή *ἂν αὐτοῦ*). In view of that possible result, the president of the court offers to satisfy him as to its constitution and intended procedure.—**καταγνωσθῆ**. The subject is Apollo. For the passive, and the dative **δίκη**, cf. ψήφω θανάτου κατακεκριμένον Eur. *Andr.* 406, and see καταφρονεῖσθαι. The nom. **δίκη** (recc.) makes the sentence more regular, but less clear.—The reference of *τόνδε* to Apollo, with the corresponding stage-directions, will, I hope, clear this passage. Without them, the sentence as given cannot be interpreted, and expedients are proposed (*e.g.* *τούσδε, ἐκ τῶνδε, διαγνώσθη*) to remedy the text. To supply *τὸν χρόνον* with *τόνδε* (*the present time*), and join it to *τὸν αἰανῆ χρόνον*, leaves *τε* without construction.—The schol. to *v.* 576 (*τῶν Ἀρειοπαγιδῶν*) does not assume *τῶνδε* in the text. It assumes and confirms *τόνδε*. The commentator, seeing no other way, took *θεσμούς ἐμούς* (*my foundations*), as subject (not object) of *σιγᾶν καὶ μαθεῖν*, and *πόλιν τε πᾶσαν καὶ τόνδε* (*θεσμόν*) as in apposition to *θεσμούς ἐμούς*. Relying probably on the fact, that the judges are addressed (*v.* 617) as *ὑμᾶς τόνδε Ἀθηναίαις...θεσμόν* (schol. *τὸν Ἀρειοπαγιδικόν*),

to this whole city for everlasting time...(*Enter* APOLLO, *who takes his place by the side of* ORESTES)...and to this deity, that sentence, if so be, against him may be fairly given. (*Astonishment and great sensation.*)

Erinyes. Lord Apollo, use thou thy power over that which is thine own. What share in this present matter, say, hast thou?

Apollo. I am come, first as a witness,—for mine was the house and mine the hearth which received this man as suppliant, and I am in this case the purgator of blood,—and also as myself defendant with him, having been the cause of the slaying of his mother.

Do thou (*to Athena*) bring this trial on. Thou, by thy skill, shalt warrant the form thereof.

Athena (to the Erinyes). The word is with you....I bring the

he explained τῶνδε (θεσμῶν) by τῶν Ἀρειοπαγιδῶν (θεσμῶν). He thus reached the foregone conclusion that τῶνδε should mean *the court*, and would render the whole thus: 'My foundations, that is to say, my city as a whole and my present foundation, *the Areopagites*, should be silent and receive instruction.'—τῶνδε recc.

577. ὦν...κράτει: 'in what is properly yours be master' and there only, *i.e.* 'do not interfere with what belongs to others'.

579—581. μαρτυρήσων: as witness to the ceremonial purification, see *vv.* 450 foll. The proper witness was naturally the performer.—δῶμων ἰκέτης...δῶμων ἐφέστιος. The *house* and *hearth* were the first and essential requirements of the ceremony; *vv.* 169, 205, 455, etc. *Qua* witness, Apollo appears as *the householder* concerned. The repetition of δῶμων signifies this, and is therefore correct.—καθάριος: here καθαρήs: similarly but with slight difference in *v.* 452.

582. ξυνδικήσων αὐτός: 'to plead as myself defendant'.

583. τοῦ Turnebus.—σὺ: to Athena.—εἰσαγε: 'bring in' the cause, as magistrate (*εἰσαγωγεύς*) to dikastery (jury), the technical Athenian term for 'authorize the proceedings to commence'.

584. 'Let *your wisdom* secure the validity of the present proceeding'—to give the sense prosaically. Lit. 'As you know how (and not otherwise), make the sentence valid in this case.' See *v.* 576, which explains this. Apollo, waiving Athena's offer to justify the tribunal by a general exposition, applicable to this and all future cases, says that, for the validity of the procedure and sentence in *this* case (τῆνδε), he will rely upon her prudence in directing them. His tone, here and throughout, is both deferential and peremptory, a style probably not without contemporary examples under the widening jurisdiction of the Athenian courts. So might speak the emissary from some noble of Thessaly or of the Thracian border, descendant of kings, who found himself compelled by his interests to seek law under the Acropolis from a committee of sailors and tradesmen. As a character, Apollo is the most interesting personage in the play.—No correction is needed, not even a copula (ὅπως τ' ἐπίστα Hermann). At εἰσαγε there is a full-stop and pause: ὅπως κ.τ.λ. is an afterthought, and the abruptness therefore intentional.

585. ἑμῶν: to the Erinyes, 'La parole est à vous'.—εἰσάγω...δικήν. This should have come first, but, under Apollo's

ὁ γὰρ διώκων πρότερος ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγων
γένοιτ' ἂν ὀρθῶς πράγματος διδάσκαλος.

ΧΟ. πολλαὶ μὲν ἔσμεν, λέξομεν δὲ συντόμως.
ἔπος δ' ἀμείβου πρὸς ἔπος ἐν μέρει τιθείς.—
τὴν μητέρ' εἶπε πρῶτον εἰ κατέκτονας. 590

ΟΡ. ἔκτεινα· τούτου δ' οὔτις ἄρνησις πέλει.

ΧΟ. ἐν μὲν τόδ' ἤδη τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων.

ΟΡ. οὐ κειμένῳ πῶ τόνδε κομπάζεις λόγον.

ΧΟ. εἰπεῖν γε μέντοι δεῖ σ' ὅπως κατέκτανες.

ΟΡ. λέγω· ξιφουλκῶ χειρί· πρὸς, δέρην τεμών. 595

ΧΟ. πρὸς τοῦ δ' ἐπίεσθης καὶ τίνος βουλευμασιν;

ΟΡ. τοῖς τοῦδε θεσφάτοισι· μαρτυρεῖ δέ μοι.

ΧΟ. ὁ μάντις ἐξηγείτό σοι μητροκτονεῖν;

ΟΡ. καὶ δεῦρό γ' αἰεὶ τὴν τύχην οὐ μέμφομαι.

precipitancy, she had almost omitted the formula.—*ὄρα τὸ δικαστήριον*, schol. This strange note is, I believe, genuine, and not without interest as a curiosity of erudition. The writer, seeing that *εἰσαγῶ δὲ τὴν δίκην* (so read) interrupts the address to the prosecutors, and not seeing that this effect is intentional, read *εἰσαγῶ* (i.e. *εἰσαγάω*, deponent imperative, see *ἀγάομαι*, *ἀγάζομαι*, *ἀγαμαι*) 'regard with reverence' (*ἀγῆ· τιμῆ, σεβασμὸς* Hesych.), and took it for a warning to the leader of the Erinyes, who might certainly need one, to 'be respectful to the court' in whatever she might say. For *δίκην· δικαστήριον*, see L. and Sc. s.v. Wrong as it is, the suggestion shows learning and method, and must be very ancient, older possibly than the general establishment of accents.

588. The Leader seems here to expect that, in setting forth the prosecutors' case by means of an examination of the defendant, each member of the Chorus will have occasion to speak. It has been inferred (Wecklein) that, before the end of the examination (v. 611), *all* have actually spoken. But this hardly follows. If, when Orestes is driven to abandon his own defence and refer himself to

Apollo (v. 612, where note *ἦδη*), the prosecutors are *not* exhausted, his defeat, the point of the dialogue, is the more conspicuous. As to the number of the Chorus (12 or 15), see the Introduction. The speeches here (vv. 588—611) can be made 12, if vv. 588—590 or 610, 611 be divided, as they may be, between two. They cannot easily be made 15. But no inference as to the number of the Chorus can safely be drawn from this.

590, 591. *κατέκτονας...ἔκτεινα*. Note the change of tense (...*art the murderer of ... , ...killed...*). The pf. denotes a present effect of the act on Orestes' position; the aor. admits the act, but that only. Hence οὐ κειμένῳ πῶ in v. 593.

592. *τῶν τριῶν*: *the three falls required for a defeat in wrestling: ἀπὸ τῶν παλαιόντων, οἱ ἐπὶ τοῖς τρισὶ πτώμασι ὀρίζουσι τὴν ἡτταν*, schol. Cf. Plato, *Phaedr.*, p. 256 B, and see *τριάξω, τριακτῆρ*.

593. οὐ κειμένῳ πῶ: *before* (the wrestler) *is done*. Orestes (see above) has *not* allowed their point.—For the dative 'absolute' as it may be called, indicating the circumstances of an act, as the genitive indicates the origin, see *Agamemnon*, Appendix Z.

594—597. ὅπως κατέκτανες: am-

trial on—...for at the commencement, the pursuer, speaking first, will fitly lay information of the cause.

The Erinyes (*speaking successively, one by one*). Many we are to speak, but our speech shall be brief. Sentence for sentence (*to Orestes*), make thou alternate answer. Say first, whether or no thou art thy mother's murderer.

Orestes. I did the deed. Of the fact there is no denial.

Erin. Here is already one of the 'three falls'!

Or. Thou makest the boast before the foe is down.

Erin. Ay, but how didst thou do it? Thou must answer that.

Or. With my bare sword, I answer; and further, by cutting her throat!

Erin. But by whom wast thou persuaded, and by whose counsel?

Or. By the oracle of this deity, who is my witness.

Erin. The prophet-god instructed thee to matricide!

Or. Even so; and of what so far hath fallen, I have no complaint against him.

biguous between 'how it came that you killed her' and 'by what means you killed her', but meant of course in the first sense: 'You must at least *account* for the deed'.—*λέγω κ.τ.λ.*: *πλανᾶται. αἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ φόνου πυνθάνονται, ὁ δὲ πρὸς τὸ 'πῶς'; 'ἔξιφει' φησίν. ὡς τὸ "μὴ δι' ἐμὴν λόγηται"* (schol.); that is to say, the reply of Orestes is an *ignoratio elenchi*, mistaking the sense of the question. The citation (Hom. O. 41) further implies that the evasion, like that of Hera, is wilful, and this seems right. No one could seriously take the question as Orestes takes it, or suppose that what the prosecutors press for is a description of the act. *How it was done* is in this sense plainly immaterial. In short, the reply is a sort of fierce jest, not very fit for the place and presence, and for this reason grimly natural.—An oddly exact parallel to the ambiguous *ἄπως* occurs in Jane Austen, *Emma*, chap. 26, "Do you know how Miss Bates and her niece came here?"

"*How!* They were invited, were not they?" "Oh yes—but how they were conveyed hither?—the manner of their coming?"—*ξιφουλκῶ...τεμών* is not divided by punctuation in M. "The text can hardly be right. We expect *ξιφουλκῶν χεῖρα πρὸς δέρη βαλῶν* or *ξιφουλκῶ προσβολῆ δέρη τεμών*" (Wecklein; see also the conjectures in his Appendix). I agree that *ξιφουλκῶ...τεμών* cannot be construed together, but would merely re-punctuate it, as above.—*πρὸς*: literally *besides, moreover*, cf. *Cho.* 300 *καὶ πρὸς πείξει χρημάτων ἀχηρῶνα*, and note there. 'With sword in hand! *If you want more*, by cutting her throat!' The violent curtness is a trait of defiance.—*πρὸς τοῦ*. They repeat their question in unmistakable form.

598. *ἐξηγεῖτο*: *gave instruction*, expounded your duty to that effect.—*ὁ μάντις* marks the ground of disbelief: the oracle should and must have foreseen the consequences of such an act.

599. *δεῦρο...ἄελ* together, *so far*. τὸ

ΧΟ. ἀλλ' εἴ σε μάρψει ψῆφος, ἀλλ' ἐρεῖς τάχα. 600

ΟΡ. πέποιθ'...

...ἀρωγὰς δ' ἐκ τάφου πέμπει πατήρ.

ΧΟ. νεκροῖσι νῦν πέπεισθι μητέρα κτανών.

ΟΡ. δοῖν γὰρ εἶχε προσβολὰς μiasμάτων.

ΧΟ. πῶς δῆ; δίδαξον τοὺς δικάζοντας τάδε.

603. δοῖν altered to δυοῖν.

ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἔως τάπτουσιν Ἄττικοι πολλάκις. “*δεῦρο μὲν μοι τόνδ' ἀεὶ τείνει λόγον*”, schol.—*δεῦρο...τύχην*: probably to be taken together (*τῆν γε δεῦρο ἀεὶ τύχην*, see on v. 566), or else, which is in effect the same thing, *δεῦρο ἀεὶ* is to be understood again with *τῆν*: hence the use and necessity for the article. *τῆν τύχην* therefore is *τῆν πράξιν* (schol., Paley), *what hath befallen me so far*, as in the parallel P. V. 1104 *ἀλλ' οὖν μέμνησθ' ἀγὼ προλέγω, | μηδὲ πρὸς ἄτης θηραθείσαι | μέμψησθε τύχην*. (Not ‘that event’, the murder.)—Note the *accus.* object (as distinguished from *μέμφομαι τύχην*): strictly ‘I have no complaint to make, respecting what has befallen me, against him’ (αὐτῷ, Φολβῷ).

601, 602. Or. ‘I trust that.....(*He starts violently and gazes horror-struck; then seems about to fly; but, glancing behind him, slowly and painfully recovers*) ...But there is *aid* from the grave, aid brought by my father.’—*An Erinys*. ‘Trust now (if thou canst) in the dead, after taking the life of thy mother.’—I propose this (partly on the authority of a scholium: see below) as a possible way of explaining a passage, which, with the bare text, seems to me very obscure. Orestes, comprehending justly the threat of torture here and hereafter (see *vv.* 264—275) conveyed in *ἀλλ' ἐρεῖς τάχα*, begins to reply that he trusts, for life and for death, in the divine protection which has followed him hitherto. But at this moment his eyes are opened, and he sees, with his adversaries, the ghost of his mother. It is but for a moment, and after a struggle he casts off his horror, reassuring himself with the thought that,

seen or unseen, there must be ghosts, the spirits of his father and other ancestors so often invoked in the *Choephori*, on his side as well as against him. Whether his vision was represented scenically, whether, that is, the theatrical *Ghost* (*supra*, v. 94) appears here, we cannot say. A somewhat similar question arises at *Cho.* 1046, where Orestes ‘sees’ the absent Erinyes. That the spirits are now present, the spectators, having witnessed the *Choephori*, must of course suppose. It is natural, and dramatically effective, that Orestes should see them, as doubtless he had often seen them before; and the acted words, without other interpretation, would sufficiently explain what it is that he sees. It is visible to him only (and to the gods; see on v. 641), like Banquo at Macbeth’s feast. Without an *interruption*, and implied stage-directions, I find the text inexplicable. No authority is cited for *πέποιθα* used absolutely, like *θαρσῶ*, for *I am not afraid*; it seems to require an object-dative or object-clause, expressed or (as in *Eur. Med.* 732, 733) supplied by the preceding context. None is so supplied here, or, if any, it must be *Ἀπόλλωνι* (from *ὁ μάντις* in v. 598), which, with *ἀρωγὰς κ.τ.λ.*, would suggest that Orestes, without apparent reason, doubts the sufficiency of Apollo’s protection. And generally, this abrupt diversion to ‘the dead’ is not natural, without some occasion for it.—*ἀρωγὰς ἐκ τάφου*: ‘support from the grave’ to meet the attack from the grave.—*πέμπει*: brings, leads, conducts, as in v. 203, not ‘sends’. The spirit of the father would himself be there for one. The pres. tense, on the

Erin. Ah, but if sentence overtakes thee, thou wilt soon say otherwise!

Or. I trust....(*An abrupt pause. Sensation. He stands speechless, with eyes long fixed as upon some dreadful vision; then, recovering slowly, continues*) But there is aid from the grave; my father brings it. (*A pause.*)

Erin. In the dead trust now, if thou darest, thou slayer of thy mother! (*A pause.*)

Or. (*speaking with difficulty*). To two, that are dead, her crimes had laid her open.

Erin. How so? Explain thy meaning to them that judge.

view here propounded, is correct and almost necessary.—*vñv*: *now*, *i.e.* ‘if after this you can’; they exult in the terror produced by the vision. The accentuation (M) is, I think, preferable to *vuv* (*then*), though this also is admissible.—*ὡς ὑμῶν ἐπέμψεν ἡ μήτηρ, οὕτω βοηθοῦς κάμοι πέμψει ὁ πατήρ*, schol. This (if the above be right) requires no correction either in itself (*ὕμās Hermann*) or in the text (*πέμψει Scaliger, κάμοιγ’ ἀρωγούς Hermann*). It assumes the action, the vision of Clytaemnestra, and paraphrases accordingly. By *πέμψει* the paraphraser means ‘will be sending’, ‘must be sending’, which expresses, more prosaically and less vividly, the same thing as *πέμπει* in the text.—*πέπισθι* (Veitch), not *πέπεισθι*, is the form suggested by analogy, *e.g.* *οἶδα*, but *ἴσθι*, from *ἴδω*.

603. ‘Ay, unto two (such) she was liable for her guilt.’ *δυοῖν*: *νεκροῖν*, supplied from *νεκροῖσι*, ‘to two dead persons’ or ‘extinct personalities’, as explained in *v.* 605. The case is dative.—*εἶχε προσβολὰς μiasμάτων*: lit. ‘she offered opportunity of attack for guilt.’ The metaphor, pursuing that of *ἀρωγὰς πέμπειν*, seems to be from the military sense of *προσβολή* *approach, assault*, and *προσβολήν ἔχειν* (*παρέχειν*) to present an *approachable* or *assailable point*, for which see L. and Sc. *s.v.* *προσβολή*. Clytaemnestra’s crime had ‘laid her open’ to two lawful assailants, *her husband* and *her son’s father* (*v.* 605); and Orestes

acted for these. *μiasμάτων* is an adjectival genitive, defining the nature of the *προσβολαί*.—*μiasμάτων* Elmsley and others, —a change quite justifiable, if it helps; but it is rather an embarrassment. Two explanations are offered: (1) ‘she was touched by (affected by) two stains of guilt’, where *προσβολή* is something like *πρόστριμμα* (Weil), and (2) ‘she had two added (*i.e.* conjoined) stains of guilt’; so schol. (*συντυχίας*) and Paley. The first seems to make *προσβολὰς* superfluous (since *εἶχε μιάσματα* would mean the same), and the second strains the sense of *προσβάλλειν*. Though neither is impossible, it is safer to give *προσβολήν ἔχειν* a sense, apparently the only sense, actually proved; and with this sense, *μiasμάτων* is more clear and preferable.—The argument is this. Orestes has admitted that he ‘killed his mother’, but not that he ‘is a matricide’ (*v.* 590—595). He now, after the dramatic interlude of *v.* 596—602, resumes his point, and supports it by insisting that, in killing Clytaemnestra, he acted, not as *her* son, but as his father’s. Her life was forfeited to the dead Agamemnon, who was both her husband and Orestes’ father (*v.* 605). In this second capacity, Agamemnon had a right to be represented and avenged by his son, whose act was therefore not his own, but that of the husband and father. Such a distinction of personalities, though not happy or satisfactory, is the necessary

OP. ἀνδροκτονούσα πατέρ' ἐμὸν κατέκτανεν.

605

XO. τοιγὰρ σὺ μὲν ζῆς, ἢ δ' ἐλευθέρα φόνου.—

OP. τί δ' οὐκ ἐκείνην ζῶσαν ἤλαυνες φυγῆ;

XO. οὐκ ἦν ὄμαιμος φωτὸς ὄν κατέκτανεν.

OP. ἐγὼ δὲ μητρὸς τῆς ἐμῆς ἐν αἵματι;

XO. πῶς γὰρ σ' ἔθρεψεν ἐντός, ὧ μαιμόνε,

610

ζώνης; ἀπεύχει μητρὸς αἷμα φίλτατον;—

OP. ἤδη σὺ μαρτύρησον. ἔξηγοῦ δέ μοι,

Ἄπολλον, εἴ σφε σὺν δίκῃ κατέκτανον.

δρᾶσαι γὰρ ὥσπερ ἔστιν οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα.

611. φίλτατον. φίλτατον m.

foundation of Orestes' defence, in so far as it can be presented technically and legally. His adversaries, as soon as they divine his point, presume (*v.* 604) that it will not favourably impress the jury, and have no difficulty in giving it a technical refutation. It is, in fact, the same plea (not improved by more subtle pretence of logic), which is advanced by Clytaemnestra (*Ag.* 1408 foll.): 'This deed is not mine; it is *the punisher of Atreus* who has assumed my person'. It is there summarily rejected. The form, which it takes here, belongs to that peculiar sort of crude metaphysics, which plays so large a part, at certain stages, in the evolution of law. Being doubtless familiar to all interested in the legendary case of Orestes, and being far from poetical, it is presented by Aeschylus with obscuring brevity. Fortunately (see next note) we have also an ancient paraphrase.

606. *And so, while you are alive, she is no murderess at all!*, lit. 'clear of murder'. A *reductio ad absurdum*. Orestes, for the purpose of his argument, has identified himself with his father. It was Clytaemnestra's husband who (in the person of his son) killed Clytaemnestra. 'Then,' is the reply, 'Clytaemnestra's husband *lives* in your person; and the murder of Agamemnon, which you plead in justification, will be com-

plete...only when *you* are dead!' The proposition *σὺ μὲν ζῆς* would be, in our mode of composition, subordinate.—*πανούργως φασί, μὴ ἡμᾶς διδάσκει, ἀλλὰ τοὺς δικαστάς.—ἐμέ κάκεινον ἠδίκησεν.—πῶς οὖν λέγεις, ὅτι ἠδίκησέ με; πῶς δὲ Ἄγαμέμνονα, ὅπου ἀπέθανεν δι' αὐτήν;* schol., rightly. The commentator uses *πανούργως* in a forensic sense; the request that Orestes tell address himself to the court is *malicious*, and leads up to the refutation. The last note means, 'How can you say 'Her crime was against *me*', and on the other hand 'Her crime was against *Agamemnon*', seeing that she caused his *death*?' Perhaps better, *ἠδίκησ' ἐμέ.—φόνῳ* (instrumental dative) Schuetz (and modern texts generally), explaining thus: 'And therefore she, as a murderess, has paid the penalty of her life, and is now *cleared by having been killed*, while you are alive, and have still your penalty to pay'. But the scholia, which have not been sufficiently considered, show that the text of M is at all events ancient. Nor is *ἐλευθέρα φόνῳ* satisfactory in itself. As to form, it should be rather *ἐλευθέρα θανάτῳ*: and as to substance, the Erinyes never allow, and would not assume, that a person, liable for blood at all, would be 'released by death' (*zv.* 267 foll., 340 *θανῶν δ' οὐκ ἄγαν ἐλευθέρος*). Nor, with *φόνῳ*, is the proposition deducible from the foregoing,

Or. Her husband and my father,—these two in one act she had slain.

Erin. We conclude then, that, since *thou livest*, she is free of murder still! (*A pause.*)

Or. And thou, while *she* lived, with thy ban why didst thou not follow her?

Erin. She was not of one blood with the man she slew.

Or. And I? Am I *within the blood* of such a mother as mine?

Erin. How else did she make thy body, foul villain, beneath her girdle? Dost disclaim thine own mother's *blood*? (*Silence.*)

Or. (to Apollo). Now, now give thou thy witness; and set forth, I pray thee, Apollo, whether it was with justice that I slew her. For the doing of the deed, as the truth is, we deny not.

however understood, and *τοιγάρ* therefore would be wrong; hence Hermann conjectured *τί γάρ*; If we follow the argument, no alteration is wanted.

607. 'But why, while *she* was alive, did you not make *her* a hunted fugitive?' He endeavours to evade the *reductio ad absurdum*. 'You call it an absurd conclusion, that my mother was and is no murderess. But why so, seeing that you yourselves have always treated her as innocent?' This is no legitimate answer to the adversary, who is, upon the ground chosen by Orestes himself, unanswerable. He perceives this, and tries to shift the issue. A pause should be supposed after *v. 606.*—*ούκ, εἰ τέθνηκεν, τούτου αἰτία εἰ σύ. πῶς; ἐδίωκες ἄν. ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀποθανούσα διὰ τὴν σὴν αἰτίαν ἀπέθανεν*, schol. (*πῶς ἄν ἐδίωκες M*). This, though not very well put, is right in the essential point, viz., that *as against the Erinyes* it may be taken that Clytaemnestra is innocent.

608. 'She was not of one blood with the man she slew,' and therefore never was blood-guilty at all. See *v. 212*; where we have observed that the Erinyes of Aeschylus do not consistently adhere to this antique definition, but adopt it when it suits them. Here the effect of it is to make a transition, from the barren

logomachy which precedes, to something nearer the heart of the matter, as represented in this play.

609. 'And am *I* within the blood (kindred) of a mother like *mine*?' This should be taken as a rhetorical sentiment, signifying that Clytaemnestra had dissolved the bond by her acts, rather than an argument, involving such a theory of parentage (excluding the mother) as is afterwards propounded by Apollo (*v. 660*). Note *τῆς ἑμῆς*, which is necessary to the sentiment, but to the argument would be superfluous and embarrassing. Moreover, if it were an argument, Orestes, when it is challenged, would naturally develop it, instead of appealing, *ὡς ἀπορῶν* (schol.), to Apollo. The truth is, and the exclamation shows, that he is at the end of his arguments, and has come off, so far, very ill. This is inevitable, so long as the cause is treated on any principles of strict law. A law, rule, or definition of murder, which should formally exclude and absolve matricide, is a thing perhaps inconceivable, certainly inconceivable in the days of Aeschylus. Apollo therefore, ignoring Orestes' lead (*v. 615*), prudently avoids that ground—as long as he can.

611. *ἀπρεύει*: *disaffirm, disclaim, ἀπαρνεῖ* schol.

ἀλλ' εἰ δικαίως εἶτε μὴ τῇ σῆ φρενὶ
δοκεῖ τόδ' αἷμα, κρίνον, ὡς τούτοις φράσω.

615

ΑΠ. λέξω πρὸς ὑμᾶς, τόνδ' Ἀθηναίας μέγαν
θεσμόν, δικαίως.—μάντις ὦν οὐ ψεύσομαι.
οὐπάποτ' εἶπον μαντικοῖσιν ἐν θρόνοις,
οὐκ ἀνδρός, οὐ γυναικός, οὐ πόλεως πέρι,
ὃ μὴ κελεύσει Ζεὺς Ὀλυμπίων πατήρ.

620

618. δ' ὦν.

616. **δοκεῖ τόδ' αἷμα** (?). *δοκῶ* (Herwerden, followed by Wecklein), *i.e.* *ei dokō tód' aîma dikaiōws* (δράσαι), where, for *δρᾶν αἷμα*, 'to do (a deed of) blood', cf. Eur. *Or.* 406 ὁ συνδρῶν αἷμα καὶ μητρὸς φόνον, *ib.* 284 εἰργασται δ' ἐμοὶ | μητρῶν αἷμα. This is the best change, if any is needed, though open to the objection that *τόδ' αἷμα* is then superfluous. That could be met by accepting also *τὸ δὴ μοι κρίνον* (Weil), 'this (question), I pray thee, judge'; but the total change is too large to satisfy.—Paley defends *δοκεῖ*, with ellipse of a passive (*πεπράχθαι*); Hermann gave the punctuation *ei...δοκεῖ, τόδ' αἷμα κρίνον*: but neither is acceptable.—What the text *prima facie* suggests is that *αἷμα* is the predicate, and that the adverb *δικαίως* is to be connected with it, thus: *ei τῇ σῆ φρ. τόδε δοκεῖ αἷμα (εἶναι) δικαίως*, 'whether to thy mind this does or does not appear (to be) justly a *αἷμα*', *i.e.* 'a true *αἷμα*', properly so called. Is this impossible? The citations from Eur. *Orestes* go to show that *αἷμα* was a fixed term for 'a deed of blood', as defined by primitive law, *i.e.* a slaying which affected the slayer with *blood-guilt*. Now the point, which Orestes has unsuccessfully tried to prove, is that his slaying of Clytaemnestra was not in that sense a *αἷμα* (see especially *vv.* 609, 611). It seems therefore natural that he should remit the issue to Apollo in this form. As to the attachment of the adverb, it offers no practical difficulty, though not strictly logical, and seems not beyond the freedom of a language, which admitted, on the one hand, *καλεῖ σ'*

ἀνασσα δῆποτ' Ἴλιου *the former queen of Ilium* (Eur. *Hec.* 891), ἡ *κάρτα μάντις* (*truly prophetic*) οὐξ *δνειράτων φόβος* (*Cho.* 928) etc., where the adverb relates formally to a substantive, and on the other hand, *Μένωνι δῶρα ἐλέγετο πέμψαι μεγαλοπρεπῶς* (Xen. *An.* 1. 4. 17), where it relates formally to a verb (as here to *δοκεῖ*), but really to a substantive (*δῶρα*). I therefore leave the text, under reserve, as it stands.

617—676. Apollo strikes a new vein. His speeches, as a whole, are designed to lead the court away from the question, whether matricide, as such, is defensible (a ground plainly disadvantageous to Orestes), to the collateral circumstances of this particular case. His points are (1) that Orestes acted under the highest authority (*vv.* 617—624), (2) that the murderess of Agamemnon was a wretch beyond the pale of protection (*vv.* 628—642), and (3) that Orestes, supported as he is, is a friend worth gaining (*vv.* 670—676). The Erinyes, after a vain attempt to bring him to book (*vv.* 625—627), assail him on his own ground with a shrewd *argumentum ad deum* (*vv.* 643—646), and dexterously avail themselves of his imprudent reply (*vv.* 647—654) to extract from him an opinion on the strict issue, or rather upon a part of it (*vv.* 655—659). That opinion (*vv.* 660—664) takes the form of a speculation in physiology, which certainly goes to the root of the matter, and farther; though the god, by his anxiety to give it a personal and adventitious recommendation (*vv.* 665—

But whether in justice it seems, or seems not, to thy mind, a deed of blood,—decide thou, that I may show it to my judges. (*A pause. Apollo comes forward. Profound silence.*)

Apollo. My pleading to you, Athena's high court here, shall be just.

As prophet, I cannot deceive. Never, in my oracular seat, said I aught concerning man, or woman, or city, save as I shall be commanded by Zeus, the Olympians' Sire. How strong a

669), seems to betray some not unreasonable doubts of its soundness and weight. The whole scene, notwithstanding the stately form in which it is cast, is extremely life-like, and probably answers nearly *mutatis mutandis* to forensic proceedings of the highest type in the Athens of Aeschylus.

617. ἡμᾶς τόνδε...θεσμόν: 'your tribunal, here instituted by Athena'. The description of the jury themselves as the θεσμός is facilitated by the regular forensic use of ἐν ἡμῶν for ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, and the like.—λέξω...δικαίως: 'I shall plead fairly' or with regard to justice. He begins, like an ordinary human pleader, by disclaiming all desire to mislead the court. To us such a disclaimer might appear beneath the dignity of a god; to a Greek it would rather have appeared especially requirable from a god. It was characteristic of τὸ θεῖον to mislead; and in fact Apollo, as an advocate, is not by any means scrupulous.—λέγω Weil (and Wecklein), making 'δικαίως', '(Orestes acted) justly', the reply of Apollo to εἶτε δικαίως εἶτε μὴ δοκῶ δρᾶσαι *supra*, as emended; but see note there.—μάντις ὧν οὐ ψεύσομαι: 'As prophet, I cannot deceive', i.e. 'when I am μάντις, and speak oracularly from my μαντεῖον'. In what follows the proposition is repeated, expanded, and justified.—ψεύσομαι. For the future of general affirmation, signifying what *must* (or *cannot*) happen, see Kühner *Gr. Gram.* § 587 f. 2, Plato *Rep.* 387 D φαμέν δὲ δὴ, ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς ἀνὴρ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, οὐπερ καὶ ἐταῖρός ἐστι, τὸ τεθνᾶναι οὐ δεῶν ἡγήσεται, Soph. *Ant.* 362 Αἶδα μόνον φεῦξεν οὐκ ἐπάξεται.

—If δὲ (M), which cannot be right where it stands, is simply omitted, μάντις ὧν οὐ ψεύσομαι is Apollo's first point ('the oracle of Delphi is infallible'), leading to the conclusion that Orestes' act, having been commanded by the oracle, is beyond criticism. The pause before and after, indicated by the absence of copulae, is for solemnity. If we read μάντις ὧν δ' (Canter), the proposition must relate to λέξω...δικαίως, Apollo offering his character of μάντις as warrant for what he shall now say to the court. This however is not easy to understand. His present function is not *mantic*; and if the argument be, that because he (or his oracle) spoke truth at Delphi, therefore all he might say anywhere must be true, the inference is hard to accept, or even to follow. On the other hand, the exceptional future ψεύσομαι might easily lead a reader to suppose a connexion with λέξω, and to insert the conjunction accordingly.

619—621. εἶπον...δ μὴ κελεύσει is ungrammatical. If it must be corrected, κελεύσει (Wecklein) is better than κελεύσομαι (archaic aor. opt.) or 'κέλευσε. Yet the corruption is not very probable, since κελεύσει is not explicable as a barbarism: in grammar it must have been always conspicuously incorrect. If it be genuine, the explanation is, that the clause reverts to the *general future* form, which would more coherently have followed οὐ ψεύσομαι: it is shaped to suit οἴποι' ἐρῶ..., 'I cannot say what Zeus does not command.' The traditional text may be represented in English approximately thus: 'I shall never be found to speak

τὸ μὲν δίκαιον τοῦθ', ὅσον σθένει, μαθεῖν,
βουλή, πιφαύσκω δ' ὑμῖν ἐπισπέσθαι· πατρός
ὄρκος γὰρ οὗ τι Ζηνὸς ἰσχύει πλέον;

XO. Ζεὺς, ὡς λέγεις σύ, τόνδε χρῆσμον ὅπασε 625
φράζειν Ὀρέστη τῷδε, τὸν πατρός φόνον
πράξαντα μητρὸς μηδαμοῦ τιμὰς νέμειν;

626. τῷ. τῷδε m.—τοῦ changed by m to τὸν.

falsely. I never said a thing which Zeus will not command.' This is incorrect, but perhaps not inconceivable.—ὄστε ἐμοὶ μὲν Ζεὺς, ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτω προσέταξα. οὐκ ἄνευ Διὸς οὖν τὸ γενόμενον, schol.

622—624. τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο: this plea, justification, viz., the appeal to Zeus. So Eur. *Iph. A.* 810 τοῦμὸν μὲν οὖν δίκαιον ἐμὲ λέγειν χρεών, *ib.* 1391 τί τὸ δίκαιον; τοῦτ' ἄρ' ἔχοιμεν τοῖς δ' ἂν ἀντειπεῖν ἔπος; (both verses probably not by Euripides, but that is at present immaterial); but in Eur. frag. 338 (θάρσει· τό τοι δίκαιον ἰσχύει μέγα) τὸ δίκαιον is apparently general, justice.—μὲν marks that this δίκαιον is the speaker's first point; it has no connexion with δὲ in the next verse.—μαθεῖν depends upon a supplied πιφαύσκω, or rather upon a projected κελεύω, which becomes πιφαύσκω, for increase of solemnity, in the second clause. But such an arrangement could hardly have been felt as possible, had it not been for the regular 'imperative use' of the infinitive, i.e. the conventional ellipse of the *verbum imperandi* (cf. Soph. *El.* 9 φάσκειν = φάσκε, and Kühner *Gr. Gramm.* § 474), which would have explained μαθεῖν without any following clause: to this extent the schol. ἀντι τοῦ "μάθε, ὦ βουλή" is right.—βουλή. The plain vocative, without ὦ, differs from the ordinary form of official address (ὦ βουλή), but may be for that reason preferred.—βουλή Turnebus, i.e. βουλή πατρός, punctuating, as M, after πατρός. This is an almost equally legitimate interpretation of the traditional βουλή, since confusions of η and η are frequent; but it is not supported by the scholium, κελεύω δὲ

ὑμᾶς πεισθῆναι τῇ βουλή τοῦ Διός, which does not, I think, assume a dative in the text, but supplies it from the vocative (see preceding schol. above cited). An objection to the conjecture is the unsuitable emphasis given by position to the word βουλή.—πιφαύσκω δ' ὑμῖν ἐπισπέσθαι: I warn you that ye follow (it), αἰτῶ, i.e. τῷ δικαίῳ, 'conform your judgment to it'. ὕμμε: ὑμᾶς. Similar dialectic (and poetic) forms are used by Aeschylus and Sophocles in lyric, *Theb.* 141, *Ant.* 846, *O. C.* 247 (? see Jebb). With the language of tragic dialogue it is not in keeping, but for that reason here appropriate. The whole phrase πιφαύσκω...ἐπισπέσθαι is inconsistent with the tone of the advocate, from which the prophet easily lapses into his accustomed 'Biblical' style. Probably it follows a (dactylic) formula, πιφαύσκω δ' ὑμῖν ἐπέσθαι: compare the Homeric κελεύω ὑμῖν ἄμ' ἔπεισθαι (*Δ* 781) cited by Wecklein.—πατρός...πλέον; For, as an oath by my father, is it not in a manner (τι) stronger than (an oath by) Zeus? πατρός ὄρκος explains ὅσον σθένει, the subject being, as throughout, τὸ δίκαιον, Apollo's plea. When he rests his incriminated oracle upon the authority of Zeus, 'the Olympians' father' (*v.* 621), he assumes, he says, as strong a position, forensically, as a defendant who should take his oath of innocence with the solemn sanction of the πατρός ὄρκος, or 'oath upon his father'. It is, in Apollo's case, something even more than an oath by Zeus. For the objective gen. πατρός cf. Soph. *O. T.* 647 ὄρκον θεῶν, 'an oath by the gods', and for the oath upon the father (or other near relation) cf.

plea is here, note, Councillors; and I charge you, be led by it. An oath by my Sire,—is it not in a manner more than an oath by Zeus? (*Silence. An interval.*)

Erin. 'Zeus'—to speak as thou—Zeus gave thee *this* oracle to declare unto *this* man, Orestes,—that, having taken a life for his father's, of his mother's price he should make no account at all?

Hom. *v* 339 οὐ μὰ Ζῆν', Ἀγέλαε, καὶ ἄλγεα πατρὸς ἐμοῖο, and Smith *Dict. Ant. s.v.* ὄρκος. Ζηνὸς is a brachylogy for Ζηηνὸς ὄρκου.—In M these sentences are punctuated thus: *πιφαύσκω δ' ὅμμι' ἐπισπέσθαι πατρὸς. ὄρκος γὰρ οὐ τι Ζηηνὸς ἰσχύει πλέον.* This division, mostly with the conj. βουλῆ, has been followed in modern texts. But ὄρκος...πλέον, as a complete sentence and without note of interrogation, offers great difficulty. The scholia, in this passage full and good, are suddenly silent. Perhaps some editors daringly ejected *v.* 624. The explanation now current is, "For certainly an oath has not greater authority than Zeus, that is, 'Your oath to decide according to justice must be held secondary to the revealed will of Zeus.' This implies that *legally* Orestes would be condemned, but that he is morally right, because he was merely the instrument..." etc. (Paley). Such, it seems, must be the sense, with the assumed punctuation; but surely it is unnatural, that Apollo should raise this objection against himself, and suggest that the jury cannot vote for him without a species of perjury,—especially since he does not effectively answer the objection. Such a scruple, if entertainable, could not be quieted by a vague reference to the might of Zeus. But as a fact, it is nowhere suggested, and is not true, that the oath of the jury bears one way rather than the other. Apollo, who is the first to mention it (*v.* 683), assumes that it makes at least equally for him. On these grounds I have changed the punctuation.

625. The application of the foregoing generalities about the authority of Delphi to the particular case of Orestes, which

would naturally have followed, is cut off by the adversary, who somewhat rudely reminds the orator of the point which he has to defend. Did 'Zeus', did *the oracle* say, that Orestes, in avenging his father, was to ignore altogether his relationship to his mother? It cannot be accidental that Apollo is made here, for the second time (see *vv.* 202, 203), to evade this plain and important question; nor is the defect supplied by the passage of the *Choephoroi* (*vv.* 268 foll.), the only other evidence in the trilogy, where Orestes adduces, *but does not cite*, the oracular command. An injunction τοὺς ἀτρίους τρόπον τὸν αὐτὸν ἀνταποκτείνειν is far from evidently requiring, that Clytaemnestra should fall *by her son's hand*, or even that *she* should be slain at all. The plural description οἱ ἀτριοὶ denotes *the responsible*, one or many. If the emissaries had chosen to hold, that the *atria* for the death of Agamemnon lay with the seducer Aegisthus, they would not have lacked warranty; and we shall see that this view is actually here suggested. Pylades, who finally forces Orestes to the matricide, invokes the oracle (*Cho.* 899) *but does not cite it*. Evidently Aeschylus, in regard to the supposed sanction of Delphi, was not without that feeling, upon which Euripides plays with triumphant malice. Aeschylus, with all his respect for religious tradition, was willing to leave a doubt, whether *the Supreme Deity* had really prescribed the enactment of that appalling scene between the mother and son. Perhaps, just on this point, there had been some dreadful mistake, such as, in dealing with oracles, was only too familiar. This would not diminish the tragedy, nor the

ΑΠ. οὐ γάρ τι ταῦτὸν ἄνδρα γενναῖον θανεῖν
 διοσδότοις σκήπτροισι τιμαλφούμενον,
 καὶ ταῦτα πρὸς γυναικός, οὔτι θουρίοις
 τόξοις ἐκηβόλοισιν, ὥστ' Ἄμαζόνος,
 ἀλλ' ὡς ἀκούσει, Παλλάς, οἷ τ' ἐφήμενοι
 ψήφῳ διαιρεῖν τοῦδε πράγματος πέρι.
 ἀπὸ στρατείας γάρ μιν ἡμποληκότα

630

634. ἀποστρατεῖαισ.

obligation of Apollo to aid his unhappy servant.

625—627. Ζεὺς, ὡς λέγεις σύ: 'Zeus', *to speak as you: i.e. if we take it from you that an oracle of Delphi does exactly represent Zeus.*—τόνδε...τῷδε: 'this command *precisely* to this person *individually*'.—πατρὸς...νέμειν: 'that, when he *had* requited the murder of his father, he should treat as nothing the value of his mother'. The terms *πράσσειν* (lit. *to exact, get in a debt*), *τιμὴ* value, *μηδαμῶ* νέμειν (*assign no place to, count as a cipher* in a calculation) are all from the language of account. *πράξαντα*: by the slaying of Aegisthus. This (they suggest) was *requital*, a life for a life; Agamemnon's murder was already 'exacted', and the slaying of Clytaemnestra was *not* the avenger's duty, but a something, or nothing, which her son chose to throw in! Did 'Zeus' command that?—We note that the prosecutors, for obvious reasons, make their allusion to the paramour as slight as their argument will permit. Apollo too (*v.* 628), who would fix attention solely on Clytaemnestra, is content to leave Aegisthus in the background. But both sides here have him in view.—The same conception of the 'equivalent' is used, from another point of view, by Cassandra (*Ag.* 1317—1325), who counts *Clytaemnestra for herself and Aegisthus for Agamemnon*; ὅταν γυνὴ γυναικὸς ἀντ' ἐμοῦ θάνῃ, | ἀνήρ τε δυσδάμαρτος ἀντ' ἀνδρὸς πέση. Of course the first part of this reckoning, however consoling to the slave, could not be adopted before a legal tribunal, as a

justification of the matricide; and Apollo accordingly (*v.* 628) rejects the equation of Aegisthus to Agamemnon.—Aeschylus, it will be remembered, so far follows the primitive legend, as to make Aegisthus still the first object of Orestes, and first slain; and so does Euripides, who further adapts to his own purposes the notion of 'equivalence', making Electra prove, by an elaborate and repulsive calculation, that the life of Aegisthus is *separately* due to herself and her brother, so that the life of Agamemnon has still to be paid for by that of Clytaemnestra (*Eur. El.* 1086—1096). Sophocles, in accordance with his general treatment, inverts the order of events. See the Introduction to the *Choephoroi*.—Some (Wecklein, Sidgwick, and apparently Paley) assume here that *πράξαντα* and *νέμειν* denote actions contemporaneous, with the sense 'that *in avenging* his father he should disregard his mother', or 'should avenge his father without regard to his mother'. This might be expressed by *πράσσοντα νέμειν* (as Schwarz proposed to read), *πρᾶξαι νέμοντα, πράσσειν νέμοντα*, or perhaps by *πράξαντα νέμειν*, but not (I think) by *πράξαντα νέμειν*. *Prima facie*, an aor. participle with present verb denotes an action precedent, and we need not here suppose otherwise. See also next note.

628—642. Apollo, fixing upon the suggested 'exaction' of the debt, swerves off, from the dangerous ground of the oracle, to his strongest topic, a *delusion* on the murder of Agamemnon. This passage puts briefly, but very forcibly, the only

Ap. Nay, it was *not* the same thing,—the death of an honourable man, by heaven invested with imperial dignity, the slaying of him by a woman,—not with the gallant weapons, the far-spined arrow, as it might be, of an Amazon, but in such manner as thou, Pallas, and you, who sit appointed to divide upon this case, are now to hear.

From a campaign, wherein, for loyal hearts, he had in the

effective plea which can be made for Orestes, an appeal to the horror excited by the character and act of Clytaemnestra, as a combination of the most atrocious domestic and political treason. It is scarcely a defence, and certainly not a legal defence under any conceivable system of law, for a matricide; but it is emotionally impressive (*v.* 641), and (with such help as it may get from the oracle) it secures half the votes.

628—633. οὐ τι ταυτόν: *not at all the same, i.e.* far worse than, and not required by, the slaying of Aegisthus. That the comparison is with this (and not with the death of Clytaemnestra) appears from καὶ ταῦτα πρὸς γυναϊκός. It is *not* worse, and no one could think so, to be slain 'by a woman' (or even 'by a wife') than to be slain *by a son*. On this head, the character of the agent, a parallel between the deaths of Agamemnon and Clytaemnestra would give no advantage to either side. But as between Agamemnon and Aegisthus, the point tells.—ἀνδρα γενναῖον κ.τ.λ.: a gallant warrior, not a cowardly villain, a legitimate king and not a usurping tyrant.—συνεχὲς τὸ ὄνομα (*i.e.* τιμαλοφύμενον) παρ' Ἀλοχύλφ, διὸ σκώπτει αὐτὸν Ἐπιχάρμος, schol.—ἐφήμενοι...διαίρειν: 'who sit appointed to decide by division of votes.' See on *v.* 491.

634—638. μιν: see *Theb.* 440, *Cho.* 620, 787 (lyrics). It is not safe to substitute νιν (Porson). The purpose of the passage comports well with a certain heightening of the tone, and this again with an exceptional vocabulary (*cf.* ἴμμε, *v.* 623 and περεσκήνωσεν below). Note also the 'epic' words δῖοςδοτος, θούριος,

ἐκήβολος, δαίδαλος, the substantival εὐφροσιν without an article, and the artificially sonorous τέρματι...ἀτέρμονι. Further, it is possible and probable that some celebrated description of the murder in older literature (perhaps in Stesichorus, who told the story) has had an influence.—ἀπὸ στρατείας...δεδεγμένη: *she had welcomed him back from a war, wherein, for loyal hearts, he had purchased advantage in the main*, lit. 'had made a bargain the-most-part-better', in which the gain (what was better) went much beyond the loss (what was worse) and nearly to the whole transaction. βελτίονα πλείστα ἠντυχηκότα ἀπὸ στρατείας schol., not quite accurately, but indicating rightly that ἀπὸ στρατείας belongs to ἠμποληκότα as well as to δεδεγμένη. The more logical expression would have been τὰ πλείονα ἀμείνονα, but πλείονα is a natural turn of rhetoric. εὐφροσιν: τοῖς εὐφροσιν (masculine). The dative signifies both the persons *interested* and the persons *judging*, the so-called 'commodi' and 'ethic', the advantage being both gained and estimated by the εὐφρονας. The English *for* has the same ambiguity.—This phrase gives just the utmost that can be said for the king as represented in the *Agamemnon*; and to be fully understood, it must be compared with the 'first act' of that play *passim*. See especially the contrast drawn between those pretending to be loyal (εὐφρων) and those truly such (*Ag.* 779, 800), to which εὐφρονας here alludes. Agamemnon, a hard and selfish prince, comes to his death through the reckless sacrifice of lives in his ambitious war, and the hatred thereby excited among his subjects. His wife had against him an especially cruel grievance

τὰ πλείστ' ἀμείνον' εὐφροσιν δεδεγμένη, 635
 δροίτη περῶντι λουτρά καπὶ τέρματι
 φᾶρος περὸ σκηνῶσεν, ἐν δ' ἀτέρμονι
 κόπτει πεδήσασ' ἄνδρα δαιδάλω πέπλω.
 ἀνδρὸς μὲν ὑμῖν οὗτος εἴρηται μόρος
 τοῦ παντοσέμνου, τοῦ στρατηλάτου νεῶν. 640
 ταύτην τοιαύτην εἶπον, ὡς δηχθῆ ἰεὺς,

635. ἀμείνον'.

637. περὸ σκηνῶσεν.

of this kind in the immolation of her daughter. The view of the *εὐφροσιν* (see the passage cited) was, that, the triumph having been won, the cost should be condoned; and Apollo here suggests, perhaps with justice and certainly with judgment, that Clytaemnestra, if she had been an honest woman, would have taken this 'loyal' view, instead of using the disloyal, as she did, to wreak her personal vengeance.—Paley and others take *εὐφροσιν* as neuter and instrumental (*with love, with loving welcome*). This would be grammatical, but not practically intelligible. By primary sense, *εὐφρων* is an epithet of persons, and the context here does not determine otherwise. The suggestion (Schuetz), that after *v.* 635 something is lost, is not disprovable, but, as I think, unnecessary.—*δροίτη*... *τέρματι*: as in a bath he passed through his purification, at the very bourne (of his journey). The bath was preparatory to the religious ceremony which it was the duty of Agamemnon to perform on his home-coming (*Ag.* 842, 1021), and probably part of it. When celebrating a return, even from ordinary travel, both host and guests appear to have bathed (Plautus *Rudens* 150 *propter viam illi sunt vocati ad prandium*.—*qui?*—*quia post cenam, credo, laverunt heri*), and after a *στρατεία* there was blood to be purged (cf. *Soph. Ai.* 654, *Eur. Heracles* 940). Hence *περῶντι*, *passing through, traversing*, as in *περῶν ποταμών*, the *λουτρά* being figured as part of the journey; and hence also *τέρματι*, similar to *τέρμα κελεύθου, πλάνης, φυγῆς, πορείας, πλανημάτων* (Aeschylus),

δρόμου (Sophocles), but here absolute, *end sought*, as in *Soph. El.* 1397, *Eur. Iph. T.* 117, the *goal, bourne, terminus* of the *ὁδός* implied in *περῶν* (or, if we please, of the *στρατεία*). Not 'end of the bath' (*τῶν λουτρῶν*, schol.).—*τὰπὶ τέρματι* (*i.e.* *λουτρά τὰ ἐπὶ τέρματι*) Fritsche; this points to the true conception and may be right.—Other domestic rites, as weddings, funerals, offerings to the dead, were also connected with *λουτρά*, and in fact the tragedians, as is natural, seldom use the word except in a religious sense.—*δροίτη*: properly instrumental 'by means of a bath', with *περῶντι λουτρά*. The bath was no ordinary instrument of religious *λουτρά*, but may have been prescribed in this particular rite. Aeschylus uses *δροίτη*, a very rare word, only of Agamemnon's bath: see *Ag.* 1541, *Cho.* 997. According to *Ag. l.c.* (*χαμεύναν*) it must be, in this instance at least, a long (reclining) bath. The scholia on *Cho. l.c.* (*δροίτης κατασκήνωμα· παραπέτασμα σοροῦ*—Stanley, for *ὄρου*), and here (*πυέλῳ, τῇ ὡς σορῶ ἀτῶ γενομένη*) imply that it meant also, or properly, *coffin* (*σορός*), and suggests therefore a *fatal* bath. The trope would be quite Aeschylean; but the schol. weaken their authority by insisting that, by derivation, *δροίτη* (or *δρότη*, see *ad Cho.*) should mean *something wooden* (*παρὰ τὴν δρὺν· ξύλινα γὰρ αὐταί, i.e. σοροί*, schol. here), whereas the Aeschylean *δροίτη* is expressly *ἀργυροτοίχος* (*Ag. l.c.*).—The dative *περῶντι* (*ἀτῶ*) depends on *περὸ σκηνῶσεν*.—*καί* (*ἐπὶ τέρματι*) may be either copulative, joining *ἐπὶ τέρματι* to *περῶντι*, as both

main made profitable purchase, she received him home; then, in his passage through the bath of purification, at the end of his enterprise, she drew the tented curtain round, in the endless maze of a cunning robe she entangled him, and she hewed her husband down!

Such, as I have told it to you, was the death of that man, the majesty of the world, the emperor of the fleet. As for that woman *there* (*pointing as if to Clytaemnestra*), I have shown her

marks of time, or (better) emphasizing, even.—περσεκῆνωσεν: an 'Aeolic' form for περιεσκῆνωσεν, as περέβαλον (περιέβαλον) in *Ag.* 1144 (lyrics); see above. Wecklein retains it in both places: παρεσκῆνωσεν is given by one later MS. (d).—κατεσκῆνωσεν Headlam, citing δροίτης κατασκῆνωμα *Cho.* 1007, and supposing περ (περί) to have arisen, as it might, from a gloss.—She 'drew the tenting drapery around'. φᾶρος, meaning in itself 'a cloth, piece of drapery', is here the curtain, which screened off the bath or bath-chamber, as in *Soph. Tr.* 916 στρώτᾳ φάρη are bed-coverings. This curtain, mentioned also in *Cho. l.c.*, must not be confused with the πέπλος.—ἐν δ' ἀτέρμονι...πέπλω: a bathing garment so made that the victim was entangled in it (πεδίθασα) as in a maze (δαιδάλω), and found no issue (ἀτέρμονι): cf. *Ag.* 1381 (ὡς μὴ φεύγειν)...ἀπειρον ἀμφίβληστρον. The assonance of τέρματι... ἀτέρμονι is sought for its own sake, rather than for any point (cf. *Theb.* 380), but is rhetorically legitimate. The idea suggested (see preceding notes) is that having entered this 'maze', the home-comer missed his *dourne*, and journeyed elsewhere for ever. Compare the assonance of κέκληνται...εὐκλεῆς in *Cho.* 320.—Acute, and worth discussion, is the suggestion (proposed in the MS.) that ἀποστρατείας is a compound substant., related to ἀποστρατεῦσθαι (*q.v.*) as ἐπιπορεία, ἐπιστατεία, ὑπογραμματεία to the corresponding verbs. The proposal is plainly deliberate, for the usual doubt is plainly the spellings, -στρατιάς and -στρατείας, is carefully marked, and if

the copyist of the reading had found ἀπὸ (*sic*), he would have so accented it. The word would signify the position of one ἀποστρατος or ἀποστρατευόμενος, the position of the στρατηγός *parting* (or, like Agamemnon, parted) *from his command*; and it would mark, in singularly apt accordance with language used in this connexion elsewhere, the charge which the speaker here desires to rebut. See on *Ag.* 1226 νεῶν ἀπαρχος, and note στρατηλάτου νεῶν below. Moreover (and this was probably the reason for it) ἀποστρατείας, as *partitive* genitive with τὰ πλεῖστα, would add to the clearness of ἡμποληκότα τὰ πλ. ἀμείνονα: 'in his ἀποστρατεία', in the winding up, so to speak, of his military enterprise, 'he showed a large balance of purchased gain': for a parallel see *Eur. Med.* 534 μεῖζω γε μέντοι τῆς ἐμῆς σωτηρίας ελληφας ἢ δέδωκας, 'your gain *in* my preservation was greater than your gift'. I incline to accept this, but put in the text the usual division, as given in the scholium.

639—642. ταύτην τοιαύτην εἶπον. 'She there...was such as I have shown her.' He points, with ταύτην, in the forensic manner, to the place where, as *he* can see, Clytaemnestra actually stands. Refer to *v.* 601. The abruptness—we expect an antithesis to ἀνδρὸς μὲν κ.τ.λ.—is calculated, and thrilling. It is the orator's parry, or counter-move, to the apparition of the ghost.—The conjecture τὴν δ' αὖ (Weil, Wecklein) presumes, what is true, that ταύτην requires Clytaemnestra to be present. But she is present.—Λεώς: οἱ δικασταί, schol., but the limitation is not quite exact. Apollo's

ὅσπερ τέτακται τήνδε κυρῶσαι δίκην.

XO. πατρός προτιμᾶ Ζεὺς μόρον τῷ σῶ λόγῳ,
αὐτὸς δ' ἔδησε πατέρα πρεσβύτην Κρόνον.
πῶς ταῦτα τούτοις οὐκ ἐναντίως λέγεις; 645
ὑμᾶς δ' ἀκούειν ταῦτ' ἐγὼ μαρτύρομαι.

AΠ. ᾧ παντομισῇ κνώδαλα, στύγη θεῶν,
πέδας μὲν ἄν λύσειεν, ἔστι τοῦδ' ἄκος·
καὶ κάρτα πολλή μηχανὴ λυτήριος·
ἀνδρὸς δ' ἐπειδὰν αἶμ' ἀνασπάσῃ κόνις, 650
ἄπαξ θανόντος, οὔτις ἔστ' ἀνάστασις.
τούτων ἐπωδὰς οὐκ ἐποίησεν πατῆρ
οὐμός, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντ' ἄνω <τε> καὶ κάτω
στρέφων τίθησιν οὐδὲν ἀσθμαίνων μένει.

XO. πῶς γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τοῦδ' ὑπερδικεῖς; ὄρα. 655

648. παιδασ altered to πέδασ.

653. ἄνω και. text recc.

654. οὐδ' ἐν ἀσθμαίνω. text recc.

rhetoric is really addressed to the general audience, the *στρατός* of *v.* 569, rather than to the judges as such. His adversaries note this, and pointedly invoke *the tribunal*; see on *ὑμᾶς* in *v.* 646. But it is true that, according to Athenian conception, a bench of judges represented the sovereignty of the people; Apollo avails himself of this theory, and deftly appeals to public sentiment.

643—646. The opponents, to diminish the effect of Apollo's harangue, try another way of bringing him to the legal issue, and, like the devil, 'quote Scripture for their purpose'. The legend of Cronus is noted by Euripides (*Heraclēs*, 1317, 1342) and by Plato (*Rep.* 378 A) among the disgraces of orthodox religion. Aeschylus, as one ready to worship Zeus if he could, had meditated on it anxiously and profoundly (*Ag.* 178 foll.). The Erinyes, like an Athenian infidel, throw it at their Olympian adversary, in the hope (note the call for attention from the jury, and refer to *v.* 604) of a particular reply, probably a commonplace of Athenian apologetics, which will suit them. Their

ruse succeeds.—*προτιμᾶ μητρός* schol.—*ὑμᾶς*, and *ἐγὼ*, contrast the speaker's appeal to the jury, only and as such, with the vagueness of Apollo in *ὡς δηχθῆ* *Λεῶς* (641), where see note. He would bring in the sentiment of the crowd; she, in a tone of protest (*μαρτύρομαι*), invites to her argument the attention of the court.

647. Apollo, stung by the damaging reference to the scandals of Olympian theology, becomes angry and, in his anger, unwary.

648. *πέδας...λύσειεν*: *fetters he may loose, i.e.* it is supposable that he should loose them. The subject is Zeus (Paley).—We cannot supply the subject *τις*, and, to make the statement general, *λύσειας* (Dindorf) must be read. As it stands, it is a generality, but applied to the case.—It strikes a modern reader as a grotesque defence of Zeus for his unfilial act to say 'Fetters can be undone' (Sidgwick). It seemed, I think, grotesque, or at least superficial and inadequate, to Aeschylus. Neither his general views, nor his design here, require the supposition that Apollo was in those early days infallible as a

such as she was, to touch the hearts of that folk, which is the instituted authority in this cause. (*Stir and sound of the crowd.*)

Erin. A father's death, according to thy argument, is more esteemed by Zeus. Yet he himself put in bonds his aged father Kronos. How does thine argument agree with that?—You (*to the jury*), you I invite, for my part, to attend here.

Apollo. Ah, ye abominable, brutish, god-detested! Fetters He may loose; for that, there is remedy; and many, very many, are the means of undoing what is done. But when the dust hath swallowed the blood of mortal man, once he is dead, there is no raising of him. Spell for this, none hath my Father made; all else, without breath of displeasure, this way, or that again, he doth reverse and dispose.

Erin. And how doth this plea for thy client touch him as

theologian and controversialist. Before the date of the *Eumenides*, even Apollo had probably come to deeper views; at any rate Aeschylus had (see preceding note), and for an adequate answer would have referred us to 'Zeus—whosoever he be'.

649. 'And right manifold is the power of loosing', *i.e.*, 'and indeed in general, what is done can be undone'. Not 'many ways of loosing fetters'.

650. *ἀνδρῶς*: *βροτοῦ*, a human being, as opp. to an immortal (Cronus).

652—654. It is the will of Zeus that death shall be the one process not reversible; others he reverses, or permits to be reversed, 'with indifference', *οὐδὲν ἀσθημάτων μένει*, lit. 'without drawing the sharp breath of anger', "Keineswegs infolge von Zornmut schnaubend, d. i. nicht über die Massen aufgebracht und unversöhnlich" (Wecklein, after Schuetz, referring to *v.* 533 f.).—*ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω*. I accept, under reserve, the obvious conjecture of the later mss. (d, f, g) for *ἄνω καὶ κάτω* (M), but am not sure that this is not the sign of some deeper injury affecting both verses (653 and 654). The language is odd, though this indeed may be due to citation or imitation of some

ancient and now unknown authority.—The doctrine in question, that the restoration of the parted life to the body is impossible, was prevalent (see *Ag.* 1004) but by no means universal among religious Greeks; nor was Delphi itself consistent about it, as the Erinyes, in mere malice, presently take an opportunity to recall (*v.* 726). The legend of Alcestis was expressly designed to contradict it. It is not consistent with any secure belief in man's personal immortality, a rising belief in the fifth century B.C., and that which was to prevail in the distant future. What Aeschylus held, we are not in a position to say; probably he trusted faintly the larger hope.

655—657. 'How then *with regard to banishment* does your plea make for your client? Note that.' *τὸ φεύγειν τοῦδ' ὑπερδικεῖς*: 'argue for him the matter of exile'. *τὸ φεύγειν*, as the order of words shows, contains the point. Apollo, using the accustomed symbol for the lost life, has incautiously insisted, that the blood once 'swallowed by the dust' is irrecoverable. His opponent, who was waiting for this, triumphantly asks how then Orestes can ever have a home?

τὸ μητρὸς αἷμ' ὄμαιμον ἐκχέας πέδοι,
 ἔπειτ' ἐν Ἄργει δώματ' οἰκῆσει πατρός;
 ποίοισι βωμοῖς χρώμενος τοῖς δημίους;
 ποία δὲ χέρνυψ φρατέρων προσδέξεται;—

ΑΠ. καὶ τοῦτο λέξω, καὶ μάθ' ὡς ὀρθῶς ἔρω. 660

οὐκ ἔστι μήτηρ ἢ κεκλημένου τέκνου
 τοκεύς, τροφὸς δὲ κύματος νεοσπόρου·
 τίκτει δ' ὁ θρώσκων, ἢ δ' ἄπερ ξένῳ ξένη
 ἔσωσεν ἔρνος, οἷσι μὴ βλάβῃ θεός.

τεκμήριον δὲ τοῦδέ σοι δείξω λόγου. 665

πατὴρ μὲν ἂν γένοιτ' ἄνευ μητρός· πέλας
 μάρτυς πάρεστι παῖς Ὀλυμπίου Διός,

656. πέδωι.

659. προσδέξαίτε. text rec.

663. θρώσκων.

664. ζτ in margin.

Earth (πέδον) is for ever polluted to the matricide, and through earth all the instruments of religion, the altars, the holy water. What will be his position in Argos? That he must be for ever a fugitive, an exile, is just their contention (*vv.* 424 foll.), and Apollo (they imply) has proved it. For the general doctrine that earth is unclean to the shedder of blood, see *Cho.* 64 foll., 277 foll., and notes there. That the pollution affected the soil of the native πόλις only, and this only for a time, were practical and arbitrary modifications of the primitive idea, and led to the conventional *φυγὴ ἐνιαυσία*, banishment for a year (*Eur. Hipp.* 37). The Erinyes, at least in this extreme case, do not recognise the limitations, and we observe, that Aeschylus does not assign them to Apollo either, and in fact does not notice them at all. They would hardly commend themselves to his profound and rigorous way of thinking.—τὸ φεύγειν “expresses the result of the pleading,” *i.e.* that he be acquitted (schol., Paley, and others). But (1) τὸ φεύγειν is then superfluous,

whereas by position it is emphatic; (2) φεύγειν, in forensic language, does not necessarily or properly mean *to be acquitted* (πεφευγέναι, φυγεῖν, ἀποφυγεῖν), but *to be defendant* or perhaps *to make a defence*: the latter (for which see *Suppl.* 395 and Jebb on *Soph. Ant.* 263) is admissible here (‘how you argue for him his defence’) but would be still superfluous; (3) the sense requires a reference to *exile*. In this lies the point of the retort.—Grammatically τὸ φεύγειν signifies no more than that φεύγειν *in some way* defines the scope of ὑπερδικεῖς: in what relation, whether as purpose or how otherwise, we must infer from the context.—The question πῶς κ.τ.λ. seems better taken as direct than as dependent on *ἄρα*.—πέδω ‘epic dative’, as usual, M; πέδοι (Attic) Dindorf.—δημίους...φρατέρων: with allusion to the religious corporations, *demes* and *phratries*, of Attica.

660—664. Apollo, brought to bay, at last offers an argument upon the technical issue, the criminality of matricide. Generation is analogous to the sowing of plants; the father is the only

fugitive? Mark that! His mother's blood, his own, he hath spilled upon earth. And shall he then in Argos inhabit his father's house? What altar of common worship can he use? What brotherhood will admit him to holy water? (*A pause.*)

Ap. This, too, I will explain, and mark thou how straightforwardly. The mother of what is called her child—is no *parent* of it, but nurse only of the young life that is sown in her. The parent is the male, and she but a stranger, a friend, who, if fate spares his plant, preserves it till it puts forth. And I will show thee a proof of this argument. A father may become such without a mother's aid. Here at my hand is a witness, the Child of Olympian Zeus,—who, even ere she came to light,

'parent', the mother is no more *δμαιο*s to the child than the ground is to the seed. As to the origin, substance, and bearing of this theory, see the Introduction. Here it will suffice to remark (1) that the speaker, who has abstained from producing it as long as he possibly can, now shows (as might be expected) little faith in its effect upon the jury, whom he does not even address (*v. 660 μάθε, v. 665 σοι*); (2) that he covers it as quickly as he can, sliding from it artfully into a personal compliment to the president, and thence abruptly to his peroration, which is in fact an appeal to the personal interests of the judges, an attempt to bribe the court.—*οὐκ ἔστι κ.τ.λ.* 'The mother of the thing called her child is no parent of it.'—*ὁ θρῶσκων: ὁ σπερμαίνων* schol.—*ἄπερ ξένω ξένη*: 'as a stranger for him (the father) a stranger': *i.e.* her part, as the nursing soil, does not give her any community of function with the father; she does not become a *parent*, as he is, any more than a nurse becomes a *parent*, if she successfully rears the child.—*ἔσωσεν...θεός*: *she preserves it till the putting forth, if his (hope) be not arrested by fate*, lit. 'preserves it for him, (to be) a plant,—for those (that is) for whom fate stops it not'.

ἔρνος is predicate: the seed becomes an *ἔρνος* when it puts forth the plant; so does the animal seed at the delivery. The antecedent to *οἴσι* is *ξένω*, or rather the *πατρὶ* which *ξένω* implies; since this *πατρὶ* is typical, 'a father' for 'fathers in general', the transition to the plural offers no difficulty. *βλάβη* in the special sense of *βλάπτειν*, *hinder*; not merely *injure*.—Attic prose would require *οἴσιν ἄν.*—By adding *οἴσι κ.τ.λ.*, Apollo sharpens his point. The mother is a depository, *not always safe*, and that is all.

666. *πατήρ ἄν γένοιτο (πατήρ): γεννήσειεν* schol.

667. Apollo conveniently ignores the fact, though familiar to his audience and specially interesting to himself, that, if Zeus produced Athena without mother, Hera retorted by producing *without father* the giant Typhaon, who was reared by the Great Serpent at Pytho (Delphi) itself (Homer *Hymn. Apoll.* 305—355). If the one birth proved his theory of *human* generation, which it plainly does not, the other would refute it. But in truth there is here hardly the semblance of reasoning. The allusion to Pallas serves merely to hurry off the argument, and introduce the bid for interest.

οὐδ' ἐν σκότοισι νηδύος τεθραμμένη,
 ἀλλ' οἶον ἔρνος οὔτις ἂν τέκοι θεός.
 ἐγὼ δέ, Παλλάς, τᾶλλα θ' ὡς ἐπίσταμαι 670
 τὸ σὸν πόλισμα καὶ στρατὸν τεύξω μέγαν,
 καὶ τόνδ' ἔπεμψα σῶν δόμων ἐφέστιον,
 ὅπως γένοιτο πιστὸς εἰς τὸ πᾶν χρόνου,
 καὶ τόνδ' ἐπικτήσαιο σύμμαχον, θεά,
 καὶ τοὺς ἔπειτα, καὶ τὰδ' αἰανῶς μένοι 675
 στέργειν τ' ἄπιστα τῶνδε τοὺς ἐπισπόρους.

AΘ. ἦδη κελεύω τούσδ' ἀπὸ γνώμης φέρειν
 ψήφον δικαίαν, ὡς ἄλις λελεγμένων;

676. τὰ πιστὰ γεcc.

668, 669. "οὐδέ: *not even*, not so much as" (Wellauer, Paley). 'Whose *covert even* was not a womb in which she grew.' The part of the mother is in no case more than ἐν σκότοις τρέφειν, the period of unseen growth before coming to light (μολεῖν εἰς φῶς) or delivery. In the case of Pallas, *even the darkness* was not that of a womb, but of the father's head and mind.—Paley says 'not even nurtured', *quasi* οὐδὲ τεθραμμένη, which is not quite exact; otherwise both his explanation and the comparison of *Theb.* 1026 (where I should have referred to his note here), seem right.—Mr Sidgwick would render οὐδέ *and not*, with a slight pause at *πάρεστι*—'a witness, child of Zeus (only) and not reared in the womb.' This is possible, but should rather be expressed by οὐδὲ νηδύος....., or οὐδὲ τεθραμμένη.....—ἀλλ' οἶον...θεός: 'yet such a birth as no miracle could make by generation', because she sprang forth adult and armed. Generation implies infancy; even Apollo, though his after-growth was miraculous, came an infant from his mother (Homer *Hymn. Apoll.* 116—129). But Pallas had no infancy, nor ever 'grew' in darkness; Zeus simply *thought* her, complete. The idea of Pallas, female, yet male-born, essentially masculine, and perpetually virgin (*inf. v.* 740),

is a rude attempt of anthropomorphic thought to spiritualize deity by the elimination of sex. As the favourite idea, perhaps the creation, of Athens, Apollo is eager to commend it.—ἔρνος, as in *v.* 664, the *plant*, or *shoot*: metaphorically, the thing put forth or born. τέκοι, in the full sense, 'produce by the way of *τίκτειν*'.

670—676. Such appeals to interest, as irrelevant and worse, the Archon Basileus would have stopped, the Areopagus being strict in such matters (*Lysias* 3, 46 ἐπειδὴ παρ' ὑμῶν οὐ νόμιμον ἔστω ἐξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν, *id.* 7. 42, *Aristot. Rhet.* 1. 1; Weil, Wecklein). But even human defendants could make a brief excursus, especially at the close; it is actually done in both the perorations cited, the rule of the court being mentioned just because it is violated. And Apollo is a defendant not easy to manage, fortunately for him; since his whole address (except *vv.* 660—664) is, from a *legal* point of view, irrelevant or evasive. What Athena can do, she does (*v.* 677). The practical effect of Areopagitic severity is indeed felt throughout, in the absence of those ελεοὶ καὶ δεήσεις, about the wrongs and sufferings of Orestes, which in any ordinary Greek court would have made the chief of his case.—σύμμαχον. For this contemporary

grew not in any womb, yet is a fairer plant than all the powers of heaven could beget.

For me, O Pallas, as in all else, with all my skill, I will make great thy burgh and host, so now I sent this man as suppliant to thy house, that he might become thy true man for all time, and thou, Goddess, gain to thy alliance him and those after him, and this abide for ever, to content in doubt the posterity of those in presence here. (*Stir in the crowd. Athena rises. Silence.*)

Ath. May I now take it that enough has been said, and bid the jury, justly according to their mind, forthwith to give their vote? (*She turns to the Erinyes.*)

alliance with Argos, and the part which Orestes was to take in securing it, see *vv.* 765 foll.—*καὶ τὰδε...ἐπισπόρους*: and that this (guarantee) might abide eternally and in such wise that, through all doubts, the posterity of these should cleave to it. *στέργειν τ' ἄπιστα κτλ.*: i.e. ὥστε τε στέργειν ἄπιστα ὄντα. The sense of *στέργειν*, cleave to, approaches the common *be content with* (see L. and Sc. *s.v.*), implying not that τὸ στεργόμενον is all that might be wished, but on the contrary that it is not. *τε* couples the adverb *αἰανῶς* to the adverbial *στέργειν...ἐπισπόρους*.—The point, explained fully in *vv.* 765 foll., is that, having made sure of Orestes (τόνδε), the Athenians would be sure of the Argives (τούς ἔπειτα), because Argos could not war against Athens if she would, and her choice would be between the Athenian *συμμαχία* or none, a security amply sufficient in the circumstances contemplated by Aeschylus. Athens might feel sure therefore, *whatever the appearances to the contrary*, or, as it is put epigrammatically, would have a surety 'to which Athenians might cleave when it was unsure'. The existing suspicion and fear of Argos, here implied, becomes explicit in the passage cited, which shows that, notwithstanding the *συμμαχία*, the appearance of the Argives in Attica, as invaders, was regarded as not impossible. In both places Aeschylus endeavours to reassure his countrymen. Our knowledge of the period, a bare out-

line uncertain even in the main dates, is not sufficient to explain these feelings, but they are not surprising. The interest of the Argives was dubious, and their policy, as between Athens and Sparta, not less so.—*τῶνδε*: the Athenians, represented by the jury and the crowd.—*στέργειν τὰ πιστὰ* (codd. Flor. Ven.) is simpler in appearance, but the words *τὰ πιστὰ* are then superfluous and ill-placed in the sentence. Moreover *vv.* 673—676 thus exhibit a verbose repetition, which is not in the manner of Aeschylus.

677, 678. Rightly given by Mr Sidgwick as a question, *κελεύω* being subj. deliberative, *Shall I now order?* "It is a formal request to both sides to know if there is anything more to be said," that is, any more argument. By Apollo rather too much has been said, as Athena hints (*ὡς ἄλις λελεγμένων*). He having spoken last, she offers first to the Erinyes the opportunity to reply, and to criticise his theory of generation; but they are content to let it pass,—another indication that we are not to suppose it likely, in the opinion of the poet, to produce much conviction or impression.—*ἀπὸ γνώμης...δικαίαν*: from their judgment...scrupulously, that is, not according to their interest or hopes, but according to their opinion of the question at issue. This also glances at Apollo's promises. With *δικαίαν*, 'founded on the δική', compare the opposite *ἐκδικος* in *v.* 492.

ΧΟ. ἡμῖν μὲν ἤδη πᾶν τετόξευται βέλος·—
 μένω δ' ἀκούσαι πῶς ἀγῶν κριθήσεται. 680

ΑΘ. τί γάρ;—πρὸς ὑμῶν πῶς τιθείσ' ἄμομφος ᾧ;

ΑΠ. ἠκούσαθ' ᾧν ἠκούσατ', ἐν δὲ καρδία
 ψῆφον φέροντες ὄρκον αἰδεῖσθε, ξένοι.

ΑΘ. κλύοιτ' ἂν ἤδη θεσμόν, Ἄττικὸς λεώς,
 πρώτας δίκας κρίνοντες αἵματος χυτοῦ. 685
 ἔσται δὲ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν Αἰγέως στρατῶ
 αἰεὶ δεκαστῶν τοῦτο βουλευτήριον·

682. ΧΟ.

686. αἰγέωι. text recc.

687. δ' ἐκάστων.

680. Probably toned as a warning or menace; cf. *vv.* 735, 736. They have done, but—will have more to say in a certain event.

681. τί γάρ; lit. 'Why what?' *i.e.* Of course, quietly puts aside, as if innocently meant, the threatening suggestion of the prosecutors. It does not seem consistent with the use of this form to take it as part of the question following. After this, she turns to the defendants.—'How in my ordering may I escape objection on your part?' πρὸς ὑμῶν... ἄμομφος together, *i.e.* 'Have you (Apollo and Orestes) more to say, or may I proceed to my θεσμός?'

682. Apollo, with graceful dexterity, contrives to remind the jurors of what, for better or for worse, they have heard (*vv.* 670—676), while at the same time correcting his attitude by an appeal to their consciences.

684. ἤδη *forthwith*, *now*, the time for what was above postponed (574) having come. λεώς: the jury as representative of the people, but also the folk assembled, the πόλις πᾶσα of *v.* 575. To them Athena's ordinance, concerning the future even more than the present, is of course addressed quite properly.

686. Αἰγέως recc., but αἰγέωι (M), *i.e.* Αἰγέωι (adjective), is possibly right, and gives the same sense.

686, 687. *As now, so in time to come, this shall ever be for the host of Aegaeus (the Athenians) the place where the*

chosen shall meet in council, lit. 'shall be ever the council-place of *decuriae*', if we may borrow the parallel Roman expression.—δεκάστων (or -ῶν). I believe this to be the reading slightly disguised in the δ' ἐκάστων of M. Such a use of δεκάξωι, as the technical term for the action of the magistrate in selecting and *making up* a bench of jurymen, is required to account for the use of it as a euphemism for *corrupting* a jury (see L. and Sc. *s.v.* and compare the Latin *decuriare*, which illustrates both senses). The briber was said to 'make up' his bench by securing a sufficient number of votes. But a word meaning properly 'to count by tens', 'to form *in decades*', could hardly have become connected either with bribery or with juries, except through an official and technical application. Whether the 'slang' use was known to Aeschylus, we cannot say, the extant examples being much later; but if it was, it would be no objection to the proper use, any more than the parallel misapplication of *decuriare* (*to bribe*) impeached or affected its continued use in the proper sense (*to collect, assemble*), upon which the parody was based. It must not however be inferred that, whenever δεκάξωι was used, the selected number was actually a multiple of ten. Terms of number often lose their numerical force, and δεκαστοὶ might as well mean simply *chosen (jurymen)* as *quarter* can mean simply *division*. On the other hand,

Erin. For our part, all our bolts are now shot,—though I wait to hear how the issue shall be judged.

Ath. Of course.—And you (*to Apollo and Orestes*),—how may I order, without complaint from you?

Ap. (to the Jury). What ye have heard, ye have heard. Give, friends, your votes, and in your hearts have respect unto your oath. (*A pause. Athena sits.*)

Ath. The time is come for you to hear my ordinance, you people of Athens, now judges in the first trial for shedding of blood.

Hereafter, even as now, this shall be, for the folk of Aegeus, the Council-place of the Bench from time to time.

Aeschylus apparently does present here a jury of *ten* or *tens* (see below on *vv.* 714—733), and perhaps this was the rule for the Areopagus in his time. The chief practical effect of such a rule would be to limit the discretion of the selecting magistrate (see on *vv.* 490 foll.) by requiring a minimum. If, by using *δεκαστοί*, the poet means to suggest that actual *decades*, a number divisible by ten, were and always had been required, his suggestion is not historical, since it contradicts the approved legend that the cause of Orestes had been tried by the *twelve* gods (see below). But, for this reason, Aeschylus was the more likely to import the suggestion, for the legends are inconsistent with his plot, and he is careful, as we shall see (*v.* 688), not only to ignore, but to contradict them. Perhaps the definitely decimal practice had replaced one definitely duodecimal, just as in the political system the *ten* tribes of Cleisthenes replaced the ancient and duodecimal 4 *φυλαί*, each of 3 *γένη*. But more probably the primitive usage had not been precise. In either case, we see why Aeschylus insists that it had been precise and decimal. He deals with the history of the Areopagus as with the history of Delphi, emphasizing his statement just in those points which tradition did not support. In the judicial system of the fifth century decimal numbers rule.—

By the Pythagoreans, the decade, and the number 5 which *divides the decade*, were mystically associated with *justice*, through the triple resemblance of *δικάζειν*, *δεκάζειν*, and *δικάζειν* (*v.* 491): see schol. to Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I. 5, Berlin ed. vol. IV. p. 541 b, *ἐνιοὶ δὲ φασὶν ὅτι ὡς μετὰ τῆς δεκάδος ὧν ὁ ἐ δικαστῆς ἐκαλείτο τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις, οἷόν τις δικαστῆς ὧν*. Such a conception would suit very well what Aeschylus seems to exhibit, a tribunal of *ten* or *tens*, equally divided upon the case, and it may have influenced him.—*αἰεὶ δ' ἐκάστων* (M), though of course wrong, is no slip. The author of it, not recognising *δεκαστῶν*, supposed an antithesis between *Ἀλγέως* (μὲν) *στρατῶ* and *αἰεὶ ἐκάστων*: 'the council-place for Athens (generally), and of each (jury) from time to time'. *αἰεὶ δ' ἐκάστω* (*i.e.* *ἐκάστω*, *recc.*) is an attempt to improve this by giving a dative on each side of the antithesis.—Several conjectures, *αὐτὸν ἀδεκάστων* (Pauw), *αἰεὶ δ' ἐδεκάστων* (Abresch), *ἀσυνδεκάστων* (Kirchhoff), would find here *ἀδεκάστος*, *unbrided*, *not to be brided*. But even if *δεκάζειν* in this sense were a fit term for Athena, she would surely be unhappy in thus thrusting forward this single negative praise. In *v.* 707 it comes in properly and is expressed in suitable language.—*δικαστῶν* Canter.

πάγον δ' Ἄρειον τόνδ', Ἀμαζόνων ἔδραν
 σκηνάς θ'. ὅτ' ἦλθον Θησέως κατὰ φθόνου
 στρατηλατοῦσαι, καὶ πόλιν νεόπτολιν 690
 τήνδ' ὑψίπυργον ἀντεπύργωσαν τότε,
 Ἄρει δ' ἔθουον, ἔνθεν ἔστ' ἐπώνυμος
 πέτρα πάγος τ' Ἄρειος,—ἐν δὲ τῷ σέβασ
 ἀστῶν, φόβος τε συγγενῆς τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν,
 σχήσει τόδ' ἡμᾶρ καὶ κατ' εὐφρόνην ὄμως, 695
 αὐτῶν πολιτῶν μὴ † πικαινότων νόμους.

696. ὄμουσ. νόμουσ m.

688. **πάγον.** The sentence is projected in the form, 'This hill of Ares I therefore hereby appoint as the place of council (βουλευτήριον)', and is in fact resumed and finished in this form at v. 707. But the historical parenthesis on the name ('Ἀμαζόνων... Ἄρειος') is succeeded by certain encomia and precepts, introduced as pre-fatory to the appointment. These have their separate commencement (ἐν δὲ τῷ...), so that, for the time, the accusative **πάγον** remains in suspense. So (substantially) Paley, Sidgwick, and others, though we must hardly say that the accusative 'is forgotten'. The grammar and logic of the whole speech correspond, and exhibit the rhetorical advantage of an inflected language in binding great periods together.—The name Ἄρειον, which has been suspected here and removed by correction, is necessary, as Paley points out, to introduce the explanation of it which follows.

688—693. The common explanation of Ἄρειος πάγος, the only one which seems ever to have had any vogue, connected the name, as might be expected, with the origin of the tribunal: *Ares* had been the first defendant, being indicted by Poseidon for the death of his son Halirrhothios, and tried by a jury of gods. So Eurip. *El.* 1258 Ἀρεῶς τις ὄχθος, οὗ πρῶτον θεοὶ ἔζοντ' ἐπὶ ψήφοισιν αἵματος πέρι, | Ἀλιρροθίου ὅτ' ἔκταν' ὠμόφρων Ἄρης, Pausan. 1. 28. 5 Ἄρειος πάγος καλούμενος ὅτι πρῶτος Ἄρης ἐνταῦθα ἐκρίθη, ... κριθῆναι δὲ καὶ ὕστερον Ὀρέστην λέγουσιν ἐπὶ τῷ φόνῳ

τῆς μητρὸς, Demosth. (?) 23. 66 ἐν μόνῳ τούτῳ τῷ δικαστηρίῳ δίκας φόνου θεοὶ καὶ δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν ἤξιωσαν καὶ δικασταὶ γενέσθαι..., λαβεῖν μὲν Ποσειδῶν ὑπὲρ Ἀλιρροθίου τοῦ υἱοῦ παρὰ Ἀρεῶς, δικάσαι δὲ Εὐμένισι καὶ Ὀρέστη οἱ δώδεκα θεοὶ, and Dinarch. 1. 87, both placing, like Euripides and Pausanias, the judgment of Ares first. Indeed it is plain, that the legend of Ares, if accepted at all, must be accepted for what it was, an account of the tribunal's *origin*. And this shows why Aeschylus dilates upon a matter which he seems to make irrelevant. To receive the *Eumenides*, the legend of Halirrhothios must be *dismissed as false*; and to give another derivation of the name *Areopagos* is to signify this in the least offensive way (see Paley's note). For the derivation given, Aeschylus seems to be the sole authority, and he may well have invented it. But the invasion of the Amazons, and their defeat by Theseus, was in itself a popular legend and became a commonplace of Athenian encomia. See also the Introduction.—**κατὰ φθόνου** in *jealousy* of Theseus' own foundation, the Πόλις or Acropolis. For the Amazons as representing *barbarism* against *Hellenism*, see Isocrates 4. 68, Lysias 2. 4, etc.: Isocrates parallels them with the Persians; and a similar thought, as Paley points out, is probably suggested here, since the Persians had besieged the Acropolis from the Areopagus (Herod. 9. 27).—**ἀντεπύργωσαν τῇ τοῦ Θησέως πόλει, τῇ Ἀκροπόλει.**—Ἄρει, as

This Hill of Ares,—whereon the Amazons pitched their tents, when, for ill-will to Theseus, they came in their hosts, and with high walls upreared this citadel, then rival and foe to his, sacrificing to Ares, whence the rock of sacrifice, and the hill, is called after his name:—

In this place, public Reverence, and the kindred Fear of doing wrong, shall restrain wrong-doing, by night even as by day,—so long as the citizens themselves shall not impair (?) the law with (?)

their 'father' and patron.—*ἑπώνυμος* ("Ares): hence the rock bears his name, and the hill (is) 'the hill of Ares'. *πέτρα*, i.e. that which served for the Amazons' sacrifice, or upon which they erected their βωμός. This altar-stone 'of Ares' was apparently the same, or in the same place, as the βωμός which Pausanias (1. 28. 5) attributes to 'Athena Areia', *ὅν ἀνέθηκεν* ('Ορέστης) *ἀποφυγῶν τὴν δίκην*. When the importance of Athena in relation to the tribunal had eclipsed that of Ares, his altar was transferred to her, in the usual way, by means of an epithet. The legend cited by Pausanias seems to have connected this dedication with the trial of Orestes. The reason why Aeschylus mentions the *πέτρα* particularly is probably that it served as a table for the voting-urns and votes, and was presented symbolically in his scene. Demosthenes (18. 134) speaks of the use of an altar for this purpose as an enhancement of the solemnity, *καὶ ταῦτα ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ φέρουσα τὴν ψήφον ἔπραξε* (ἡ ἐξ' Ἀρ. πάγ. βουλῆ). As a fact, it may be assumed that the court was anciently content to assemble under the patronage of Ares, though it would not have suited Athenian conceptions in the fifth century, least of all those of Aeschylus, to admit this. And it may further be true (Wachsmuth, Gilbert; see Frazer on Pausan. l.c.) that even the connexion with Ares was an accident, the name *areios pagos* having really meant 'hill of cursing', from the stem of *ἀρά*. But its *real* origin is a matter upon which we have no evidence, and can hardly even guess with safety.

693—702. *ἐν δὲ τῷ: and here, ἐν τούτῳ*

τῆ πάγῳ.—φόβος τε συγγενὴς τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν: and the kindred fear to do wrong. The φόβος is συγγενὴς to the σέβας, both personified; but probably there is also a glance at the mythological kinship of Ares and Phobos (his son in Hes. Theog. 940, and see Theb. 45 Ἄρη τ' Ἐννώ καὶ φιλαίματον Φόβον). In this way Aeschylus marks so much connexion between the tribunal and the eponym of the hill (Ares) as he thinks fit to recognise. As an instrument of religious terror, the court is fixed in a place already sacred and already associated with Phobos. The schol., *ὁ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ γάρ*, is therefore in substance right.—*τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν* explains the φόβος: cf. Ag. 14 φόβος γὰρ ἀνθ' ὕπνου παραστατεῖ τὸ μὴ βεβαίως βλέφαρα συμβαλεῖν ὕπνῳ, and note there.—*σχήσει τὸδε*: either (1) *shall restrain it*, i.e. τὸ ἀδικεῖν, *crime*: or (2) with the same sense, *σχήσει* (τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν) 'shall restrain from crime', *σχήσει* being then absolute, and τὸδε standing for a repetition of the preceding phrase. I prefer the first.—*ἡμᾶρ ... ὄμῳς*: *by day and even by night*. Both substantives depend on the preposition, as in Soph. O.T. 734 Δελφῶν κἀπὸ Δαυλλίας, etc.; ὄμῳς belongs specially to κατ' εὐφρόνην, 'by night in spite of the night', as the season of crime. Whether in such a case we write ὄμῳς (as M) or ὀμῳς, *alike*, makes little difference; but ὄμῳς better marks the point.—From this, and the more definite ὑπὲρ εὐδόντων ἐγγηγορῶς φροῦρημα (v. 708), it seems that at the date of the *Eumenides* the power of the Areopagus over crime, which (it must be remembered) had but recently been almost unlimited, was represented by some

κακαῖς ἐπιρροαῖσι βορβόρω θ' ὕδωρ
 λαμπρὸν μαιίνων οὐποθ' εὐρήσεις ποτόν.
 τὸ μῆτ' ἀναρχον μηδὲ δεσποτούμενον
 ἀστοῖς περιστέλλουσι βουλευὺν σέβειν, 700
 καὶ μὴ τὸ δεινὸν πᾶν πόλεως ἔξω βαλεῖν.
 τίς γὰρ δεδοικῶς μηδὲν ἔνδικος βροτῶν;
 τοιόνδε τοι ταρβοῦντες ἐνδίκως σέβας,
 ἔρυμά τε χώρας καὶ πόλεως σωτήριον
 ἔχοιτ' ἂν οἶον οὐτις ἀνθρώπων ἔχει 705
 οὐτ' ἐν Σκύθαισιν οὔτε Πέλοπος ἐν τόποις.—
 κερδῶν ἄθικτον τοῦτο βουλευτήριον,
 αἰδοῖον, ὀξύθυμον, εὐδόντων ὑπερ
 ἐργηγορὸς φρούρημα γῆς καθίσταμαι.—
 ταύτην μὲν ἐξέτειν' ἐμοῖς παραίνεσιν 710
 ἀστοῖσιν εἰς τὸ λοιπόν. ὀρθοῦσθαι δὲ χρή,

700. σεθεν. σέβειν (in margin) m.

706. σκύθησιν. corr. rec.

watch, maintained there at all hours under the management of the Council. It seems in short, as Wecklein remarks, to have then directed the 'police'. That its *judicial* proceedings took place at night (necessarily or usually) is not proved; nor is there any sufficient indication in the present case, though we may note *v.* 748, and the *torches* of the final procession (1030, 1043).—τό τ' ἡμαρ Grotius (and many modern texts), on the assumption that τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν belongs primarily to σχήσει, so that τότε is unconstructable. But neither τὸ ἡμαρ nor κατὰ τὸ ἡμαρ, for *by day*, seems to be the usage of Aeschylus, or of the tragedians (at least) generally, but κατ' ἡμαρ, καθ' ἡμέραν, as here.—²πικαινότων (?). No such word is otherwise known, nor has any etymology been traced. μὴ πικραινότων Valckenaer, μὴ πικραινότων Wakefield, μὴ πικαινούτων Stephanus. The first has the advantage of colour, the metaphor (*spoiling the taste*) leading naturally to that of the water. Possibly πικαινότων (*sic*) itself is right. We cannot be sure that there was

no such word as πικαινω, or that, if it existed, it was not here appropriate.—Equally difficult is the choice between punctuating at νόμους, or, as Hermann, Dr Headlam and others, at ἐπιρροαῖσι, with change of βορβόρω θ' to βορβόρω δ'. In several collections of proverbs (see Hermann) βορβόρω ὕδωρ κ.τ.λ. is cited by itself, from which he infers, but not very safely, that a sentence began at βορβόρω in the original. I should prefer the division at ἐπιρροαῖσι, if it did not involve a change of letter. For κακαῖς κ.τ.λ. without copula, Mr Sidgwick cites the similar treatment of proverbs in *Ag.* 334 ὄξος τ' ἀλειφά τε κ.τ.λ. and *Eur. Or.* 234 μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ.—τὸ μῆτ' ἀναρχον κ.τ.λ. For the bearing of this sentiment on the history and position of the Areopagus see *vv.* 520—531, and notes there. The κακαὶ ἐπιρροαὶ are the Council's 'encroachments'. By making Athena thus cite the very language of the Erinyes (*v.* 529), the poet implies that, in their denunciation of the Council, that portion, which refers to the *abuses* of the institution,

ill admixture. If thou foul bright water with mire, thou wilt never win a draught.

‘Not ungoverned, nor yet governed tyrannously,’—this is the rule I would have my people preserve. This I counsel them to reverence, and that fear be not altogether outcast from the city. For what mortal is righteous if he nothing fear?

Such be your reverence, such your righteous dread, and ye will have such protecting bulwark to country and town, as none of mankind has, not in Scythia nor in the parts of Pelops.

Pure from corruption, compassionate, quick to wrath, the Council here assembling I do establish, to be a vigilant guard of the land’s repose. (*A pause.*)

So far I have pursued the path of exhortation to my people for time to come; and now, to proceed in the straight course,

is to be accepted as right. Dramatically also, the citation is doubly effective, both as a reminder to the Erinyes of Athena’s far-reaching knowledge (for she was not present to sense when they so spoke), and as preparing the way for her eventual invitation of them to join in supporting the new foundation. It is to be established upon their own principles, in so far as these are laudable.—We must not therefore conclude (with Dindorf) that *vv.* 699—702, because borrowed from the Chorus, are spurious.—*μήτε...μηδέ. μήτε...μήτε* recc., followed by recent editors. But there seems to be an intentional variation from the common form, analogous to the use of *τε...δέ, ούτε...ούδέ* (see Kühner *G. G.* §§ 520 n. 3, 536 g), ‘what is neither lawlessness nor yet despotism either.’—*περιστέλλουσι σέβειν*: *i.e.* *περιστέλλειν καὶ σέβειν*.

703—706. *τοιόνδε*: such as has been said, control without tyranny, subordination without servility. Whether *σέβας* is here the feeling or the object of it, is a question which in the Greek does not practically arise.—*ἔρυμά τε χώρας*: *i.e.* *ἔρυμα χώρας τε*. Strictly speaking, there is no transference of *τε* in such cases, but an ellipse, for *ἔρυμά τε χώρας καὶ (ἔρυμα) πόλεως*.—‘Not in Scythia nor the Pello-

ponnese.’ This expression must not be taken as simply equivalent to ‘neither among Hellenes nor barbarians’, though this is part of the meaning. Had the Athenian hopes of a land-empire been realised, the Areopagus might well have become the centre of justice for a region which, northward, had no limit but that of Hellenism itself. The phrase, like those in *vv.* 292 foll., 400 foll., sweeps the horizon of Athenian ambition at this critical moment.

707—709. See on 688, and note the repetition of *τοῦτο βουλευτήριον*, to mark the connexion, from 687.—*εὐδόντων... ἐγρηγορός*: primarily metaphorical, *εὐδόντων* emphasizing by contrast *ἐγρηγορός*, ‘vigilant, though others may sleep’; but see also on 695.—*ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τιμωρῶν*, schol.; this also may perhaps be suggested.

710—713. The act of foundation and the oration thereupon, placed as it is (see on 574, 684), is a divergence (*ἔξ-έπεινα*), for the sake of the future (*εἰς τὸ λοιπόν*), from the present business. To this Athena now returns, directing the judges to vote. The antithesis *μὲν...δὲ* suggests that *ὀρθοῦσθαι χρή* bears the exceptional, but not unnatural, sense, ‘we must (now) put ourselves straight’, *i.e.* ‘resume the

καὶ ψῆφον αἴρειν, καὶ διαγνῶναι δίκην
αἰδουμένους τὸν ὄρκον. εἴρηται λόγος.

ΧΟ. καὶ μὴν βαρεῖαν τήνδ' ὀμιλίαν χθονὸς
ξύμβουλος εἶμι μηδαμῶς ἀτιμάσαι. 715

ΑΠ. κᾶγωγε χρησμούς τοὺς ἐμούς τε καὶ Διὸς
ταρβεῖν κελεύω μηδ' ἀκαρπώτους κτίσαι.

ΧΟ. ἀλλ' αἵματηρὰ πράγματ' οὐ λαχὼν σέβεις,
μαντεῖα δ' οὐκέθ' ἀγνὰ μαντεύσει μένων.

ΑΠ. ἦ καὶ πατήρ τι σφάλλεται βουλευμάτων 720
πρωτοκτόνοισι προστροπαῖς Ἰξίονος;

ΧΟ. λέγεις· ἐγὼ δὲ μὴ τυχοῦσα τῆς δίκης
βαρεῖα χώρα τῆδ' ὀμιλήσω πάλιν.

ΑΠ. ἀλλ' ἐν τε τοῖς νέοισι καὶ παλαιτέροις
θεοῖς ἄτιμος εἶ σύ· νικήσω δ' ἐγώ. 725

713. αἰδουμένοις.

716. κἀγὼ τε.

direct course'. Somewhat similar is *ὀρθομένων*, 'holding the true course', in *v.* 775. The unexpressed subject includes all concerned, Athena, the court, and even the cause, though *αἰδουμένους τὸν ὄρκον*, and perhaps also *ψῆφον αἴρειν*, belong to the dicasts only; the thought becomes more definite in the process of expression.—'You must rise (from your seats)'; Paley, Wecklein. Wecklein notes this use of *ὀρθοῦσθαι* (without further explanation) as remarkable, though we could not reject it upon this ground. But it would lay a strange emphasis upon the action. Before the judges can take their counters from the altar, they must certainly stand up; but to mention this seems to impair the terse solemnity of the conclusion.—*αἰδουμένους* Canter. The dative (M) probably arose from the false construction *αἰδουμένοις εἴρηται λόγος*, 'the dicasts have been bidden' (see *v.* 683).

714—733. This dialogue accompanies the voting of the dicasts. The *ten couplets* indicate that the number of judges is divisible by 10, and probably is 10, this

number being quite sufficiently large for the purposes of the stage. See further on 687, 746.—By counting a vote for the triplet 734—736, and by other expedients, the scene may be accommodated, without violence, to 11 votes or to other numbers, but 10 is the most natural. The question is connected with that of Athena's vote, on which see *v.* 738 and the Introduction.—The division is (I think) by separate *urns* (*τεύχη*, *v.* 745) not by different sorts of *ψῆφαι*: see on *vv.* 751 foll. The voting is secret, and the urns therefore must be so arranged that the voter's choice cannot be detected. Various arrangements are conceivable and admissible.

714, 715. καὶ μὴν *Mark!*—*τήνδε... χθονὸς*: *ἡμᾶς τάσδε ὀμιλοῦσας* (*visitors*) *τῇ πόλει*.

716, 717. ἀκαρπώτους κτίσαι (*ποιῆσαι*): to deprive of their full effect.—*κἀγωγε* Porson.

718, 719. By meddling with what is not his function (*οὐ λαχὼν*), a case of blood, Apollo has himself compromised the purity and dignity of his oracle (see *vv.* 169 foll.).—*σέβεις* (if right) is similar to

let each take up his counter, and give sentence with respect unto his oath.

My say is said.

(During the ten speeches following, the judges give their votes by taking counters from an altar-table, and putting them in urns, so arranged that the result is unknown.)

1. *Erin.* Mark! We are visitors dangerous to your land, whom I counsel you not to slight.

2. *Ap.* And for my part I say, dread the oracular command, not mine alone, but of Zeus; and make it not ineffectual.

3. *Erin.* Nay, but now that, contrary to thine office, thou respectest the causes of murderers, impure henceforth must be the sanctuary, where thou awaitest them.

4. *Ap.* Hath my Father also lost at all his wisdom, because he received as suppliant the first slayer, Ixion?

5. *Erin.* Thou arguest! I, if I win not the judgment, will be dangerous to this land, when I visit again.

6. *Ap.* But to the new gods, as to the elder, thou art contemptible, and the victory will be mine.

σέβει in *v.* 92, and correlative to *σεμνός* in *v.* 444: 'Thou art become a respecter of the causes of murderers.' As the criminal entitled to religious acceptance is *σεμνός*, so the person, who receives him, purges him, and becomes responsible for him, is said *σέβει* him and his cause (*πράγμα*). *μένων* (if right) should be completed by *αίματηρὰ πράγματα* from the preceding sentence, and points to the expectation, on which the Erinyes insist in *vv.* 174 foll. (where see note), that, having once undertaken this polluting function, Apollo and his oracle will not easily be rid of it: *And the oracle, where thou awaitest such causes, will henceforth be impure.*—*νέμων* (Hermann), *i.e.* *νέμων μαντεῖα giving oracles, or managing the oracle, is easier, and may be right.*—*νέμεις* (for *σέβεις*) *you manage, Rauchenstein.* This, or some change of *σέβεις*, seems necessary, if we assume that the present action of Apollo in the trial is the chief or sole matter in view. We might then suspect confusion between the final

words of the verses. The text is questionable, but not certainly wrong.

720, 721. 'Has Zeus become fallible because he first purged a murderer, Ixion?' See on *v.* 444.—*σφάλλεται βουλευμάτων*: lit. 'does he miss his counsel' or 'purpose?'—*τι*, in some way, to some degree, implies that *σφάλλασθαι Δία* is a strange conception.—*προστροπαῖς*: see *v.* 448 etc. The dative is causal, 'because of the (accepted) supplication'. Not 'Was Zeus mistaken in accepting...?' The argument is that, as Zeus, though a purgator of murder, is still the wise governor of the world, so Apollo, though a purgator, will be none the less the wise prophet.

722—725. *λέγεις*: *Mere words!* *i.e.* 'you may argue'. Not finding at the moment an effective reply, they fall back upon threats.—*τῆς δίκης*: *the sentence in my favour.* Cf. *vv.* 576, 712.—*βαρεῖα κ.τ.λ.*: 'will be dangerous to this land when I come again'.—*ἀλλὰ...έγω*. 'If it

- ΧΟ. τοιαῦτ' ἔδρασας καὶ Φέρητος ἐν δόμοις·
Μοίρας ἔπεισας ἀφθίτους θείναι βροτούς.
- ΑΠ. οὐκ οὐκ δίκαιον τὸν σέβοντ' εὐεργετῆιν,
ἄλλως τε πάντως χᾶτε δεόμενος τύχοι;
- ΧΟ. σύ τοι παλαιὰς ΔΙΑΝΟΜᾶς καταφθίσας 730
οἴνῳ παρηπάτησας ἀρχαίας θεάς.
- ΑΠ. σύ τοι τάχ' οὐκ ἔχουσα τῆς δίκης τέλος
ἐμὲ τὸν ἰὸν οὐδὲν ἐχθροῖσιν βαρύν.
- ΧΟ. ἐπεὶ καθιππάζει με πρεσβῦτιν νέος,
δίκης γενέσθαι τῆσδ' ἐπήκοος μένω, 735
ὡς ἀμφίβογλος οὔσα θυμουῖσθαι πόλει.
- ΑΘ. ἐμὸν τόδ' ἔργον, λιοισθίαν κρῖναι δίκην.

730. δαίμονας.

736. ἀμφίβολος.

comes to force, you are, as you ever were, inferior.'—These two couplets were placed by Merkel (and Wecklein) between 733 and 734. Thus (1) λέγεις is somewhat simpler: 'so you say', referring to οὐδὲν ἐχθροῖσιν βαρύν in 733; (2) πρεσβῦτιν νέος (734) is immediately contrasted with ἐν νέοις τε κ.τ.λ. (724); (3) 726 comes as a retort to 720, 721. In short, the whole movement is smoothed, and the reasoning is not interrupted by mere explosions of temper on the one part (722) and the other (732). But whether this is a dramatic improvement may be doubted. Mr Sidgwick retains the MS. order.

726—731. The Erinyes resume, and with better success, the contest of wit. This is not the first case in which Apollo has meddled beyond his sphere (τοιαῦτ' ἔδρασεν). He did so when by vile means (731) he got the *Moirai*, goddesses of the elder generation, to infringe the law of death, by suffering Admetus, son of Pheres, to purchase remission of his own fate by substituting another. His wife Alcestis consented to die in his place. Apollo's motive was gratitude to Admetus (728) for having treated him kindly when, for a previous interference with the course

of *divine law*, he was sentenced by Zeus to a term of slavery. See the prologue to the *Alcestis* of Euripides. The allusion is very damaging to Apollo's assumption of perfect harmony between himself and his father (716); and he betrays his wound (732), as the Erinyes did (722), by fury. He behaves, as at 647, like a divine confronted with an inconvenient text. The fidelity, with which Aeschylus reflects contemporary controversy, does him credit both as a dramatist and as a theologian.—τὸν σέβοντα: τὸν εἰς σε εὐσεβοῦντα, 'one that has used you piously'.—τύχοι: optative, not subjunctive, though the principal verb is present (δικαίων ἐσσι), because the general maxim, as such, has no relation to any particular time: 'it is, and always was, just to requite a benefactor, especially should he need it'.—ΔΙΑΝΟΜᾶς Cobet, from schol. to Eur. *Alc.* 12.—οἴνῳ: to which the *Moirai*, *δοῖνοι*, like the elder gods generally, were not accustomed. This explains *abolishing ancient distribution* (of functions), which however would probably gain in point, if we knew exactly the legend of the deception: the words νέμειν, διανέμειν are applicable specially to the service of the

7. *Erin.* Even such a part didst thou play in Pheres' house, persuading the Moirai to release a mortal from death!

8. *Ap.* Is it not then always just to repay regard with kindness, especially when the friend entreats?

9. *Erin.* Thou, thou it was, who, abolishing old division, didst deceive with wine those ancient powers.

10. *Ap.* Thou, thou anon, not winning the final award, wilt vomit the venom of thy not dangerous enmity.

(*Here the voting is ended.*)

Erin. Since thy young violence over-rides our age, to hear that award is the thing for which I wait, as in doubt suspending my wrath against the town.

(*ATHENA rises from her seat.*)

Ath. Here is a task for me,—to make difference in the last resort. (*She raises her arm, with a gest of command.*) And

table. It would seem also that Apollo was treacherous as a host, which would sharpen the retort (σὺ τοι) upon his claim to 'piety' and 'justice'.

732. οὐκ...τέλος: *losing the issue of the justice (sentence) here.*—ἐμέι τὸν ἴον: *will vomit the poison* (cf. v. 785). I fear that this also (ἐμέι) is an allusion to the effect of the wine upon the sober Moirai, as related by the schools of Homer and Hesiod. A disputant galled is little restrained by decency.

736. ἀμφίβουλος (Turnebus)...θυμούσθαι: 'in doubtful mind to be angry', *i.e.* in suspense whether to be angry or not.

737—746. Athena declares that, should the votes of the dicasts be equally divided, a vote from her, as president, shall be counted to Orestes, and he shall be acquitted. Such was the Athenian rule, supposed to be founded upon the precedent of Orestes' case. See Eur. *Iph. T.* 965, 1472, *νικᾶν ἰσθρῆυς ὄστις ἂν ψήφους λάβῃ.*—From the course of the scene, it seems probable that Athena does not actually place a ψήφος in the urn either here or at all, but signifies her conditional vote by 'holding up a white pebble' (so Mr Sidgwick), or per-

haps simply by extending over Orestes, as it were, her protective arm. Such an attitude, if famous, as we may well suppose, would help to explain the odd expression of Euripides (*Iph. T.* 965), who makes Orestes say, 'The votes being equal, difference in my favour was made by Pallas with her arm', *ἴσας δέ μοι | ψήφους διηρίθμησε Παλλὰς ὤλενη.* A direct allusion to a scenic effect in the *Eumenides* is quite probable in the *Iphigenia*. See also *supra* 260.—For further consideration of this subject, and of the important question, how Athena's vote and her alleged reasons for it (vv. 739—743) are related to the meaning of the play as a whole, see the Introduction. The vote is (in modern language) not judicial; it merely determines (by arbitrary choice) the practical question necessarily raised by the non-decision of the court.

737. ἐμὸν τόδ' ἔργον: 'Here is a part for me...'. She takes up the last words ἀμφίβουλος...πόλει, which naturally suggest the thought, that, after the voting, *Athens* may still be found to have pronounced no decision (see 798). To determine what shall then be done is a part which the goddess accepts, though she

- ψῆφον δ' Ὀρέστη τήνδ' ἐγὼ προσθήσομαι.
 μήτηρ γὰρ οὔτις ἐστὶν ἢ μ' ἐγείνατο,
 τὸ δ' ἄρσεν αἰνῶ πάντα, πλὴν γάμου τυχεῖν, 740
 ἅπαντι θυμῶ, κάρτα δ' εἰμὶ τοῦ πατρός.
 οὔτω γυναικὸς οὐ προτιμήσω μόρον
 ἄνδρα κτανούσης δωμάτων ἐπίσκοπον·
 νικᾶ δ' Ὀρέστης, κἂν ἰσόψηφος κριθῇ.—
 ἐκβάλλεθ' ὡς τάχιστα τευχέων πάλους, 745
 ὅσοις δικαστῶν τοῦτ' ἐπέσταλται τέλος.
- OP. ὦ Φοῖβ' Ἄπολλον, πῶς ἀγὼν κριθήσεται;
 XO. ὦ Νυξ μέλαινα μήτηρ, ἄρ' ὀρᾶς τάδε;
 OP. νῦν ἀγχόνης μοι τέρματ', ἢ φάος βλέπειν.
 XO. ἡμῖν γὰρ ἔρρειν, ἢ πρόσω τιμὰς νέμειν. 750
 AΠ. πεμπάζετ' ὀρθῶς ἐκβολὰς ψήφων, ξένοι,
 τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σέβοντες ἐν διαιρέσει.

749. ναῦ (for νῦν).

has rejected (474) that of a judge. See the Introduction.—**λοισθίαν κρῖναι δίκην**: 'to give a distinguishing sentence in the last resort'.—**κρῖναι** has the full sense, *to divide, distinguish*.—**προσθήσομαι**: *I shall* (if necessary) *reckon in addition*. Note the middle voice; *προσθήσω* (schol.) would be less appropriate.

739—743. **πλὴν...τυχεῖν**: 'except for wedlock'; the infinitive (of purpose) depends on *αἰνῶ*.—**κάρτα...πατρός**: not merely 'on the father's side' (*πρὸς τοῦ πατρός*), but of *the father*, 'my father's daughter specially and altogether', and therefore on the father's side. Wecklein refers to Eur. *El.* 933, Soph. *El.* 365, frag. 148 (where, with reference to the regular Athenian manner of naming, 'son or daughter of [the father]', to be called the mother's child is treated as a reproach). Athena is the supreme case for the better way.—**οὔτω**: *accordingly*.—**προτιμήσω**, in the full sense: 'I shall not value the death of the wife more highly than that of the husband'. The future corresponds to that of *προσθή-*

σομαι. If the judges give no decision on the question of right, and therefore there must be partiality or preference in the practical result, her preference will be *not* for the wife as against the husband. The negative turn of the sentence is significant. See the Introduction.—**δωμάτων ἐπίσκοπον**: 'in the act of *visiting* his household'. For the Athenian conception of an *ἐπίσκοπος* or *Visitor*, see on *v.* 521; and for the application of it to Agamemnon, returning *to do justice* on Clytaemnestra and others, see *Agam.* 798 foll., 835 foll., 905, etc. The description points to the wife's treason, and must not be weakened or generalised into that of *governor*.

744. **κἂν**: in case of equality *as well as* (*καί*) of superiority.—It is possible to take this verse as a separate ruling, not grounded on the reasons preceding. But see the Introduction.

745, 746. **ὅσοις** indicates that some regular number of dicasts, such as 2 of the 10, acted as tellers.—**τέλος**, *office*.—During *vv.* 747—754 the votes are counted.

748. See on *v.* 695.

this, *my* vote, I shall reckon to Orestes. For mother is there none who bare me, but in all things, save to be wed, I yield with whole heart praise to the masculine, and am verily of the father's side. Therefore I shall not prefer in value the death of a woman, who slew her man, the lawful overseer of the house; but Orestes, even with equal votes, hath the victory.

Put forth from the urns with speed the votes cast therein, you of the jury on whom this office is laid.

(*Here the votes are counted.*)

Or. Ah, Phoebus Apollo, how will the judgment go?

Erin. Ah, Night, dark Mother, dost thou behold these things?

Or. Now come I to the goal,—life, or the halter!

Erin. And we to honour prolonged, or utter loss!

Ap. O reckon aright, my friends, the votes put forth, observing in the division to do no wrong. A judgment missed

749, 750. ἀγχόνης... βλέπειν... ἔρρειν... νέμειν all depend on *τέρματά ἐστι*, 'it is the goal *for*...', i.e. these are the results or issues now depending.—ἀγχόνης: *the halter*, i.e. suicide, the familiar use and significance of the instrument at Athens: Soph. *O. T.* 1374, Eur. *Bacch.* 246, etc.—γάρ, indeed (*allerdings* Wecklein), expresses that for them, as for Orestes, the alternative is tremendous.

751—754. Though *πεμπάξεν* can mean merely *ἀριθμεῖν* (cf. *quarter* for part), we may note that, according to Aeschylus (see above *vv.* 687, etc.), the votes of the court must be divisible *by fives*.—ἐκβολάς ψήφων: *ἐκβαλλομένας τὰς ψήφους*, the 'pebbles' taken from the respective urns.—ἐν διαίρεσει: 'be scrupulously honest in the distinction', i.e. in the process of ascertaining the division, not miscounting, or transferring a pebble, or practising other devices probably sometimes suspected.—διακρίσει τῶν λευκῶν καὶ μελαινῶν schol., and so Mr Sidgwick, on the ground that *διαίρεσις* must be strictly the 'parting' of the votes, the act of separating them, and therefore "the voting was by black and white pebbles,

which was the commonest method at Athens. In this system there were two *καδίσκοι* or urns, one called *κύριος* or the 'decisive' one, the other *ἄκυρος*: each voter had a black and a white pebble; his vote was counted according as the pebble he dropped into the *κύριος* was white or black... The second or 'inoperative' urn was to get rid of the other pebble, that there might be no clue to the way he had voted." I agree that *διαίρεσις* might suggest this, but the plural *τευχέων* in *v.* 745 is against it. The essential purpose of the *κύριος* and the *ἄκυρος* was that the contents of *one* urn only, the *κύριος*, should be 'turned out' for inspection. The plural *ἐκβολάς* also points the same way, though this might doubtless refer to the plurality of *ψήφοι*, or even describe one act of *ἐκβολή*. I think the division here meant is by urns, not by colours, and so Dr Wecklein, who notes that the division by urns is mentioned in the *Agamemnon* (806, *αιματηρὸν τεύχος the urn for death*). The absence of any reference in the scene to the *black* and *white* is perhaps also not insignificant. If *διαίρεσις* must be pressed,

γνώμης δ' ἀπούσης πῆμα γίγνεται μέγα,
βαλοῦσά τ' οἶκον ψῆφος ὠρθωσεν μία.

AΘ. ἀνὴρ ὄδ' ἐκπέφευγεν αἵματος δίκην· 755

ἴσον γάρ ἐστι τὰρίθμημα τῶν πάλων.

ΟΡ. ὦ Παλλάς, ὦ σώσασα τοὺς ἐμοὺς δόμους,

καὶ γῆς πατρώας ἐστερημένον σὺ τοι

κατώκισάς με· καὶ τις Ἑλλήνων ἐρεῖ,

'Αργεῖος ἀνὴρ αὖθις ἐν τε χρήμασιν 760

οἰκῆ πατρώοις,—Παλλάδος καὶ Λοξίου

ἔκατι καὶ τοῦ πάντα κραινοντος τρίτου

σωτήρος, ὃς πατρῶον αἰδεσθεῖς μόρον

753. γίνεται.

755. ὄγ'. ὄδ' recc.

may it not refer to the separation *into fines* (πεμπάζειν)? Some such formal division is the best and usual way of securing an accurate count, and may have been imperative by custom.

753, 754. γνώμης: ἀντὶ τοῦ ψήφου schol., 'by the absence of a judgment', i.e. a vote.—Note however that naturally, and in almost any context, the verse would mean 'by lack of judgment great mischief comes'. We may suspect that it was in this sense proverbial, and that the application of it here is an artificial point.—βαλοῦσα...μία: and the stroke of a single pebble sets a house upright, i.e. one vote may save a man's all. The words are probably right; but it is not easy to divine how such an expression arose. The figure of a house 'set up' by a pebble 'hitting it' seems not merely 'sudden and bold' (Sidgwick) but extravagant. Mr Sidgwick's translation, 'the cast of one pebble saves the house', expunges the metaphor, and in effect makes βαλοῦσα intransitive (*fall*). But, by the arrangement of the words, βαλοῦσα should here be transitive, with οἶκον for object; and this, with the apparent connexion of metaphor between βαλοῦσα and ὠρθωσεν, is what requires explanation. Possibly the case is similar to that of the preceding verse: βαλοῦσα ψῆφος suggests

a sling, and would stand most naturally in such a phrase as βαλοῦσ' ὀπλίτην ψῆφος ἐστρωσεν μία, 'the stroke of one pebble can bring down a full-armed man'. If there were such a saying, this, as an imitation of it, would have an intelligible, though artificial, point. Or perhaps the phrase alludes to the rules and language of some game: ψῆφοι were employed in many.—To omit the verse (Mr Macnaghten) would remove, but scarcely solve, the difficulty. If here interpolated, it must still have, or have had, a meaning.—The proposed corrections, παρούσα, πάλλουσα, σφάλουσα, etc., are not satisfactory.

755. The numbers are apparently reported by the tellers to the president. If Athena gives an actual ψῆφος, it is here; but see on v. 737.

756. The announcement of the result would be followed by a 'sensation', for which the crowded scene (see on v. 569) afforded ample means, a varied demonstration of gestures, movements, and cries. During this, Apollo (as I conceive) retires; the attention of the audience being fixed on others, and especially on Orestes and the Erinyes, his exit would be imperceptible, and would have the effect of a disappearance. He never speaks or is addressed again, and the

does mighty hurt, and by stroke of one pebble a house is set upright.

(*The count is reported to Athena, who declares the verdict.*)

Ath. This man—is acquitted of murder. For the numbers of the casts are equal. (*Great and prolonged sensation, during which APOLLO departs unperceived.*)

Or. O Pallas, O saviour of my house,...To the fatherland, whence I was shut out, to that then also thou hast restored me; and it shall be said in Hēllas, ‘The man is Argive again, and master in the estate of his fathers,’...thanks to Pallas, and to Loxias, and to Him that ordaineth all, Saviour and Third; who,

allusion in *v.* 761 is just sufficient to let the audience mark that he is gone.—Others suppose him to depart with Orestes at *v.* 780. No supposition can be proved, and each must judge for himself. To me it appears, that to dismiss the god in that way would be undignified, and that, unless he made a stately and solemn departure, after taking leave of Athena (which the text excludes), the disappearance was the only, and far better, alternative.

758. *καὶ γῆς κ.τ.λ.* The acquittal not only ‘saves the house’ in the person of the heir, but *also* restores to him his citizenship in Argos, whither he can now return. The change to *γαίας* (Dindorf and others) is, I think, mistaken. There is reason for distinguishing and emphasizing the point, that a judgment of the Areopagus, and the command of the president, will be received in a foreign state. The legend of Orestes probably assumed this; but in the legend the judgment was that of gods, a thing above ordinary rule. With Aeschylus, it becomes in all respects regular, a complete legal and political precedent. Such a sentence as he represents, resting ultimately on the fact that a jury of Athenians was divided equally, cannot have had any direct effect in Argos, either in the fifth century or at any time. But in the actual circumstances of the

growing Athenian empire, the foreign validity of Athenian judgments, especially in matters of personal status, must have been a question of the highest importance; and an Athenian audience would receive complacently the suggestion, that acquittal by the Areopagus would or should be effective everywhere,—if in Argos, then *a fortiori* in Samos.

761. *πατρώοις*. The quotation, if it is to be marked off at all, must end here; the following words express the gratitude of Orestes rather than the judgment of the *τῆς*, so that *Ἰαλλίδος...ἔκατι* belongs not exactly to *οἰκέτ*, but to the substance of the whole statement *καὶ γῆς...πατρώοις*, ‘I shall be restored to Argos’. That *δς...δρῶν* belongs to Orestes, not the *τῆς*, is shown by *με*. But the truth is that the thought and sentence glide, naturally and dramatically, from one person to the other, and strict punctuation can scarcely be applied.

763. *σωτήριος* (*Διός*): for the special association of *τρίτος* with Zeus Soter, see *Suppl.* 26, *Ag.* 257. But such emphasis on the *third* was a Greek habit much used in drama, and has an effect something like our ‘not forgetting’, ‘last but not least’. Wecklein compares *Soph. Oed. Col.* 8, 331, *Ai.* 1174, *Eur. Hipp.* 1404, *Menand.* sent. 231 *θάλασσα καὶ πῦρ καὶ γυνὴ τρίτον κακόν*.

σφίξει με μητρὸς τάσδε συνδίκους ὄρων.

ἐγὼ δὲ χώρα τῆδε καὶ τῷ σῶ στρατῷ 765
τὸ λοιπὸν εἰς ἅπαντα πλειστήρη χρόνον

ὄρκωμοτήσας νῦν ἄπειμι πρὸς δόμους,

μήτοι τιν' ἄνδρα δεῦρο πρυμνήτην χθονὸς

ἐλθόντ' ἐποίσειν εἶ κεκασμένον δόρυ.

αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ὄντες ἐν τάφοις τότε 770

τοῖς τὰμὰ παρβαίνουσι νῦν ὄρκώματα

ἀμηχάνοισι πράξομεν δυσπραξίαις,

ὁδοὺς ἀθύμους καὶ παρόρνιας πόρους

τιθέντες, ὡς αὐτοῖσι μεταμέλη πόνος...

ὄρθουμένων δὲ καὶ πόλιν τὴν Παλλάδος 775

τιμῶσιν ἀεὶ τήνδε συμμάχῳ δορὶ

αὐτοῖσιν ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν εὐμενέστεροι.

764. σώζει.

771. παρβαίνουσι (α erased).

772. ἀμηχάνοισ. text rec.

764. ὄρων is suspected. If it is right (as I think), μητρὸς συνδίκους goes with it as predicate, 'seeing in the Erinyes co-defendants with my mother', regarding them as co-defendants and representatives of her guilt; σύνδικος, συνδικεῖν belonged properly, though not invariably, to the defence (*v.* 582). The only strong plea of Orestes is that of *vv.* 461, 630, etc., that the real criminal is Clytaemnestra, and the prosecutors should be defendants. The meaning here is that the judgment (for which Orestes naturally assumes the highest sanction) has adopted that view.—If πατρῶν and μητρὸς were taken generally, the suggestion would be that Zeus has preferred the cause of the father, as such, to that of the mother; and, though this is not the view commended by Aeschylus, his language here, as elsewhere, may have been influenced by it as an element of the tradition. See the Introduction.—*παρὰ* (Wecklein), *στρυγῶν*, *κρατῶν* are proposed.

765—777. The Argives shall never invade Attica; Orestes himself, from his grave, as an Argive ἥρωσ, will thwart any such attempt, and reward them for amity

and alliance with Athens. This 'alliance' alludes to that actually subsisting at the date of the play (see the Introduction). The emphatic protest against 'invasion', and the suspicion implied, is not explained by the contemporary history, as we know it; and on this ground *vv.* 765—777 were regarded by Dindorf as an interpolation belonging to the time of the Peloponnesian war. But see on *vv.* 674—676.

766. πλειστήρη: unique and uncertain. It is commonly taken as acc. sing. masc., with χρόνον: but Prof. Bury (*Class. Rev.* VIII. 301) points out, that it gives a smoother construction, if taken as acc. neut. plural, depending on ὄρκωμοτήσας, —ὄρκωμοτήσας πλειστήρη τὸ λοιπὸν εἰς ἅπαντα χρόνον, 'having sworn oaths which shall be authoritative for all time to come'. This sense fits with πλειστηρίζομαι (*Cho.* 1027, where see note), meaning apparently 'I aver, cite as an authority'. Prof. Bury would derive it from 'a common use of πλείστος as signifying widely spread, generally received, in vogue.' Whatever be the derivation, he seems to be right as to the

in pity of my father's fate, hath saved me, because, in these my pursuers, he sees the defenders of my mother's guilt.

And I, now going to my home, leave solemn oath with Athens and thy men of arms, an oath of assurance (?) for all time hereafter, that never any governor of Argos shall come hither, to raise against Athens the martial spear. For we ourselves, who then shall be in our grave, will make sorry the transgressors of this my oath, by desperate misadventures,—crossing with dismay their marches and with ill omen their passages, that they themselves may repent of their enterprise. While the straight course is kept, while they still requite this city of Pallas by joining their arms with hers, we unto them are the more favourable.

sense, and I follow him, under reserve.—Taken as epithet of χρόνον and as a term of quantity, πλειστήρη would seem rather to abridge than confirm πάντα, since πλείστος means most. Such renderings as 'all the fulness of time' are hardly legitimate.

769. εὖ κεκασμένον. Such a merely decorative 'Epic' epithet is unusual in Aeschylus; but, as a phrase of antique and therefore religious flavour, it is in place here.

770—774 are not perfect in grammar. The form projected seems to be πράξομεν ὥστε τοῖς παραβαίνουσιν αὐτοῖς μεταμέλει τὸν πόνον, 'I will bring it about that the transgressors themselves shall repent of their enterprise'; but eventually the clause ὡς...πόνος is accommodated, as final, to ὁδοῦς...τιθέντες, 'thwarting their march, that they may themselves repent...'. Thus πράξομεν is left incomplete, the construction πράξομεν ὡς μεταμέλη (efficiemus ut poeniteat) being inadmissible. Or, to put the same thing otherwise, there is an ellipse, at the end of the period, of ὥστε μεταμέλει. The irregularity is possibly intentional, to express excitement (see 482, 759 ff.), like the bolder irregularities of the Herald in the *Agamemnon* (556 ff.).—The schol. (τιμωρησόμεθα) refers πράξομεν to πράσσειν exact (punishment); but this does not help.—τάμὰ νῦν ὀρκώματα together.

δυσπραξίαις, instrumental, by means of misfortunes. The artificial assonance, with difference of sense, in πράξομεν δυσπραξίαις, is characteristic (see on v. 160, 637) and confirms the reading πράξομεν. Characteristic, too, is the echoing emphasis on the pronouns, αὐτοὶ ἡμεῖς...αὐτοῖσι, ...αὐτοῖσιν ἡμεῖς.—ὁδοῦς...τιθέντες: discouraging their marches and thwarting with omens their passages. πόρους: passing of streams and other boundaries, for which the consultation of omens was especially necessary.—τὸν τάμὰ παραβαίνοντα...θράξομεν Wecklein (θράξομεν Burges), transferring 772 to follow 774. Many other changes have been proposed, but the text, I believe, is sound, though not smooth. An expressive and threatening gesture, after v. 774, would be more effective than any additional words.

775—777. ὀρθομένων: neuter, 'while things go straight', while the true course is kept, cf. v. 711. 'While their oath is respected' is the sense, but we must not supply ὀρκωμάτων, because ὀρθοῦν ὀρκώματα would be rather to 'give' a true oath than to 'keep' one: πραγμάτων (Sidgwick) is a better supplement, but, properly speaking, there is no subject, ὀρθομένων being a passive impersonal.—τιμῶσιν: pay, requite, reward.—αὐτοῖσιν ἡμεῖς. 'While they behave well to Athens, I shall be the more gracious to them'.

- καὶ χαίρε, καὶ σὺ καὶ πολισσοῦχος λεῶς
 πάλαισμι' ἄφυκτον τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἔχοις,
 σωτήριόν τε καὶ δορὸς νικηφόρον. 780
- ΧΟ. ἰὼ θεοὶ νεώτεροι παλαιοὺς νόμους στρ. α'.
 καθιππάσασθε.—καὶ κ' χερῶν εἰλεσθέ μου...—
 ἐγὼ δ', ἄτιμος ἢ τάλαινα, βαρύκοτος,—
 ἐν γὰρ τᾶδε,—φεῦ,—
 ἰὼν ἰὼν ἀντιπενθῆ μεθείσα καρδίας 785
 σταλαγμὸν χθονὶ—
 ἄφορον· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
 λειχῆν ἄφυλλος, ἄτεκνος,—
 ἰὼ δίκαια,—πέδον ἐπισύμενος
 βροτοφθόρους κηλίδας ἐν χώρᾳ βαλεῖν...— 790

787. χθονιαφόρον.

788. λειχῆν.

The emphasis on the pronouns brings out and clinches the purpose of the whole. Cf. *P. V.* 372 ἐξ ὀμμάτων δ' ἤστραπτε γοργωπὸν σέλας (Τυφώς), | ὡς τὴν Διὸς τυραννίδ' ἐκπέρσων βίαι· | ἀλλ' ἦλθεν αὐτῷ Ζητὸς ἄγρυπνον βέλος, | καταβάρης κεραυνὸς ἐκπνέων φλόγα, | ὅς αὐτὸν ἐξέπληξε τῶν ὑψηγῶρων | κομπασμάτων κ.τ.λ. : 'Even while he meditated to conquer, with the lightning of his eyes, the kingdom of Zeus, the bolt of Zeus descended on *him*, and put an end to *his* ambition.' Such a use of αὐτός is characteristic of Aeschylus, who seldom employs it when there is not emphasis, preferring *νῦν*, *σφε* or (most commonly) the ellipse of the pronoun. Cf. *supra* *vv.* 12—15.—If change is to be made, αὐτοῖ σφιν ἡμεῖς, suggested to me by a friend, is preferable to any other.—ἔσμεν. The 'anticipatory present' of prophecy. He speaks as for all time.

778—780. ἄφυκτον τοῖς ἐναντίοις together, a wrestling-grip which your foes cannot escape.—δορὸς νικηφόρον : 'victory-winning of war', *i.e.* winning victory therefrom.—*Exit* Orestes.

781—the end. The Erinyes are pacified and established at Athens. On the scheme

of the scene and its relation to the play, see the Introduction.

781—796. This passage, as given in M and here, presents not a single sentence (except *τί βέξω*;) complete in construction. It is possible that this is the effect of some local injury. By supposing that something is lost after 782, that in 786—787 there should be a verb (*σταλάξω* for *σταλαγμὸν*, with other changes, Wecklein), that *βαλεῖν* in 790 should be *βαλεῖ* (Turnebus), and that some connexion should be made in 792—793 (where see notes), we may restore syntax. But that which the MS. offers, a series of broken outcries, intelligible but not construable, is surely more appropriate in the situation. The distribution must in that case be conjectural, but it is possible to give each of 15 *choreutae* a voice; in the conclusion, ἰὼ μεγάλα κ.τ.λ., all are probably united. For other divisions (all of which however assume an emended syntax) see Wecklein's *Appendix*. The metre fluctuates between iambic (ἰὼ θεοὶ νεώτεροι) or trochaic (ἰὼν ἰὼν ἀντιπενθ-) and dochmiac (παλαιὸς νόμος), with an effective invasion of the *dacchius* (— — —, here a sort of unfinished *dachmius*) in 791—793,

And so farewell. Mayst thou, and may the people of thy city, find, for those who wrestle against you, a throw inevitable, to keep you safe and win the triumphs of war. (*Exit.*)

Erinyes (in a wild confusion of voices, following, crossing, mingling, and united). Ha!...Younger gods, ye have ridden down old laws, and out of my hands have taken...But I dishonoured, I miserable, sore in wrath, upon this land...O rage!...Venom, ay, venom of punishment, discharging from my heart, in drops unto the soil...Intolerable! And therefrom a tetter, blasting bole and birth,...Ha, ha! Revenge!...Spreading quick over the earth, till the land be dashed with life-destroying

before the final outburst.—We see that it is the safe departure of their destined prey which rouses the Erinyes from their astounded silence.

782. εἴλεσθε τὴν ἄγραν, τὸν φυγάδα : cf. v. 325 τὸν δ' ἀφαιρούμενος πτώκα. The omission of the object, though perhaps not impossible, would be harsh; but in fact the voice is choked by anger, or the second breaks in, as at some of the subsequent divisions. There is a *crescendo* of violence throughout.

784. ἐν γῆ may be loosely constructed with μεθεῖσα, but it is truer to say that the projected verb (*e.g.*, will make havoc) never comes.

785. ἰὸν ἀντιπνευθῆ: the poison of avenging grief, lit. 'making grief for grief'. The wrath of their hearts is figured as an actual venom, which, spilt upon the earth, takes from it the powers of life. Since the *Semnai Theai* (see hereafter) give fertility, so also, as Erinyes, they can prevent it. The physical effect possibly represents some popular explanation of real phenomena; see on *vv.* 804 foll.

787. σταλαγμὸν χθονί—ἄφορον· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κ.τ.λ. The dropping whereof is to the earth—Intolerable; and therefrom etc. The seventh voice, like the fourth and sixth, takes up (in ἄφορον) the sentence left by the preceding voice, but instantly, leaving ἄφορον as an exclamation, starts a fresh sentence, which in its turn is pur-

sued to *v.* 790, but never finished.—That there is a change of voice, between χθονί and ἄφορον, is strongly indicated by the harsh hiatus of vowels. √

788—790. 'A canker deadly to leaf and fruit,...rushing over the soil, till the face of earth is dashed with life-destroying blots,...'—ἄτεκνος might refer metaphorically to the plant, but glances also at the consequence to animal life, which, not nourished, cannot bear. Similarly, βροτός in βροτοφθόρους covers all things mortal, plants, beasts, and men, but points particularly to the last.—ὠ δίκαια: O revenge!, a parenthetic exclamation.—βαλεῖν: an inf. of sequence, depending on ἐπισύμενος, 'speeding...to put blots...', *i.e.* spreading fast, from the points where the mischief begins, so as to make broad stains of destruction: the figure is taken from the progress of malignant disease.—βαλεῖ (Turnebus) gives a complete sentence; but it is better to suppose an interruption.

791—793. The succession of cries becomes still more rapid and confused, mere ejaculatory words, as of several speaking together, so that, though the effect is right, and the drift clear enough, construction is scarcely to be attempted. We may compare, in principle, the broken and unconstruable sentences of the Herald in the *Agamemnon* (556 foll.), the Nurse in the *Choephoroi* (745 foll.), and the mad Orestes in the latter play (995 foll.). See also the *Parodos* of the *Septem*

στενάζω;—τί ῥέξω;—
 γένωμαι;—δύσοιστα—
 πολίταις—ἔπαθον—
 ἰὼ μεγάλα τοι
 κόραι δυστυχεῖς
 Νυκτὸς ἀτιμοπενθεῖς.

795

AΘ. ἐμοὶ πίθεσθε μὴ βαρυστόνως φέρειν.
 οὐ γὰρ νενίκησθ'. ἀλλ' ἰσόψηφος δίκη
 ἐξήλθ' ἀληθῶς, οὐκ ἀτιμία σέθεν,
 ἀλλ' ἐκ Διὸς γὰρ λαμπρὰ μαρτύρια παρήν, 800
 αὐτὸς θ' ὁ χρήσας αὐτὸς ἦν ὁ μαρτυρῶν,
 ὡς ταῦτ' Ὀρέστην δρῶντα μὴ βλάβας ἔχειν.

797. *πέθεσθε.*
 apparently from ὀρθήσασ.

801. θ' on erasure of δ'.—ὀρθήσασ by correction,

(78 foll.). Aeschylus, with all his stateliness, is less academic than either of his great successors, and bolder, at fit places, in imitating the actual phenomena of passionate speech.—**στενάζω**; subj. 'Am I to lament (and not act)?'. The sense is rather suggested than expressed by the exclamation.—...**γένωμαι**; *i. e.* τί γένωμαι; *What is to become of me?*, the ejaculation overlapping, as it were, the preceding τί ῥέξω;. The explanation of the schol. ("ἢ τί γένωμαι;—the conjunction ἢ being omitted") is substantially right, though not (as it is meant) a formal justification of the grammar.—**δύσοιστα—πολίταις**. *Insufferable!...To Athens!*, *i. e.*, 'Our injuries are insufferable, and so will those of Athens be',—if we must translate the half-heard fragments into sentences: cf. ἀντιπενθῆ, ἄφορον above.—**δυσόιστα** (fem. sing.) O. Müller, perhaps rightly; but the metrical division justifies the 'short for long', and in sense the neuter seems better.—**ἔπαθον...ἰὼ μεγάλα** (ἐπάθομεν) κ.τ.λ. *I am wronged...Ah deeply (are we wronged)*, etc.—ὐπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔπαθον. ἐμίξε τῷ θρήνην τὴν τιμωρίαν τεχνικῶς. εἰπὼν γὰρ "δύσοιστα ἔπαθον" ἐπήγαγεν "πολίταις", ἵνα ἦ πολίταις

δύσοιστα ὄντα: "The expression of pain (*δύσοιστα ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔπαθον*) is artificially combined with that of resentment (*δύσοιστα ὄντα πολίταις*):" schol. If we add that the combination is presumably produced by a succession of voices, this note is right, and shows, like that on γένωμαι, that the ancient commentators had a sound, though imperfect, tradition about the peculiar nature of this passage.—Note that at *ἔπαθον | ἰὼ* there is a rhythmical break. The long syllable required to complete the rhythm ~-- (*e.g.* *ἔπαθον ὦ*) is lopped off, as it were, by the breaking in of the final voice or voices in unison. This is no doubt a very bold and exceptional treatment of music, but it seems here more than justifiable. Somewhat similar is the cutting short of *λειχὴν ἀφυλλος ἀτέκνος...* (the commencement of an iambic senarius) by *ἰὼ...ἐπισύμενος* (two *dochmi*, *ἰὼ = ~--*). These, and all the phenomena, have one and the same cause, the representation, in musical and choric form, of a furious crowd.—For attempts to restore these verses, on the supposition that they should present continuous sense and metre, see Wecklein's *Appendix*.

blots...(*with increasing tumult*). Shall I lament?...What shall I do?...become?...Hard, hard!...To Athens!...My wrongs!...(all together) Oh, great indeed the wrongs of the hapless Daughters of Night, dishonoured and distressed!

Ath. (coming down towards them). Let me persuade to patience your sore lament. Ye are not vanquished. No! Equal in votes the sentence was, falling so honestly, not for contempt of thee, but because there was presented testimony that shone with the light of Zeus, given by the very god who himself gave the oracle, to the effect that Orestes by this deed should not take

797. It is supposed by some (Wecklein) that the parts of Athena in this scene, as well as those of the Chorus, originally exhibited strophic correspondence, and that therefore this speech and 850 foll. should be reduced, and 882 foll. should be augmented, to 13 lines, the actual length of 827 foll. See on 803, 860 foll., 887. Except as to *v.* 887, the questions raised are of little importance. On the whole, I think that the case is not made out; Mr Sidgwick appears to be of the same opinion.—*πίθεσθε* Turnebus.

798—802. Since the prosecutors obtained half the votes, they are 'not defeated'; and the votes for Orestes implied no contempt of them, but an honest belief (*ἀληθῶς*) that he was justified, or excused, by the oracle. Thus against the jury, and therefore against Athens, they have no complaint. Two distinguishable points, *ισόψηφος ἐξήλθε* and *ἐξήλθε ἀληθῶς*, are combined in one statement.—“You had half the votes, and therefore no defeat; but that Orestes should be released by my vote was necessary, because...” (Wecklein). The words may certainly be so understood, but *μαρτύρια* points rather to the jury; and as to the motives of Athena, contrast *vv.* 739 foll., where Apollo and the oracle are not mentioned. Here Athena, judiciously though not without a certain sophistry, ignores her executive act, and treats the question as lying now simply between the Erinyes and Athens.—I place accordingly (as Sidgwick and others) no full stop at

σέθεν. The causal sentence, *παρῆν γὰρ...*, stands in antithesis to the causal dative *ἀτιμῆα*, and the two together explain *ἀληθῶς*, *honestly*.—The ‘witness from Zeus’, so called purposely but with some exaggeration, is Apollo’s evidence as to the oracle in *vv.* 617—624. The acquitting jurors (this is the point) took the oracle *bona fide* as representative of Zeus and decisive; and that impression was the more natural, when the ‘splendour’ or ‘dazzling effect’ of the testimony was enhanced by the appearance of the oracular deity in person. That the oracle did in fact give the mind, the whole mind, of Zeus, is not asserted by Athena, or by Aeschylus anywhere. If so, neither she nor he could have said anything for the jurors who condemned. Nor need we suppose that this account of the motives for acquittal is complete. Athena naturally insists on the dignity of Apollo and the oracle, but the rhetoric and pathos of *vv.* 628—642 seem quite as likely to have carried the votes, and possibly the poet thought so.—*ὤς...* *ἔχων*: to the result that the obedience of Orestes should not injure him, pointing, that is, to this conclusion. *ὤς*: *i.e.* *ῶστε*.—*ὁ χρήσας* Turnebus, *et plerique*. Technically (see critical note) *θροήσας* (Merkel) is slightly more probable; but we must then read *αὐτὸς θροήσας...μαρτυρῶν*, as a parenthesis, and not (as Merkel) *αὐτὸς θ’ ὁ θροήσας*, objectionable in metre.—The repetition of *αὐτὸς* is for emphasis.

ὕμεις δέ † τε τῆδε γῆ βαρὺν κότον
 σκήψησθε, μὴ θυμοῦσθε, μηδ' ἀκαρπίαν
 τεύξῃτ' ἀφείσαι δαιμόνων σταλάγματα, 805
 βρωτῆρας αἰχμὰς σπερμάτων ἀνημέρους.
 ἐγὼ γὰρ ὑμῖν πανδίκως ὑπίσχομαι
 ἔδρας τε καὶ κευθμῶνας ἐνδίκου χθονὸς
 λιπαροθρόνοισιν ἡμένας ἐπ' ἐσχάραις
 ἕξειν, ὑπ' ἀστῶν τῶνδε τιμαλφουμένας. 810

ΧΟ. ἰὼ θεοὶ νεώτεροι παλαιοὺς νόμους ἀντ. α'.
 καθιππάσασθε.—κάκ χερῶν εἴλεσθέ μου...—
 ἐγὼ δ', ἄτιμος ἢ τάλαινα, βαρύκοτος,—
 ἐν γὰρ τᾷδε,—φεῦ,—

805. γρ. στενάγματα m.

803, 804. ὕμεις δὲ τῆ γῆ τῆδε μὴ βαρὺν
 Turnebus, σκήψητε Elmsley; alii aliter.
 The exact reading cannot be determined,
 but the commonly received suggestions
 of Turnebus and Elmsley are as probable
 as any. The use of the middle σκήψησθε
 as a variation for σκήψητε (*make to
 alight, for yourselves*—in your interest),
 though it would be irregular, is perhaps
 not impossible. But the termination
 -σθε may be an involuntary anticipation
 of θυμοῦσθε.—Omission of τε...σκήψησθε
 (Wecklein), or of some other words, has
 been proposed, in order to shorten the
 speech by one verse; see on v. 797.

805, 806. δαιμόνων σταλάγματα :
angel-drops, ghost-drops, fairy-drops—
 but no modern English word repre-
 sents the vagueness of δαίμονες. It must
 not be assumed that this expression is
 incorrect. If certain phenomena of
 blight or other devastation were super-
 stitiously attributed to a poison distilled
 by offended supernatural beings (see
 above v. 785), δαιμόνων σταλάγματα may
 well have been a general name for such
 poison. We need not suppose that
 originally the operation was restricted
 to the Erinyes (or the Semnai Theai),
 though indeed originally the conception

of ἐρινύες appears to have been little more
 precise than that of δαίμονες itself: see
 on Cho. 282 foll.—The proposed cor-
 rections mostly seek in δαιμόνων some
 part of the body (*e.g. throat*) from which
 the drops are to come: πλευμόνων,
 καρδιῶν, λαιμάτων, λαιγμάτων, λαιμόνων.
 But some of these words are fictitious or
 doubtful, nor does such particularity seem
 appropriate.—βρωτῆρας...ἀνημέρους: *the
 ungentle sharpness whereof devoureth
 the seed*. Take βρωτῆρας (adj. to αἰχμὰς)
 σπερμάτων together. αἰχμή, commonly
point, has here the larger sense 'sharp
 thing'.—Others construe σπερμάτων ἀνη-
 μέρους together, 'ungentle and seedless
 (barren)' or 'ungentle in respect of seed',
i.e. destructive to it, nor is this wrong.
 But the instances of genitives with the
 negative or privative adj. do not exhibit
 any precise parallel, and we may doubt
 whether σπερμάτων ἀνημέρους could have
 stood in this sense alone. The whole
 βρωτῆρας...ἀνημέρους justifies itself to
 the ear, but scarcely admits of gram-
 matical distribution.

807—810. She offers them a cave-sanctuary (that of the *Semnai Theai* below the Areopagus; see the Introduction).—ἔδρας τε καὶ κευθμῶνας: *a cavern-abode*, but, as

hurt. And you, hurl not the weight of your wrath upon Attica; be not indignant, nor make barrenness, by shedding the fairy-drops, whose sharpness doth ungently devour the seed. For I unto you do promise sacredly, that in sacred ground ye shall have a cavern-seat, where on altars rich ye shall sit enthroned, by these our citizens worshipped and dignified.

Erinyes (as before). Ha!...Younger gods, ye have ridden down old laws, and out of my hands have taken...But I dishonoured, I miserable, sore in wrath, upon this land...

τε καί marks, each aspect is important. Being a *κευθμών*, the place will suit them as *χθόνια*, denizens of the underworld (the *Ταρτάρου μελαβαθής κευθμών*: see 420 and *P. V.* 235): with that it was probably supposed to communicate (see 1037), though there is now no trace of an internal opening, and little of a cave. But it will also be a *ἔδρα*, an *abode* and *seat* upon earth, where they will receive regular worship. The play throughout assumes that this is new to them, a sign of their reconciliation with the upper gods and with humanity.—*ἐνδίκου χθονός*: of *legal ground*, i.e. 'your especial property'. *λιπαροθρόνοισιν* ... *ἑσχάραις*. Either (1) *altar-stones*, *λιπαρά* (*fat, shining*) with the offerings of oil poured upon them: so O. Müller, Wecklein and others, citing Lucian *Alexander* p. 238, τὰ δὲ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς πάνυ νοσῶν καὶ ἀλλόκοτα περὶ αὐτῶν πεπιστευκώς, καὶ εἰ μόνον ἀλημιμένον που λίθον ἢ ἐστεφανωμένον θεάσαίτο, προσπίπτων εὐθὺς καὶ προσκυνῶν, Theophrastus *Char.* περὶ δευσιδαιμ. c. 17, καὶ τῶν λιπαρῶν λίθων τῶν ἐν ταῖς τρυόδοις παριῶν ἐκ τῆς ληκύθου ἔλαιον καταχεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ γόνατα πεσῶν καὶ προσκυνήσας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, etc. Or (2) *shining seats*, i.e. 'splendid' marble seats. I incline to (1). Mr Sidgwick rejects it on the ground that "the regular libations to the Eumenides were honey and water, fully detailed in Soph. *O.C.* 470—481." But the ritual of the Areopagus-cave may have differed from that of Colonus, even if the *Semnai Theai*, before Aeschylus, were identified with the Eumenides (see the

Introduction). The use of oil in chthonian offerings was common. The citation from Theophrastus points to this association for the word *λιπαρός*, and a definite reference to offerings suits the context here. Both Lucian and Theophrastus treat such worship as generally of a low type; but that is far from proving that it was not the ritual of the *Semnai Theai* in the age of Aeschylus. Nor, because the *ἑσχάραι* are the 'seats' of the deities, can we infer that no offerings are to be poured on them; for there is little doubt that the image on the *βωμός* merely figured the deity, who had been primitively supposed to place himself unseen on the stone, and receive the libations really given, according to a still earlier conception, to the sacred stone itself. We might decide the question more easily, if we knew what was the condition of the sanctuary at the date of this play, whether there were then images of the *Semnai Theai* there, and how they were represented. But this is uncertain. See further on *v.* 837.—The *δεῖπνα ἐπ' ἑσχάρα πυρός*, offered by Clytaemnestra to the *Erinyes* (*v.* 108), certainly mean more than honey and water, probably more than oil; but (see note there) it is not clear that her rite is supposed to follow any approved use, still less that it is appropriate to the *Semnai Theai* and their sanctuary.

811—826. The *Erinyes* repeat their invective, *ipsis verbis*. The offer of the goddess they do not notice, and apparently have not even heard.

ἰὸν ἰὸν ἀντιπενθῆ̃ μεθεῖσα καρδίας 815
 σταλαγμὸν χθονὶ—
 ἄφορον· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
 λειχὴν ἄφυλλος, ἄτεκνος,—
 ἰὼ δίκαια,—πέδον ἐπισύμενος
 βροτοφθόρους κηλίδας ἐν χώρᾳ βαλεῖν...— 820
 στενάζω;—τί ρέξω;—
 γένωμαι;—δύσοιστα—
 πολίταις—ἔπαθον—
 ἰὼ μεγάλα τοι
 κόραι δυστυχεῖς 825
 Νυκτὸς ἀτιμοπενθεῖς.

ΑΘ. οὐκ ἔστ' ἄτιμοι, μηδ' ὑπερθύμως ἄγαν
 θεαὶ βροτῶν στήσητε δύσκηλον χθόνα.†
 καὶ γὰρ πέποιθα Ζηνί, καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν;
 καὶ κληῖδας οἶδα δωμάτων μόνῃ θεῶν 830
 ἐν ᾧ κεραυνὸς ἔστιν ἐσφραγισμένος·
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ δεῖ· σὺ δ' εὐπιθῆς ἐμοὶ
 γλώσσης ματαίας μὴ ἴκβάλλης ἐπὶ χθόνα
 καρπὸν φέροντα πάντα μὴ πράσσειν καλῶς·
 κοίμα κελαινοῦ κύματος πικρὸν μένος, 835

815. ἀντιπαθῆ̃ (but see 785).

819. ἐπεσσύμενος (but see 789).

827, 828. The reading and interpretation are uncertain: *στήσαι χθόνα* has no clear sense, though perhaps it might conceivably mean 'to stay the land', *i.e.* 'stop' it from bearing; nor has *δύσκηλον*. Even if we assume for *δύσκηλον* the meaning *hard to charm* (*κηλεῖν*) and so *incurable* (*δυσθεράπευτον* schol.), we cannot join *στήσητε δύσκηλον*, with the sense 'make incurable'; for, though *τίθημι* is regularly so used, *ἵστημι* apparently is not. Nor can *δύσκηλος* (for *δυσκλήητος*) be inferred from *κηλέω*; rather, as others suppose, *δύσκηλος*, if a real word, should be the opposite, by false analogy, of *εὐκλήος* (*calm of temper*, properly *ῥέκηλος*), and should mean *peevish*, *spiteful*,

or the like; but then it can scarcely apply to *χθών*.—Perhaps in *ἄγαν* (or *ἄγην*, but see on *Ag.* 1178) we should find the substantive *ἄγη spite* (cf. *Ag.* 136 *ἄγα θεόθεν spite of gods*, and see L. and Sc. *s.v.*), as there seems no reason to suppose that the word was confined to lyrics; *στήσαι ἄγην*, for 'to feel high indignation', is defended by the analogy of *ἰσθάναι ὀργήν, χόλον* etc. (see L. and Sc. *s.v.* ἵστημι). *δύσκηλον* (*spiteful*) will then belong to *ἄγην*, but we should require the dative *χθονί*, as in *ὀργιζέσθαι τινι, θυμούσθαι τινι*, etc. . *Being divine, let not your spite rage too angrily (ὑπερθύμως) against a land of men* (Attica). The antithesis *θεαὶ βροτῶν* brings out the force

O rage!...Venom, ay, venom of punishment, discharging from my heart, in drops unto the soil...Intolerable! And therefrom a tetter, blasting bole and birth,...Ha, ha! Revenge!...Spreading quick over the earth, till the land be dashed with life-destroying blots...(with increasing tumult) Shall I lament?...What shall I do?...become?...Hard, hard!...To Athens!...My wrongs!...(all together) Oh, great indeed the wrongs of the hapless Daughters of Night, dishonoured and distressed!

Ath. Dishonoured ye are not; nor should ye, being goddesses, let your wrath rise to peevish spite(?) against a city of men. Moreover I am strong in Zeus,—and what need to say it?—and know, I only among gods, the keys of the chamber, wherein the thunder is sealed up. But there is no need of that. Rather do thou listen to me, and fling not upon earth the fruit of a wild tongue, whereof is born universal ill-success. Oh, sink in slumber

of the protest, and justifies the separation of βροτῶν from χθονί.—Other suggestions are (1) κτίσῃτε (*make*) Linwood, but see above as to the assumed sense of δύσκηλος: (2) δύσκημον φρένα Schmid (δύσκημον χόλον Wecklein), ‘unrestrained (κερμὸς *muzzle*) human anger’, from a corrupt and obscure gloss in Hesychius, δύσκημον· ἔφρανα δυσοιώνιστον.

829. **κἀγῶ.** She also could, if necessary, bring force, superior force.—πέποιθα Ζηνί: if the Erinyes are the daughters of Night (825), she is the daughter of Zeus.

830. **δώματος** Casaubon, perhaps rightly; but δωμάτων is possible, depending not on κληῖδας but (as partitive) on ἐν φῶ, quasi κληῖδας ἐκείνου τῶν δωμάτων ἐν φῶ κ.τ.λ.,—‘how to open the particular chamber in which...’.

832. **αὐτοῦ:** properly ‘there is no need for *that*’, for ‘the thing *itself*’; it is enough to name it. As commonly in Aeschylus, αὐτός gives an emphasis.

833, 834. *Cast not on the ground the wild tongue’s fruit, which produces the ruin of all,*—the fruit becoming seed and producing another fruit in turn. πάντα...καλῶς depends as substantive on φέροντα.—Ξη χθονί Burges, followed by Wecklein, Sidgwick (1899), and others:

καρπὸν is then object to φέροντα (neuter plural), and χθονί will be constructed with φέροντα (καρπὸν), not with ἐκβάλλης. But this is disadvantageous to the rhythm, and the pregnant terseness of the traditional text seems more Aeschylean than the grammatical simplicity of the other. See also next note.

835. Lit. ‘make the bitter force of that black ‘concept’ sleep’; but we have no poetical word exactly equivalent to κύμα here. It is used very nearly as in *Cho.* 128 γαίαν αὐτήν, ἣ τὰ πάντα τικτεται, | θρέψασά τ’ αἰθῆς τῶνδε κύμα λαμβάνει, and pursues, with slight modification, the preceding metaphor. The κύμα is the seed of rage, ‘conceived’ in the mind as in a soil, which must not be suffered to grow, to produce fruit, and to shed it, but should ‘fall asleep’, as a seed which decays. See also κύματος νεοσπόρου, *sup.* 662.—That this, and not the secondary (though common) meaning *wave*, is intended, I think certain. As the passage from the *Choephori* shows, the sense *concept* (κύημα) could not in this context escape the ear, so that, if *wave* be meant at all, there is a play on the word, which, though Aeschylean enough, can hardly be made out, because the idea *wave* is not sufficiently indicated:

ὡς σεμνότιμος καὶ ξυνοικήτωρ ἔμοί.
πολλῆς δὲ χώρας τῆσδ' ἔτ' ἀκροθίνια
θύη πρὸ παίδων καὶ γαμηλίου τέλους
ἔχουσ' ἐς αἰεὶ τόνδ' ἐπαινέσεις λόγον.

ΧΟ. ἐμὲ παθεῖν τάδε, φεῦ,

στρ. β'.

ἐμὲ παλαιόφρονα, κατὰ τε γᾶν οἰκεῖν,
ἀτίετον,—φεῦ,—μῦσος.—

841

πνέω τοι μένος ἅπαντά τε κότον.—

οἶ, οἶ, δᾶ, φεῦ.—

τίς μ' ὑποδύεται
πλευρὰς ὀδύνα;—

845

θυμὸν αἶε, μᾶτερ

Νύξ. ἀπὸ γάρ με τιμᾶν †δαμαιᾶν θεῶν
δυσπάλαμοι παρ' οὐδὲν ἦραν δόλοι.

845. ὑπόδεται (but see 877).

there is nothing in the context which points to it.—The asyndeton, as in Aeschylus and in Greek often, signifies a repetition of the foregoing thought.

836. *σεμνότιμος* points to the title (*Semnai Theai*) under which they are to become *ξυνοικήτορες*. Note also that *ξυνοικήτωρ* and *χώρας* (837) lead back the thought to the real 'soil' (*Attica*), by which the preceding metaphor was suggested.

837. *ὡς προτέλεια θυόντων Ἀθήνησι ταῖς Ἐρινύσι* τέλος δὲ ὁ γάμος, schol. : *προτέλεια* are rites preliminary to marriage. The *Semnai Theai* were supposed (see the sequel) to give every kind of fertility. What offerings were made is not specified, but since they were *ἀκροθίνια* of Attica, it may be supposed that *οἶλ* was or had been an important part of them. This may throw light on *v.* 809.—By *Ἐρινύσι* the schol. means *Σεμναῖς Θεαῖς*, assuming, like Pausanias and late writers generally, the Aeschylean identification; see the Introduction.—*ἔτι*, with *ἐπαινέσεις*: *for all this*; 'you will be pleased, though you may not now think it'.

840—849. On the metre see Appendix II. The rhythm is *dochmiac*, thrice interrupted by *φεῦ*: the insertion of this (842) within the foot or bar (*ἀτίετον μῦσος*) is extremely violent (hence *φεῦ*, *ἀτίετον μῦσος* Weil), but cannot be safely rejected. Doubtless this *strophe*, like *v.* 781 foll., is distributed between different voices, as the interjections especially indicate. A distribution between 15 is easily made, but nothing certain can be determined.

840—842. *I to submit to this!*, that is, to accept a fixed habitation among men, further explained by *κατὰ γᾶν οἰκεῖν*, *i.e.* *κατοικεῖν γᾶν*, 'to settle in a place' or 'in the place, in Attica': *γῆ* has its local and political sense; not 'earth' generally. *ἀτίετον μῦσος*: *a thought contemptible and abhorred*, in apposition to *κατὰ γᾶν οἰκεῖν*. See on *v.* 335—355. The whole notion of a dwelling-place and local cult on earth is (according to Aeschylus) alien from their primitive way of thinking (*παλαιόφρονα*). They will have nothing of any such pact, no mutual commerce with mankind whatever. They are no *θεοί* (contrast *v.* 848

the bitter bane of that black seed, as one high-honoured of me, as a partner of my homē. When the prime offerings of this wide Attica, sacrifice for children and the marriage-rite, shall be thine for ever, then, if not now, thou wilt commend this offer.

Erinyes (as before). I to submit to this, oh shame! To change my ancient mind! I, to be resident...Scorn on the abhorred thought! My spirit is all fury and rage. Oh horrible, oh vile! Ah, what an anguish thrills my breast! Hark to my indignation, O Mother Night! For a crafty trick of gods had well-nigh wrenched me from my immemorial (?) honours.

with *v.* 828), to be propitiated forsooth with gifts.—We must on no account substitute *κατὰ γᾶς οἰκεῖν* or *κατὰ γᾶς οἰχεῖν* (Hermann). The Erinyes have always had ‘a home underground’ (*v.* 420 *οἴκοι γῆς ὑπαι*), nor is it this which they contemn.

844. *δαῖ*: exclamation of horror; origin unknown. See *Ag.* 1057.

846. *τίς ὀδύνα πλευράς*; Hermann. See Appendix II.

848. *ἀπό...ἤραν*: *ἀπήραν ἀπό...*, ‘removed me from...’—*δαμαιᾶν*: an unknown word, and probably erroneous. *δαναῖᾶν* ancient (L. Dindorf) suits the sense very well, but not so well the rhythm, which points rather (if we may assume that the scansion of *θεῶν* is disyllabic, ~ -) to the quantities ~ - -. The conjecture *δαμίαν* (Schuetz), from *δήμιος*, introduces political associations, here specially inappropriate. No quite satisfactory suggestion has been made.—*δυσπάλαμοι...δόλοι*: *evil craft*, *παλάμη* repeating the signification of *δόλος*. This language is extremely interesting and significant. The Erinyes term Athena’s offer a ‘trick’, conceiving that the local cult, if accepted, would annul their general powers, which, however limited in scope, are universal in application. They are asked, as they think, to become divinities of Athens and nothing more; and, not unnaturally, they regard the proposal with scorn. Athena treats this view as a prejudice, subtle (*σοφωτέρα* 851) but antiquated (*γραιυτέρα* 850). The truth is rather, that it was,

in Aeschylus’ day, and in Hellas, the very latest novelty, and has ever since waged war in Europe, with varying success, against religious observances of the political type which Aeschylus loved and wished to save. It was the philosophers, the thinkers, who were beginning to disengage the conception of deity from connexion with places and cults, and to challenge paganism on this ground. It is Aeschylus, no less than his Athena, who is pleased to mark as narrow and retrograde, a thing to be treated by larger minds with tolerant condescension, the notion that a sacred person is abridged in function by having a favoured and particular sanctuary.—*παρ’ οὐδέν*: ‘as of no account’ (Sidgwick), ‘so dass ich gleich nichts bin’ (Wecklein), and others generally. For the sense of *παρ’ οὐδέν*, lit. ‘at nothing’, cf. *Soph. O. T.* 983 *ταῦθ’ ὅτι παρ’ οὐδέν ἐστι ἡε, τοῦ ὧν ταῦτα εἰσὶν ἄνευ λόγου*, and *L. and Sc. s.v. παρά*, C 5. But the construction of *παρ’ οὐδέν* as a proleptic adjective, *quasi ὥστε παρ’ οὐδέν εἶναι*, is strange, and not warranted by *sup.* 213 *ἄτιμα καὶ παρ’ οὐδέν ἤρκεσω...πιστώματα*. However that passage be read or interpreted, the presence of the word *ἄτιμα* makes, for this purpose, a great difference. Nor is it clear why the Erinyes should say that ‘the trick’ (Athena’s proposal) *has actually effected* what, by rejecting it, they can still prevent.—Another meaning of *παρ’ οὐδέν* is *all but*, lit. ‘within (a mere) nothing’; cf. *Aeschin.* 3. 258 *παρ’ οὐδέν*

ΑΘ. ὄργας ξυνοίσω σοι· γεραιτέρα γὰρ εἶ.
 καίτοι <τὸ> μὲν σὺ κάρτ' ἐμοῦ σοφωτέρα
 φρονεῖν δὲ κάμοι Ζεὺς. ἔδωκεν οὐ κακῶς.
 ὑμεῖς δ' ἐς ἀλλόφυλον ἐλθοῦσαι χθόνα
 γῆς τῆσδ' ἐρασθήσεσθε· προυννέπω τάδε.
 οὐπιρρέων γὰρ τιμιώτερος χρόνος
 ἔσται πολίταις τοῖσδε. καὶ σὺ τιμίαν
 ἔδραν ἔχουσα πρὸς δόμοις Ἐρεχθέως
 τεύξει παρ' ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικείων στόλων,
 ὄσσην παρ' ἄλλων οὔποτ' ἂν σχέθοις βροτῶν.

850

855

851. καίτοι μὲν.

858. στόλων. text m.

μὲν ἦλθον ἀποκτεῖναι, ἐξεκήρυξαν δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, and see L. and Sc. s.v. παρά C 5 b. It should be considered, whether παρ' οὐδὲν ἦραν is not a brachylogy for παρ' οὐδὲν ἦλθον ἄραι, 'it had *all but* dispossessed me'; though exceptional, this construction is more natural than the other. The sense will then be, that the offer, being on the face of it specious, *might have* ruined them, if they had not seen through it. The exaggerated expression would be a natural note of anger.

850—852. ὄργας ξυνοίσω σοι: 'I will humour you, will bear your *moods* sympathetically'. For the sense of ὄργαλ see on Eur. *Med.* 121, and for συμφέρειν cf. *ib.* 13 πάντα συμφέρονσα (*complying*) Ἰάσωνι.—καίτοι, *and yet*, belongs to φρονεῖν κάμοι κ.τ.λ., the clause with μὲν being concessive (*though*).—τὸ μὲν (rather than τὰ μὲν, Hermann): *in the one way*. Like the common τοῦτο μὲν in prose, it signifies little more than μὲν simply.—καὶ τῷ μὲν εἶ σὺ (Wakefield, Abresch, and others), 'and *thereby* (sc. τῷ γεραιτέρα εἶναί) you are wiser', is a little less probable technically, and rather too much narrows the sense. The schol. however has διὰ τὸν χρόνον, which perhaps assumes τῷ.—For σοφωτέρα, which has been suspected, see preceding note. Their objection, she says, not without

irony, is too subtle for her comprehension.

853. ἐς ἀλλόφυλον ἐλθοῦσαι χθόνα, not merely equivalent to ἐς ἄλλην...χθόνα, means 'if ye pass into *the people* of another place', *i.e.* adopt another city. The Erinyes have no such thought; but Athena prudently shifts the ground, avoiding the discussion of their theology. Hence the somewhat abrupt transition, which has been supposed to indicate a lacuna.

855. *The glory of this people will grow with growing time*: lit. 'the in-flow of time will be more glorious (than that to which it flows)', each age more glorious than the preceding time to which it is added. Not simply 'the future will be more glorious than this present'.

857. πρὸς δόμοις Ἐρεχθέως: *by the house of Erechtheus*, *i.e.* 'under the Acropolis', the sanctuary of the *Semnai Theai* being on that side of the Areopagus.—On the history of the buildings upon the Acropolis, connected with Erechtheus and Athena, and the difficult question, to what building, if any actually in existence, δόμοι Ἐρεχθέως would refer at the date of this play, see Miss Harrison in *Mythology etc. of Ancient Attica*, and Dr Frazer's edition of Pausanias (*Indices* s.v. *Erechtheum*). The

Ath. I will bear with thy humours; for thou art elder. And yet, if one way thou, doubtless, art more subtle than I, to me too Zeus hath given no foolish wit.

As for you, if you go to land of other folk, you will regret this Athens, I warn you that. For with on-flowing time, more honour still shall flow to her citizens. And thou, seated honourably by Erechtheus' house, shalt receive from men and from women, coming in procession to thee, honours greater than thou couldst get from all the world besides.

existing Erechtheum was not yet built, perhaps not projected; but there had been (at all events) a 'house of Erechtheus' (Hom. *Od.* 7. 78), and the Persian devastation might here naturally be ignored. Indeed the reference is rather to the Acropolis itself, as the 'home' or 'castle' of the ancient kings, than to any structure upon it.

858. ἀνδρῶν (στόλων) καὶ γυναικῶν στόλων: processions of men and of women; for στόλος, see *v.* 1028.

859. ὄσσην (τιμῆν): such honour as... The prevalent view, that ὄσσην is unconstructible, does not allow for the Greek habit of ellipse, and the manner in which the intended τιμῆν is fixed upon the ear and the mind by the context. Not only does the whole altercation turn on this word (783, 813 ἄτιμος, 796, 826 ἀτιμοπενθεῖς, 848 ἀπὸ τιμᾶν, and, on the other side, 789 οὐκ ἀτιμίᾳ, 810 τιμαλφουμένας, 827 οὐκ ἔστ' ἄτιμοι, 837 σεμνῆτιμος), but these sentences especially do so (855 τιμώτερος, 856 τιμίαν). The Erinyes protest against the loss of their τιμαί, and Athena's reply is that they will gain on the contrary the ever-growing τιμή of Athens. In these circumstances, there is no practical obscurity in ὄσσην (τιμῆν), although the substantive, in the singular, has not actually occurred in the context. — On the other hand ὄσων (Pauw), *i.e.* τεύξει τοσοῦτων ὄσα..., with attraction of the relative, so collides with the other genitives, ἀνδρῶν...στόλων, ἀλλων...βροτῶν, as to be scarcely intelligible. ὄσ' ἄν (Weil) avoids this objection; but it is not clear that an anticipatory ἄν is

admissible; with ὄσ' ἄν we should expect a clause like ὄσ' ἄν θέλῃς. It has also been suggested (Dindorf), that something, containing an antecedent for ὄσσην, has been lost after *v.* 858; this is possible, but the text should not be suspected.

860—868. 'Athens will give you worship enough; let it be hoped that you (σύ) will inspire your worshippers happily, with courage in just defence, but not with that ungovernable and suicidal fierceness which you seem to favour.' This is the connexion of thought. The power of the *Semnai Theai* over marriage and birth (838, 858, 896, etc.) might be supposed, and probably was supposed, to make them specially efficacious in determining the character of the young (*νέοι*). It may even be gathered that there were some current notions on this subject, particularly among the lower populace, of which Aeschylus did not altogether approve. After all, Zeus and Athena, not the *Semnai Theai*, are the deities to whom he points.—These lines (860—868) are certainly something of a digression, a meditation of the goddess, addressed rather to the audience than the Erinyes; but there is no sure ground for ejecting them and thus reducing the speech to 13 verses (see on *v.* 797). *Vv.* 866 foll. are admirable, and if those preceding are hyper-Aeschylean, we may argue from that either way.

860—865. 'Do not stimulate Athenian youth to bloodshed, or put in Athenian hearts the spirit of civil war'.—The form of the period is slightly irregular; to μήτε...θηγάνας should respond another

σὺ δ' ἐν τόποισι τοῖς ἐμοῖσι μὴ βάλῃς 860
 μῆθ' αἵματηρὰς θηγάνας, σπλάγχων βλάβας
 νέων, αἰνοῖσις ἐμμανεῖς θυμώμασιν,
 μῆτ' ἐξελοῦσ' ὡς καρδίαν ἀλεκτόρων
 ἐν τοῖς ἐμοῖσι ἀστοῖσιν ἰδρύσῃς, ἄρη
 ἐμφύλιόν τε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους θρασύν. 865
 θυραῖος ἔστω πόλεμος, οὐ μόλις παρῶν
 ἐν ᾧ τις ἔσται δεινὸς εὐκλείας ἔρωσ'
 ἐνοικίου δ' ὄρνιθος οὐ λέγω μάχην.
 τοιαῦθ' ἐλέσθαι σοι πάρεστιν ἐξ ἐμοῦ,
 εἶ δρῶσαν, εἶ πάσχουσαν, εἶ τιμωμένην 870
 χώρας μετασχεῖν τῆσδε θεοφιλεστάτης.

862. αἰνοῖσις.

863. μῆδ'.

864. ἰδρύσῃ κάρη (changed to κάρα).

object to βάλῃς, e.g. μῆτε ἄρη ἐμφύλιον, instead of which we have a fresh verb, ἰδρύσῃς. Cf. *P. V.* 185 foll. (Wecklein).—**ἐν τόποισι...θηγάνας**: lit. 'in a place belonging to me put not sharpeners to blood'; the 'place' or 'ground' is at once Athens (metaphorically) and the hearts of the Athenians (literally).—**αἵματηρὰς**: epithet from the effect, as ἐμμανεῖς below, and αἵματηρὸν (τεύχος) *urn of death* in *Ag.* 806, but simpler, since the 'whetstone' is often stained.—**σπλάγχων...θυμώμασιν**: *marring the breast (temper) of youth, and maddening with worse rage than any wine.* ἐμμανεῖς: see above. αἰνοῖσις (Robortello): 'not wine (yet like it)', a favourite use of such negative epithets.—**μῆτε...θρασύν**: *take not, to put in my citizens, the heart, as it were, of the cock, war against kin and courage against one another.* The notion, which Aeschylus treats as metaphor (ὡς), that man was made up of elements from animals, was adopted literally in some legends of the creation: see Horace, *Od.* 1. 16. 12 *fertur Prometheus, addere principi | limo coactus partikulam undique | desectam, et insani leonis | vim stomacho apposuisse nostro*, with commentaries there. The theory is

here applied to the making of individual children (see above), or rather, as we should say, of their souls. Such crude physics or psychology, for Aeschylus figurative, may have been really believed by many of his contemporaries,—especially the devotees of the *Semnai Theai*. He would be not the less inclined to depreciate it, because Athena herself was associated with the fabulous operation of Prometheus: Lucian *Prometh.* 3 *συνειργάζετο αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ ἐμπνέουσα τὸν πῆλον κ.τ.λ.* If we knew more of the popular doctrine, we might see more reason for θηγάνας, and for the peculiar phrasing of this passage generally.—**ἀλεκτόρων**. For the cock as the type of civil war, cf. Pindar, *Ol.* 12. 20 *ἐνδομάχας ἄτ' ἀλέκτωρ.—ἄρη*. Cf. *Ag.* 78 "Ἄρης δ' οὐκ ἐνὶ χώρᾳ (in the young child 'Ares is not yet at his post'), where however the psychology is different, and *Ares* more of a proper name. Where, as here, it is absolutely non-personal, should we not avoid the misleading capital, as it is now common in Latin to distinguish *Mars* and *mars*?—**μῆτ'** Dindorf.—**ἰδρύσῃς Ἄρη** Stephanus. The error of M seems to have arisen from the confusion of ιϞ (σ) and κ (κ).—**ἐξελοῦσα**,

And thou, never must thou sow within my bounds those sharp incentives to blood, furious as drunkenness with the wine of rage, which mar the bosom of youth, nor take, to put in my citizens, heart of the cock, home-courage, bold against his kind. Warfare abroad let them seek,—not difficult to find, whenever there shall be a mighty passion for renown. Fight of the fowl within the yard I reckon nought.

Such is the choice now opened to thee by me, in kindness done and received, in honour fairly paid, to have thy part in this most heaven-favoured place.

“which has been immensely emended, is no doubt right” (Sidgwick, after Paley). *ἐκφέουσα* (Musgrave), *ἐξέδουσα*, *ἐκχέουσα*, *ἐκχολούσα*, etc. The schol. *ἀναπτερώσασα* may be merely a guess, a loose and false interpretation of *ἐξέλοισα*, based, if it has any base, on some confusion between *ἐξαιρέω* and *ἐξάιρω*. The schol. on *θηγάνας νέων* (*τὰς ἀναλισκούσας τὰ νέα*) is equally loose and false, yet no one rejects *θηγάνας*. The defence of the ms. may perhaps be fortified by the parallel of the ‘Promethean’ psychology, which is adduced above.

866—868. *Abroad be their warring; and easily they may have it, whenever there shall be a mighty passion for renown. As for the fowl that fights in his yard, I make no account of his fighting.*—*οὐ μῶλις παρών* is a supplementary remark (*Nebenbemerkung*, Wecklein) but not exactly a parenthesis. It is closely connected with *ἐν ᾧ* κ.τ.λ., and should be so punctuated.—*ἐν ᾧ*: in the temporal sense, *quasi ἐν ᾧ* (*χρόνῳ*), though such a supplement is not scientifically correct. *The moment that the passion for fame is felt, exists at all, it may be satisfied in legitimate fighting against the enemies of Athens.* This was certainly true in 458 B.C. There is an interesting parallel in the close of Edie Ochiltree’s rebuke to the duellists (Scott, *The Antiquary*): *The French will be o’er to harry us one of these days, and ye’ll have fighting enough.* The remonstrance seems to point at quarrels between rival families, chiefs,

and the like, rather than at political faction in the proper sense. The social and personal incidents of the time are almost unknown to us; but we may well suppose that the predecessors of Midias gave not less trouble to the makers of Athens than the duellists to Richelieu.—Paley seems right in not referring *ἐν ᾧ* to *πόλεμος*. He supplies *ἐκεῖνω*: *coming without stint* (see below) *to him who shall feel* etc. This is possible, but (I think) unnecessarily difficult.—*οὐ λέγω*: *I do not reckon*. A martial spirit is valuable only so far as it is directed against the enemy; what spends itself within, is, in the eye of the State, mere waste and worse; *it does not count*. The contrary opinion, that *τὸ μαχιδόν* deserves public encouragement *per se*, has been always common enough; the history of duelling again offers illustration.—“*I do not advise, or bid, is a μείωσις for I forbid*” Sidgwick, rejecting rightly the comparison of Soph. *El.* 466 *εἰ δ’ ἔπεισι νέμεσις, οὐ λέγω* (*if the word is invidious, be it unsaid, or retracted*). But could *λέγω* *bid* take as object such a subst. as *μάχην*?—A very different sentiment is given, if (with many) we join *οὐ μῶλις παρών* with *ἔστω*, and let there be plenty of it, justifying *οὐ* for *μή* by close connexion with *μῶλις*. But this does not fairly render either *μῶλις* or *παρών*. *Ag.* 1066, where (see note) *οὐ μῶλις* means ‘more than just enough’, is not parallel.

869—871. She resumes her expostulation, from *v.* 859, where see note.

- ΧΟ. ἐμὲ παθεῖν τάδε, φεῦ, ἀντ. β'.
 ἐμὲ παλαιόφρονα, κατὰ τε γὰν οἰκείν,
 ἀτίετον, — φεῦ, — μῦσος. —
 πνέω τοι μένος ἅπαντά τε κότον. — 875
 οἶ, οἶ, δᾶ, φεῦ. —
 τίς μ' ὑποδύεται
 πλευρὰς ὀδύνα; —
 θυμὸν ἄιε, μάτερ
 Νύξ. ἀπὸ γάρ με τιμᾶν †δαμαϊᾶν θεῶν 880
 δυσπάλαμοι παρ' οὐδὲν ἦραν δόλοι.
 ΑΘ. οὔτοι καμουμαί σοι λέγουσα τάγαθά,
 ὡς μήποτ' εἴπης πρὸς νεωτέρας ἐμοῦ
 θεὸς παλαιὰ καὶ πολιισσούχων βροτῶν
 ἄτιμος ἔρρειν τοῦδ' ἀπόξενος πέδου. 885
 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀγνόν ἐστί σοι Πειθοῦς σέβας,
 γλώσσης ἐμῆς μείλιγμα καὶ θελκτήριον.....

...σὺ δ' οὖν μένοις ἄν· εἰ δὲ μὴ θέλοις μένειν,

888. θέλησ.—ει superscr. (i.e. θέλεις) m.

872 foll. See on 840 foll.

882—892. This speech, the crisis of the whole drama, and the abrupt and total change which it appears to effect in the attitude of the Chorus, are fully discussed in the Introduction. As to the mere interpretation of the words, the only question (but that is not unimportant) is whether *εἰ μὲν... μένοις ἄν* (886 foll.) should be construed as one sentence, continuous and complete: 'if you regard persuasion, then remain'. Those who so take it (*e.g.* Hermann, and Dindorf *Lex. Aesch.*) assume that *δ' οὖν* marks the apodosis of the conditional sentence, as *δέ* does frequently in Homer, and also, but less frequently, in later authors. In my note to *Ag.* 1045 (1st edition), this passage was cited on that assumption, but, as I now think, wrongly. For (1) in such cases there is regularly, if not always, a concessive force in the conditional

clause, and the apodosis expresses, not the natural and immediate consequence of the condition, but something which, that being so or so supposed, is possible *nevertheless*. So in *Ag. l.c.* (if the *δέ* there is apodotic at all, but see note in 2nd edition), and Herod. 3. 68, *εἰ μὴ αὐτὴ Σμέρδιν... γινώσκεις, σὺ δὲ παρὰ Ἀτόσσης πύθου*, 'if you do not know Smerdis yourself, you may at any rate ask Atossa....' All the examples cited by Kühner (*Gr. Gr.* § 533, 1 b) are of this kind, and the antithetic conjunction (*δέ*) has then a reason, which it has not in a case, like the present, of direct consequence. It is not clear that, in direct consequence, Aeschylus at all events would have admitted even *δέ*. (2) Of an apodotic *δ' οὖν* no example is cited; if it occurs, it should be, to judge by the ordinary use of this combination, where, after a long or complicated protasis, the main thought is *resumed*, with a certain

Erinyes (as before). I to submit to this, Oh shame! To change my ancient mind! I, to be resident...Scorn on the abhorred thought! My spirit is all fury and rage. Oh horrible, oh vile! Ah, what an anguish thrills my breast! Hark to my indignation, O Mother Night! For a crafty trick of gods had well-nigh wrenched me from my immemorial (?) honours.

Ath. (coming closer). I am not to be wearied of pleading with thee what is good, that thou mayst never say that thou, goddess and ancient, wast by me thy younger, and by Athens' mortal inhabitants, dismissed with dishonour, inhospitably, from our soil.

(She is now in the midst of them, and speaks as for them alone.)

Ah, if sacred Suasion be holy unto thee, the appeasement of my tongue, and the soothing...*(Her voice ceases to be heard, and for a while she seems to commune with them in silence. They become suddenly calm, and show in their behaviour a great awe.)*

...So then, thou wilt belike abide; and if it should be thy will

interruption; but this again is not the present case. (3) Admitting the use as possible, we have no ground to suppose it here, for the *prima facie* appearance, that the argument is unfinished, is confirmed by the requirements of the situation.—We should therefore adopt the alternative (Butler, Wecklein), that *vv.* 886, 887 are, in grammar, *not complete*.—But it is a distinct question, whether they should be completed, that is to say, whether the text is defective. As the translation will show, I think not. The apodosis (never completed) begins probably at γλώσσης (see below). We cannot say, and are not meant to know, exactly in what form it proceeds. It is shaped so as to suggest that *some* very powerful persuasion is to be used. The obvious doubt, whether θελεκτήριον is a substantive, or an epithet to some substantive which is to follow, is probably left open intentionally, and is reproduced in the translation. δ' οὖν has its ordinary force, marking *resumption*, after the interval. The emphasis on οὖν signifies that the Erinyes *themselves* will probably now

wish to stay. But whether they stay or go—which is not, and never was, the essential matter—they have been satisfied; the divine controversy is over, the discord mystically solved. See further the Introduction.—As this point is of special interest, I give all the critical suggestions mentioned by Wecklein, who himself (see on *v.* 797) assumes after 886 the loss of two verses. 886. ἐστὶ μοι Paley. 887. γλώσση τ' ἐμῇ or γλώσσης δ' ἐμῆς (or *a lacuna* before *v.* 887) Butler. γλώσσης δ' ἐμῆς μελιγμ' ἄκος θελεκτήριον Merkel, γλώσσης τ' ἐμῆς μελιγμα σοῦ (or σοί) θελεκτήριον Paley, γλώσσης τ' ἐμῆς μελιγμα καταθελεκτήριον L. Schmidt, μελιγμα μαλθακτῆριον Heimsoeth, Wecklein. 886, 887. ἀγνὸν ἔκτισεν...μελιγμά σοι Th. Heyse. 887 foll. γλώσσης τ'... | αἰδεῖ, μένοις ἄν Hartung. 888. σύ τοι μένοις Rauchenstein.

884. θεός. See *v.* 828, and *vv.* 848, 849 (note).

886. *If sacred persuasion is holy to you, i.e. if you are accessible to persuasion at all.*

887. Whether this is part of the protasis, in apposition to Πειθούς σέβας, or of

- οὐ τὰν δικαίως τῆδ' ἐπιρρέποις πόλει
 μῆνιν τιν' ἢ κότον τιν' ἢ βλάβην στρατῷ. 890
 ἔξεστι γάρ σοι τῆσδε γαμόρῳ χθονὸς
 εἶναι δικαίως ἐς τὸ πᾶν τιμωμένη.
- ΧΟ. ἀνασσ' Ἀθάνα, τίνα με φῆς ἔξω ἔδραν;
 ΑΘ. πάσης ἀπήμον' οἰζύος· δέχου δὲ σύ.
- ΧΟ. καὶ δὴ δέδεγμαί· τίς δέ μοι τιμὴ μένει; 895
 ΑΘ. ὡς μὴ τιν' οἶκον εὐθενεῖν ἄνευ σέθεν.
- ΧΟ. σὺ τοῦτο πράξεις, ὥστε με σθένειν τόσον;
 ΑΘ. τῷ γὰρ σέβοντι συμφορὰς ὀρθώσομεν.
- ΧΟ. καὶ μοι πρόπαντος ἐγγύην θήσει χρόνου;
 ΑΘ. ἔξεστι γάρ μοι μὴ λέγειν ἂ μὴ τελῶ. 900
 ΧΟ. θέλξειν μ' ἔοικας, καὶ μεθίσταμαι κότου.

889. οὐτ' ἄν.
 893. ἔχειν.

891. τῆδεγ' ἀμοίρου.
 896. εὐσθενεῖν.

an unfinished apodosis, cannot perhaps be certainly determined, and is of little moment; but it is more natural to take Πειθοῦς σέβας as general in sense (*persuasion*, not *my persuasion*), and therefore to treat γλώσσης ἐμῆς κ.τ.λ. as the commencement of the apodosis.

888. On the view which I take of the situation, θέλοισ, *though you should be unwilling*, is preferable to θέλεις, *if you are...*: Athena would scarcely now put the supposition of their unwillingness in so positive a form. The ms. reading (see above) is practically equivocal.

891, 892. δικαίως (with ἔξεστι... εἶναι), *justly*, without any infringement of justice: ἐς τὸ πᾶν τιμωμένη, *with perfect rights*. This is no mere verbiage or repetition: the couplet means, not that Athena has made an offer, but that the *Erinyes* can entertain it, consistently with their principles and their rights. Hitherto they have fiercely maintained the contrary; now, as immediately appears, they are convinced. Why and how, we have considered in the Introduction.—τῆσδε

γαμόρῳ Dobree. I place in the text this pretty and generally accepted conjecture, but am by no means sure that it is right. The τῆδεγ' (*i.e.* τῆδέ γ') of the ms. is much to the purpose, meaning *so at all events, in this way at all events*, that is to say, on the principles, and in virtue of the mystery, which Athena has disclosed to them. If we retain it, we should probably read, for ἀμοίρου, ἐμμοίρον (ἐμμορον) or ἐμμοίρω (ἐμμόρω), after suggestions of Hermann and Schütz.

893—916. The *Erinyes* (or rather now the *Semnai Theai*) accept the offered sanctuary; they are invited to bless Attica as their new dwelling-place. On the general effect of the dialogue, see the Introduction.

893. τίνα...ἔδραν; not 'What place?', but, as the reply shows, 'What manner of settlement?' The question expresses the astonishment of their new sensations.—ἔξω Elmsley.

894. πάσης...οἰζύος: *absolutely without hurt or grief, i.e.* a settlement so given and accepted, that no one is wounded

not to abide, thou mayst not rightfully turn upon Athens any manner of wrath or anger whatsoever, or hurt to her people. For it is possible for thee rightfully to be a portioner in the land, with honours all entire.

The Leader of the Erinyes. O Lady Athena, what sayest thou of this proffered habitation ?

Ath. That utterly griefless, harmless it shall be. Accept it thou.

Erin. Suppose it then accepted, and what are my destined powers ?

Ath. That without thee no family shall have increase.

Erin. Thou wilt effect this, wilt give me such might as that ?

Ath. Ay, for we will prosper the fortunes of him that honoureth thee.

Erin. And wilt thou give me warranty for all time forth ?

Ath. Free am I not to promise what I shall not perform.

Erin. Thou wilt soothe me sure ; my anger is going from me.

and nothing injured, all claims and feelings satisfied. The point is the same as that of *vv.* 891, 892, but put, better and more truly, so as to include all parties.—For the construction see *v.* 353.

895. *Suppose me to have accepted, ... then...* See on *Cho.* 563. — *τιμή* ; *privilege, office, special function*, in the same sense in which a magistracy is a *τιμή*. The word, with its various senses, is hardly worked in this scene, and serves to cover or bridge the chasm which, as Aeschylus well knew, we have to cross. The question has already in effect been answered (*vv.* 837, 858), but the Erinyes would not then listen.

896. *ὥς* : *ᾧστε*, such (a function) that no household (family) shall prosper without you, as givers of fertility and especially of children (838). See also *vv.* 908 foll., 945, 957 foll.—*εὐθeneῖν* Scaliger. The word (see *vv.* 909, 945, and the article in L. and Sc.) was especially associated with vigour and fertility of life.

898. *συμφορὰς*. Respectis versibus, qui proxime supra citantur, patet (opinor) id vocabulum sic in hac re a religiosis fuisse usurpatum, a volgo praecipue τῶν Σεμνῶν Θεῶν studioso, ut *coitus* significaret. Quid enim sit *συμφέρεσθαι γυναικί*, quis possit hic non reminisci? Poeta, si vellet ignorare, aliter loqui debuit. Sed non voluit, nec ausus est; verum crassiorem antiquitatis sermonem feliciter ita mitigando servavit, ut latior sensus (*res, eventus*) quodammodo insinua-retur.

901. *I think thou wilt win me ; I am parting with my angry mood.* *Θέλλειν*. The future does not mean that they expect further persuasion, but that the end is visible, and may as well come at once. It is in fact manifestly reached already, this brief debate being no more than a sort of self-propitiation, the converts' formal and decent farewell to their former state of mind.

ΑΘ. τοιγὰρ κατὰ † χθόν' οὔσ' ἐπικτήσει φίλους.

ΧΟ. τί οὖν μ' ἄνωγας τῆδ' ἐφθυμῆσαι χθονί;

ΑΘ. ὁποῖα νίκης μὴ κακῆς ἐπίσκοπα·

καὶ ταῦτα γῆθεν, ἔκ τε ποντίας δρόσου, 905

ἐξ οὐρανοῦ τε κἀνέμων ἀήματα

εὐηλίως πνέοντ' ἐπιστείχων χθόνα·

καρπὸν τε γαίας καὶ βοτῶν ἐπίρρυτον

ἄστοῖσιν εὐθενοῦντα μὴ κάμνειν χρόνῳ·

καὶ τῶν βροτείων σπερμάτων σωτηρίαν. 910

τῶν δυσσεβούντων † δ' ἐκφορωτέρα πέλοις.

στέργω γάρ, ἀνδρὸς φυτυποῖμενος δίκην,

τὸ τῶν δικαίων τῶνδ' ἀπένθετον γένος.

908. βροτῶν.

909. εὐθενοῦντας.

913. ἀπένθετον.

902, 903. *Therefore thou dwelling in our land shalt gain new love* (?). κατὰ χθόν' οὔσα: 'as inhabitant of Athens'; but the text can hardly be right. The metre, though not Aeschylean in elision of a substantive with quantities ~ (see on *Ag.* 898 and *inf.* 972), may be defended by regarding the phrase κατὰ χθόνα as making, for rhythmical purposes, a single 'word'; but neither οὔσα nor κατὰ χθόνα expresses naturally the sense which it thus has to bear.—κατάχθων οὔσα would partly meet the objection, but the compound adj. does not seem to occur, and, if it did, should rather mean καταχθόνιος *subterranean*, which is not the point.—κατῶ-σων, οὔς κ.τ.λ. Weil, from Hesych. κατῆσαι (i.e. κατῶσαι) κατακλήσαι. *Then thou must win with a spell those whose love thou art to gain*, leading naturally to the question τί...ἐφθυμῆσαι; (*What charm do you bid me chant...?*). The acceptors being now not only willing but eager, Athena, with a touch of gentle reproach, invites them to efface their former threats by blessing and propitiating Athens. I believe this to be right. The change is less bold than it appears: from ΚΑΤΑΙΟΝ to ΚΑΤΑ ΚΟΝ is a common slip (see *v.* 864), and the

next step would be obvious.—τί οὖν as in *Pers.* 789, *Sept.* 192, 691, *Suppl.* 310 (Wecklein). See Jebb on *Soph. Phil.* 100. τί μ' οὖν ἄνωγας Porson.

904. 'Let your blessings be *universal* as the benefit of the victory', lit. '(Sing) such (good spell) as regards a victory without evil'. ἐπίσκοπα *regardant to*, i.e. 'proper in consideration of...'. For the construction see *Soph. Ai.* 976 ἄτης τῆσδ' ἐπίσκοπον μέλος, and *Cho.* 126, where however (see note) the sense is distinguishable.—νίκης μὴ κακῆς, i.e. a victory where none has lost. It is in the nature of a victory to imply defeat, and therefore to be, for some one, κακόν. But not so here; the present reconciliation means no defeat of the prosecutors, or of those jurymen (not to be forgotten) who voted for them, or of any one. All is good.—Others take ἐπίσκοπα as 'having for their object', and νίκης μὴ κακῆς as the future victory of Athens over external foes, not her own citizens, referring to *v.* 866. But that topic is not here relevant, nor sufficiently indicated.—The reference to this passage in my note to *Cho. l.c.* is, in the words 'the object sought', not accurate.—νείκης Hermann, but see on *Ag.* 1377.

Ath. Win therefore, with chanted spell (?), them whose love thou art to gain.

Erin. What blessings then upon Athens is my song to call ?

Ath. All blessings proper to a victory wherein is no hurt ; blessing from earth, and from waters of the deep, and from the sky likewise spirits of winds, whose breath shall move in sunlight over the land ; fruit of the soil, and of living creatures, inflowing to her citizens with increase which time shall never tire ; and to the seed of man a safe deliverance. Yet favour thou more the birth of the virtuous kind (?) ; for I love, even as one that nurseth plants, the sort which from these, the righteous, hath taken graft.

905. 'Ay, (invoke on Athens) blessings from every element, earth and water, air and sun.' ταῦτα, like ὅποια, is still governed by ἐφύμνησον, the reply to v. 903, and so, with a slight change in the form, is ἀήματα ἐπιστείχειν..., '(pray) that breath may move...': lit. 'and from sky and winds (invoke good, invoking) breath to move...'. The appearance of irregularity arises from the peculiarly Attic habit of ellipse, by which a dominant word or concept, such as ἐφύμνησον here, can be supplied, with tacit grammatical modification, as the period proceeds. The signification of ταῦτα, i.e. ἀγαθά, is given by μὴ κακῆς.—Or we may make ἀνέμων ἀήματα obj. to ἐφύμνησον, and ἐπιστείχειν 'exegetic' (so as to move....).—ποντίας δρόσου waters of the deep ; δρόσος, as often, is water in general ; ποντίας is used rather typically than with actual reference to 'the sea', though we need not therefore forget that Athens was maritime. So Poseidon is πόντιος and ποντομέδων, not as limited to the sea, but as the god of water.—εὐηλώς completes, though without formality, the reference to the 'four elements', to be taken in a popular, not philosophic, sense.—Note here (vv. 904—908) the sudden and strong emphasis on the metrical division between the verses, *syllaba anceps* thrice, and violent

hiatus twice in succession (δρόσου | ἐξ, ἀήματα | εὐ-), contrasting the rest of the speech, or any average passage of Aeschylus. The delivery is broken by solemn and emotional pauses.

908. βοτῶν Stanley.

910. σωτηρίαν reverts to the substantial construction with ἐφύμνησον ; see above.

911—913. (Preserve, that is, the good human seeds), but of the impious rather get rid (?) ; for I love, as doth a gardener, the sort that is grafted from these, the just. For the idea that the *Semnai Theai*, as governing birth, govern character and the improvement of the race, and for the transition or suspension of the thought, between the material and the merely figurative notion of σπεῖρειν, see vv. 860 foll., where however the application of these ideas is somewhat different.—τῶν δυσσεβούντων δ' ἐκφορώτερα πέλοις (MS.): 'be you rather a destroyer of the bad', a 'taker away' (?). The required sense is clear, but the words difficult and suspicious. Not only is there apparently no proof that ἐκφέρειν, ἐκφορά, ἐκφορος and the cognates, were used with any such meaning (the association of ἐκφορά, carrying out, with funerals is irrelevant and inapplicable), but ἐκφέρειν actually is used, in a similar connexion, with just the contrary meaning, 'to produce, bear, bring

τοιαῦτα σοῦστι. τῶν ἀρειφάτων δ' ἐγὼ
 πρεπτῶν ἀγώνων οὐκ ἀνέξομαι τὸ μὴ οὖ
 τήνδ' ἀστύνικον ἐν βροτοῖς τιμᾶν πόλιν. 915

ΧΟ. δέξομαι Παλλάδος ξυνοικίαν, στρ. α'.
 οὐδ' ἀτιμάσω πόλιν,
 τὰν καὶ Ζεὺς ὁ παγκρατῆς Ἄρης τε

into existence', as the earth its plants, and animals their offspring. See Plato *Rep.* 461 C διακελευσάμενοι (τὰς γυναῖκας) μάλιστα μὲν μὴδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κήμα μὴδέ γε ἐν, ἐὰν δέ τι βιάσῃται, οὕτω τιθέναι, ὡς οὐκ οὖσης τροφῆς τῆ γε τοιοῦτω, Herod. 1. 193 ἔστι δὲ χωρέων αὕτη ἀπασέων... ἀρίστη... Διμήτρος καρπὸν ἐκφέρειν, and other exx. in L. and Sc. s.v. ἐκφέρω. Applied to the deities of birth, no word, to mean *destructive*, seems less happy or more confusing than *ἐκφορος*. We should probably read (with Heath) τῶν δ' εὐσεβοῦντων or τῶν εὐσεβοῦντων δ' (supposing *δυσσεβοῦντων* to have arisen through transference of the δέ): 'but favour more the production (birth) of the pious'. They are to be τῶν βροτέων σπερμάτων σωτήρες generally (for σφῆζεν 'bring safely to birth' see v. 664), but to prefer the good. Note also that (1) this gives a more regular and natural sense to the comparative, 'more (productive)', not '(destructive) rather'; (2) we avoid the somewhat harsh sound, on the lips of Athena and in a blessing, of a prayer that some 'human seeds', the bad or less good, should be suppressed; the import is the same, but it is more gently and graciously put; (3) we get rid of all difficulty in τῶνδε (v. 913, see below).—*ἐκφορωτέρα* (Wellauer), and some other similar but less plausible suggestions, meet the case partly, but not altogether.—In the *Class. Rev.* xvii. 286 Dr Headlam supports τῶν δ' εὐσεβοῦντων almost exactly as I do. The conjecture has been so little noticed, that, till I read Dr Headlam, I was not aware that it had been propounded. My argument for it was written many years ago.—τὸ...γένος: 'the plants of the

good', the offspring of virtuous stocks, but more exactly, 'the sort *grafted from* (ἀπ-ἐνθετον) the good', because the improvements of the *φυτιποίηση* are most commonly obtained by *grafting*, to which ἐντίθημι, ἐνθεσις (see L. and Sc. s. v.) seem to have been specially applied. The extant examples of the limited sense are rare and late, but this may well be accidental. The general sense *implant* (here sufficient) is common. Observe that, in the old alphabet (not yet obsolete in the time of Aeschylus), the words ἀπένθητος—ἀπένθετος were graphically indistinguishable, both ΔΠΕΝΘΕΤΟC. It is for this reason that I venture to put ἀπένθετον in the text: it is but one way of interpreting the MS. Wecklein, suggesting ἀπανθιστὸν γάνος, remarks truly that "we expect an expression borrowed from gardening".—τῶνδε may merely refer to τῶν εὐσεβοῦντων (see above), but probably marks that τῶν δικαίων is explained by a gesture indicating the Areopagites, as types of ἀστῶν τὰ βέλτατα (490).—ἀπένθητον, *untroubed*, or *untroubedful*, seems impossible. If retained, it must, in spite of the order, be taken predicatively with στέργω, 'I cherish the good sort (and keep them) untroubed (by the bad)'. But (1) ἀπένθητος could not mean *untroubed* in the sense demanded (ἀπήμαντος): contrast ἀπενθήτω φρενί *Ag.* 886, and see note there; it would at least require some supplementary explanation, which however (2) can be got only by joining τῶνδε (i.e. τῶν δυσσεβοῦντων) with ἀπένθητον, 'unvexed by these (the bad)': this has been suggested, but the division of τῶν δικαίων τῶνδε into opposites is impracticable, since the article τῶν draws

Such is thy part; and for the trials, the fit trials, of grim war, I will not let them fail to glorify this city among men with public victory.

Chorus. I will accept a dwelling with Pallas, nor scorn the citadel which She, with Zeus Almighty and with Ares, holds for a

τῶνδε to itself irresistibly (contrast *v.* 195); and as to τῶν δυσσεβοῦντων itself, see above.—τοῖσιν δικαίων τῶνδ' ἀνέθετον (*sic*) γένος Th. Heyse, cited in the *Addenda et Corrigenda* to the *Appendix* of Wecklein's critical edition.

914—916. 'Such is thy part; (be that performed), and I will not permit that Athens shall want military glory.' τοιαῦτα; *i.e.* to make the εὐσεβεῖς and δίκαιοι.—σοῦ ὄστι or σοῦσσι (σοι ἐστί) as M. τῶν...ἀγῶνων οὐκ ἀνέξομαι τὸ μὴ οὐ...τιμᾶν...: 'I will not suffer war not to give glory to...'. The ἀγῶνες are personified. For ἀνέχεσθαι τί τινος, 'to tolerate something, or such an act, on the part of a person', see L. and Sc. *s.v.*—"The gen. ἀγῶνων is a gen. of respect put provisionally at the beginning, and depending ultimately on ἀσπύνικον, 'in the strife...as victorious'", Sidgwick, supplying the general notion 'people' as the subject of τιμᾶν. This is possible, but the other way (Wecklein and others) is simpler and more consistent with the order.—ἀρειφάτων...πρεπτῶν: 'contests of deadly war, when proper', contests to which fighting and slaying are proper, *i.e.*, those against external foes. The emphasis on πρεπτῶν is given by position in the verse, and the antithesis is to the forbidden ἀρης ἐμφύλιος (864).—An ἀγών, as such, is not necessarily 'martial' at all, including politics, athletics, and rivalry of every kind. For the active use of ἀρειαφτος, as distinct from the true passive (*slain in war*), cf. Eur. *Suppl.* 603 ἀρειαφτοι φόνου, μάχαι.—It is here needless to suppose, that in ἀρειαφτος the connexion with πέφνον and φόνος is ignored, and that the meaning is simply martial, if, indeed, Aeschylus would have admitted such a use. Hesychius has ἀρειαφτων λήμμα.

λαχρῶν: Λαχρῶλος ἐν Νεαρίσκου, but one would like to see the context.—For πρεπτῶν another possible meaning is conspicuous (*i.e.* glorious?), but this gives less point. In this scene of concord, any praise of fighting requires a cautious touch, and the qualification πρεπτῶν (*proper*) is to the purpose.—οὐκ ἀνέξομαι. The negative turn points at and rejects the idea that the εὐσεβεία and δικαιοσύνη, essential to the members of a true πόλις, are inconsistent with the deadliest and most triumphant fighting, when patriotism (ἐγῶ) demands it. Here (as in *vv.* 860 foll.) the language seems to have a critical and corrective purpose, connected with the worship of the *Semnai Theai*, which we imperfectly understand. It will be observed that, in the blessings which follow, war is never mentioned. The view of Aeschylus seems to be, that the *Semnai Theai* had nothing, at least directly, to do with it.

917—1021. The new goddesses bless the city in accordance with the foregoing prayer, Athena assenting, and in her turn noting (931 foll., 955, 991 foll.) that, in their new part, they have not lost their salutary function of inspiring awe.

919. καὶ also, 'with Pallas' (of course not καλ...τε, both...and).—Ἄρης: with reference to the Areopagus. It should be remembered that originally the *Acropolis* (in a somewhat extended sense), to which the Areopagus, a spur of the hill, might be regarded as an appendage, had been itself the πόλις, and never lost that name (Thucyd. 2. 15). It is even doubtful whether the πόλις proper, the fortified area, received any further extension till after the Persian wars and shortly before the date of this play. The language here is not precisely or definitely archaic, but is

φρούριον θεῶν νέμει, 920
 ῥυσίβωμον Ἑλλά-
 νων ἄγαλμα δαιμόνων.
 αἶτ' ἐγὼ κατεύχομαι
 θεσπίσασα πνευμένῳς
 ἐπισσύτους βίου τύχας ὀνησίμους 925
 γαίας ἑξαμβρόσαι
 φαιδρὸν ἀλίου σέλας.

AΘ. τάδ' ἐγὼ προφρόνως τοῖσδε πολίταις
 πράσσω, μεγάλας καὶ δυσαρέστους 930
 δαίμονας αὐτοῦ κατανασσαμένη.
 πάντα γὰρ αὐται τὰ κατ' ἀνθρώπους
 ἔλαχον διέπειν.
 ὁ δὲ μὴ κύρσας βαρέων τούτων

926. ζτ in margin.

conceived naturally from the antique point of view.—To add the name of *Zeus* would be, for Aeschylus, imperative, and is justified (*v.* 1002) by his relation to Pallas. We need not therefore here suppose in this name any local reference, and may decline the difficult question, whether such a reference is possible. See on *v.* 999.

921. ῥυσίβωμον. This view of Athens, as protector of the Hellenic religions, points especially to the expulsion of the Persians (Paley, Wecklein, comparing *Pers.* 811 foll., Herod. 8. 109), which the Athenians in particular regarded as a punishment for their sacrilegious treatment of the Acropolis.

925. ἐπισσύτους may be compared with ἐπίρρυτον (908), but differs from it in being strictly passive rather than intransitive. The prosperity, of which the gifts of the earth are a principal part and general type, is to be *sped* (hastened), as plants are 'sped' from the earth by the sun.

926. ἑξαμβρόσαι, ἑξαναβρόσαι, the commonly accepted correction (Pauw) for ἑξαμβρόσαι, is probably so far correct,

that the word here used for *make to grow* was connected with βρέων *teem*. The extension of this idea from the producing earth to the producing sun is natural; cf. ἐκφορωτέρα in *v.* 911. The form would be more convincing if there were evidence, of satisfactory date, for a transitive βρέων with obj. acc. As it is, ἑξαμβρόσαι (Pearson), as from a stem βρω- related to βρυ- somewhat as χω- (χώσαι, χώμα) to χυ-, has an equal claim, notwithstanding that no such stem is actually found.—The verb βράσσω [making the aorist ἑξαμβρόσαι or -βρόσαι (see Paley)] is much less appropriate. The metre (see *v.* 948) favours, but does not require, a long vowel. See Appendix II.

931—938. πάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. relates to δυσαρέστους *hard to please*. Because the Erinyes have made a pact with Athena, and now appear as authors of prosperity, they have not ceased to be *Erinyes* and *δυσάρεστοι*, have not forgone their hatred of wrong, or the will and power to punish. Their functions are not abridged (see *v.* 892) but extended, so that they now govern *all* life, *all* human experience

fortress of deity, a precious thing to protect the altars of Hellas' gods. And I on this place call down, with prayer of love, sendings of happy life beneficent, which from the soil shall burgeon beneath the bright shining of the sun.

Ath. This is the work of my zeal towards these my citizens; for that I won to dwell here deities great and hard to be pleased. For all estate of man belongs to their governing; though he, that hath never met the dangers thereof, knoweth not whence the

(πάντα τὰ κατ' ἀνθρώπους), good and blessing, but evil and punishment too, and both universal. Those therefore, who hold their happiness at the will of the *Semnai Theai*, must hold it in pious fear. Throughout this scene the part of the goddess is to correct any rash misinterpretation of the thought that 'the ministers of wrath are appeased'.—ὁ δὲ μὴ κύρσας κ.τ.λ. All are liable to the *Erinyes*, though some may forget it. The man who 'has not found life dangerous' (and therefore may flatter himself that he is innocent and safe) is in more danger than he knows. He is responsible for others. 'The sin of his fathers' may deliver him to the avengers, and by their stern execution, for all his protests, he may be crushed.—τούτων: neuter, τῶν κατ' ἀνθρώπους, 'the state' or 'circumstances of man', in modern language 'life'. The conditions of life are the outward fact, in and by which the power of the *Erinyes* is exercised; so that 'not having found the human (state) dangerous' means the same thing as 'not having had personal proof that the *Erinyes* are dangerous', μὴ κύρσας βαρειῶν τούτων (feminine). In a style so full of personification as that of *Aeschylus* (see e.g. 935), the variation is natural; and it is more easy in Greek than in a modern language, which cannot represent τὰ κατ' ἀνθρώπους without introducing some too definite and embarrassing substantive.—Nor need we say with *Paley* (whose exposition is otherwise substantially correct) that τούτων is λαχέων, supplied from ἐλαχον. See further below.—ἔθεν πλῆγαι βίотου (εἰσl): literally, 'strokes upon life from what quarters there are',

i.e. 'from what quarters life can be hit', 'what or how many dangerous quarters there are'. Not 'from what quarter his life is hit'. It would be untrue to say that the victim of a 'judgment' is always or generally unable to divine the cause of it. What is said, and truly said, is that the prosperous are often ignorantly blind to their danger of a 'judgment'. The phrase, though simple, cannot be verbally rendered in English, because we cannot, by the order or otherwise, effect such a connexion as 'whence-strokes', whereas in Greek ἔθεν πλῆγαι is the obvious connexion.—ἀπάγει: the regular term in Attic law for arrest and delivery to justice. The present tense is general, meaning that arrest and punishment do sometimes befall τὸν μὴ κύρσαντα, the person whose experiences have not prepared him to expect it.—σιγῶν. In the 'Court of Life' there is no explanation, not even a sentence; the 'criminal' cries—and is crushed; and that is all.—ἀπλακῆματα *Pauw*. δ' *Musgrave*.

The words βαρέων τούτων have been much disputed, but mainly upon two doubtful assumptions: (1) that τούτων, like αὐται, must not only point to the operations of the *Erinyes* (which it does), but actually and grammatically mean τῶν Ἐρινύων: and (2) that μὴ κύρσας refers to the time of the punishment afterwards described, and that the sense required is 'he who experiences their severity' or 'does not find their favour'. We then want for βαρέων some fem. adj. meaning kind, favourable, or the like. Hence πράων, προφρόνων, εὐνῶν, ἰλαρῶν, and other suggestions (see *Wecklein's Appen-*

οὐκ οἶδεν ὄθεν πληγαὶ βίотου.

τὰ γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων ἀπλακῆμάτᾳ νιν 935

πρὸς τὰσδ' ἀπάγει· σιγῶν <δ' > ὄλεθρος

καὶ μέγα φωνοῦντ'

ἐχθραῖς ὄργαις ἀμαθύνει.

ΧΟ. δειδροπήμων δὲ μὴ πνέοι βλάβᾳ— ἀντ. α'.

τὰν ἐμὰν χάριν λέγω— 940

φλογμός <τ' > ὀμματοστερῆς φυτῶν, τὸ

μὴ περᾶν ὄρον τόπων·

μηδ' ἄκαρπος αἰα-

νῆς ἐφερπέτω νόσος, .

μῆλά τ' εὐθενοῦντα Πᾶν 945

935. ἀπλακῆματα. 941. φλοιγμός. φλογμός recs. 945. εὐθενοῦντ' ἄγαν.

dix); but none are acceptable. Taking this line, we must rather suppose some extensive corruption, as Dr Headlam does (*Class. Rev.* xii. 249), proposing to read ὅ γε μὴν κύρσας βαρυνμηνίτων (*sc.* αὐτῶν, τῶν Ἐρινύων). The passage, as it stands, is certainly obscure, but only, I think, from that compressed and elliptical turn of thought, to which Aeschylus inclines in his desire for strength and weight.

After βίотου (*v.* 934) Hermann and others would insert προσέπαισαν, in order that these anapaests (*vv.* 928—938) may be metrically equal to *vv.* 1004—1014. The three passages beginning at 950, 969, 989 being equal to one another, the speeches in anapaests would then correspond thus, 1 2 2 2 1. But, since the choric passages have not a symmetry of this kind, a symmetry about a centre, it is not easy to see what purpose the supposed correspondence of the speeches would serve, or how it could even be made perceptible to the audience. The arrangement of the whole 'blessing', chorus and speeches (917—1021), would be this: 1 2 1 3 4 3 4 3 5 2 5, an arrangement not *prima facie* symmetrical, but rather a confusion of two inconsistent symmetries. Compare and contrast the

First Part of the *Commos* in the *Choephoroi* (314—421, see note at 305), where the anapaestic passages and the lyric have a symmetry with reference to the same centre (371—378), and this centre is marked as such by not corresponding with any other part. If the like effect were intended here, the supposed centre (969 foll.) should be non-correspondent, a No. 6; as it is, the hypothesis lacks proof. Whether in *v.* 934 the supplement προσέπαισαν is desirable for itself, is a distinct question: I think it rather disadvantageous.

939. δειδροπήμων, with reference particularly to the olives, the most important crop of Attica.—βλάβᾳ, here probably hindrance, check, as well as harm. See *vv.* 495, 664 and on *Ag.* 123. The reference, as the antithesis of φλογμός indicates, is to cold winds.

941. φλογμός, scorching, may refer simply to excessive heat, and not to hot winds, since we may supply not μὴ πνέοι, but a more general verb, μὴ γένοιτο or the like. But in southern countries the hot winds are, as a fact, especially formidable, and μὴ πνέοι is probably meant. The point is of importance to the interpretation of *v.* 942.—ὀμματοστερῆς φυτῶν: which robs the trees of their buds,

life-strokes fall ; for it is the sin he inherits, which brings him to their judgment-seat, where Ruin, silent to his loudest cry, in cruel mood doth lay him low.

Chorus. And never—such is my grace—may the trees feel the hurtful wind that checks, or the scorching that robs them of their buds, beyond the limited bound (?); nor blight so visit them, as to blast their fruitfulness for ever. And the flocks, may Pan

though in grammar the genit. depends rather on *φλογμός*.—τ' Turnebus.

942. τὸ μὴ περᾶν ὄρον τόπων, consecutive or exegetic, 'so as not to pass...', may be joined either (1) with *ὀμμαστοτερῆς* or (2) with *μὴ πνέει* (or *μὴ γένοιτο*), the subject of *περᾶν* being in the first case the buds (or trees), in the second the winds (or heat). If we take (1), then *τόπων* is impossible and *ὄρον* not appropriate: 'a plant does not 'pass its bounds' by growing' (Sidgwick), nor even a bud. The correction *λοπῶν* (Wecklein), 'to prevent the buds from passing the bound of their sheaths', meets this difficulty imperfectly, and seems prosaic. If we take (2), then (a), since winds can scarcely be said to have any *τόπος* or *τόποι* of their own, sense can be made only by assuming that *τόπων*, 'the place', means the country, Attica: 'Let ill winds not blow,...so as not to pass the bounds of the place', i.e. 'let them not invade the land'. But, apart from the dubious metaphor, the meaning put on *τόπων* is forced, which forbids this interpretation, and some of the proposed emendations. Or (b), referring τὸ μὴ κ.τ.λ. to *μὴ πνέει*, we may still seek to correct *τόπων*. I formerly proposed *τροπῶν* (or perhaps *τροπῶν*) *change* or *changes*, and still think it worth consideration. The word *τροπή*, *τροπαί*, *turn* (see L. and Sc. s.v. *τροπή* III. and *τροπαία*), was specially applied to changes of wind or weather. The sense will then be 'Let not the cold wind blow, nor the hot,...beyond the bound of their changes', i.e. not too long, not out of their proper seasons. Such an addition or limitation to the absolute *μὴ πνέει* is not unnatural or superfluous; for the in-

tended promise cannot be that there shall never be weather cold enough or hot enough to injure growing plants, but that it shall not last so long, or come at such times, as to have that effect. The construction of τὸ μὴ κ.τ.λ. is that usual with verbs of forbidding, preventing, etc. (Kühner *Gr. Gr.* § 516 b), (*μὴ πνέει*)...τὰν ἐμῶν χάριν λέγω being equivalent in sense to 'I will forbid to blow'.—Dr Headlam has suggested *φυγῶν τὸ μὴ*...('banished so as not to pass...'), but also, more recently, that *φυτῶν* is a gloss to *ὀμμαστοτερῆς*, explaining the special sense of *ὀμματα* (*buds*), and -το is the remains, the final syllable, of an optative.—It seems at all events certain that the text is unsound. The correction *ὀμμαστοτερῆς φυτῶν τομῆ πέραν ὄρων τὸ πᾶν* (Wieseler), 'Let the heat, which cuts the buds from the trees, (not come) beyond our bounds at all', is most ingenious, but assumes a more than doubtful use of *τομῆ*, *τέμνειν*.

943. *αἰανῆς*: 'everlasting, eternal', I think, as in v. 482, not 'destructive'. It qualifies, by extending, *ἄκαρπος*, 'disease which makes them barren for ever'. Here again (as in *μὴ περᾶν ὄρον τροπῶν*, if right) the boon promised is such as might really be hoped for. It is not conceivable that trees should not *sometimes* lose their fruit; the promise is that they shall not be made permanently barren. The expression is peculiarly applicable to the long-growing olive and vine. Such a limit, such preference for truth even in imagination, seems to me characteristic of the Athenian mind.

945. Πᾶν, Meineke. A reference to Pan, as god of the flock and herd, is the more appropriate in this place, be-

ξὺν διπλοῖσιν ἐμβρύοις
 τρέφοι, χρόνῳ τε τ < ῶ τετ > αγμένῳ γόνος
 πλουτόχθων ἐρμαίαν
 δαιμόνων δόσιν τίοι.

- AΘ. ἦ τάδ' ἀκούετε, πόλεως φρούριον, 950
 οἷ' ἐπικραίνει; μέγα γὰρ δύναται
 πόντι Ἐρινὺς παρά τ' ἀθανάτοισ
 τοῖς θ' ὑπὸ γαίαν, περί τ' ἀνθρώπων
 φανερώς τελέως διαπράσσουσιν,
 τοῖς μὲν αἰοιδάς, τοῖς δ' αὖ δακρυῶν 955
 βίον ἀμβλωπὸν παρέχουσαι.

946. διπλοῖσ. text reccl.
 951. οἶα ἐπικρανεῖ (ι erased after ρα).

947. χρόνῳ τεταγμένῳ.
 955. κρύων (with ζτ in margin).

cause the worship of Pan on the Acropolis, a cult having, in the cave and the torch-ritual, resemblances to that of the *Semnai Theai*, and belonging doubtless to the same ancient stratum of religious practices, had been within recent memory instituted, or more probably revived and augmented, in honour of Marathon and the service of the god there (Herod. 6. 105). The political aspects of that institution, as a propitiation to those classes of the people who inclined to the more ancient rites (see the commentators on Herod. *l.c.*), throws light upon the importance assigned in this play to the *Semnai Theai*, and on the significance of the present reconciliation between them and Athena.—γὰ Dobree.

947—949. The reference is to mines, and specially to the silver mines of Attica, a chief source of Athenian wealth both public and private. See *Pers.* 241 ἀργύρου πηγὴ τις αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ, θησαυρὸς χθονός. Hence ἐρμαίαν δαιμόνων δόσιν, 'the gift of luck', because the finding of minerals was principally such, and πλουτόχθων, which, though it might refer to all wealth, as the gift of earth, more naturally suggests wealth underground and the metals associated with Πλούτων. γόνος: metaphorical, τὸ γιγνόμενον, προ-

duce (so Hermann, Paley, and Wecklein).—I think further that χρόνῳ τεταγμένῳ, at the fixed time, belongs to this sentence, not the preceding, the reference (note τίοι pay) being to the annual and periodic reckoning of the produce, required by the fact that the state, as owner of the mines, let them for terms, and was paid in part by a 'royalty'. See Grote *Hist. Gr.* II. chap. 39, vol. 3, p. 405 of the 8-vol. edition, and references there. On this supposition, the defect in the metre can be cured by repetition of letters (ψτετ). The notion of τάσσειν, τάξις, and a χρόνος τεταγμένος, though perhaps applicable to births, is certainly not less so to dates fixed by contract and law.—It has been objected, that mineral wealth is not mentioned in the prescription of Athena (905 foll.) which the 'blessing' follows; but there is at least as much hint for it (καρπὸν γαίας 908) as for the matter of the subsequent *strophe* and *antistrophe*.—If χρόνῳ τεταγμένῳ be joined to τρέφοι, we must insert (after γόνος) δὲ γὰς (Hermann), δὲ τῶς (Headlam, *Class. Rev.* XVIII. 242), or the like.

950. πόλεως φρούριον. ὦ Ἄρεοπαγίται, schol.—ἀκούεις Meineke, χώρας Weil, to avoid the sequence of four short syllables, very rarely admitted in this

enlarge and prosper, with double fruit of the womb. And at the appointed time, may wealth from the bowels of the earth pay the good gods' fortunate boon.

Ath. O, do ye understand, ye wardens of Athens, what things their voices assure? For great is the power of the mighty Erinys alike with the deathless gods and them of the underworld; and visibly, in the world of men, they execute with full authority, making some to sing, but some to live in blinding tears.

metre, and specially noticeable to the ear in the highly finished anapaests of this scene. We may observe that they exhibit only this instance of the somewhat unpleasing combination ~ ~ - | ~ ~ in the μέτρον or pair of feet, so that this, though not dubious in itself, may strengthen suspicion here. The use of πόλεως φρούριον as a personal invocation is also open to remark, though passable. The text is probably wrong, but beyond reach of correction.

951—956. ἐπικραίνει...δύναται...διαπράσσοσιν. The sing. and plur. are used almost indifferently, as in the chorus itself the sing. (ἐμάν 940 etc.) is plural in effect. See also ἡμῖν...μένω 679, 680, κεκλήμεθα...ἐμὰς...ἐλαύνομεν 420—424, διέπομεν...ἐμοῦ 388—394, σπεύδομεν...ἐμαῖς 361—363, and below 989, 990.—ἀθάνατοι: not 'the gods', but the οὐράνιοι θεοί, as having no connexion with death, opposed to οἱ ὑπὸ γαῖαν, which means the powers of the underworld (rather than the dead), or at least includes them. See *v.* 350.—μέγα γὰρ...γαῖαν: for the Erinyes are mighty with the Deathless Ones as well as with Them of the underworld. This is the sole use of the name Ἐρινύς after the reconciliation: it is used here because necessary to the point. Their foregoing promises extend to all parts of nature, the upper world (939) as well as the lower (947), and the promises emphasize (τὰν ἐμὰν χάριν λέγω) their power in the former region. Athena remarks that they do this with authority (ἐπικραίνει), because 'the Erinyes' are now in league with the ἀθάνατοι as well as the others;

that they should have power *below* is natural in itself.—περὶ τ' ἀνθρώπων... And about the human world visibly they execute with full power. φανερώς contrasts their manifest operations among men with their invisible, or less directly observable, operations in heaven and under the earth. The collision of adverbs φανερώς τελέως, though it does not obscure the thought, seems inelegant and rather surprising. φανερώων Casaubon, 'in the visible human world', perhaps rightly.—περὶ δ' ἀνθρώπων Hartung, not without some reason, since this last clause introduces a new sphere of thought, and rather invites the next blessing (957 foll.) than confirms that which precedes: see on *v.* 975. But the change is not necessary.—τελέως both *absolutely* and *by office*, the two kindred senses of τέλος merging. Nor is that of *rite* (marriage, *v.* 838) beyond view: see the sequel.—δακρύων βίον ἀμβλωπόν: the gen. depends in sense as much on the adj. as on the subst., a *life eye-dimmed with tears*, and probably βίον δακρύων by itself could not stand. But in grammatical analysis (if applicable) it seems that δακρύων is 'governed' by βίον, rather than (as Wecklein) by ἀμβλωπόν, *quasi πλήρη*.—The correction δακρύων (Aldine) is acceptable, but not certain. The copyist of M (note his query) appears to have been satisfied that his original, whatever it meant, did not mean δακρύων.—ὑπὸ γαῖας (Bothe for ὑπὸ γαῖαν) is not required, because, the point being that the power of the Erinyes extends to both worlds, the description of the powers *below* is modified, as often in Greek, accordingly.

- ΧΟ. ἀνδροκμήτας δ' ἀώ- στρ. β'.
 ρους ἀπεννέπω τύχας,
 νεανίδων τ' ἐπηράτων
 ἀνδροτυχεῖς βιότους 960
 δότε, κύρι' ἔχοντες,
 θεαί τ' ὦ Μοῖραι
 ματροκασιγνήται,
 δαίμονες ὀρθονόμοι,
 παντὶ δόμῳ μετάκοινοι, 965
 παντὶ χρόνῳ δ' ἐπιβριθεῖς
 ἐνδίκους ὀμιλίαις,
 πάντα τιμιώταται θεῶν.
- ΑΘ. τάδε τοι χώρα τῆμῃ προφρόνως 970
 ἐπικραινομένων
 γάννυμαι· στέρῳ δ' ὄμματα Πειθοῦς,
 ὅτι μοι γλώσσαν καὶ στόμ' ἐπωπᾶ
 πρὸς τάσδ' ἀγρίως ἀπανηναμένας·
 ἀλλ' ἐκράτησε Ζεὺς ἀγοραῖος·

962. θεαί τῶν. 963 foll. ζτ in margin. 965. μέγα κοινοί. 968. πάντα.

957—968. The children shall not die young, but come to maturity and marriage. ἀνδροκμήτας ἀώρους τύχας: 'strokes (fates) by which boys die before they are men and husbands' (ἀνήρ in both senses).—νεανίδων...δότε: 'Let the young men live to win brides and the young women to get husbands'. The looseness of the Greek composition and syntax permits these conceptions to be fused, nor can it be said whether the gen. νεανίδων 'depends' on βιότους or on -τυχεῖς. For the metre of νεανίδων see Appendix II.—κύρια ἔχοντες: ye that have authority herein, to whom the matter belongs; cf. Eur. Alc. 1140 δαίμωνων τῷ κυρίῳ, 'the power concerned'. The θεοὶ οὐράνιοι of marriage (Zeus, Hera, Aphrodite, and others) are meant, and with these are joined the Μοῖραι, as representatives of the elder generation.—

ματροκασιγνήται: mother-sisters, i.e. 'daughters of our mother, Night' (*sup.* 795 etc.). The *Theogony* also makes the Μοῖραι daughters of Night (Hesiod, *Th.* 217) and without father (*ib.* 213), but gives the Erinyes a different pedigree (*ib.* 185). In reckoning descent and relationship by the mother, legends of the older gods probably followed the contemporary practice of their worshippers.—θεαί τ' ὦ Hermann.—δαίμονες...θεῶν. The connexion of ideas here, and the exact significance of the language, is (to us) obscure, though we may presume that, together with the obvious suggestion that the power of the Μοῖραι is universal, there is a reference to marriage and the family, as a particular province of the Semnai Theai, and as the theme of this *strophe*. The expressions παντὶ δόμῳ μετάκοινοι and ἐνδίκους

Chorus. On the young men I forbid to fall the stroke of untimely death; and that the lovely maids live to find each her man, O grant it, ye that have the power, and grant it, ye divine Moirai, our mother-sisters, deities true in appointment, by just association partners in every house, and over all seasons potent (?), everywhere richest in rights among beings divine!

Ath. Glad am I indeed for these sure promises of their zeal to my land. And thankful I am to Suasion, that her eyes were keeping watch over my tongue and lips, when we encountered their savage refusals. But might was with Zeus, with

δμυλλίαις fit together well in the sense 'having a share in every household, as lawful visitors there'; but παντι χρόνῳ δ' ἐπιβριθεὶς is dubious. Some commentators think, perhaps rightly, that ἐπιβριθής has a bad sense (βαρός, grievous, dangerous); so Sidgwick, and Wecklein (*beschwerlich, feindlich*). That however is not necessary (see ἐμβριθής); and this would thus be the only place where the Chorus mix their blessings with hint of punishment, a theme which they now leave to Athena. Perhaps therefore *weighty, powerful, important* is nearer; the δέ need not, though it may, mark actual contrariety. If χρόνῳ is right, the sense seems to be 'mighty over every moment of time'. The point of the antithesis δόμῳ... χρόνῳ is not clear; hence Wecklein reads θρόνῳ *chair, seat*, which may be right, but also requires more explanation than has yet been discovered.—ὀρθονόμοι (thus accented) is 'just in dividing' or 'distributing', from νέμω, as μοῖρα itself means *part, division*.—Probably we miss some link of association, which would make all plain.—μετάκοινοι Turnebus, πάντα Canter.

969—971. ἐπικρανομένων must apparently be a causative deponent, ἐπικρανομένων αὐτῶν τάδε: 'I rejoice indeed that they assure these promises of goodwill to my town'; although the evidence for a deponent (middle) κραινόμεαι is otherwise of slight authority. The point is, that the Erinyes or Semnai Theai, as deities of the underworld, *obtain* the

ratification (causal middle) of their promises from the other powers concerned. See on *vv.* 951 foll., 961.—If we take ἐπικρανομένων as passive, then τάδε γάννυμαι is required to mean 'I rejoice at this'; but it should mean rather 'This is the joy that I have', a different thing.—τοι: 'of course'.

971—976. 'I love (thank) the power of Persuasion, for that her eyes watched my tongue and lips, when I met their savage refusals.' πρὸς τὰσδε depends, with some help from the verb, on γλώσσαν καὶ στόμα, 'my speaking to them'. She was enabled to soothe and to refrain from harshness: ἐπωπᾶ lays stress rather on the latter. The relation of tenses, and the force of the aor. part., as distinct from ἀπαναινομένης, should be observed; the Erinyes *had given* an *absolute* refusal, when Peitho, or rather Zeus, enabled Athena to overcome (see *vv.* 882 foll., and the Introduction): ἐπωπᾶ is historical present. The whole phrase, though intentionally obscure and mystical, suggests, according to the intention, that her victory was won by something other than speech; see *vv.* 886 foll.—στόμ'. The elision of such a noun is noticeable in the lyrics, as well as in the iambics, of Aeschylus (see on *v.* 902), but here satisfies the ear because of the close connexion between γλώσσαν καὶ στόμα, felt, for metrical purposes, as a unit.—ἀλλά: the antithesis is to ἀγρίως ἀπανηναμένης 'savagely they refused, yet still...'.—Ζεὺς ἀγοραῖος: the Supreme

1. νικᾷ δ' ἀγαθῶν 975
 ἔρις ἡμετέρα διὰ παντός.
- ΧΟ. τὰν δ' ἄπληστον κακῶν ἀντ. β'.
 μήποτ' ἐν πόλει στάσιν
 τᾶδ' ἐπεύχομαι βρέμειν.
 μῆδ' ἐπιούσα κόνις 980
 μέλαν αἷμα πολιτᾶν
 δι' ὄργαν πωινὰς
 ἀντιφόνους ἄτας
 ἀρπαλίσαι πόλεως.
 χάρματα δ' ἀντιδιδοῖεν 985
 κοινοφιλεῖ διανοία,
 καὶ στυγεῖν μιᾷ φρενί.
 πολλῶν γὰρ τόδ' ἐν βροτοῖς ἄκος.
2. / < Α'. > ἄρα φρονούσιν; < Β'. > γλώσσης ἀγαθῆς
 ὁδὸν εὐρίσκει. 990
- 981 foll. ζτ in margin. 986. κοινοφελεῖ changed by m to κοινωφελεί.
 989. ἄρα (ἀρά m). ἄρα recc.

Power, which favours *civility*, reason and moderation, the qualities of the ἀγορά and the πόλις, against *savagery* (τὸ ἄγριον), the quality of the *wild*; the antithesis is aided, and perhaps suggested, by the sound. The connexion of the ἀγορά with speech (ἀγορεύειν) is also relevant, but secondary. The opposition of οἱ ἀγοραῖοι θεοὶ to οἱ οὐράνιοι in *Ag.* 90 (where see note) indicates that the title *Zeus Agoraios* is also appropriate to the present conciliation of *all classes*. The main point (for Aeschylus) is the ascription of the triumph to Zeus; see the Introduction.—There was a *Zeus Agoraios* at Athens, but no local allusion seems to be meant.—νικᾷ κ.τ.λ.: 'The (true) victory is our rivalry in blessing (ἀγαθά), a rivalry of good altogether.' See on *v.* 904 νίκης μὴ κακῆς. ἀγαθῶν affects equally ἔρις and διὰ παντός. These words give the cue for the next *strophe*, against faction, where ἀγαθῶν is taken up antithetically by (ἄπληστον) κακῶν.

980—984. 'Let there be no alternate massacres between party and party, each provoking the next'. μῆδ' ἐπιούσα... ἀρπαλίσαι: 'Let the dust not drink blood, and so become greedy for...', the particip., as often, bearing the principal thought.—πωινὰς ἀντιφόνους ἄτας (gen.) ...πόλεως: *the murderous revenge of an infuriated people*, lit. 'of fury in the people': the gen. πόλεως (*i.e.* πολιτῶν) depends on ἄτας, though it is influenced, as an 'ablative', *from the people*, by ἀρπαλίσαι, *take greedily*.—πωινᾶς later MSS., taking ἄτας (*ruin, destruction*) as acc. plur. Others would eject πωινὰς as an interpretation of ἀντ. ἄτας.—For the rare and obscure ἀρπαλίζειν, meaning apparently, here at any rate, 'to be gluttonous for', see on *Theb.* 229. For the archaic form (-αι, not -ειε), see *Suhrb.* 667 foll. μήποτε λοιμὸς ἀνδρῶν τάνδε πόλιν κενώσαι, μῆδ' ἐπιχωριῶν <στάσις> πτώμασιν αἱματίσαι πέδον γᾶς (Wecklein), a prayer, like this, and of similar import.

Zeus and Civility; and the victory is this, that we are rivals only to bless.

Chorus. May the roar of Faction, hungry for evil, never be heard in this place; nor the dust, slaked with the red blood of brethren, grow eager and greedy for brute retribution on brethren slain in revenge! But may they rejoice one another, loving with common affection, and hating as with one soul! For among men this mendeth much.

A Citizen. Is not this wisdom indeed?

Another Citizen. Their tongues are finding the good path.

985—988. 'Let them give joy for joy in mutual and united love, and (feel) hatred with one soul.' *κοινοφιλεῖ* Hermann: but *κοινοφελει*, the original reading of M, is not impossible. It would be formed correctly from *κοινός* and *δφελος*, and gives the sense 'with boon of mutual service'.—On *διάνοια*, which in Aeschylus seems always to indicate *feeling between two persons* (*διά-, inter-*), see on *Theb.* 816 *ἄλοντρο* (Eteocles and Polynices) *ἀσειβει διανοία*, and *infra v.* 1014.—*στυγεῖν*, substantival, depends on a verb (*let them share*) to be supplied from *ἀντιδιδόειν*.

989, 990. 'Ah, how wise they grow!'—'The path of kindness becomes familiar to their tongues.' *I.e.*, they are learning from Athena to bless and to persuade. *ἄρα φρονούσιν*; *Is not this wisdom?*, *i.e.* 'This is a conversion indeed!' Cf. *P. V.* 761 *ἄρ' ὑμῶν δοκεῖ | ὁ τῶν θεῶν τύραννος ἐς τὰ πάνθ' ὁμῶς | βίαιος εἶναι*; *Soph. O. T.* 822 *ἄρ' ἔφυν κακός*; and *El.* 614. The positive form of question in such a case usually imports irony or bitterness (see Jebb on *Soph. Il. cc.*), and does so here; see below.—*φρονούσιν...εὐρίσκει* (*She is finding*): for the change of number see on 951 foll.—A very interesting question arises here as to the distribution of parts. The ms. gives *ἄρα...εὐρίσκει*; (as one sentence) to Athena. This however is rightly condemned; for (1) the supposed sentence can be construed only by taking *φρονούσιν* (*i.e.* *τοῖς φρονούσιν* masc.) as an ethic dative, *to a sound judgment, if rightly considered* (see *v.* 635), which, as

suggesting dissentients, would here be worse than pointless; and (2) the metrical *hiatus*, *εὐρίσκει | ἐκ*, breaking the regular continuity (*synaphea*) of anapaests, has thus no excuse. Various corrections have been suggested, as ... *φρονούσαι...εὐρίσκουσ'*, ... *φρονούσα...εὐρίσκεις*, etc. But it has not been explained (1) why the simple sentences so produced should have been corrupted, and (2) why the *hiatus*, if accidental and erroneous, should coincide with the absence of copula and discontinuity in sense, which also point to a fresh beginning at 991. The fact is (I believe), that we have here the same phenomenon, which has been noticed in the other two plays of the trilogy (see *Ag.* 363, 506, 618, etc., *Cho.* 1042, etc.). The 'audience' on the scene, the crowd (*v.* 569) or some of them, are now about to act as a *Second Chorus*, escorting the principal Chorus to their destination (1033). The speakers here are two of them, two citizens (*τοῖσδε πολιταῖς* 992), who are convinced of their past errors (hence the note of bitterness) by the peaceable language and lessons of the Erinyes, and are resolving henceforth to live in united loyalty to Athena and her new institution, a resolve which they and others probably express in some dramatic manner. If the ministers of wrath are converted into conciliators, should there not be goodwill among men? Athénà notes the effect with gladness, and recommends them to persist in following the example (*εὐφρονας εὐφρονες* 993).—This distribution is confirmed by

ΑΘ. ἐκ τῶν φοβερῶν τῶνδε προσώπων
 μέγα κέρδος ὄρῳ τοῖσδε πολίταις.
 τάσδε γὰρ εὐφρονας εὐφρονες αἰεὶ
 μέγα τιμῶντες καὶ γῆν καὶ πόλιν
 ὀρθοδίκαιον

995

πρέψετε πάντως διάγοντες.

ΧΟ. <χαίρετε> χαίρετ' ἐν αἰσιμίαισι πλούτου, στρ. γ'.
 χαίρετ' ἀστικὸς λεώς,
 ἴκταρ ἤμενοι Διός,
 παρθένου φίλας φίλοι,
 σωφρονούντες ἐν χρόνῳ.
 Παλλάδος δ' ὑπὸ πτεροῖς
 ὄντας ἄζεται πατήρ.

1000

ΑΘ. χαίρετε χυμείς· προτέραν δ' ἐμὲ χρῆ

993. εὐφράνασ. εὐφρόνας rec. 996. πάντες. πάντως rec.
 997. χαίρετε omitted. ἐναισιμίαισ. 1000. παρθένουσ. 1004. δέ με.

σωφρονούντες ἐν χρόνῳ (1001), where see note.—Two of the three speaking actors were set free by the departure of Apollo and Orestes, and have since been reintroduced among the 'supers'.

991—996. φοβερῶν marks both the sternness which has been overcome, and their power to punish, if disobeyed.—προσώπων (?). προσέρπον, *coming to...*, Headlam (*Class. Rev.* xvii. 287), comparing Soph. *Ai.* 1255 καὶ σοὶ προσέρπον τοῦτ' ἐγὼ τὸ φάρμακον | ὄρῳ τάχα. τῶνδε: τῶν Ἐρινύων. The grammar of the MS. reading, the dependence of ἐκ τῶνδε on κέρδος without a participle, is defensible (see for example πρὸς τάσδε in *v.* 973); and the substitution of *faces, features*, for 'persons having such faces', would be rather Aeschylean. But the aesthetic objection to προσώπων is grave. Seeing that these πρόσωπα were masks, specially invented by the playwright, it would surely be audacious and perilous to challenge hostility by this pompous commendation of their effect. If Aeschylus so wrote, it must, in default of some non-

apparent excuse, be reckoned as a lapse from discretion. We cannot safely change the text upon such grounds, but προσέρπον is probably right.—καὶ γῆν καὶ πόλιν. The distinction of these words, which are often synonymous, especially in poetry, has here a purpose, the divergent feelings and interests of 'country' and 'town' being a common source of faction, particularly when the town had taken such a prodigious development as Athens did in this age. Compare Eur. *Orest.* 917 foll., and the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes.—πάντως (MS. Ven.): rather *in any case* than *altogether*. Whatever else may come to them, they will at least have the distinction, which was indeed such in Hellas, of being a state at peace with itself.—For διάγοντες *conducting*, Wecklein compares Isocr. 3. 41 τὰς πόλεις ἐν ἀρμονίᾳ πειρᾶσθαι διάγειν.

997—1003. χαίρετε: both *fare well* and *farewell*. Cf. St Paul, *Philipp.* 4. 4. They prepare to move; from here to *v.* 1032 the procession is being marshalled for the *exodos*.—αἰσιμίαισι (Butler) πλούτου:

Ath. From their fearful countenances (?) great profit comes, I see, to these my Athenians. For if, kindly as these are kindly, ye continue greatly to honour them, then, come what may, this mark shall be yours, that ye guide both country and town in the straight way of righteousness.

Chorus. Farewell, O well may ye fare, in duly divided wealth. Blessings on the folk of this city, who sit nigh Zeus, who are loved by the Virgin beloved, who are coming to wisdom at last! Ye are under Pallas' wings, and the Father regardeth you.

Ath. To you likewise blessing and farewell! (*Here, under the orders of ATHENA, a great procession begins to form, torch-bearers, bearers of offerings, the women-guardians of the 'Bretas' (Palladium of Athens), and probably many figures and emblems familiar to the audience, but not distinguished in the text.*)

fair-parted wealth, fair wealth for all and each. See *ἀῖρα share* and *ἀσιμος in fair measure*. This interpretation, glancing discreetly at another source of faction, seems better, especially as the word is unique, than merely 'blessings' of wealth.—The metaphors *seated near Zeus* and *under the wings of Pallas* signify divine protection, but, in both, some more particular allusion is probable, in the first perhaps necessary, to justify the expression. ἤμενοι points most naturally to the Areopagite court, representing the people (*vv.* 641, 684), and therefore to the Areopagus as the place; but a neighbouring 'Zeus' cannot be identified with certainty. The Olympieum of Pisistratus is much too remote. If, as is maintained by Dr Dörpfeld and others, the *Διὸς ἱερὸν* of Thucyd. 2. 15 was in this region, W. of the Acropolis, the reference may well be to that. Possibly it is Pallas herself who is conceived as 'throned by Zeus' as his nearest and dearest, and her people with her, as sharing her place and favour. This however would almost require some antecedent representation in art.—πτεροῖς: perhaps the *aegis*, as symbol of protecting power. The comparison of it to *wings*, upon which she traverses the air, has been suggested by Athena herself (*v.* 407 *πτερῶν ἀτερ ροιβδοῦσα κόλπῳν ἀλγίδος*). It seems there-

fore unnecessary to suppose a reference to the winged figure of Niké, as commonly associated with that of goddess. For the familiar image of a bird and its young Wecklein refers to Eur. *Heraclid.* 10.—*ἡμένας* (Bothe), genit. with *παρθένου*, greatly simplifies the expression, but is for that reason a hazardous change. Nor does it remove all difficulty from the passage, which, like *v.* 294, seems to presume some pictorial or plastic illustration, which we do not possess.—*σωφρονοῦντες ἐν χρόνῳ*: *now learning wisdom at last*, referring to *vv.* 989—992, which explain the disputed *ἐν χρόνῳ* here. The poet is also thinking of his own time, and the present 'reformation', which his play in one aspect symbolizes (see on *vv.* 520 foll.). As a democratic improvement, it would be connected with Pallas Athena, the patron of the democracy.—*παρθένου* *Robertello*.

1004—1014. *προτέραν*. She here takes her place, immediately before the Chorus (where she is joined by her attendants, *v.* 1025), in the procession which is forming in the orchestra and probably ends with this group as the most imposing part. Next in front is the sacrificial group (1007 foll.), and before these (*ἡγείσθε* 1011) the citizens generally. The attendants and the sacrificers probably become visible now for the first time; how they come to be ready,

στείχειν θαλάμους ἀποδείξουσαν

1005

πρὸς φῶς ἱερὸν τῶνδε προπομπῶν.

ἴτε καὶ σφαγίων τῶνδ' ὑπὸ σεμνῶν

κατὰ γῆς σύμεναι, τὸ μὲν ἀτηρὸν

χώρας κατέχειν, τὸ δὲ κερδαλέον

πέμπειν πόλεως ἐπὶ νίκη.

1010

ἴμεῖς δ' ἠγείσθε, πολισοῦχοι

παῖδες Κραναοῦ, ταῖσδε μετοίκους.

εἴη δ' ἀγαθῶν

3. ἀγαθὴ διάνοια πολίταις.

XO. χαίρετε, χαίρετε δ' ἀθθις, †ἐπιδιπλοῖζω,

ἀντ. γ'.

πάντες οἱ κατὰ πτόλιν,

1016

δαίμονές τε καὶ βροτοί,

Παλλάδος πόλιν νέμον-

τες· μετοικίαν δ' ἐμῆν

1006. πρόπομπον.

1007. ἕτ in margin.

1008. ἀτήριον.

1011. ἡμεῖς.

1012. μέτοικοι.

is a question which a theatrical audience would willingly ignore; the scene has assumed throughout (see on *v.* 569) that the crowd comprises many not actually in view. The Areopagite jury, and their Herald, also doubtless have their place, and not improbably other figures and emblems, which the text does not notice. For the connexion of the whole with the Panathenaic procession, see below on *v.* 1029. The members of the procession, some or all, and certainly the leaders (1030), bear lighted torches. The procession goes out by one of the *parodoi* of the orchestra.—**θαλάμους**: the cave-sanctuary, see *vv.* 808 etc.—**πρὸς**: 'looking to' (Wecklein, comparing *v.* 247 *πρὸς αἷμα*), because the torches lead.—**προπομπῶν** (Bentley) *leaders*.—**ἴτε...σύμεναι...** *Let these holy sacrifices also speed you to your nether home*. The principal verb, in effect, is *σύμεναι*, here practically passive. The induction is to be accompanied by a sacrifice; the blood of the victim, the essence of *σφαγίων*, is to pass

κατὰ γῆς with the powers for whom it is offered.—**καὶ**: *as well as* the torches.—**τῶνδε** suggests (but see on *v.* 496) that the intended sacrifice is visibly represented, but perhaps only by the ministers (*ιερεῖς*) with their instruments. We need not necessarily suppose that an animal or animals were brought into the orchestra, though the words point to this, and, for my own part, I see no objection. There is at all events no reason to suspect the text.—**τὸ μὲν...πέμπειν**: 'to detain (keep below) the land's harm, and let pass (send up) her profit'. The (consecutive) infinitives *κατέχειν...πέμπειν* depend on the whole preceding phrase, and particularly on the idea in *σφαγίων*, as suggesting a prayer for the expected return. Similar prayers accompany the *χοαί* (offerings to the dead poured into the ground) in *Pers.* 223 *αἰτοῦ...σὸν πόνω Δαρείον...ἔσθλά σοι πέμπειν τέκνω τε γῆς ἐνερθεν ἐς φάος | τᾶμπαλιν δὲ τῶνδε γαῖα κάτοχα μαυροῦσθαι σκότῳ* (cited by Wecklein), and *Cho.* 147 *ἡμῖν δὲ πομπὸς ἴσθι τῶν ἐσθλῶν ἄνω*.

But I must go before, to show your chamber by the sacred light of these, your escort.

With victims also, this solemn sacrifice, be ye sped on your way to your nether home. Emprison there whatever may do Athens hurt; and whatever may profit her, send forth to make her victorious.

And ye, our people, children of Kranaos, be leaders to these goddesses, who are to be denizens here. And, between fellow-citizens, let there be good will toward what is good.

Chorus. Farewell and (twice be it said) again farewell, all ye in this country, deities and mortal men, who inhabit Pallas' town.

The formula was probably connected with primitive theories respecting the physical effect of such offerings to earth, which cannot now be exactly traced.—Paley, putting a comma after *ἔτε*, assumes that *κατέχευ...πέμπειν*, coordinate, as imperativ infinitives, with *ἔτε*, are coupled to it by *καί* ('go and detain'), and others seem less distinctly to imply the same. But no example is cited. In Kühner *Gr. Gram.* (§ 474) there are many instances of infinitives parallel with imperatives; but in all, as might be expected, the clauses are distinct, and disjoined, as well as joined, by *δέ*, e.g. *Od.* 16. 150 *ἀλλὰ σὺ γ' ἀγγείλας ὀπίσω κτε, μηδὲ κατ' ἀγροῦς | πλάζεσθαι.* In *Plato Rep.* 580 B we have *ἴθι...κρίναι* (the intervening *καί* means, as here, *also*) and in *Aristoph. Ach.* 1000 *ἀκούετε λεῶ· κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τοὺς χόρας | πίνειν*: but neither do these justify *ἔτε καὶ κατέχευ* for *ἔτε καὶ κατέχετε*, a construction which here at least we need not suppose.—*χώρας*: the genitive (possessive, Sidgwick) follows *τὸ ἀτηρόν, τὸ κερδαλέον* on the analogy of *ἄτην, κέρδος*: somewhat similar is *v.* 306 *ἕμνον...δέσμον σέθεν*.—*χώρα* Paley.—*ἀτηρόν* Bentley.—*παῖδες Κραναοῦ*: the Athenians, from Kranaos a legendary king of Attica (Pausanias 1. 2. 6, etc.). According to Herodotus (8. 44) the Athenians in the 'Pelagian' age were themselves called *Κραναοί*. Whether the name has here any particular intention does not appear. As the adj. *κραναός*

(see L. and Sc. *s.v.*) was commonly interpreted by *τραχύς hard, rugged*, and is actually applied to rocks, and by Aristophanes to the nettle, the goddess may here be glancing at a moral interpretation of *παῖδες Κραναοῦ*, analogous to that of the Scotch thistle, and may be preparing the way for the recommendation of peace which follows. The sterner qualities of the nation, hitherto (978, 989, 1001) too much wasted in feuds, are softened and purified under the new dispensation.—*εἴη δὲ κ.τ.λ.*: *Let fellow-citizens mutually think well of what is well*, that is to say, be favourable judges of one another and of their common good. On *διάνοια* see *v.* 986.—*ὑμεῖς* and *μετοίκους* Turnebus. See *μετοικίαν* (1019) and note on *v.* 1029. 1015—1021. *ἐπιδιπλοῖζω* (?) M. I cannot decide between (1) *ἐπεὶ διπλοῖζω* (Wieseler) for *I repeat my blessing*, (2) *ἐπανδιπλοῖζω* (Hermann) from *P.V.* 843 *ἐπανδιπλασε* (probably *ἐπανδιπλασε*), and (3) *ἐπη διπλοῖζω* (Weil). The last however would rather suggest, by the plural *ἐπη*, that the whole *χαίρετε, χαίρετε δ' αὐθις* is again to be 'doubled', and so Wecklein understands, though this seems unnatural. We note, in any case, that the reason for the 'repetition' is the reference (just renewed) to former party-divisions: the blessing of the *Semnai Theai* is for both sides.—The form *διπλοῖζω* is given here and in *Ag.* 826.—Sidgwick (ed. 1900) corrects it here

εὖ σέβοντες οὔτι μέμ-
ψεσθε συμφορὰς βίου.

1020

AΘ. αἰνῶ τε μύθους τῶνδε τῶν κατευγμάτων,
πέμψω τε φέγγει λαμπάδων σελασφόρων
εἰς τοὺς ἔνερθε καὶ κάτω χθονὸς τόπους,
ξὺν προσπόλοισιν, αἶτε φρουροῦσιν βρέτας 1025
τοῦμόν† δικαίως· ὄμμα γὰρ πάσης χθονὸς
Θησῆδος ἐξίκοιτ' ἂν † εὐκλεῆς λόχος
παίδων γυναικῶν καὶ στόλος πρεσβυτίδων...

φοινικοβάπτοις ἐνδυτοῖς ἐσθήμασι...

1020. εὐσεβοῦντες.

1022. δέ.

to διπλάσω, but leaves it in *Ag. l.c.*—**οὔτι μέμψεσθε**: a litotes for 'ye shall have good cause to praise...', but, as is commonly the case, this turn of expression has a reason: the jealousies and discontents, *which have existed*, shall, if the settlement be duly observed, exist *no more*.—For the acc. *συμφορὰς*, implying an indirect obj. *μοι* ('ye shall not have to complain of the fortunes I shall give'), see on *v.* 599.—**εὖ σέβοντες** Turnebus, but **εὐσεβοῦντες** (transitive) is also possible.

1020. **αἰνῶ τε** (Hermann)...**πέμψω τε** ...: *With 'amen' to these prayers, I will conduct you.* The conjunctions **τε...τε...** mark the two acts as parts or aspects of the same: the establishment of the Semnai Theai will be the guarantee of their promises.

1024. The effect here produced, by sudden and severe simplicity, is possible only to the most sublime composers. Dante and Milton can do the like.

1025. **ξὺν**: join with **πέμψω**.—**βρέτας**. For this **βρέτας**, doubtless the ancient wooden image of Athena Polias, kept on the Acropolis, see Pausanias *i.* 26. 6, with Frazer's note. On the question whether it is identical with that mentioned in *vv.* 80, 242, etc., see notes there, and Appendix to *v.* 568. Its

dignity, as representing the patron-goddess in the citadel, was as yet without rival, since neither the statue of the Parthenon, nor that commonly called *Promachos*, had been erected. Of the attendants here mentioned as 'watching' or 'guarding' it, and of their functions, nothing seems to be known; they have been compared or identified with the *ἀρρηφόροι* and others, whose performance however was different. If, as may safely be assumed, such attendants existed in the time of Aeschylus, it was natural to exhibit them, on this occasion, as waiting upon the goddess herself. It is further disputed, whether they are, as I think (see below), or are not identical with the 'girls, matrons, and aged women' of *v.* 1028.

1026 to the end. The text, from this point, is bad, a large proportion of the verses being faulty or suspicious.

1026—1028 are uncertain in reading and sense.—Two embarrassments may be first dismissed: (1) Those who assume (see the Introduction) that the name *Eumenides* was bestowed on the goddesses by Athena in the play, have further assumed that she did it in this speech, and further, that the loss of the passage is connected with the obscurity of these particular verses. But each of

To us, here dwelling with you, be pious, and your lot in life shall give you no discontent.

Ath. Saying 'amen' to the words of this invocation, I will guide you, by the shine of lighting torches, to your nether place, to your place beneath the ground. And with me shall go my women ministrant, who keep over my image good watch,—as their duty is, for, were it lost, the very eye of all Theseus' land would be gone(?),—a fair-famed band of maids and matrons, and of elder women a noble company,...

...with draping robes of crimson dye...

these suppositions is disputable, and the result is, at most, slightly to increase the uncertainty of any interpretation which may appear otherwise probable. (2) *V.* 1028 has been connected with the ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικείοι στόλοι promised in *v.* 858, but without reason: the present passage refers apparently to the present procession only, not to future worship.—The two main questions are: (1) What is the eye (*i.e.* most precious treasure) of all Attica? The Semnai Theai, their sanctuary, the attendants, and the βρέτας have all been suggested, and seem to exhaust the possibilities; but the expression is (in my opinion) not naturally applicable to any except the βρέτας. If we take this, we must suppose ἐξίκοιτ' ἂν corrupt. (2) What is the sense of ἐξίκοιτ' ἂν, would (should, may, will) reach? Who 'should arrive', and where? No quite satisfactory answer has been proposed. Dr Wecklein, for example, renders: "For, as the treasure of Attica, must their noble company (the Semnai Theai) reach (dürfte gelangen)..."—here a lacuna. But the mood, whether potential or mildly jussive, is inappropriate, and so *mutatis mutandis* with other versions.—I formerly proposed (and J. F. Davies also had proposed before) to read and punctuate thus: αἵτε φρουροῦσιν βρέτας | τοῦμόν (δικαίως· ὄμμα γὰρ πάσης χθονός | Θησηῶδος ἐξίκοιτ' ἂν), εὐκλείης λόχος | παίδων κ.τ.λ.: who guard my image (as they ought; for the very

eye of Attica would be lost [if that were lost]), an honourable band of girls and matrons with company of aged women. I still think this, or something like it, most probable; but the problem is too doubtful to repay discussion.

1029. This verse, as given, and without supplement, cannot be construed either with the preceding or the following. (1) The bare dative, without ἐν or other link, cannot be attached to στόλος πρεσβυτίδων, so as to mean 'in robes' The conjecture ἐνδυνῶν (Hartung) is a possible way of making connexion; but as to this, see below. (2) The dative goes well with τιμᾶτε (if this is right) in *v.* 1030, 'honour...with robes'; but we still require a direct object to τιμᾶτε, which the context does not fairly supply.—In itself, the verse may be sound; it means with robes of red (crimson) dye clothed upon (clothing) some person or persons.—It remains to ask, to whom these robes belong. On this point an entirely new light is thrown by Dr Headlam (*Journ. of Hellenic Studies* xxvi. 268). *Crimson*, as he points out, was worn in the Panathenaic procession, by the μέτοικοι, resident and privileged aliens, who took part in it: Φότιος—Σκάφας: ἔφερον οἱ μέτοικοι ἐν τῇ πομπῇ τῶν Παναθηναίων οἱ μὲν χαλκᾶς οἱ δὲ ἀργυρᾶς, κηρίων καὶ ποσάων πληρεῖς, ἐνδεδικότες φουικίους χιτῶνας, and Bekker *Anecd.* 214. 3 ὥσπερ νόμος τοὺς μετοίκους χιτῶνας ἐνδεδύ-

τιμᾶται† καὶ τὸ φέγγος ὀρμάσθω πυρός, 1030
 ὅπως ἂν εὐφρων ἦδ' ὀμιλία χθονὸς
 τὸ λοιπὸν εὐάνδροισι συμφοραῖς πρέπη.

ΠΡΟΠΟΜΠΟΙ.

βάτ' ἐν† δόμῳ μεγάλαι φιλότιμοι στρ. α'.
 Νυκτὸς παῖδες ἄπαιδες,
 ὑπ' εὐθύφρονι πομπᾷ— 1035
 εὐφραμείτε δὲ χωρίται.

1030. Above *αι* in *τιμᾶται* is written *ε*, apparently by *m*.
 altered to *ἄπαιδες*. 1036. *χωρέετε*.

1034. *ἄπαιδος*

σθαι χρῶμα ἔχοντας φοινικιοῦν. Since the new goddesses are here expressly designated as *μέτοικοι* (*vv.* 1012, 1019), crimson robes would be the appropriate emblem of their incorporation with Athens; and it may fairly be conjectured, that such robes were, at this point, actually put upon the Chorus, for which act *φοινικοβάπτοις...ἔσθήμασι τιμᾶτε* (*τὰς μετοίκους*) would give the cue. Further allusions to the Panathenaea may be found in *εὐάνδροισι* (1032), *εὐάνδρια* being 'a means by which the leaders of the procession were chosen', in the *ὀλολυγαί* (1044), and elsewhere; see Dr Headlam's article at large. Subject to so much reserve, as is demanded by the state of the Aeschylean text, this may be confidently accepted. It is far more satisfactory than any previous suggestion.

1030. *τιμᾶτε*, the correction of *m*, is open to no other doubt than arises from the general uncertainty of the passage.—*πρόβατε* Paley, taking it with *καὶ τὸ φέγγος ὀρμάσθω*, as an order to start the procession.—*πυρός* (?). *πάρος*, *before*, Headlam (*Class. Rev.* xvii. 287) objecting to the order of the words, which is certainly unusual.

1031, 1032. *ἦδ' ὀμιλία χθονὸς*: *αἶθε ὀμιλοῦσαι τῇ χθονί*, as in *v.* 409, but with a different tone.—*εὐφρων πρέπη* together:

that their friendship may be seen hereafter—(*i.e.*, made evident) *εὐάνδροισι συμφοραῖς* (instrumental) *by the prospered manhood of our people*; see on *v.* 1029; this might naturally be attributed to the favour of the goddesses who presided over the increase of the family (*v.* 838 and this scene *passim*).—The addition of *ἂν* to the final clause imparts, as it usually does (see on *v.* 576), a conditional tone, 'in order that, if they are well-honoured; they may well repay'. The goddess, speaking for the people, uses the respectful language of religious hope.

1033 foll. The designation *προπομποί* (M, list of *dramatis personae*) or *χορὸς προπομπῶν* (M here *χορὸς*) is best. How many persons of the procession sing, and which, the text does not show. A *scholium* here (*αι προπομποί*) makes the singers feminine, and apparently limits them to the attendants of *v.* 1025. But this proves at most only that the scene was at some time so performed, as it might be, though this does not appear to be the intention of the poet. The two bodies of singers in the *Agamemnon* (see the Introduction to that play) are both masculine. Those in the *Choephori* (if there are two, as I incline to believe) are one masculine, one feminine. But this does not affect the present question. Here

...do honour (?).

And let the fiery light set forth,—that so the good love of these, now joining themselves to Athens, may be seen henceforth in good to Athens' men.

(Here the procession begins to move, singing.)

The Escort. Pass on your way (?), exalted, rejoicing in worship, Daughters Unbegotten of Night, with escort heart-sincere,—
Good words, O ye of the land, for the sacred rite!

the natural supposition is, that every one on the scene, who could sing, did.—The metre is dactylic, and within each strophe (excluding the burdens) continuous.

1033. βᾶτε δόμῳ (Wellauer) has been generally read, and δόμῳ construed with βᾶτε: but such a use of the 'local dative' goes beyond any example cited. Nearest perhaps is Pind. *Ol.* 6. 58 Ἀλφείῳ μέσσω καταβάς, having descended right into *Alpheus' stream*; but even this is distinguishable. 'Go to your dwelling', not 'enter', seems to be demanded, but is not a legitimate rendering.—A conceivable alternative is to construe together δόμῳ μεγάλαι, 'mighty in' or 'exalted by your house', where 'house' would mean both *dwelling* and *family*. The *dwelling* is then not exactly the cave, but the underworld, the οἴκοι γῆς ὑπᾶι of *v.* 420, while the metaphorical sense *family* is developed in Νυκτὸς παῖδες: βᾶτε must be construed directly with γᾶς ὑπὸ κεύθεσιν. But I do not think this satisfactory.—Other suggestions are βᾶτε δόμον (Hermann), βᾶτ' ἐν ὀδῶ (Paley), βᾶτ' ὀδόν, ᾧ (Headlam *Class. Rev.* XIV. 201). I prefer the last.

1034. παῖδες ἀπαιδες: commonly interpreted 'children, but not young', with reference to *v.* 68 αἱ κατάπτυστοι κόραι, γράϊαι παλαιαὶ παῖδες. Mr Sidgwick objects justly, that the expression in this sense is not reverent. In *v.* 68 no reverence is intended, but the contrary. He proposes (following Donaldson) to omit ἀπαιδες, and equivalent syllables (τύχαι

τε) in *v.* 1039; but this is scarcely a legitimate solution. I believe the appellation to be mystical, and comparable to Νυκτὸς ἀλανῆ τέκνα, applied by the Erinyes to themselves in *v.* 419. *Eternal child* is, to common apprehension, a contradiction in terms, since a *child* must have a beginning; and it is in this sense that the goddesses are παῖδες, yet not παῖδες, children, but dateless and coeval with their mother. It should be noted that Aeschylus never gives them a father. We need hardly dwell upon or illustrate the importance of such formulae in the statement or adumbration of religious mysteries.

1035. εὐθύφρονι: literally 'straight-hearted', *i.e.* 'whole-hearted, sincere', welcome in which is no shadow of aversion or fear. That this should be changed to εὐφρονι (Burney and many others) is not probable, unless we are also to change the correlative εὐθύφρονες in *v.* 1041; and the double error is not easily explained. The scansion παῖδες ἀ-|παῖδες ὑπ' | εὐ-|θύφρονι | πομπῆ is perfectly natural, the note εὐ- being prolonged so as to fill a foot; see on *v.* 1041. The antistrophe (*v.* 1039) is too uncertain for inference.

1036. The burden (by another voice or voices) interrupts the sentence, commanding, in the usual form, abstention from any sounds of ill omen. Kirchhoff plausibly gives the burdens to the κῆρυξ.—χωρίται (Hermann), *i.e.* πολῖται, *fellow-countrymen*.

γᾶς ὑπὸ κεύθεσιν ὠγυγίοισιν ἀντ. α'.
 †καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ θυσίαις πε-
 ρισέπται τύχαι τε. †

εὐφραμεῖτε δὲ πανδαμί. 1040

ἴλαοι δὲ καὶ εὐθύφρονες γᾶ στρ. β'.
 δεῦρ' ἴτε, σεμναί, πυριδάπτω
 λαμπάδι τερπόμεναι καθ' ὄδον.

ὀλολύξατε νῦν ἐπὶ μολπαῖς.

σπονδαὶ δ' †ἐς τὸ πᾶν ἔνδαιδες † οἴκων ἀντ. β'.

Παλλάδος ἀστοίοισι Ζεὺς παντόπτας † 1046

οὕτω Μοῖρά τε συγκατέβα.

ὀλολύξατε νῦν ἐπὶ μολπαῖς.

1039. ζτ in margin.

1043. ὄδον | δ'.

1038, 1039: uncertain in the words, though the general sense is clear. The omission of the first *καὶ* (Hermann) is probable; but in *περισέπται τύχαι τε* the injury is beyond remedy, if only because it is first necessary, but impossible, to decide absolutely between *εὐθύφρονι* and *εὐφρονι* in *v.* 1035.

1041. *ἴλαοι...καὶ εὐθύφρονες*: *propitios* with all your hearts; see on *v.* 1035. I do not think it safe to alter *εὐθύφρονες*. As to the rhythm, it is perhaps better, though not necessary, to suppose a scansion in five feet, not in four: ἴλα-|οι δὲ καὶ | εὐθύφρον-|ες | γᾶ. The corrupt antistrophe gives no light.—Dr Headlam has suggested *εὐμενέες* (for *εὐθύφρονες*), making an allusion to the title *Εὐμενίδες* (which does not occur in the play as we have it; see the Introduction); so, in the next verse, we have an allusion to the title *Σεμναὶ Θεαί*. If *εὐθύφρονες* is to be changed, this correction has more point, and so far a better claim, than any other.

1042. *θεαί* (monosyllable) is inserted by Hartung and others, after *σεμναί*, to complete the metre, and *ξὺν* by Hermann and others. But, assuming the rhythm to be four dactylic feet, the scansion *δεῦρ' ἴτε | σεμ-|ναί πυρι-|δάπτω* is not necessarily

to be rejected. To insert *θεαί* would be, I think, extremely hazardous. The full title *Σεμναὶ Θεαί* is not now found in the play, nor is this likely to be accidental. The poet had good reason for caution and reticence on this point. See the Introduction. Without *θεαί*, the epithet *σεμναί* is not, properly speaking, a title, but an allusion to the title. The sense (we should observe) does not show any defect.

1043. *καθ' ὄδον δ'* (sic) M, assuming a full stop at *τερπόμεναι*, and attaching *καθ' ὄδον*, in construction, either to the burden or to *σπονδαὶ κ.τ.λ.* But the reading and construction *τερπόμεναι καθ' ὄδον* (Boissonade) are more probable.

1044. *ὀλολύξατε*: a call for the *ὀλολυγμός*, properly the sacred cheering cry of *the women*. The *ὀλολυγμός*, whatever it was, no doubt here followed.—*ἐπὶ*: 'let your cheers follow the song' seems to be the meaning, not 'tunefully' or 'in time' (*μολπηδόν*).

1045—1047 have been deeply injured. The letters *ἐνδαιδες* have no probable meaning: *ἐνδᾶδες*, as if from *δαῖς torch* (Linwood), is not an intelligible word. The sense should apparently be, 'Peace (*σπονδαί*) is made between all Athenians

—into the primeval caverns of earth, high-honoured with worship and sacrifice in a happy hour (?).

Good words, ye people all, for the sacred rite!

In kindness heart-sincere to our land, come, ye Venerable, this way, gladdened as ye go by the fire-feeding torch.

Cheer to the song, now cheer!

Peace is for ever, peace in the home (?), among the people of Pallas. Zeus All-seeing, and Moira, so assuredly have agreed.

Cheer to the song, now cheer!

Exeunt.

(including the goddesses) for ever'.—*εἰσοπιῶν* (Linwood) for *ἐς τὸ πᾶν* is possible, but must bear, as Dr Headlam observes, the sense *for the future, in future*. Accepting this, Dr Headlam would complete the verse by *ἐνδομετοικεῖν*: *a treaty is made (for us) to dwell henceforth as inmates with Pallas' citizens*. He would then give the words to the *principal* Chorus, the goddesses. Perhaps it is more probable, as generally supposed, that all belongs to the *προπομποί*. But neither words nor distribution can be determined.—*ἀστοῖς*: *Ζεὺς ὁ πανόπτας*

Musgrave, with probability.—*οὔτω...συνκατέβα*: *have so assuredly agreed*, *κατα* denoting permanence. Note that the union of Zeus and Moira (see *vv.* 726—731, 961—962, etc.) signifies that reconciliation of the younger and elder deities, the peace in heaven, which, as a type and guarantee of reconciliation and peace on earth, is the principal subject of the play.—The conventional subscription of the copyist in M, *Εὐμενίδες Αἰσχύλου . σὺν θεῷ τέλος*, is more than commonly appropriate.

APPENDIX I.

A.

v. 490. κρίνασα δ' ἀστῶν τῶν ἐμῶν τὰ βέλτατα....

THIS passage raises an interesting question of Athenian history and law. Athena, whose function in the trial corresponds generally to that of the *Archon Basileus*, on this occasion *selects* the jury. Was any such power exercised in fact by her antitype? There are reasons for supposing that it was.

(1) A *selection*, by one process or another, must necessarily be supposed. The Council of the Areopagus, in the time of Aeschylus, consisted and had long consisted of *past archons*, that is to say, all such persons were capable of sitting there, and for ordinary purposes probably sat (or were absent) according to their pleasure. But for judicial purposes, to try, for example, a particular case of murder, how was the bench composed? That all the members of the Council, or even any large proportion of them, were in every such case compelled to attend, is inconceivable. An Areopagite could then have had no other regular occupation, public or private, a hypothesis not requiring disproof. Equally inconceivable is it, that attendance in such cases was left to private inclination, with the inevitable result that the bench, in any case of importance, would consist mainly of just those members who were most unfit, namely those who had an interest in the criminal, while common motives of prudence and weakness would keep the rest away. The history of the criminal jurisdiction belonging to our House of Lords, in the case of felony committed by a peer, will sufficiently answer the question whether such a tribunal would have earned, as the Areopagus did, the peculiar respect and confidence of the people at large. It would have been, by the necessity of its formation, the worst court of justice imaginable. Nor is it likely that

the selection was by any process of chance, such as *rota*, or *lot*. The whole number of Areopagites, actually available for an ordinary case and at a given time, cannot have been large; all things considered, 100 will appear a full estimate. To take from this number *by chance* a bench even of 10 (and this, as we shall see hereafter, seems to have been the minimum) would have been to risk intolerable scandals. *Deliberate selection*, exercised by a respected official responsible and punishable for any abuse of his powers, is the method which reason and probability would suggest. So far as I can discover, there is no direct testimony on the subject, unless we find it in this passage of Aeschylus. The ordinary books of reference are silent upon the question, which does not appear to have been raised.

(2) The mere fact, that Aeschylus introduces a *deliberate selection*, seems to warrant the conclusion that, in his time at least, it was part of the procedure. It is plainly his intention to commend the tribunal as it actually existed. It would therefore have been against his purpose, and unnecessary, to introduce the choice of Athena into his picture, if actual practice had offered no parallel to it. If an actual Areopagite tribunal in his time had been formed of all the ex-archons available and willing, or of some, but selected by chance, it would have been easy and obvious to put something analogous into the play.

For these reasons, the procedure in Aeschylus may here be taken as supplying a gap in our information, and showing that, in his time at any rate, the actual jury at a particular trial was *selected* from among the Areopagites by the presiding magistrate, the Archon Basileus. See further on *v.* 687.

B.

v. 568, 569.

The place of the trial-scene, and the transition to this scene from the preceding.

Here is the most convenient place to discuss the question,—Where during the trial (*v.* 569 to the end) is the scene laid? And in particular, is it laid on the Areopagus? I hold the view,—which is assumed in the scholia, and was generally assumed (as by Paley) until recently, when the balance has been perhaps against it,—that the scene of the trial is laid on the Areopagus.

If we consider the trial-scene itself, the evidence for this view seems *prima facie* decisive.

For (1) Athena, in formally instituting the court (*vv.* 684—713), expressly directs that it shall sit on the Areopagus and implies that it is sitting there now. To understand her speech otherwise, as we find it, is by general admission impossible. The effect depends not upon any single phrase (as for example ‘*this Hill of Ares*’ in *v.* 688) which might, if necessary, be interpreted otherwise or corrected, but upon the whole gist and purport of the speech, which is to make the present occasion a *precedent for the sittings of the Areopagus*. If, in the important article of place, it was not to be a precedent, this exception should certainly be specified, and the reason explained; but no hint of this is found in the speech, or can be introduced into it by any moderate alteration. Accordingly the argument on this head, after some experiments, has been carried (by Wecklein) to its logical end, that the whole speech of Athena, as we have it, is out of its place and *not genuine*,—a corollary surely somewhat burdensome to the proposition with which it is connected.

And (2), from a time very near to that of Aeschylus, the belief, that Orestes was tried by and at the Areopagus, was established and familiar (Eurip. *Iph. T.* 961, etc.). This would indeed by no means prove that such was the representation of Aeschylus. But it does raise a presumption (which there is nothing, so far as I am aware, to rebut) that this view was already known and prevalent in his time, and that, if he had meant otherwise, he must have shown his dissent and his true intention,—just as he does state his peculiar and probably heterodox doctrine respecting the origin of the name ‘Areopagus’ (*vv.* 688 foll.). The absence therefore of any indication, that the place of his trial-scene is *not* the Areopagus, is in itself a strong ground, *prima facie*, for supposing that it is.

On the other hand, *if we assume that the place of the trial-scene is identical with that of the preceding scene, the arrival of Orestes at Athens* (*vv.* 235—568), it is difficult, if not impossible, to place the trial-scene on the Areopagus. The arrival-scene has but three marks of identification, an altar (ἑστία), a ‘house’ (δῶμα), and an ancient image (βρέτας) of Pallas (*v.* 79) or Athena (*vv.* 235—242, 446 foll.). These marks may perhaps leave more than one choice open to us (see on *v.* 79), but they seem to exclude the Areopagus. At least I am not aware that any evidence for a δῶμα and βρέτας of the goddess on the Areopagus has been, or can be, produced. The Areopagus then will be excluded for the trial-scene also, if, but only if, we must assume that, between the two scenes, there is no imaginary change of place.

How then is this latter assumption proved? It rests entirely upon

the manner in which the action is supposed to proceed between the departure of Athena (*v.* 492) and the opening of the trial (*v.* 569). It is supposed, that both the Chorus and Orestes remain on the scene throughout, Orestes 'in supplication', the Chorus performing their ode. In that case, the spectators certainly must infer, not only that the imaginary interval is very short, but that the parties to the trial (Orestes and the Erinyes) are found where they were left. By allowing this conception of the performance (Paley at *v.* 507), the case for the Areopagus as the place of the trial-scene, otherwise unimpeachable, becomes untenable, and the result is an apparent dead-lock.

But we have no authority for these stage-directions. No one is bound by the opinion of the person, unnamed and undated, who wrote the scholium to *v.* 493. And it is not supported by the text of Aeschylus. The directions given by Athena before her departure (*vv.* 488 foll.), that the parties are to 'summon their witnesses and evidence', so far from requiring that from this to the trial they are to remain *in loco*, would rather suggest or require that they should not. The manner in which the trial-scene opens is equally consistent (to say the least) with the supposition that Orestes and the Erinyes enter with Athena and the jury, as with the supposition that she here returns to them. Of Orestes' presence, after the departure of Athena, there is no trace. That the Chorus, after the ode, remain on the scene, the text neither asserts nor implies.

It does not indeed contain any march (in anapaests or the like) to accompany an exit; but such forms are not always found at the final exit of the play. See for example the *Suppliants* (of Aeschylus) and the *Persians*. Nor is there any such accompaniment in the only *certain* examples now extant, of an 'empty stage' within the play (Soph. *Ai.* 814, Eur. *Helena* 385). In the *Ajax* the Chorus apparently make their exit without accompaniment; in the *Helena*, and in the case before us, we should rather perhaps suppose an accompaniment of music. The cases in the *Choephoroi*, where the departure is disputable, need not here be discussed; but if, as I think probable, the Chorus of that play (the principal Chorus) leaves the scene, with the actors, at *v.* 582 (see my edition), and the secondary Chorus at *v.* 714, they do so without any other provision than the natural requirements of the situation. These, in the case before us, are provided by the directions of Athena above cited (*vv.* 488 foll.). That these directions have *not* their natural effect, and that the Chorus, after the ode, remain on the scene, the text, let us repeat, neither asserts nor implies.

Suppose that they do not remain, but on the contrary go away, to

prepare for the hearing, as Athena directs. The difficulty then vanishes. The scene is then empty at *v.* 568, and a change of place as easily made here as at *v.* 234. There is thus opportunity here for changing the theatrical properties, the arrangements exhibited. Some such change, some preparation for the trial, if only the placing of seats for the court, it seems necessary to suppose; and, without an 'empty stage', no change could be made conveniently. Moreover, a point of scarcely less importance, we need no longer suppose (what is not convenient to suppose) that the imaginary interval, between the second scene and the scene of the trial, is very brief. It becomes indefinite. According to legend, Orestes was in Athens for some little time before the actual trial (*Eur. Iph. Taur.* 947 foll.); and according to the *Eumenides* itself, there are things to be done (besides the selection of the jury, which ought not to be precipitate) before the court actually assembles,—for example, the formal oath to be taken by the jurors (*v.* 683), and other matters, which Athenian practice would suggest, but which the poet naturally leaves in obscurity. Among these suppressed details he has included, not injudiciously, the selection of the Areopagus as the place of trial, relying upon a presumption that the audience, left to themselves, would ask no reason for the selection. Such a reason Aeschylus (see on *v.* 688 foll.) may not have been ready to give.

We conclude therefore, that the trial-scene is laid, as it appears to be, on the Areopagus; and further, that the stage-directions given by the schol. to *v.* 493 are wrong; that Orestes here goes out, under the protection of Athena, 'as for the city', and that the Chorus, after venting their indignation, also go out. The scene is then for a short time empty, as at *v.* 234, and at the points where the place of action is changed in the *Choephori* and in the *Ajax* of Sophocles. The imaginary interval so indicated we make as long as we think convenient (the choric ode itself would be sufficient for this, though not for the change of place), and fill with whatever proceedings we think likely to occur before the actual hearing. The Areopagite procession then enters, with Orestes and the Erinyes as part of it, and we transfer ourselves (in imagination) to the Areopagus as a matter of course.

As a matter of taste and effect, a break and pause, between the solemn climax of the ode and the pomp and stir of the procession, seems advantageous, if not indispensable. What Aeschylus needed here, and often, was a curtain; not having it, he has used his best though inadequate substitute—an empty stage.

So far I had written, and printed, before the appearance of Prof. Ridgeway's discussion of the question in the *Classical Review* (September, 1907, vol. XXI. p. 163). Prof. Ridgeway follows recent views in laying both scenes, the arrival of Orestes and the trial, at the same place. But this place, by an entirely new departure, he takes to be that of the ancient murder-court known as ἐπι Παλλαδίου.

His elaborate and interesting argument should be read *in extenso*. I must here be content to state briefly the impression made upon my own mind. As I have already said in the note to *vv.* 79, 80, inserted upon an incomplete report of Prof. Ridgeway's suggestion, I see no defect in it, and much advantage, so far as concerns the scene of the arrival. To remove this from the Acropolis, the place hitherto supposed, is highly desirable; and the place suggested by Prof. Ridgeway must have satisfied, certainly or probably, all the very meagre requirements of the Aeschylean text, so far as concerns this scene.

As to the trial-scene, I am still of the opinion above expressed. The foundation-speech of Athena (*vv.* 684 foll.) conveys, and must be intended to convey, the impression, that it is spoken on the Areopagus. This point however cannot with any advantage be debated. Each reader must consider for himself, whether that is in fact the impression which he receives.

But even as to the trial-scene, though I cannot follow Prof. Ridgeway altogether, I find in his statement-fresh light upon the scenic treatment adopted by Aeschylus. In this treatment, whatever conclusions we base upon it, the most obvious and remarkable fact is the extreme meagreness of the place-indications, the severe and manifestly intentional abstinence from what we call 'local colour'.

Prof. Ridgeway notes, quite truly, the absence, in the trial-scene, of any reference to the familiar characteristics of the court on the Areopagus, either in the text or in theatrical arrangements implied by the text. The 'rock-altar' (πέτρα) of *v.* 693, if we allow it for an exception, is the only one. But the remark is equally applicable to the scene, wherever we place it, and applicable with even more force to the play as a whole. Nowhere does the play exhibit descriptive touches of any sort. The sanctuary of the *Semnai Theai*, for instance, which plays so prominent a part in the *finale*, is neither pictured nor even placed. If our evidence were confined to the play, we could not guess where the sanctuary was, or in what relation it stood to the place or places where the actions pass.

Now for this abstinence and reticence on the part of the author there may have been more than one reason. Inadequacy of spectacular

machinery would be one. Another may be found in the symbolic aspect of the story, of which, after all, the true subject is not so much the justice of Athens, as justice itself. From this point of view, it might seem not desirable, even had it been practicable, to insist upon local detail. But it is at least possible that, together with these reasons for vagueness or slightness of description, we should reckon that of uncertainty or conflict in local traditions. The Areopagus, we may say with confidence, was certainly one, and the most famous, of the places in Athens which then laid claim to the trial of Orestes. But it need not have been the only one. It is quite possible that the court ἐπὶ Παλλαδίῃ had pretensions, and even other places of ancient jurisdiction also. This we might say or admit, without regard to the special character of Orestes' case, or the question, to which of the courts it should have fallen according to the traditional division of competence; for we need not assume that this division was always so established and universally recognised, that no legend could conceivably ignore it.

Now if such uncertainty or conflict existed, assuredly Aeschylus had a motive for not committing himself to a decision any further than he must, and for leaving the question of localities, as far as possible, open. His play, by its very essence, involved him in so many and such vital contradictions of authority and prejudice, that he might well decline any which were avoidable. It seems to me not at all improbable, after the observations of Prof. Ridgeway, that *according to some*, the court ἐπὶ Παλλαδίῃ had the honour of the whole story; and that in this way partly we should explain not only the place-indications, such as they are, of the arrival-scene, but the vagueness, which undoubtedly obscures, at the moment, the transition from this scene to that of the trial on the Areopagus.

APPENDIX II.

ON THE CHORIC METRES.

1. *Strophe and Antistrophe.*

In strophic correspondence, the *Eumenides* exhibits the same phenomena as the other plays of the trilogy (see Appendix II. to my editions of the *Agamemnon* and the *Choephori* respectively). The responsion is generally syllabic; but occasionally, less often in proportion than in the *Agamemnon*, such variations are permitted, as are consistent with the preservation of the rhythm. Thus :

{ 157. μεσολα- | βει κεν- | τρω
 { 164. φονολι- | βη θρο- | νον.

The 'unnatural' long syllable answers, in the place without stress, to a short; this is not uncommon.

{ 172. παρα νομον θεων
 { 177. ποτιτρόπαιος δ'ων.

Similar, if correct; but ποτιτρόπαιος ὧν δ' (Porson) may be right.

173. πα- | λαιγε- | νεις δε | Μοι- | ρας φθι- | σας


 178. μι- | αστορ | εκ κεί- | νου | πασε- | ται



ἐκείνου (M) is impossible; for ἐκ κείνου see note *ad loc.* The metre offers no difficulty.

353. παλλεῦ- | κων δε πεπ- | λων ∪ ∪ | - ∪ α- | μοιρος α- |


 365. Zeus γαρ | αιματ- | οσταγες | αξιο- | μισον εθν- |


The apparent lacuna in *v.* 353, though it leaves some doubt of the reading, does not affect the presumption that the first two feet of the respective verses are given correctly. The slight modification of the rhythm in *v.* 365, tending to throw a stress upon the word *Ζεύς*, and sharpening the beat, is effective, and should be accepted.

In *v.* 390 ἀνῆλψ λάμπρα, if correct, would answer to *v.* 398 ἀτιμίας κυρῶ, as it well might. But probability (see note) favours λάμπρα.

In *v.* 495 -σει δίκαια καὶ βλάβαι () is, in my opinion, admissible as a resposion to *v.* 504

-ψει κότος τις ἐργμάτων ().

But considering the alternation of rhythms in *vv.* 493—496 and *vv.* 502—505, we should perhaps accept δίκαια τε καὶ (Heath). The τε is not otiose or objectionable here, as it is in some places, where it has been similarly introduced.

In *vv.* 514, 515, M gives ἰώ as a monosyllable, assuming that the pronunciation of the ι is practically consonantal (γ). It is not safe to substitute ῶ.

{ 517. η τεκ- | ουσαι | νεοπαθ- | ης
 { 526. καρδι- | αν αν- | ατρεφ- | ων

offers, if we assume the archaic (epic) lengthening of the second syllable in ἀνατρέφων, only a common example of the so-called 'resolution of the long syllable' (υ υ = -). This is preferable to the insertion of ἄν before ἀνατρέφων, as if anticipating the subsequent ἄν σέβοι, which, though grammatically justifiable, has an unpleasant and feeble effect here, the first ἄν being improperly placed. The scansion καρδι- | αν | ανατρεφ- | ων is also possible.

{ 529. μητ αν- | αρκ- | τον βι- | ον
 { 541. ες το | παν δε | σοι λε- | γω.

See above on *v.* 495: ἀνάρχετον (Wieseler) is possibly right, but not demonstrably. See also on *v.* 539 and *v.* 959.

{ 539. φρεν- | ων ο | πα- | σιν φι- | λος

 { 551. | δωματ- | ων ε- | πιστρο- | φας


So these verses correspond, if the reading is right. The 'anacrusis' (φρεν-) in *v.* 539 is either an irregularity or, more probably, belongs to the previous bar—εκ δ υγι- | ει- | ας φρεν- |



answering to 550 και ξενο- | τι- | μους.

If this example stood alone, it would be obvious to restore syllabic correspondence by reading ἐπιστροφᾶς δωμάτων (Heath). But in view of *v.* 959 and other like cases, where such restoration cannot easily be effected, it is not certain here.

In *v.* 553 ἐκ τῶνδ' and *v.* 561 καλεῖ the correspondence of long and short is simple, such an 'anacrusis' being in all metres and poets treated as common. The conjecture ἐκὼν (Wieseler) must stand, if at all, on other grounds; see note *ad loc.*

In *v.* 568 ᾄστος, so pronounced, gives syllabic correspondence with *v.* 560, ᾄστος rhythmical correspondence only. The MS. (ᾄστος) is doubtless of no authority on the point, but ᾄστος seems preferable in itself. The effect of the termination ἄκλαυστος ᾄστος is surely less fine, if the latter word be contracted.

{926. γαι- | ασ εξ- | αμβρο- | σαι (?)
 {948. πλου- | τοχθων | ερμαι- | αν

This, if correct, may be explained by the correspondence of an 'unnatural' long to a short. But the reading ἐξαμβρόσαι is improbable (see note), and, on the other hand, the second syllable of ἐρμαίαν might be abbreviated.

{959. νε- | ανιδ- | ων τ επ- | ηρα- | τωv
 {979. | ταδ επ- | ευχο- | μαι βρε- | μειv

An interesting case. There is no sign of clerical error, and no probable way of restoring exact correspondence has been proposed. It is conceivable, but unlikely, that the first two syllables of νεανίδων are to be contracted to one. But see above on *vv.* 539—551. It is not scientifically legitimate to remove such exceptions now by one expedient and again by another. Nor do they offer real difficulty. Either the 'anacrusis' of *v.* 959 is a (not unnatural) irregularity, or it belongs musically to the last bar of the preceding verse, thus:

ανδρο- | κμη- | τας δ α- | ω- || ρους απ- | εννεπ- | ω τυχ- | ασ νε- || ανιδ- | ων
 τον δ α- | πληστ- | ον κακ- | ων || μηποτ | εν πολ- | ει στα- | σιν || ταδ επ- | ευχ-

I prefer the latter supposition.

2. *On the choric parts generally, and some passages in particular.*

The choric portions of the *Eumenides* may be safely pronounced, as a whole, the finest specimens of the art, as applied to drama, which exist. Aeschylus has on this occasion secured the exceedingly rare advantage of a situation and characters really and naturally suited to the form of a dramatic chorus. Such a chorus, with all its artistic merits, is, in most cases, a purely artificial creation. The Elders of the *Agamemnon* are not, in their dramatic function as characters in the story, a body of persons to which choric performance, symmetrical action and chanting, is appropriate. The Maidservants of the *Choephoroi*, except (an important exception) when they are performing religious rites, are still less such a body. And generally speaking, in Greek tragedy, the choric type is plainly imposed on the body of *choreutae* by convention, and for a theatrical purpose. It does not arise naturally out of the story. Out of a merely human story, without supernatural elements, it is hardly possible (Racine's *Athalie* and a few other cases forbid us to make the statement universal) that a chorus should naturally arise. No doubt the convention is easily understood and accepted; but a convention, a technical requirement, it is, and, so far, disadvantageous. But in the *Eumenides*, the choric form is so suitable as to be almost a necessity; the Erinyes could hardly have been put on the stage in any other way; there is dramatic, and not merely theatrical, reason why such personages should act not altogether as a collection of human beings might do, and their choric function serves only to keep them at a sufficient distance from familiarity and commonplace. Yet on the other hand they can without inconvenience quit it and mix in the general action. The shade of the grotesque which properly belongs to them makes a free treatment safe. They are dignified enough to perform properly as a chorus, and not too dignified to perform otherwise. There is perhaps no other instance of an adaptation so perfect. The Ocean-nymphs in the *Prometheus* may be equally convenient as a choir of singers, but they offer little dramatic opportunity, and could hardly have been fitted to a play presenting ordinary conditions. In the *Eumenides*, Aeschylus has used to the full the opportunity which he had thus created. Elsewhere the tragic Chorus exhibits perhaps not less majesty, but nowhere else does it exhibit such a union of majesty and vigour.

The effects, though bold, are in general not complicated. We miss undoubtedly much, especially in movement and gesture, which was

important ; and even the rhythm, when it is to be inferred from nothing but the words, must often be doubtful ; but on the whole there is no serious difficulty. A few suggestions may be serviceable ; but they are put forward as suggestions merely, which the reader will adopt or modify according to his own knowledge or taste.

The principal *Parodos* or entry (*vv.* 140—178) is composed of rapid iambic senarii, several of which (140, 142, 155, 162) are purely iambic, the agitated dochmius with 'resolved syllable' (ε- | παθο- | μεν πα- | θος), and other allied forms. Most remarkable is the second *strophe* and *antistrophe*, in which fury and impatience are represented with extraordinary force :

ε- | μοι δ ονειδος | εξ ονειρατ- | ων μολον
 ε- | τυψ- | εν δικ- | αν διφρ- | ηλατ- | ου
 μεσολαβ- | ει κεν- | τρω | υπ-
 ο φρενας | υπο λο- | βον | παρ-
 εστι μασ- | τικτορος | δαϊου | δαμιον | ... βα-
 ρυ το πε- | ριβαρν | κρυος εχ- | ειν

The startling dexterity of the final rattle, with its quadruple ρ and other effects, will be best appreciated if the reader will try to make a second. Aeschylus himself could not make a perfect pair to it, though the antistrophic βλο- | συρον α- | ρομενον | αγος εχ- | ειν is very admirable.

The other *strophæ* are similar. The effect of ἐκ κείνου in *v.* 178, the reading for which the ms. evidence is almost conclusive, is undoubtedly that the close has a slackened rhythm, but this may well be intended. The singers are interrupted (by the entrance of Apollo) and the song should naturally die away.

The lyric part of the second *Parodos* (*vv.* 253—275) has similar rhythms, but, as the situation requires, drops the more violent types, and has not the strophic structure. Worth note is the way in which,

by suitable treatment, the metrical elements, the iambics and dochmius, are brought gradually up to the stateliness of

μέγας γὰρ Ἄιδης ἐστὶν εὐθύνος βροτῶν
 ἔνερθε χθονός,
 δελτογράφῳ δὲ πάντ' ἐπωπῆ φρενί,

preparing us for the tremendous *δέσμιος ὕμνος* which presently follows.

This (*v.* 322—399) for the most part cannot be mistaken. The first pair of *strophæe* (*v.* 322—328, 335—341) has a little, the fourth pair a very little, of the urgency marked in the *Parodoi*, altered however (one would suppose) by a much slower time :

v. 325



The second and third pairs are purely solemn :



and the like. Here, and elsewhere, a 4-time is also possible.

But most astonishing are the *ephymnia*, or repeated burdens, which with rhythms wild, strange, vigorously contrasted, and yet majestic too, break into the majesty of the rolling chant, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ τεθυμένῳ κ.τ.λ. (*v.* 329), ἀνατροπᾶς ὅταν Ἄρης κ.τ.λ. (*v.* 356), μάλα γὰρ οὖν ἀλομένα κ.τ.λ. (*v.* 374). It is not uncommon to hear these recited with a choriambic movement (— ∪ ∪ —) or something near it :



and so on. But this of course is not correct. Rather the rhythm is something like this, a drum-beat rhythm, with the principal stroke on the *second* bar, the *fourth*, and so on :



υμνος | ἐξ Ἐρ- | ινυ- | ων || δεσμ- | ος φρεν- | ων α- | φορ- |
 μικτος | αυον- | α βροτ- | οis

The first three lines would be given *staccato* and *crescendo*, the fourth slower, with the ordinary movement and time of the ode, and the fifth slower still. The crashing effect (see note *ad loc.*), imparted by the sound and sense of ἀδονά, suggests that the word should be extended, the first and third syllables being long sustained¹.

The second *epithymium* (vv. 356—360) is supposed by many to be corrupt, but this is not clear. The words and meaning are considered in the commentary. The rhythm is no doubt very unusual and irregular; but, if regard be had to the sense and circumstances, it admits an appropriate interpretation:

cresc.
 ανατροπ- | ας | οταν Δρ- | ης
 τιθασος | ων | φιλον ελ- | η (pause)
p. cresc. e accel.
 ἐπι τον | ω | διομεν- | αι
ff.
 κρατερον | ονθ ο- | μοι- | ως | μαυρ- |
rall. e dim.
 -ουμεν υφ | αι ματ- | ος νε- | ου ||

This, the straightforward rendering, is plainly possible, and the transition, by which (in the words *κρατερόν... νέου*) the drum-beat rhythm of the commencement swings into the stately roll of the *strophe*, though weird, is surely not ineffective.

Finer still is the third burden (vv. 374—378). As in the other two, we begin with the drum-beat and return to the general movement, but with a new and startling device:

cresc. e accel.
 μαλα γαρ | ονν | αλομεν- | α

¹ The assumption that for *φρενοδάλης* (if this is the word and the quantity) we require the quantities ~ ~ ~ (φρενομανής, φρενοπλανής or the like) does not seem to be justified by musical considerations. The reading however is not certain.

f.



 ανεκαθ- | εν | βαρυπεσ- | η




 καταφερ- | ω | ποδος ακμ- | αν

tempo mf.



 σφαλερα | τανυδρομ- | οισ | κωλα

f. rallent.



 δυσφορον | α- | ταν ||

It is usual to insert *καὶ* between *σφαλερὰ* and *τανυδρόμοις*, so as to maintain the rhythm of the commencement; but this is not necessary, nor does it seem to be a clear improvement.

The *Second Stasimon* (*vv.* 493—568) begins in sharp agitation, and the close, though solemn, is stormy. The last pair of *strophæe* (*vv.* 552—568) manifestly invite variety of treatment, with pauses, changes of time, and other such devices, which however each must imagine as he thinks best.

We need not discuss the musical aspect of the pieces in recitative, each repeated, in which the Erinyes give vent to their fury after the acquittal (*vv.* 781 foll., 840 foll.). Here rhythm and speech are alike in confusion, tossed between different voices, broken, entangled, elaborately lawless. The commentary on the words will sufficiently indicate what sort of music we should naturally assume; but no precise conclusion is possible. The most striking point perhaps is the re-appearance, in a new application, of the rapid triplets which are so marked a feature in this play (*v.* 788 *πέδον ἐπισύμενος*). Naturally such passages offer temptation to the corrector, and in some places, *e.g.*

v. 846 *τίς μ' ὑποδύεται*
τίς ὀδύνα πλευράς; (Hermann),

a little more regularity can be made by plausible conjecture. But the gain is doubtful.

For opposite reasons, nothing need be said upon the hymns of the *finale*. They appeal directly to the simplest and most universal instincts. of rhythmical beauty, and seem almost to make their own music.

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